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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation considers how modem science fiction (SF) has continually employed 
elements of European folk narrative to explore subaltern and subterranean culture-
meaning, both the politically disenfranchised and biologically deformed figures who 
threaten to emerge from their underground habitations and infiltrate the most cherished 
institutions of the upper world. According to legends deriving from England, Wales, 
Cornwall, Scotland, Ireland, and Scandinavia, it was common practice for the fairies, also 
called the "Good People" or the "little people," to abduct human children and leave 
withered and cantankerous fairies, known as "changelings," in their place. I argue that the 
changeling emerges as a "conceptual persona" in the nineteenth century when folklorists 
and scientists alike began to interpret changeling tales as unsophisticated diagnoses of 
congenital diseases-before the medical lexicon of "congenital malformation" was even 
available. The changeling provided the absent lexicon, which was specifically adopted by 
Victorian British society as an explanation of insubordinate behaviour among children, 
women, the lower classes, and the non-white races. My five chapters discuss the figure of 
the fairy changeling as it appears in British and other European legends and as it is 
adapted in several SF novels of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To 
begin, I suggest that these European folk legends describe a "fairy economy," in which 
two species engage in various forms oftrade and exchange (Chapter 1). Through detailed 
readings of such folktales as "The Fairy Wife" and "The Speckled Bull" and such legends 
as "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "Johnnie in the Cradle," I argue that the 
changeling enunciates a particular set of issues that surface in the Victorian period, 
concerning childcare, reproduction, cross-cultural and cross-species relations, and 
hybridity, and which are further explored in the realm of modem SF. Both Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein and Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
re-imagine the changeling as a representative of the lower-class mob, the atavistic 
criminal population, and the Gothic underworld (Chapter 2). Shelley's and Stevenson's 
monsters are also clearly prototypical SF creations, related as they are to early 
speculations on the biologically engineered human. In both The Time Machine and The 
Island of Dr. Moreau, H. G. Wells modifies these gothic/scientific fictions and their 
folkloric antecedents by exploring, on the one hand, the future devolution of the species 
into a two-nation world consisting of fey-like "little people" and monstrous underlings 
and, on the other hand, a near future hybridization of the species through the radical 
vivisection ofvarious animal types (Chapter 3). Wells's two works present vivid attempts 
to conceptualize a "symbiotic" community, clearly hinted at in the legends involving 
human-fairy interactions. As I argue through these first three chapters, the changeling 
narrative presents a fictional narrative that explores human origins through the interaction 
and exchange with a nonhuman species. Viewed through the lens of SF, the changeling 
legend conceptualizes species evolution and speculates on the utopian possibilities of 
cross-breeding cultures and species. Providing an Eastern European perspective, Karel 
Capek explores the folkloric-cum-evolutionary notions ofhybridity and symbiosis, first, 
in R. U R., a craftily disguised melodrama about artificially grown workers called 
"Robots" and, second, in War with the Newts, a satirical scientific parable about 
salamanders conditioned and bred to function as a labour force (Chapter 4). In both 
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scenarios, the engineered entities possess the "changeling" instinct to infiltrate and 
undermine human authority but also present the nightmarish results of co-opting monsters 
for profit and war. Olaf Stapledon develops this twentieth-century folkloric-cum-
evolutionary exploration, first, in two "cosmological" fictions, Last and First Men and 
Star Maker, which contemplate the future development of the human species and the 
potential function of symbiotic communities. Adapting these original far- future visions, 
Odd John and Sirius return us to the quaint environment of folk narrative, conceptualizing 
new changelings in the form of a mutant superman and a hybrid man-dog. Together, 
Stapledon' s "composite" fictional world testifies to the resilience of the folkloric tradition 
and the religious or supernatural fascination with the fearful symmetry of the human 
organism. Such science-fictional speculations enable us to discover that legends contain 
within them subversive undercurrents associated with both a rural underclass as well as a 
"little folk" driven underground by colonization and industrialization. From this 
perspective, there are some fascinating intersections between folklore and SF, including 
the crossover between the "alien" and the "fairy," the abduction motif itself, and the 
cultural significance of physical metamorphosis as it is consistently presented in 
changeling narratives and in "alien encounter" SF. 
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Introduction-The Convergence of"New and Alien Racial Groups": The Changeling in 
Folk Narrative and Modem Science Fiction 
As science-fiction author and critic Brian Aldiss has argued, if the "Alien" is "the 
essential American obsession," the "'submerged-nation' theme" is the essential "British 
obsession" (Billion Year Spree: The History of Science Fiction 132). While Aldiss 
associates this theme with the fantastic fictions of Lewis Carroll, S. Fowler Wright, and 
John Wyndham, the "submerged nation" also has its source in the dark and subterranean 
realm of the fairies as depicted in British folk legend. If there was, as Walter Houghton 
argued back in the 1950s, a discernible "Victorian frame ofmind," 1 it was surely 
dominated by a literary fascination with fairy lore, as evidenced in some of the major 
literary works of the period: William Allingham's "The Fairies" and Christina Rossetti's 
"Goblin Market," Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights and Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre, 
Charles Dickens's The Old Curiosity Shop and Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange 
Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. As Carole Silver elaborates: 
The Victorian study of fairy lore acts as an excellent reflector ofboth the 
dominant ideas and the concealed anxieties of the era. The specific areas and 
problems in fairy faith and fairy lore that preoccupied Victorian folklorists and 
believers are revelations of social and cultural concerns perhaps shown elsewhere, 
but never in such sharp relief. Concerns about change and growth in children, 
about the status of women in marriage and divorce, about the discovery of new 
and alien racial groups, and about the sources of evil, occult and natural, are all 
revealed in the lore the Victorians chose to emphasize and how they "read" and 
used it. (57) 
There is much to suggest that fairies functioned for the Victorian fantasy, gothic, or realist 
writer in much the same way as aliens would for twentieth-century American SF authors: 
as metaphors, if not analogies, for outsiders and the subversive elements in society. Like 
1 See Walter E. Houghton's The Vzctorzan Frame ofMznd, 1830-1870. 
aliens, fairies operate as vehicles of social criticism and, more crucially, as estranging 
parallels to the humans that supposedly inhabit the same geographical space. 
This dissertation broadly considers how modem SF has continually employed 
elements ofWestem European folk narrative to explore subaltern and subterranean 
culture-meaning, both the politically disenfranchised and biologically deformed figures 
who threaten to emerge from their underground lairs (caverns, cellar dwellings, 
laboratories, industrial underworlds) and infiltrate the most cherished institutions of the 
upper world. While Chapter 1 concerns the larger context of folk narrative, individual 
forms like the legend and the folktale, and the particular importance of the fairy 
changeling in British Victorian culture, subsequent chapters focus on the science-fictional 
exploration of the terrain of Western European legend in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Chapter 2 considers Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus 
(1818) and Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
(1886), each of which anticipate the "generic idea [of science fiction] that did not come 
into being until well after [they were] written" (Rose 5). Chapter 3 then considers H. G. 
Wells's The Time Machine (1895) and The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896), which, along 
with his other scientific romances ofthe 1890s, helped to create a "mental location" for 
what would come to be called "science fiction" (Rose 6-7). Chapter 4 concerns the Czech 
author Karel Capek whose R. U R. (Rossum 's Universal Robots, 1920) and War with the 
Newts (1936) constitute vital contributions to a genre-"science fiction"-that was 
relatively new. Finally, Chapter 5 considers British author Olaf Stapledon whose Last and 
First Men (1930), Star Maker (1937), Odd John (1935), and Sirius (1944) collectively 
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influenced the generation of science-fiction authors that included Robert A. Heinlein, 
Arthur C. Clarke, and Isaac Asimov. 
While this study focuses largely on the "Victorian" context of fairylore and the 
"British" dissemination of utopian/SF texts that derive from the folk legend tradition, it 
also broadens its view to consider the wider European interest in the residual significance 
of folk traditions in modem society. Indeed, the specific legends I discuss in Chapter 1 
("The Caerlaverock Changeling," among others) are known internationally, while a 
number of specific texts by British authors (Frankenstein, The Island of Dr. Moreau, Last 
and First Men, and Star Maker) are set in places outside of England or, indeed, beyond 
our blue planet, Earth. Additionally, Chapter 4 presents an Eastern European perspective, 
while the Conclusion considers two representative American authors. Moreover, the 
larger goal of this project is to 1) begin with a study of British preoccupations with fairy 
legend and then 2) consider the further development of similar folk motifs in other 
cultures and societies. 
If Chapters 2 through 5 track the early development of science fiction, they also 
demonstrate the crucial ways in which additional genres like the folk legend and folktale 
contributed to the creation of the novel worlds that functioned as defamiliarizing parallels 
to the actual worlds in which the writers composed their works. The important discovery 
of the relationship between SF and folk narrative forces us to reconsider the accepted 
distinction between "fantasy" and "reality" and, specifically, the degree to which these 
generic forms challenge the "stability" and "present order of things" (Rose 21). 
In his classic study, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, 
Tzvetan Todorov argues that the "fantastic" requires a hesitation on the reader's part 
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between "total faith" and "total incredulity" (31 ); in this sense, the fantastic "is defined by 
the reader's own ambiguous perception of the events narrated" (31 ). In such a scenario, 
where s/he has become integrated into the fiction-making process, the reader considers 
the world of characters presented in the fiction as a world of living persons, and hesitates 
between natural and supernatural explanations (33). As we will see, both folk narrative 
and SF are concerned with this tension between fantasy and reality, and each genre 
involves the creation of imaginary worlds, some of these corresponding analogously to 
the "real" or empirical world. But before we continue on with this comparative 
investigation, it is important to note that "folk narrative" itself generally consists of two 
basic oral forms-the legend and the folktale-and that each has a different relation to 
"reality." According to Jacob Grimm, whereas the folktale draws "freely out of the 
fullness of poetry," the legend "has almost the authority of history" (qtd. in Degh 72). 
Lutz Rohrich elaborates on this distinction in the following way: 
Legendary figures belong to a real otherworld; folktale figures have become part 
of a fantasy world and are no longer truly 'demonic,' and therefore not truly 
'otherworldly' in the same sense as the legend. 
[ ... ] 
The legend lives in two worlds; the tension between them becomes life-
threatening for humans. (23-24; original emphasis) 
There is something more "local" and "homelike" about the legend (Jacob Grimm, 
qtd. in Degh 72), even if the supernatural does intrude on the domestic realm from time to 
time. But, then, that is the point: in the legend, the supernatural intrudes on and perhaps 
comes to dominate the mundane human world, whereas in the folktale, the supernatural 
has been almost domesticated. We might add that the legend enables us to see the 
transformation that has already taken place before the folktale begins. In other words, it is 
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almost as if the legend and the folktale exist as part of the same sequence, with the legend 
functioning as the explanatory text of the folktale: this is how that fantastical world came 
to be. Moreover, these apparent distinctions at the same time reveal the important link 
between the two folk narratives: in regards to Jacob Grimm's distinction between poetry 
and history, Linda Degh argues that the two forms "correspond to primary attitudes in 
human culture and by their very nature merge and blend into each other" (59). Rohrich, 
too, admits that the distinctions do not really constitute hard and fast rules: "the same 
narrative text can be a believed 'legend' for one person and a fabled folktale for another" 
(10). Chapter 1 offers examples ofboth forms, and while I give preference to the legend, 
since the changeling seems to appear most often in this form, I also argue that the two 
forms frequently share a common interest in the "unknown" elements that constantly 
change the shape of mundane human existence. Both sorts of folk narrative can be poetic 
and historical simultaneously, depending on how readers interpret the text or tale placed 
before them. The two folk forms could then be viewed as part of a composite genre, "folk 
narrative," which contains supernatural and historical ingredients. If the folktale bears a 
general formal resemblance to other fictional narratives, particularly the romance, and if 
its interest in the creation of imaginary worlds draws parallels to the genre of fantasy, the 
folk legend's closer allegiance to an empirical horizon, in which the miraculous intrudes 
upon and exists in tension with the human world (Rohrich 23), anticipates the genre of 
science fiction. 
Most critics of the genre insist that SF is, or at least should be, distinguished from 
other forms of fantastic literature, such as myth, folklore, and horror. Darko Suvin, 
perhaps the most influential contemporary theorist of the genre, argues that SF is 
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determined by a "common denominator the presence of which is logically necessary and 
which has to be hegemonic in a narration in order that we call it an SF narration" 
(Metamorphoses of Science Fiction 63). For Suvin, this common feature is the "novum" 
(a term he borrows from Ernst Bloch), which is a "cognitive innovation" that deviates in 
some way "from the author's and implied reader's norm of reality" (63-64). Suvin further 
stresses that, in SF, the author's environment should be "identifiable" from the text's 
formal structure; for this reason, he maintains, SF is an "historical genre" (64; original 
emphasis). SF's historicity specifically derives from its fictional exploration of 
innovations (gadgets, techniques, technological inventions, new relationships) that are 
plausible in the given society. For the reason that this relationship between a novum and 
an empirical environment weds together "science" or "critique" and "fiction," Suvin 
designates SF as the "literature of cognitive estrangement" (4, 7-8). The narrative 
dominance of the verifiable novum does not, at least as a rule, operate in folk narrative 
and especially in the folktale: Suvin is, in fact, very forthright about proving such a point 
(8). There is neither a distinct historical context nor a distinct scientific/technological 
novum identified in these originally oral forms, which frequently have no identifiable 
author and no date of composition. Our comparative task is complicated further by the 
very fact that the "novum" itself-as defined by Suvin-is "postulated on and validated 
by the post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific method" (64-65; original emphasis). 
While it would be presumptuous to assume that science or philosophy could not have 
come into play in the composition of a particular folk narrative, it would be very difficult 
to prove that the opposite is true. SF, on the other hand, is written out of a specific 
historical context, which places the narration in a dynamic relation with a specific 
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scientifically informed audience; for example, the content in The Time Machine dealing 
with the theory of the fourth dimension indicates a very specific and dominant novum that 
was popular in both scientific and non-scientific forums in Wells's day. The powerful 
impact of such a narrative is that it has the ability to engage with and critique current 
scientific progress, so that, to use the example ofWells again, "science is no longer, as it 
was for Verne, the bright noonday certainty ofNewtonian physics" (Suvin, 
Metamorphoses 21 0). In this instance, of course, SF can be distinguished from folk 
narrative since its themes derive from very specific historical trends that often do not 
concern folk artists or storytellers. 
All the same, I would reiterate that SF-as defined here by Suvin-depends on a 
fundamental "critique" that is inherent in any exploration of the unknown. While folk 
narrative is not the same as history, it can participate in such a critique "by providing that 
extremely important undercurrent of human thought, feeling, and expression" that history 
often ignores in its focus on dates and national events (Toelken 350-51); SF and other 
fictional forms stand out for exactly the same reason. While "myth" and the folk genres I 
am specifically concerned with may not express an explicit engagement with identifiable 
technological innovations, their investigation of the elements "beneath [ ... ] the empiric 
surface" (Suvin, Metamorphoses 7) means that they can and frequently do play an 
important part in the creation of"cognitive estrangement." Following Fredric Jameson's 
analysis in "Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre," we might say that, as a "contract" 
between writers and readers (or story tellers and listeners), genre can oscillate between 
the "semantic," which defines by comparison with other genres, and the "syntactic," 
which defines by the exclusion of other genres (Jameson 135-37). While folk narrative 
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still does not formally resemble SF, the folk legend's engagement with estranging 
experiences means that it can semantically cross over with the plots and themes of the SF 
narrative. In other words, genre is not a static category but is part of an ongoing 
negotiation of terms, in which the participants (writers/readers, tellers/listeners) sustain or 
modify the structural rules, and the genre itself changes as a result. More specifically, this 
dynamic between the writer and what could be called the "social addressees" produces 
change over time and is therefore embedded in social history (136). Due to its contractual 
engagement with social addressees who often have an intimate relation to the very 
production of novel experiences, folk narrative is always "re-created with each telling," is 
therefore a "creation of the moment," and, as a result, "crystallizes around contemporary 
situations and concerns, reflecting current values and attitudes" (Oring 123). 
The basic generic category of folk narrative is not usually associated with the 
"real world" or even with possible changes in that world. And yet, my primary goal in 
this dissertation is to demonstrate that this limited view of folkloric genres is a major 
blind spot in contemporary literary criticism, and in particular, contemporary SF 
criticism. So I reject, for example, Mark Rose's premise that "reading a story about elves 
reinforces the conviction that elves do not exist in the world" (21). This is as wrong-
headed as the claim that reading a story about aliens somehow confirms the absence of 
aliens in the world: as I argue in Chapter 1, the "elf' (or, for that matter, the "dwarf," 
"fairy," or "changeling") can function equally as a vehicle for the exploration and/or 
critique of a particular social milieu. Folk legend in particular may not even warrant the 
category of "fantasy," so closely tied is it to a particular conception of empirical worlds-
concerns "about change and growth in children, about the status of women in marriage 
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and divorce" (Silver 57). In other words, if a legend did not derive from a particular 
historical moment, this does not eliminate the possibility that the very same legend might 
inform an understanding of a historical moment after it has occurred. As Rose himself 
admits, "At issue in [the] distinctions [between fantasy and realism] is not, of course, the 
literal possibility or impossibility of the fictional world but, rather, the kind of 
relationship between the text and the empirical world that the story asks the reader to 
pretend to be true" (20). Working from this stronger premise, we then need to ask a series 
of questions: Who is reading/telling the story? Who is repeating it, and to which 
audience? What is the context of the reading/telling? What if, in the context of the telling 
of this story about elves, a child is born with "elfin" features? Might it then be possible to 
interpret the story as a parable about the physical changes of an infant in a particular 
empirical environment? The questions change, but always as a repetition with a 
difference, every time we substitute the particular narrative agent (elf, alien, fairy, and so 
forth). 
The obvious structural differences between a folktale and a science-fiction 
narrative should not discourage us from finding other points of correspondence. 
Specifically, the nineteenth-century anthropological interest in indigenous cultures found 
a parallel in folkloric accounts of human encounters with a hidden or submerged 
civilization. The burgeoning discipline of ethnology certainly bolstered the popular 
interest in "savage" cultures and provided good material for fiction writers with a 
scientific tum of mind. We need only glance through Arthur Conan Doyle's The Lost 
World (1912) to see the effects of such a folkloric-scientific interplay: when Doyle's 
journalist narrator Malone catches sight of the lost world, he describes it as a "fairyland" 
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and "the most wonderful that the imagination of man could conceive" (Doyle 60). 
Moreover, the folktale and the legend converge with SF in a particular social milieu (the 
nineteenth century, and particularly, the Victorian period), during which time folklore and 
science found common ground through their mutual interest in "new and alien racial 
groups" (Silver 57). But the popularity of the anthropological discourse was not simply 
the result of widely held racist beliefs; for, as Christine Bolt has argued, many 
anthropologists in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were highly critical ofboth 
sensationalized reports on "savage" cultures and racially prejudiced depictions of"a 
monster class of which nothing yet is known" (Charles Dilke, qtd. in Bolt 6). Especially 
after the establishment of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 
1871 (which combined the originally separate fields of anthropology and ethnology), 
practitioners wanted to legitimize their study of indigenous cultures as scientific and 
informed, so that rather than isolating the differences between, say, British and Ashanti 
society, anthropological studies could discover "unsuspecting links between past and 
present, barbarous and civilized peoples" (Bolt 5). This is to say that anthropology was 
concerned with correspondences as much as divergences between cultures. Modem SF 
clearly finds something fundamentally significant in a discipline whose "field work" 
provides plot material for tales about alien worlds, especially if those worlds provide 
estranging reflections of the culture that has sent out the explorers in the first place. We 
need look no further than the massive corpus of folk narratives involving human-fairy 
encounters to find possible prototypes for such "alien encounter" SF. 
My more specific argument in the dissertation is that folk belief-and its primary 
vehicle, folk narrative-is an expression of a subaltern culture whose voice remains 
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"submerged" in the midst of modem culture. As it should be evident now, my focus is on 
particular but variable "environments" and the figures that inhabit these spaces and, 
inevitably, induce fundamental changes. The larger corpus of "fairy legends"2 describes a 
wide variety of underground creatures, ranging from the "fairy people" associated with a 
fairy kingdom, fairy markets, and human-fairy trade; "tutelary fairies," which include 
benevolent/malevolent creatures like the brownie and the boggart who are generally 
attached to a human household; the "nature fairies," such as water spirits, and dryads, 
associated with "seas, rivers, lochs or bogs" (Briggs, Personnel of Fairyland 15); and 
"monsters, witches, and giants," usually associated with ghosts or "lost races" (16). Early 
in her work, The Personnel of Fairyland: A Short Account of the Fairy People of Great 
Britain for Those Who Tell Stories to Children, Katharine M. Briggs states that these are 
simply "rough divisions for the sake of convenience": the truth of the matter is, 
"Fairyland" is a vast swarming community of various species, which overlap and 
intermix despite the folklorist's attempt to designate class and social distinctions. There 
is, of course, a consistent distinction made between the underground nonhuman 
community oflegend and the upper-world human society of so-called "reality." This may 
explain why legends about the fairies are so similar to those concerning the dead: it is 
easier for one to make a designation between a living, breathing, animate "person" and a 
ghostly, immaterial, inanimate "thing." Nevertheless, the persistence of folk narratives 
treating the human-fairy relation-whether this involves human encounters with the 
2 The most comprehensive collectton ts probably Kathanne M. Bnggs 'sA Dzctwnary of Brztzsh Folk-Tales 
zn the Englzsh Language, Incorporatzng the F J Norton Collectwn, Part B: Folk Legends, Vol 1, whtch 
mcludes well over two hundred pages (pp. 175-411) of legends concermng changehngs, browmes, and 
other sundry human-fatry encounter tales. 
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elegant "fairy people" or with the more uncouth brownies and giants-suggests a long 
established human interest in the chaotic undercurrents oflived experience. For, as 
numerous folklore scholars have consistently shown, the fairy folk live "alongside" or 
"side-by-side" humans and participate in similar sorts of activities, such as marriages, 
births, funerals, and wars. This is to say that the ghosts, fairies, and witches of folk legend 
conceptualize and enunciate "concrete social events and occasions" (Geertz 30) that 
either have no previous articulation or, on the contrary, find a new articulation to counter 
the mundane human one. A particular haunting, for example, may offer a model for social 
rebellion; a witch's "expropriation" of objects in a household for the purpose of working 
magic on an intended victim (Jenkins 31 0) may offer a model for the guerrilla tactics of 
seizure or abduction. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz has argued, "social actions are 
comments on more than themselves," and "where an interpretation comes from does not 
determine where it can be impelled to go. Small facts speak to large issues, winks to 
epistemology, or sheep raids to revolution, because they are made to" (23). As indicated 
by folk legends and the science-fictional works that adapt them, Fairyland offers a 
conceptualization of that "something" that constantly eludes us, like the "lost treasure" of 
past revolutions (Arendt 4-5). 
Since I have identified the articulation of imagined worlds as a relationship 
between an environment and the narrative agents that populate it, I would now add that 
these "worlds" (and indeed the treasures they possibly contain) cannot be contemplated 
without the agency of "conceptual personae." Fallowing the description of French 
philosophers Gilles De leuze and Felix Guattari, if the "concept" has the components of a 
"possible world, [an] existing face, and real language and speech" (17), the conceptual 
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persona is the agent through which these components come to life for us. In a certain 
sense, the use of such concepts and personae is a philosophical practice, even while the 
conceptual persona "reintroduce[ s] into thought a vital relationship with the Other" that 
precedes the philosophical plane ( 4), in the same way that folk belief (re )introduces pre-
philosophical ideas through its conceptual personae. As Deleuze and Guattari elaborate, if 
philosophy "constantly brings conceptual personae to life" or "gives life to them" (62), 
"conceptual personae carry out the movements that describe the author's plane of 
immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the author's concepts" (63). To 
put it another way: thought requires a vehicle in order to move in a particular direction, 
and so we constantly send out personae in search of concepts and worlds that would 
otherwise remain undiscovered. 
The changeling is one such "conceptual persona." According to British folk 
legend, it was common practice for the fairies, also called the "Good People" or the "little 
people," to abduct human children and replace them with fractious and deformed fairies 
known as "changelings." If, for example, we have trouble distinguishing between a 
boggart and a brownie (since, as Briggs notes, the only difference appears to be that the 
former is nastier than the latter [The Personnel of Fairyland 193]), our task is much more 
difficult when it comes to the ubiquitous changeling. The main reason is that the 
changeling does not designate a species or group of fairy but is, rather, a description of a 
particular operation and its mechanism: the changeling is that which is substituted for 
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another. 3 The central claim of my dissertation is that the changeling is analogical to the 
crossover and perversion of biological and conceptual boundaries, for, as the legends 
consistently demonstrate, this divergent creature straddles the human and nonhuman 
realms and is associated with multiple fairy races. The changeling's changeable nature 
speaks to the problems of classifying and drawing strict boundaries. Accordingly, the 
changeling relates to the artificial dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural, for 
changeling legends always depict a creature that appears as a human anomaly-a 
frightening variation on the human form and, therefore, the result of a supernatural 
intervention. These two initial interpretations are related if we consider the impact that 
both Darwinian theory and medical science had on the folklore scholarship in the 
nineteenth century: if, for the parents, the changeling was a monster, something awe-
inspiring and therefore unnatural, for doctors and anthropologists alike, it was also a 
physical regression of the human form, an evolutionary throwback. Added to this cluster 
of interpretations is the historical fact that, throughout the nineteenth century, countless 
young children and women were abused or killed because their parents or husbands 
suspected them to be changelings. In this instance, the changeling assumes the operation 
of an estranging novum, and in particular, the role of the outsider, the insubordinate, and 
the unwanted human. Moreover, the fundamental significance of the changeling is its 
manner of linking the human and nonhuman worlds, for it is a fairy that frequently 
insinuates itself into a human home by assuming the appearance of a human child. Much 
of the drama in such legends relates to the difficulty of determining the changeling's 
3 See the entry in the online Oxford English Dictionary (http://dictionary.oed.com.qe2a-
proxy.mun.calentrance.dtl), an excellent electronic source, which I have used for my discussions of 
"monster," "robot," and "subterranean." 
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origin, but one theme is quite consistent: fairies depend upon humans for their livelihood. 
The changeling not only supplies a mechanism for exchange between "alien" groups but 
also offers an analogy to the state of actually being an outsider. Finally, the changeling 
also enunciates a fundamental human anxiety about the unpredictable nature of life and of 
the strange denizens that seem to compete with us for territory. 
While the changeling is, on occasion, associated with specific races such as elves 
and dwarves, it is more accurate to say that it derives from the larger community of fairy 
folk that inhabit the subterranean world of Fairyland. As W. Y. Evans-Wentz once 
argued, Fairyland is "peopled by more species ofliving beings than [the human] world, 
because [it is] imcomparably more vast and varied in its possibilities" (52). Such a 
description resituates folk legend in a particularly utopian light despite its relative brevity. 
Since the legend tends to end with a sort of cognitive dissonance in which the previous 
boundaries of the human and nonhuman, the supernatural and the natural have been 
violated (Rohrich 13), we might surmise that it invites its readers/listeners to fathom the 
possibilities or the "possible worlds" briefly conceived but never fully articulated. Two 
possible worlds here are Fairyland and the empirical world in which it lies submerged. 
The "existing face[s]" are the very denizens that emerge at once as individual personae 
(dwarves, elves, and brownies) and as a collective assemblage (the fairy folk, the Good 
People, and so forth). As I have suggested, the changeling is both separate from this 
crowd, in that there are specific legends about it, and an integral part of the larger 
community, in that it provides the fullest articulation of the function of the fairy 
community: to promote trade, exchange, transformation, metamorphosis, and symbiosis. 
The changeling is the conceptual persona par excellence because it both precedes the 
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birth of fairy races (as the progeny of this dwarf community or that elfin community) and 
deviates from these forms (as the hybridized progeny of this or that human community). 
For, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, a single persona "has several features that may give 
rise to other personae"; in other words, personae "proliferate" and "constantly bifurcate" 
(76). What appears in the folk legend as a deformed fairy becomes in the SF story a 
hybrid human-animal or human-machine. 
Folk legend is one point of origin for the changeling, the fragrant subterranean 
realm from which this human-fairy organism emerges into the light of day for folklorists 
and anthropologists alike. As Raymond Williams has reminded us, however, any 
"emergence" carries with it traces of a past or "residual" process (122), and is not bound 
by a particular space or time but, as Bakhtin might say, operates within the interstices of 
space-time. 4 Who knows when the changeling first appeared on the scene, or in what 
form? The folkloric changeling of the Victorian period appears to us in the already 
hybridized form of a demonic-monstrous-insubordinate-deformed child; and we can only 
comment on the particular conceptual influences (pagan, popular, or Christian religion; 
folklore, anthropology; pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, or post-Darwinian natural science) 
that comprise this dynamic and divergent organism. Moreover, the changeling's origin 
changes depending on which matrix or era (such as Victorian, Romantic, or Medieval) we 
consider. 
Chapter 1 considers the changeling's emergence in the Victorian period when it 
becomes, before the advent of the SF "mutant," the most effective enunciation of 
metamorphosis and change. The relation between humans and fairies, as depicted in folk 
4 Bakhtin defines "chronotope" as the "intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships" (84). 
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narrative, says much about relations between insiders and outsiders, the familiar and the 
strange, the self and the other. In this sense, folk legends narrativize the difficulties of 
offering hospitality to strangers and especially to those perceived as hostile; Jacques 
Derrida provides an additional insight into an interpretation of both changeling tales and 
their real-life parallels, which reinforce the ordeal of housing, looking after, and being 
overtaken by one's potential enemies ("Hostipitality" [2002] 380). The close proximity 
between the fairy folk and human communities is reinforced by the precedence of what 
Briggs calls a "fairy economy" in which the two species engage in various forms of trade 
comparable to but nevertheless distinguishable from the modem capitalist model. 
Through the analysis of five folk narratives, the bulk of the chapter focuses on the 
changeling figure who, as a substituted (human/fairy) child, demarcates the impasse of 
the fairy economy but who also establishes Fairyland as a realm of transformation rather 
than stasis. While folk legends supplied a metaphorical language for dealing with the 
transgression of established moral boundaries, they also offered intelligent attempts to 
comprehend the human capacity for intolerance and violence (Briggs, "Johnnie in the 
Cradle" and "A Fairy Changeling: I"). The legend's emphasis on the atrophied body of 
the changeling (Briggs, "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II") 
suggested also a parent's interpretation of a physically deformed child: "this can't be our 
child-our child was stolen away" (Eberly 232). The new relations established between 
changeling and child, human and fairy races, lower and upper worlds are possible only 
through a radicalized understanding of "hospitality" in which the "exchange" initiates the 
perversion of purity. Associated as it is with the intermixture or hybridization ofthe 
human and fairy worlds, and the unregulated "becomings" that characterize entities that 
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manage to straddle two kingdoms, the changeling conceptualizes the primacy of the 
"alliance" as a contingent relation between disparate groups. My closing discussion of a 
folktale structured around the animal-human transformation motif (O'Sullivan, "The 
Speckled Bull") establishes the changeling legend as a nexus around which several 
concepts constellate. For folk narrative explores the dynamics of crossing territories and 
species, and discovers in these geographical and biological aberrations new relations for 
the changeling. 
The chapters that follow this initial foregrounding chapter offer the general 
premise that both folk narrative and SF present conceptual models for the practical 
biological experiments since the early nineteenth century. I begin with the late Romantic 
period in which the gothic romance appears to function as an additional component in the 
shaping of the folkloric personae that dominate the Victorian period. While not every 
fictional narrative under examination in these chapters explicitly explores the changeling 
persona described in folk legend, each one is concerned with the issues of biological 
metamorphosis, the mutation or hybridization of the species, and biological 
engineering-issues that the changeling motif/narrative has anticipated. Classic SF-by 
which I mean fictional works that contributed to the development of the genre-
reinforces the cognitive function of folk genres and folkloric personae. 
Chapter 2 considers how in the nineteenth century folk narrative became 
transformed by novelistic treatment, and how, as a result, Fairyland assumed the shape of 
the sublime "sea of ice," the busy metropolis, and even the laboratory. In Shelley's 
Frankenstein and Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde the fairy folk, in turn, assumed the shape 
of the lower-class mob, atavistic criminals, and gothic/science-fictional monsters. Given 
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the gothic sublime's interest in the fearful symmetry of the body, I argue that it shares an 
important correspondence with "cognitive estrangement," which, as a central feature of 
SF, manifests itself as a "shock" to the reader's own cognitive norms (Suvin, Positions 
and Presuppositions in Science Fiction 142). In the first instance, Shelley reproduces her 
own form of the monstrous sublime in the figure of an engineered human who articulates 
new social relations among the deformed lower classes in the post-Revolutionary period. 
In the second instance, Stevenson offers an urbanized variation on the changeling motif in 
his depiction of a human's metamorphosis into a dwarf, even as he returns to the 
Romantic gothic themes of class deformation, illegitimacy, and monstrosity. I conclude 
by suggesting that the proto-science-fictional elements of Frankenstein and Jekyll and 
Hyde enable us to rethink the "monstrous sublime" (gleaned from both Edmund Burke 
and Thomas Malthus) in terms of a "cognitive estrangement." Modifying the definition 
somewhat, I suggest that Shelley and Stevenson each introduce a gothic monster as the 
"novum" (agent) of their work in order to resituate the changeling and the doppelganger 
as biological possibilities. 
Chapter 3 argues that Wells's The Time Machine and The Island of Dr. Moreau 
employ the gothic-cum-folkloric motif of the underground nonhuman community as a 
configuration of the "submerged nation," which threatens to supplant the ruling class in 
society. Wells's use of folkloric figures such as the Eloi and the Morlocks in The Time 
Machine acknowledges the cognitive possibilities of the folktale and the sociological 
possibilities of remapping Victorian England as a "Fairyland" consisting of two nations. 
While they are biologically distinct species, the Morlocks and the Eloi are bifurcated 
members of a single species, Homo sapiens, and therefore operate as the changelings in 
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this futuristic world; this is Wells's first notable articulation of such an SF persona. After 
all, the folkloric changeling is associated with the always shifting boundaries between 
individual fairy groups, and between individual classifications ofhuman and fairy, human 
and animal. Moreau carries on the Wellsian project of adapting and modifying popular 
genres for the purpose of scientific speculation, using a folktale-parable form to 
narrativize the process by which the human becomes beast and vice versa. While the 
narrator Prendick calls Moreau's vivisected "Beast Folk" "inhuman monsters," the 
sympathetic Montgomery sees them simply as "men" who seem to possess more 
humanity than Homo sapiens. I conclude by distinguishing the Traveller's obvious 
revulsion towards the Morlocks from Prendick's more ambiguous attitude, noting that 
Moreau presents a more advanced stage ofWells's neo-Darwinian thought since it 
exchanges the gothic terror of the bestial reversion for the folkloric wonder of the 
unexplained and potentially liberating transformation. Because it becomes associated with 
the "accidental" nature of evolution, sudden, unforeseen alterations in the human 
organism, and the crossing over of the human and animal kingdoms, the changeling may 
be the conceptual persona par excellence in SF. 
Chapter 4 considers Capek's R. U R. and War with the Newts. Like the figures in 
Wells, Shelley, and Stevenson, Capek's characters appear to be further variations on 
folkloric personae (Robots, Newts), combining as he does the folk motif of 
metamorphosis with the "hard" scientific facts about evolution and biological mutation. 
In R. U R., genetically engineered humans in the form of "Robots" emerge as tacticians, 
incorporated as they are into the labour force and the military: here we have another key 
evolutionary leap in which artificially produced changelings assume significant positions 
20 
in society-although, as it turns out, at the expense of society's human inhabitants. The 
play's final evocation of Genesis parodically subverts the Christian/humanist notion of 
the "dominion" of one species over the other, particularly since the new "men" and 
"women" who inherit the earth are actually the product of a hybrid human-Robot 
intermixture. In my discussion of War with the Newts I consider the inevitable problems 
of recruiting or co-opting the changelings oftwentieth-century society: in this instance, a 
sea captain and a businessman employ a contingent ofhighly evolved salamanders first to 
hunt for pearls and then to assume the collective role as a world-wide labour force. 
Inevitably, the exploited Newts, who have since learned how to use underwater drills, 
literally tum the tables and begin to submerge the major continents of the world. This 
scenario reflects Capek's keen awareness of the Nazi threat in his own Czechoslovakia, 
and the ways in which class and racial deformities of the "little man" can lead to powerful 
and obsessive reactionary behaviour. In the end, Fairyland has been ransacked and 
redesigned by the capitalists, while its inhabitants have been armed and deployed as a 
host to frighten even the most "modem" of families. Despite this dystopian conclusion, 
Capek nevertheless returns us to the "plebeian" concerns of the "little people" by 
exposing the sham of "free enterprise" as well as the limitations of "hospitality." There is, 
moreover, a subtle Darwinian lesson implied in Capek's work: that the beautiful 
complexity of a single society becomes savage, destructive, and ultimately sterile when it 
attempts to impose its creativity and inventiveness on other societies; when it, in other 
words, prefers automatism over variability. My discussion ofboth texts considers the 
important differences between natural spontaneous mutations, of which the "changeling" 
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is a key example, and unnatural or engineered mutations, of which Frankenstein's 
monster is a representative example. 
Chapter 5 considers four works by Olaf Stapledon: Last and First Men, Star 
Maker, Odd John, and Sirius. In contrast to the pulp writers ofhis era (John W. 
Campbell, Edmond Hamilton, A. E. van Vogt), Stapledon presents the most sophisticated 
attempt to "vary [the] surface" ofWells's original paradigm, as established in both The 
Time Machine and Moreau (Suvin, Metamorphoses 242), conceptualizing two 
changelings: one, a deformed superman, and the other, a hybrid man- dog. Following 
Capek's engagement with the fascist "little men," Stapledon employs the changeling as 
an antidote to the Nazi "Superman" and the ideology of racial perfection. Stapledon's 
cosmological fictions, Last and First Men and Star Maker, constitute the author's first 
attempts to articulate the philosophical notion of"personality in community," which turns 
out to be a variation on the concept of symbiosis. The first work explores a variety of 
human species over an evolutionary span of some two thousand million years, but I focus 
on a few notable societies in which the changeling appears to be a prototype for societal 
mutation. The second work explores inter-planetary relations over an even longer span of 
time, but again I focus on a few fascinating instances of symbiosis, including that 
between a "fish-like" race, the Ichthyoids, and a "crustacean" race, the Arachnoids. While 
we find no recognizable folkloric changelings in either text, we do discover the 
metamorphoses at work in the crossing over of kingdoms within the alien biospheres-
operations that characterize all changeling tales, whether they be found in European 
folklore or SF. I next consider Odd John, which constitutes Stapledon's most deliberate 
evocation of the changeling persona: a deformed superman who infiltrates a variety of 
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human institutions and who strives to form his own colony of "supernormals." But as he 
begins to distance himself from Homo sapiens, in his newfound philosophy of spiritual 
transcendence, he also loses touch with his human heritage. Because Odd John 
completely rejects the human world, I argue that he is just one vital coordinate in a 
"composite" persona. As I argue in the final section of the chapter, Sirius completes the 
composite changeling persona by reintroducing the animal, which would return to the 
earth while the superman would wish to transcend it. The additional importance ofPlaxy, 
the female human who engages in sexual relations with the "man-dog" Sirius, is such that 
she enables a woman-becoming-animal, which we witness for the first time since "The 
Speckled Bull." 
Stapledon is perhaps one of the first SF authors to self-consciously incorporate the 
folk motif of changelingism. If SF, like that of Capek and Stapledon, adds plausibility to 
the changeling tale by providing a scientific explanation for biological engineering, the 
folk narrative returns us to an almost primitive reverence for the body and its sometimes 
unpredictable processes. From this perspective, the changeling persona in both folk 
narrative and SF actually has a significant religious component; for the changeling's 
supernatural origin-as a species of the unknown-is what constantly undermines the 
scientific reduction of the anomaly to a set of symptoms (congenital malformations, and 
so forth). Indeed, what frees the human from the clutches ofthe "factories of pain" 
(Gomel404), so prominent in Nazi and Stalinist Europe, is the notion that the human is 
worthy of worship. As Theodore Sturgeon once remarked, sex and worship are the two 
prime motivating forces of the human species ("Science Fiction, Morals, and Religion" 
99). For this reason the old folkloric changeling, with its origin in the syncretism of 
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popular religion, is a vital persona in contemporary SF since it reasserts the marvel of 
conception (Eberly 228), which always comes in the form of an intrusion or seizure. The 
changeling may constitute the pagan version of the divine intervention, which paralyzes 
its hosts with an ethical command: worship me! But this command is not bound by an 
ideological investment in biological purity or by a belief in the sanctity of a particular 
racial type. On the contrary, the command to worship is also a command to be hospitable, 
to allow the stranger into the home, and to enable the intermingling that may occur as a 
result. Despite its divergence from the Christian path of righteousness, the changeling has 
the potential to be an ethical figure and the convergence of "new and alien racial groups," 
with humans thrown into the mix, its main source of divinity. 
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Chapter 1-Becoming Monstrous, Becoming Divergent, Becoming Hybrid: 
The Changeling in Victorian Folklore5 
We are the fairies' children! 
-Martha Williams, qtd. in Gwyndaf 181 
Introduction 
One of the classic misconceptions about folktales and folk legends, including the 
supernatural figures that populate them, is that they derive wholly from the insular 
"superstitions" and "popular beliefs" of a primitive peasant society.6 On the contrary, folk 
narratives conceptualize inter-group relations, which concern the material circumstances 
of raising families, dealing with poverty, disease, and war, and learning to adapt to 
changes in both the environment and in the economy. Folk belief, and fairy belief in 
particular, can be understood as a "conceptual world" (Appiah 94) that was dynamic 
rather than static and that derived its idiom, metaphors, and narratives from its intimate 
(and sometimes violent) relation with and not its indifference to so-called "civilized" 
society. If, in the British tradition, fairies have been identified as the primitive inhabitants 
of ancient Britain or the prehistoric Celtic realms, the persistence of belief in these 
otherworldly creatures suggests that they are contemporaries-nay, perhaps even 
subterranean neighbors-of the same "folk" who tell stories about them. Fairies are not 
simply an invisible race but have, for centuries, manifested themselves in various forms, 
5 This chapter denves from a smaller article, entitled "Hybndlty, Hospitality, and the Changeling m 
Contemporary Insh Culture," Workmg Papers m Irzsh Studies 5.2 (2005): 3-32. 
6 See, for example, Andre Jolles's Emfach Formen (trans. as Simple Forms), which, as Dan Ben-Amos 
argues, classifies folklore gemes as "pnmitive, even pnmeval" forms of "human verbalizatiOn," which are 
ultimately supplanted by "written forms" dunng the "transition from orality to literacy" (Ben-Amos IX). See 
also Richard Dorson's discussiOn of the "cross-cultural" approach to folklore m such authors as Edward B. 
Tylor, Andrew Lang, and Edwm Sidney Hartland, for whom folklore "represented survivals of pnmitlve 
beliefs held by races of men at the lower rungs of the evolutiOnary ladder" (Dorson 38). 
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including most notably, "changed" children. According to the informants of changeling 
legends, it was common practice for fairies to abduct human children and leave withered 
and cantankerous fairies in their place. According to the Victorians, however, "on some 
level at least, the changeling phenomenon was a mysterious and frightening occurrence 
that could, if successfully probed, provide explanations for sudden death or 
disappearance, mysterious illness, and eccentric and bizarre behaviour" (Silver 60). While 
fairies, and especially changelings, "belong to the margins, and so can serve as reference 
points and metaphors for all that is marginal in human life" (Bourke, The Burning of 
Bridget Cleary 32), they also display, particularly for the Victorians who studied and 
feared them, the ability to infiltrate even the most dominant-and sacred-facets of 
human life. 
This chapter argues that the changeling of nineteenth-century European folk 
narrative can be understood as a "conceptual persona" in that it articulates the 
"psychosocial types" (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 64) that dominated 
Victorian British society. As a "persona" rather than a "character," the changeling is not 
merely a symbol but becomes the embodiment of or the diagnosis for existing social 
behaviours, particularly in the Victorian period. "In philosophical enunciations," Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari write, "we do not do something by saying it but produce 
movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona. Conceptual 
personae are also the true agents of enunciation" (What Is Philosophy? 64-65). As 
popular figures of folk legend in the nineteenth century, changelings have important links 
to folk religious beliefs (Degh 77) and therefore become central in the legend's general 
attempt to negotiate a particular "truth" (Oring 125). Moreover, the persona is constructed 
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as the "unknown" ofthe philosophical problem (Deleuze and Guattari 81). So, then, what 
"problem," or set of problems, does the changeling explore?7 While it was certainly a 
figure popular in Ireland, Scotland, and Scandinavia, the changeling enunciates a specific 
set of issues that surface in nineteenth-century England and concern childcare, 
reproduction, cross-cultural and cross-species relations. For this reason, the changeling is 
perhaps the most effective enunciation of metamorphosis and social change in the milieu 
of the Victorian period. The relation between humans and fairies, as depicted in the 
literature, says much about relations between insiders and outsiders, the familiar and the 
strange, the self and the other. 
The first, and perhaps most fundamental, problem the changeling explores is the 
human concern with origins, and fairies were generally considered to be a devious tribe in 
the conceptual world of all Victorians (lower, middle, and upper class). As the work of 
Briggs suggests, the ambiguity of the fairy folk may result from the numerous and often 
conflicting "theories of fairy origins." Fairies may be spirits of the dead, fallen angels, or 
elementals, as Theosophists argued in the later nineteenth century; they may also be the 
souls ofunbaptized babies, called "piskies" (a variant on "pixies") (Briggs, A Dictionary 
of Fairies 318), or "the diminished and conquered Tuatha de Danann" who were the 
original inhabitants of Ireland (The Fairies in Tradition and Literature 74). The most 
consistent "theory" is that the fairy people as a whole live lives parallel to humans: they 
eat, sleep, marry, die, sell, steal, and work to ensure a genetic future. As Briggs has 
7 C. F. Goodey and Ttm Stamton's tllummatmg arttcle "Intellectual Dtsabthty and the Myth of the 
Changehng Myth" suggests that both the changehng figure and the chtld substitutiOn mottf denve from 
medteval theologtcal texts. Whtle my htstoncal focus m thts study does not go back any further than the 
early mneteenth century, I do acknowledge the earher rehgwus and phtlosophtcal mfluence of the motif 
(for example, m Luther or m Locke) m order to remforce the rruxed ancestry of the changelmg 
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convincingly shown, fairy legend confirms the presence of a "fairy economy," which 
relies upon the hospitality ofhuman communities, even while it appears to violate the 
rules ofhospitality in the process of the exchange. It was well known, for example, that 
trooping fairies, known as sluagh si, often raided farms for cattle in order to steal the 
precious milk. As I suggest in my discussion of one folktale, "The Fairy Wife" 
(O'Sullivan),8 the fairy economy underscores the difficulties of offering hospitality to 
strangers, and especially those whose ongm or legitimacy is in question. 
Because fairies live lives parallel to humans, as folk narrative continually 
demonstrates, they provide an imaginative way of dealing with human problems, 
including those that prove especially challenging, like insubordination, disease, 
deformity, death, and relations with outsiders perceived to be hostile. The changeling, as I 
describe in the second section of the chapter, is often portrayed as an unusually contrary 
newborn child whose insatiable appetite, eccentric behaviour, and ability to speak identify 
him as an interloper. Indeed, while the changeling is consistently identified as a child of 
the fair "Good People," in its rough and sallow features it also bears some resemblance to 
lower forms such as dwarves, boggarts, and, arguably, brownies. This sort of changeling, 
featured in the legend "Johnnie in the Cradle" (Briggs), indicates the fear of the 
precocious child who refuses to submit to parental authority. In most cases, the intruder is 
driven out of the home through an elaborate ritual, which often involves fire or some 
other violent method. In "The Fairy Changeling: I" (Briggs), as an additional example, a 
parson advises the parent to slap her child until it cries and thereby reveals its fairy 
8 Whlle thts narrative ts mcluded m a collectiOn entitled Folktales of Ireland, 1ts "local" and "homehke" 
atmosphere, not to mentwn tts lack of exphctt supernatural content, strongly suggests that we are readmg a 
legend. See my dtscusswn of the dtstmctions between folktales and legends m the Introductwn 
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identity. As a reflection of the degree to which folk narratives crystallized around 
"contemporary situations," as Oring suggests (123), there are reported cases in the 
nineteenth century of parents who abused suspected changelings, often relying on the 
religious hierarchy to further justify their actions. As Silver suggests, the characteristic 
violence of changeling narratives reflects the belief in the aggressive nature of 
changelings themselves. "For the fairies who most frightened the folk and fascinated the 
collectors were the ones perceived as cruel participants in antisocial acts" (149). If the 
changeling was treated cruelly, it was only to ensure the safety of the human child: the 
theory was that if the parents followed the procedure correctly, their real child would be 
returned safely. 
As Susan Schoon Eberly and Joyce Underwood Munro argue, the changeling 
legend may have offered parents an explanation for child deformity, and so vigilance 
against fairy intrusion could be understood in this framework as the attempt to ward off 
disease or to find a cure. This additional interpretation, which I treat in the third section of 
the chapter, adds a new dimension to our conceptual persona: by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the changeling was employed by the medical profession to explain otherwise 
inexplicable birth defects. Changelings, like those featured in "The Caerlaverock 
Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II" (Briggs), are often noted for their unhealthy 
skin, hairy bodies, and deformed limbs: in many of those reported occurrences of child 
abuse in the nineteenth century the assaulted children suffered from similar afflictions. 
The regularity of these instances prompted Victorians to associate fairy belief with 
marginalized cultures, including the Irish and gypsy population, although it was 
abundantly clear that changeling narratives provided titillating entertainment for the vast 
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majority (Silver 70). Further, and more to the point, "Victorian folklore collections 
provide a set of insights into the ways in which a culture sought to externalize evil" (149). 
Those who believed in fairies-whether they acted on their belief or not-were regarded 
with the same revulsion imparted to changelings. If changelings, and the innocents 
stigmatized as such, were conceptualized by the Victorians as primitive justifications for 
otherwise unexplained misfortune, the "stranger" or the "foreigner" has assumed the role 
of the scapegoat in our own era: it/s/he has become, in other words, a child of unknown 
parentage, monstrous in appearance and behaviour. 
As I argue in the fourth and final section of the chapter, the changeling also 
became associated with the disenfranchised, primitive underclass and, through its 
attendant significations of deformity, monstrosity, and insubordination, a figure of 
hybridity. I argue that this originally folkloric figure is a nexus around which several 
concepts constellate, but that no single interpretation (folkloric, scientific, philosophical) 
can suffice on its own. One final folktale, "The Speckled Bull" (O'Sullivan), reinforces 
the conflicting human responses to the changeling and the affiliated anxieties surrounding 
marriage, reproduction, and legitimacy, as first witnessed in "The Fairy Wife." In both 
legends and folktales, the changeling becomes closely associated with both the subhuman 
and the animal-human, both the abnormal and the supernatural. By Darwin's account, we 
can gauge the development of the changeling persona in terms of the "modification" of 
the species by natural selection; however, by Deleuze and Guattari's account, we can 
gauge such modifications not simply as the shedding of primitive nature but as the 
creation of new divergences and new alliances between disparate forms. 
I do not intend to suggest that we can verify the changeling's development as a 
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series of definitive steps. While I have identified the Victorian period as my historical 
frame of reference, my focus on the conceptual nature ofthe changeling also requires me 
to acknowledge a geographical or geological frame of reference. As Deleuze and 
Guattari elaborate, the concept "is not object but territory" (101), and the conceptual 
persona constitutes a "becoming," or event, that operates in a particular territory-hence 
their term "geophilosophy" (85-113). As a vehicle for conceptual creation, the folk legend 
itself presents a moment ofbecoming, the event of the arrival of the changeling. As a way 
of registering such an event, I reconceptualize the changeling motif as an exemplary case 
of"deterritorialization." As Deleuze and Guattari write: 
We already know the importance in animals of those activities that consist in 
forming territories, in abandoning or leaving them, and even re-creating territory 
on something of a different nature (ethologists say that an animal's partner or 
friend is the 'equivalent of a home' or that the family is a 'mobile territory'). All 
the more for the hominid: from its act of birth, it deterritorializes its front paw, 
wrests it from the earth to tum it into a hand, and reterritorializes it on branches 
and tools. A stick is, in tum, a deterritorialized branch. We need to see how 
everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a 
territory, tolerates or carries out deterritorializations, and is reterritorialized on 
almost anything-memory, fetish, or dream. (What Is Philosophy? 67-68) 
Granted, this description seems to echo Chevalier de Lamarck's fallacious evolutionary 
notion of spontaneous generation, or the belief that an organism's development can be 
propelled by a sheer act ofwill (see Darwin, Origin ofSpecies 6-7). In this instance, 
however, Deleuze and Guattari are playfully using the Lamarckian notion to reinforce the 
hominid's ability to adapt to particular alterations in the environment rather than willfully 
change its physiology (as in Lamarck's now infamous explanation of the giraffe's 
elongated neck). Moreover, deterritorialization/reterritorialization is a conceptual 
variation on evolutionary "gradualism" in that it implies more prolonged changes in an 
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organism: an animal "wrests" its paw from the earth only insofar as its physiology allows 
it to, and only much later does it "tum into a hand"-and even then, this change simply 
occurs without the organism's help. In other words, deterritorialization is not done but 
simply happens; the result, however, often enables the organism to develop new methods 
of mobility and new tactics of survival. That being said, Deleuze and Guattari place great 
emphasis on the sudden or eruptive changes that evolutionary gradualism, and certainly 
Spencerian progressionism (see section IV below), cannot entirely account for. Following 
this description, then, the changeling is a deterritorialization, or sudden biological 
mutation, ofthe human, even while it is itselfreterritorialized, or conceptualized 
negatively, as a child with congenital disease or as "mutant" of some sort. Ifthe 
changeling takes a leap forward when it becomes a human child, it also experiences an 
atavistic "reversion," as Darwin might say, when it assumes the role of the deformed or 
monstrous child or a metamorphosed human-animal. In other words, "history" requires 
the mapping out of the changeling's various territories, as well as its reterritorializations 
and deterritorializations, in order to show where the changeling has been. While it is 
clearly aligned with specific fairy communities, the changeling also tends to oscillate 
between the animal and the hominid and therefore marks out the path ofhuman evolution 
as it carries out its operations. Changeling tales, then, indicate a primordial desire on the 
part of humans to discover their origins and their relation to the others that intrude on 
their familial realm. Both changeling tales and their real-life parallels reinforce the violent 
implications ofhospitality, or as Jacques Derrida describes, the ordeal ofhousing, looking 
after, and being overtaken by one's potential enemies ("Hostipitality" [2002] 380). The 
powerful message of these tales is that the "other" may be an ancestral relative, separated 
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by space and time, but resembling humans in character and gesture. Let me now begin 
with an examination of where the changeling has been and how it has evolved from 
European folk narrative. 
I: Fairy Origins, Fairyland, and the Fairy Economy 
My investigation of folk narrative excludes what are now called "fairy tales" for 
the simple reason that, while they seem "to imply the presence of fairies[,] the great 
majority of such tales have no fairies" (Thompson 4). To be sure, the Marchen, derived 
from the Grimms' Kinder-und Hausmarchen, has been translated as "fairy tale," although 
most folklorists today prefer the translation "wonder tale" or "magic tale." Marchen 
might then be seen as comparable to the "folktale" since the former is defined as a tale of 
"some length involving a succession of motifs or episodes," which "moves in an unreal 
world without definite locality or definite characters and [which] is filled with the 
marvelous" (Thompson 8). This description broadly fits that of the folktale. However, the 
Marchen that we read today are frequently the literary imitations of folktales and are 
usually "the product of one individual's craft and creative imagination" (Altmann and de 
Vos xx). Unlike these sorts of tales, folktales are distinctly identified as a species of oral 
literature, as the recited or written version of a much older tale, originally recited or 
written down in some earlier generation or era. Folklorist Stith Thompson elaborates on 
this important distinction: 
In contrast to the modem story writer's striving after originality of plot and 
treatment, the teller of a folktale is proud of his ability to hand on that which he 
has received. He usually desires to impress his readers or hearers with the fact that 
he is bringing them something that has the stamp of good authority, that the tale 
was heard from some great story-teller or from some aged person who 
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remembered it from old days. (4) 
It would be na'ive to assume that the fairy tale does not, on occasion, cross over with the 
folktale; the very fact of transmission-the passing on of oral traditions through ritual 
recitation; the recording, translation, and transcription of recited tales-enables the fairy 
tale to become an oral narrative once again, or, vice versa, enables a recited folktale or 
legend to become a thoroughly literary narrative. Nevertheless, the strong association of 
"wonder tale" with "fairy tale" through a couple centuries' worth of folklore scholarship 
on such tale types as Cinderella, Snow White, and Hansel and Gretel suggests that we 
might do better simply to opt for the safer or more accurate folktale and folk legend. 
Heroes, villains, and other supernatural creatures find their way into the Grimms' and 
Hans Christian Andersen's collections, but, with rare exception (see my note 18), fairies 
and changelings do not. Finally, folk narrative, and the folk legend in particular, has a 
more intimate connection with local belief systems and the creation of corresponding 
conceptual worlds. 
As Diarmuid 6 Giollain has argued, any account of fairy origins and the "fairy 
faith" in particular must take into consideration the relationship between "popular" and 
"official" religion. By citing the evidence of both pagan and Christian religious sites that 
dot the Irish countryside, 6 Giollain in fact demonstrates that popular religion itself was 
characterized as a "syncretism" of both pagan and Christian beliefs ("The Fairy Belief 
and Official Religion in Ireland" 203 ). Such a belief system meant that supernatural, or at 
least extraordinary, events could be attributed to a combination of agencies. As 6 
Giollain elaborates, 
Anything which upset the natural order of the community tended to be linked to 
34 
the disorderly world outside. The diagnosis of misfortune identified the culprits as 
fairies, or evil spirits, or people in league with them, or individuals who occupied 
ambiguous, unordered social roles. Various categories of outsiders could be easily 
confused since the only important distinction was between insiders and outsiders. 
(201) 
This certainly explains why, in so many changeling tales, for example, the method for 
driving out the changeling took the form of an exorcism. In fact, 6 Giollain demonstrates 
convincingly that fairy belief was neither eliminated nor wholly preserved but has existed 
since the modem period as a hybrid combination of Christian and pagan beliefs. In fact, 
even by the middle of the nineteenth century, there "was no conflict between belief in the 
fairies and belief in the saints. Both belonged to the same popular religion and inhabited 
the same mythical universe" (202). For example, especially in legends, while some 
families would splash the suspected changeling with holy water, a recognized Christian 
ritual performed by priests, others might just as likely resort to a mixture of new milk and 
herbs (Bourke, The Burning of Bridget Cleary 89), a recognizably pagan ritual performed 
by "fairy doctors." This is to say that the authority of the church was important sometimes 
only as a default measure (0 Giolhiin, "The Fairy Belief and Official Religion in Ireland" 
203), so that fairy doctors as well as "wise women" (village experts on the fairies) might 
be called upon in lieu of a priest. 
Certainly the rise of folklore-and the invention of the term by William John 
Thoms (0 Giolhiin, Locating Irish Culture 46)-in the mid-nineteenth century helped to 
situate fairy belief as a legitimate field of study. Further, while the religious hierarchy, 
particularly in Ireland, was able to drive pagan beliefs to the margins of society around 
the same time ("The Fairy Belief and Official Religion" 205f.), new forces in modem 
culture were competing for the rights to make fairy belief and fairy legend fashionable 
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again. The shift in the later nineteenth century to "spiritualist" interpretations that the 
fairies were in fact "elementals" or governing spirits (Silver 38) reflected this diminishing 
power of the Church, particularly in the wake of evolutionary theory. In fact, some 
Theosophists in the Victorian period felt that the great development of science in the 
second half of the nineteenth century "could prove that the fairies did exist" (51). The 
folklorist Jacob Grimm had already speculated early in the century that "there was once a 
widely diffused dwarf population all over northern Europe," and Sir Walter Scott himself 
believed that the Oriental Lapps were "one of the sources of the fairies" ( 4 7). This initial 
enthusiasm was encouraged by the post-Darwinian argument that the fairies exemplified a 
separate branch of evolution, and Charles Leadbeater, in The Hidden Side of Things 
(1913), sketched out such an "unnatural natural history" (Silver 52), crafting a diagram 
that placed fairies in between the mineral world and the angelic realm (see Silver 53). 
Moreover, well into the twentieth century, both scientists and folklore scholars were 
convinced that fairies were "real" in some fashion. Arthur Conan Doyle himself became 
caught up in the sensation known as the "Cottingley fairies," the diminutive creatures that 
two young girls claimed to have captured with their camera in 1920. Moreover, those 
whose studied "fairy belief' throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
oscillated between a religious/pseudo-philosophical interpretation and a 
scientific/anthropological one. 
The often conflicting interpretations of the function and origin of the fairies, while 
frequently dependent upon religious and scientific prejudice, indicated that the fairy 
"character" was not easy to define. Folklore itself, which comprised Christian, mystical, 
and anthropological interpretations (or combinations of all three), was a complex field of 
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study that had its competing schools of thought. Moreover, at any given moment in the 
nineteenth century, when fairy belief was at the height of its popularity, fairies, and 
changelings in particular, designated several things-philosophies, beliefs, doctrines, and 
numerous other scientific and pseudo-scientific matters. For that matter, the "scientific" 
study of the fairy peoples in the mid to late nineteenth century was related to a more 
general critique of the very boundaries imposed on scientific enquiry, and reinforced the 
need for a more "fruitful interaction between different branches of science" and perhaps 
even the possibility of promoting a "speculative natural philosophy" in which the average 
layperson could participate (Yeo 22-23). More than this, such a "synthetic" approach 
translated well in folkloric studies where the subject of enquiry seemed to exist in so 
many registers and to simultaneously cut across so much social strata. 
Daithi 6 hOgain describes the fairies as the "otherworld community which, 
according to Irish folklore, inhabits the countryside side by side with, but usually 
invisible to, the human race" (185). This general description derives from the popular 
notion that Fairyland was an "immaterial place" but not "the same as the world of the 
dead" (Evans-Wentz 73). Nevertheless, ghost lore has sometimes been confused with 
fairy legend for the reason that fairies were often understood to be a community of the 
dead living in burial chambers. As evidence of this, some believers note the phenomenon 
of "ring forts," or the circular impressions all across the Irish countryside that mark the 
foundation of ancient ruins: for many, these are actually sidh or "fairy forts," and they 
designate the passageway to the submerged community of the fairy folk. Visitors to this 
realm, usually tricked or lured into Fairyland by dazzling lights, distant music or a 
sudden, world-weary fatigue, often awaken to see "subterranean streams" and enchanted 
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orchards (Briggs, The Fairies 23 and "The Fairy Dwelling on Selena Moor" 225), or 
perhaps "temples and palaces [ ... ] of gold and silver," "lakes full of gold and silver fish," 
"trees laden with fruit and flowers," and "lovely garden[s]" (Briggs, "Anne Jefferies and 
the Fairies" 176-77). Because time works differently in Fairyland, and because tasting 
these unearthly pleasures often ends tragically for the human, the legends about the 
submerged world of the fairies remain ambivalent. But if the legends eschew happy 
endings, they frequently remam open-ended,9 for, m almost every case, the human visitor 
(or abductee) eventually returns to her own mundane world and, in a many instances, 
pines for the exotic country that appears to be always just out of reach. It is no surpnse, 
then, that a number of legends, including "The Fairies of Merlin's Craig" (Briggs 215-17) 
or "The Fairies ofRothley Mill" (Briggs 217), depict Fairyland as an odd impression or 
"ring" in the earth, as the hill or fort that exists on the margins of the human world-
neither here nor there but somewhere. W. Y. Evans-Wentz puts it in these terms: 
"Fairyland actually exists as an invisible world within which the visible world is 
immersed like an island in an unexplored ocean," and it is "peopled by more species of 
living beings than this world, because imcomparably more vast and varied in its 
possibilities" (52). Moreover, despite its undercurrent of darkness and mystery, the 
otherplace of the little people appears to be a better version of the upperworld of 
nineteenth-century European society, which was becoming tarnished with the coal-dust 
and machinery of the industrial revolution. 10 It is my basic argument in subsequent 
9 Unhke the folktale, whose happy endmg restores order to the world, the legend most often "ends with 
umesolved dissonance" (Rohnch 13) 
10 As Wilham Morns wntes m his utopmn poem, "The Earthly Paradise" (1865), 
Forget six counties overhung with smoke, 
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chapters that utopian fiction and SF of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries explore the 
territory of the legendary Fairyland as a variation on the Elysium, Otherworld, or Earthly 
Paradise popular in European mythology. 
The dwellers of this submerged realm are believed to be remnants of the ancient 
inhabitants of Ireland, the Tuatha de Danaan, the "heroic" fairies of Celtic mythology 
who are most associated with the Earthly Paradise motif in folk legend. Such belief is 
consistent with the Christian interpretation insofar as the fairies are not celestial spirits 
but an earth-dwelling and subterranean species (Hartland 95; Briggs, Dictionary 131; The 
Fairies 6, 8, 12, 23, 24). Briggs elaborates by suggesting that this theory indicates the 
"memory of a more primitive race driven into hiding by the invaders, lurking in caves or 
fens, some of them half-domesticated and doing chores about the houses" (Dictionary 
394). This description constitutes an "anthropological" perspective, which strengthens the 
argument that fairies may have been understood as a "real" but imperceptible race or 
species that possessed certain characteristics comparable to the human race. Together, the 
various theories of fairy origins undoubtedly contributed to a classification system, which 
included the elegant fairy folk, also called the "Good People" or the "little people," as 
well as a whole contingent of lower species, such as bogies, beasts, brownies, tutelary 
spirits, hobgoblins, imps, dwarves, gnomes, and elves. In The Personnel of Fairyland, 
Briggs identifies the three larger categories of fairies as the "heroic," the "trooping," and 
Forget the snortmg steam and ptston stroke, 
Forget the spreadmg of the htdeous town; 
Thmk rather of the pack-horse on the down, 
And dream of London, small and whtte and clean . (11. 1-5) 
Expressmg the senttment of Morns's poem, the hteratt of the Vtctonan penod sought m the sparklmg 
vtswns ofFatryland a means to transform the dystoptan scenano m whtch nature ts at the mercy of the 
factory. 
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the "homely" sort, the first resembling the much older, aristocratic remnant of ancient 
Ireland or Britain (14), the Tuatha de Danaan, the second resembling a more ordinary 
version of the first ( 15), and the third resembling the "common people of fairyland who 
do not go to court" (83). As her description suggests, however, these classes were not 
entirely stable, and the term "fairy" is variously used to refer to the most elegant as well 
as the most monstrous creature. As Briggs elaborates, "The different types of fairy melt 
into each other so much from place to place, and the name of a fairy in one locality is so 
often used for quite a different type in another, that it is very difficult to dogmatize about 
the fairies" (13 ). The changeling in particular, while usually identified as the progeny of 
the fair Good People, resembles members of the "lower" species such as the spiteful 
boggart or the domestic brownie; changelings, dwarves, and brownies are all generally 
characterized as a dark, hairy, ugly, and often irascible lot. All of these denizens struck 
fear into their human counterparts because they were either unidentifiable-points of 
light on the horizon, diminutive creatures dancing under the moonlight-or, on the 
contrary, because they sometimes closely resembled humans. As Richard P. Jenkins 
notes, the Irish fairies were understood to be a 
"society outside society," with its own leaders, the King and the Queen, and its 
own particular problems-the need for healthy children, women to suckle and 
raise them, healthy cattle to feed their folk and safe habitations to house them. It is 
no surprise that these were the same concerns as those of the peasant family. The 
fairies were in part recruited from the peasantry since they were thought to include 
dead ancestors. (314) 
If Fairyland was indeed "immaterial," as popular belief would have it, its proximity to the 
human world nevertheless reinforced the possibility that the utopian "nowhere" was 
actually "nowhere" in the form of a model for new social relations. By both 6 Giollain's 
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and Jenkins's accounts, then, the fairies provided an insight into non-Christian morality 
and, perhaps, a certain form offairy ethics. In such a scenario, humans negotiate claims 
with the fairies in order to ward off disease, produce healthy offspring, and thereby 
maintain economic prosperity. 
In traditional folk narratives involving human economic exchanges with fairies, 
the particular transaction is always characterized as a gesture of hospitality on the part of 
the human. The demand for such a gesture may reflect the "heroic" origin of the fairies, 
for the Tuatha de Danaan were closely associated with the dark and mysterious rites of 
the underworld, and they demanded a reverence comparable to mythological gods. 
Nevertheless, the "fairy economy" is characterized by the more "prosaic" activities of the 
trooping or homely fairies (Briggs, The Personnel of Fairyland 83), and involves the 
"social structure" of "weddings and love-makings between mortals and fairies, fairy 
markets and fairy visits to human markets, of fairy visits to mortal houses, of mortal visits 
to Fairyland, oflending and borrowing and fairy skills" (Briggs, "The Fairy Economy: As 
it may be deduced from a Group of Folk Tales" 533). Such trade and exchange requires a 
human to oblige the request made by one of the fairy contingent, even if the request does 
not fall in the human's immediate favour. "[A]s always in dealing with the fairies," 
Briggs argues, "politeness and modesty are well paid" (533). Briggs further theorizes that, 
while humans-often quite cautiously-attended fairy markets in the hopes of gaining 
favour with the Good People, possibly trading their good grain or cattle, fairies tended to 
visit human markets in order to steal. This may be the reason, Briggs conjectures, why 
"fairies, like the Leprechaun, are credited with great stores of wealth," and also why 
fairies were able to exchange with gold in the first place (534). And yet, neither the 
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monetary nor the barter system could be viewed as the norm, especially since the 
frequency of"borrowing" fundamentally undermined the notion of any proper system, 
and since fairies themselves were difficult to classify, often because they could not 
always be distinguished from their human hosts. 
As a further example of this unusual economy, humans were expected to prepare 
for the imminent arrival of a fairy host by keeping their houses tidy, well stocked, and 
well-heated and by keeping themselves in bed (Gwyndaf 169). "Then the fairy ladies 
would come and wash their babies in the water set ready for them, warm themselves by 
the fire and eat the bread and milk left for them" (Briggs, "The Fairy Economy" 53 5). 11 
Such nightly visitations to mortal homes, Patricia Lysaght claims, were likely associated 
with legends about the activities of the dead who were said to haunt the houses of the 
living (32). These visitations also underscore the importance of fairy invisibility and the 
taboo against interfering in their affairs. The key point here, however, is that the fairies 
initiated situations where such taboos might be broken; the trooping fairies' demand for 
"order" (Briggs, The Personnel of Fairyland 55) was often coupled with the homely 
fairies' penchant for mischief (83). This unpredictable behaviour confirms Briggs's 
theory that the three categories of fairy folk "may well be three aspects of the same 
people" (14). For example, a human host might not be prepared for the fairy host and 
leave her house in disarray, in which case "pinching was the best [she] could expect" 
("The Fairy Economy" 535). Any attempts to prevent such "expropriations," as Jenkins 
calls them (31 0), were usually met with recurrences of such activity, or simply bad luck-
11 Bnggs's summary of the tale "Betty Stogs and the Fames" makes mentwn of the tradttlon m the "htgh 
countnes" m the west of England that "fames often take away the children of lazy, duty mothers, and care 
for them tenderly before returnmg them" (178). 
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meaning, the loss of fairy trade, the loss of cattle, and bad milk. "They can bring disease 
on crops, animals, and humans," Bourke notes, "but by and large, if treated with 
neighborly consideration, they mind their own business and even reward favors" (The 
Burning of Bridget Cleary 32). The implication of all this is that the fairies depended 
upon human economy in order to refashion it in their own terms, and so the actual 
"exchange" was often asymmetrical: a human would lose a crop, a cow, or even a child, 
while the fairies would gain one or all of these items. As 6 Giolhiin elaborates, "Tradition 
held that they called to the door to borrow meal, they enlisted the help of mortal 
midwives, they lent their cows, they saved people from death and bestowed magical 
gifts" ("The Fairy Belief and Official Religion" 201). For, as numerous folklorists have 
argued, fairies desire to extract the essence of human nourishment: the "vitamins and 
nutrients called 'foyson' from our milk or cheese or grain" (Rojcewicz 492) and the 
vigour ofhuman blood (493). Moreover, the fairies desire to instigate a cultural 
transaction, and so this requires an even greater sacrifice from the human race. 
Bourke reinforces this argument, noting that "fairies resemble humans and live 
lives parallel to theirs" (The Burning of Bridget Cleary 31 ). One particular legend, "The 
Fairy Wife," demonstrates the delicacy of the human-fairy economy and the additional 
human taboo against intimate human-fairy relations. While a man is straining potatoes 
one day, a woman visits him on three separate occasions. Upon each visit, the man invites 
the woman into his home; she finally agrees after the third occasion, marries him and 
bears him a son (Briggs, "The Fairy Wife" 171-72). The man visits the harvest fair a year 
later, hoping to commune with some of his relations, but discovers that they do 
everything in their power to avoid him. When he finally approaches them and asks for an 
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explanation, one uncle retorts, "Why shouldn't we avoid you[ ... ] when we hear that you 
have married a fairy woman? If you had come to us first, we would have got a good wife 
for you, and you needn't have taken up with her at all" (172). The uncle then buys his 
nephew a knife and instructs him to kill his wife. The nephew promptly refuses, throwing 
the knife in a nearby lake. When the husband returns, the woman tells him that she knows 
what has transpired, acknowledges her fairy identity, and instead of congratulating the 
man on his chivalry takes up the child and departs from the house-presumably to avoid 
any further threat of violence but more likely as a punishment for his family's 
inhospitable behaviour. 12 But before she leaves, she instructs her human mate in the 
following way: "Every night when you are going to bed, I want you to leave a light 
burning and some food on the table for me. The child and myself will come and eat it" 
(173). As promised, the fairy woman begins to visit the house with her child, and on 
every occasion eats at the kitchen table, which is adjacent to the bed, where the man and 
his new human wife sleep. Upon the second consecutive visit, the man's new wife laughs 
at the woman and her child, and in retaliation, the fairy woman places a curse on the 
man's stock. He loses all but one foal and, in the hopes of saving his household, visits the 
fair once again in order to sell the foal for cash. On his way, he meets a young boy who 
comes out through a door in a cliff on the side of the road. The boy offers to buy the foal 
if the man cannot sell it for more than five pounds. Unable to attract a higher offer at the 
fair, the man promptly returns to the boy. When he meets up with the child again, the man 
is invited inside the cliff where he sees his first wife. She instructs the lad to give him 
12 Sean O'Sullivan suggests that the tale employs the motifF302.3.3.l, "Fairy avenges herself on inconstant 
lover (husband)" ("Notes to the Tales" 272), but I would argue that it does not fit the situation: the man's 
refusal to kill his wife suggests his constancy. 
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three times the amount promised, tells him the boy is his own, and announces that it 
"won't be long until you are well off again" (174). As it happens, the man becomes 
prosperous and is "snug till the day ofhis death." 
There are several items of note here. Primarily, we should recognize the emphasis 
on hospitality throughout: the man invites the woman into his home, mates with her, and, 
when she departs, follows through on her request to prepare the home for her imminent 
return; similarly, the man accepts the offer of the young boy-presumably a fairy-human 
"hybrid"-in an economic transaction; however, the man also refuses the request of his 
own family to kill the fairy woman; finally, the man's new wife interrupts the privacy of 
the fairy woman and mocks her quiet ritual. The last two examples underscore the tension 
between the fairy and human worlds and particularly the fear that the "little folk" could 
quite easily infiltrate the human economy and the sacred institution of marriage. These 
instances also indicate the limits of hospitality: 1) a human can potentially alienate 
himself from his own kind ifhe shows too much hospitality to the fairies; 2) on the other 
hand, a human can alienate himself from the fairies if he shows too much loyalty to his 
own kind. If hospitality relates to the breach of a familial or communal code, as I have 
suggested here, the breach was often manifested in other ways, including disease and 
famine. In folktales that focus on the "people ofthe otherworld" 13 we find a consistent 
motif of fairy-related afflictions and diseases: "fairy-struck" children or adults, which 
meant that individuals had been hit with the "blast," or the host of fairies that rush down 
certain lanes or pathways in the Irish countryside; "fairy-struck" cattle (Jenkins 315-18), 
which meant that cows had been afflicted by a disease that would debilitate or kill them, 
13 The sub-section of 0 'Sullivan's Folktales of Ireland in which we find "The Fairy Wife." 
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and ultimately deprive the family of one important source of sustenance. In the case of the 
present tale, the disturbance and mockery of a very intimate fairy ritual lead to retaliation 
in the form of a curse on the husband's cattle. The ritual of hospitality then (for example, 
allowing a woman to warm herself by the fire and feed her child) could be understood as 
a way of acknowledging the vulnerability oflife, especially given the delicacy of an 
economy based largely on agriculture, where crops were at the mercy of the elements and 
where crop failure could mean poverty and death to the afflicted family. In many ways, 
rural life was dependent on favours and gifts, especially since famine (in Ireland, for 
example) was an inevitable part of life. 
The vulnerability of the economy was such that familial and social relations were 
held under close scrutiny: if a man made a bad deal or exchange, he could bring ruin to 
his household; similarly, if a man made a poor choice of a wife, her ineptitude or 
proficiency could spell ruin (either from an error in judgement or a deliberate deception). 
Indeed, the fairy wife poses a major threat to the uncles who claim to know what a "good 
wife" means (O'Sullivan, "The Fairy Wife" 172): presumably, a woman who would not 
be so assertive as this one, but more importantly, a woman who would not have so much 
power to come and go as she pleases, to make demands on men, and to ultimately control 
the terms and conditions ofhousehold finance. As is typical with legends, we do not get 
much in the way of characterization, and yet it is apparent that the man is the dupe of the 
fairy woman, a little witless in the ways of the world, especially considering that his 
uncles need to inform him that his wife is not human. On the other hand, the husband 
does not wish to cause the fairy woman or his own household (including his new witless 
wife) any further harm and resumes the flow of the economy through that final 
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transaction with his hybrid son. 
This newly enunciated relation is constructed on the principle of hospitality, 
which is most effectively presented in "The Fairy Wife" as the territorial conflict between 
fairy and human. At the same time, this struggle reinforces the inherent problem of a 
certain kind ofhospitality-one that is bound by conditions: 
[the] law of hospitality[ ... ] violently imposes a contradiction on the very concept 
of hospitality in fixing a limit to it, in de-termining it: hospitality is certainly, 
necessarily, a right, a duty, an obligation, the greeting of the foreign other [!'autre 
etranger] as a friend but on the condition that the host, the Wirt, the one who 
receives, lodges or gives asylum remains the patron, the master of the household, 
on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his own home. (Derrida, 
"Hostipitality" [2000] 4; original emphases) 
Derrida, of course, is speaking of the "hospitality" that we generally understand, the kind 
we offer to friends, and even to foreigners, providing they express their gratitude and do 
not impose upon our generosity. In the ideal situation, hospitality occurs when one "host" 
receives another with a laugh and a smile, happy or joyous ("Hostipitality" [2002] 359). 
Further, even at its basic level as a form of neighbourly kindness, hospitality is structured 
around a figure of authority-a "master of the house," in Derrida's description. As we 
saw in "The Fairy Wife," the husband's relations urge him to enforce his domestic power 
and to be ruthlessly vigilant against fairy intrusions. To assume such authority means that 
one has the power to evaluate each and every request for asylum (you are welcome, but 
you are not!), demarcate a specific location for that asylum (you can sleep here, but not 
there!), and determine the duration (you are welcome as long as you leave tomorrow!). 
Moreover, in returning to the question of responsibility and obligation, Derrida reminds 
us of the essential tyranny and violence of selfhood, and of the "being-oneself in one's 
own home" ("Hostipitality" [2000] 4; original emphases) that displaces rather than 
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welcomes the other The new social relatwn descnbed above, and especially outhned m 
subsequent sectwns, undemunes this authonty of the "host" by redefimng hospitahty as a 
form of parasitism, a "radical hospitahty," as Dernda descnbes elsewhere, which consists 
m "recezvzng wzthout znvztatwn, beyond or before the mvitatlon" ("Hostlpitahty" [2002] 
360, ongmal emphasis) The husband m "The Fmry Wife" apparently perceives the 
tyranny of a rule-bound hospitahty and, With the patience and passive kmdness of a Job, 
relmqmshes his mastery to the mvadmg "host," the fa1ry woman As I demonstrate below, 
the changelmg (to which category we must add the fmry wife and her hybnd child) 
Imtlates such a radical hospitahty smce It IS not mvited and smce It contmues to demand 
hospitahty long after It enters the home, we host the this other and become, m tum, Its 
hostage 
II The Changelmg as Naughty or Precocwus Child 
At the apona of all transactwns m the fmry economy IS the changehng, which 
remforces the notwn that Fa1ryland IS a realm oftransformatwn rather than stasis As 
Bnggs descnbes, the changelmg was a fmry secretly exchanged for a human child at 
mfancy (Dzctwnary 70) One vanatwn of the motif14 can be descnbed as follows A fairy 
couple visits a specially selected human couple and calls upon them for an emergency 
favour, usually a request to feed thelf hungry, wmhng chlld While the fmry husband 
distracts the parents' attentwn, the fmry Wife sneaks mto the human mfant's room, 
14 Stith Thompson's Motif-Index ofFolk-Lzterature IS the basis for most scholarly discussiOns of general 
"categones" (or themes) and specific "motifs" m folk narrative The large Six-volume compendmm mcludes 
the followmg maJor categones A Mythological Motifs, B Ammals, C Tabu, D Magic, E The Dead, and 
F Marvels It IS this last category that mostly concerns me smce It mcludes such mdividual motifs as F200, 
Fames, F21 0, Fatryland, F251, Ongm of fames, and F321 1, Changeling 
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snatches him from his cradle, and substitutes the changeling in his place (116-17). The 
implication here is that the substitution serves the purpose of acquiring nourishment that 
is unavailable in the fairy realm (Skjelbred 220; Eberly 234; Jenkins 315), and it was 
theorized that fairies specifically required human milk (Briggs, The Fairies 116). Tales 
that actually describe the details of the abduction, and identify the culprits in the moment 
of the exchange, were less frequent, and in most cases the parents only discover that a 
switch has been made after the fact, when the child begins to exhibit strange behaviour. 
For the most part, it is only the changeling, and not the fairies themselves, that make an 
appearance in the legend. In any event, the human understanding of hospitality is 
radically undermined. As the vehicle for the truth claims in legends (Oring 125), and as 
the intermediary for philosophical enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy? 64-65), the changeling begins to answer the fundamental questions, "What is 
it? Why is it so? What can be done about it?" (Degh 74). Despite its relation to other, 
fantastical figures of the Marc hen or folktale, the changeling is in a certain sense the 
persona par excellence of the legend, for, while it poses as a double or deformed 
substitute, it enunciates primordial human questions through recognizably human speech 
and action. The changeling is the most human of the nonhuman personae featured in such 
folk narratives; but we still want to know, "What is it?" 
Silver offers a fairly comprehensive description of this creature. 
If the changeling, as was most usual, took the form of a child, the child had an old, 
distorted face, a small or wizened body, and dark or sallow skin, and was often 
backward in learning to walk or speak. Some changed children were active though 
monstrous little beings; others were immobile, doll-like wooden creatures who 
soon lost all semblance of life, becoming 'stocks.' But whether child or adult in 
form, the changeling was a creature noteworthy for its gluttony and peevishness, 
its lack ofheart or soul, and its strange, malicious, or ungovernable spirit. (60) 
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The suggestion here is that the fairy folk, despite their frequent indulgence in merry-
making and dancing, are quite dependent upon the human race and, in fact, survive by 
constantly infiltrating the human community (Briggs, The Fairies 95). Most fairy births, 
as the legends indicate, are unsuccessful unless a human midwife is present to deliver the 
child and give suck to it; even then, the infant often languishes in the early stages, and 
displays all the signs of a failure to thrive: the shrivelled and atrophied limbs, the 
darkened or hairy skin, and the fractious and ill-tempered behaviour. And so, we might 
ask, "Why is it so?" My subsequent discussion of four changeling legends offers at least 
two answers. At its most basic level, the changeling undermines the human domestic 
realm by imposing upon the parents and by refusing to abide by their authority, or their 
mastery in the household, as Derrida says. Accordingly, the first two legends I discuss 
present the changeling as simply an uncommonly naughty child. And yet, the particular 
brand of disobedience in each case is interpreted as an aggressive act of anarchy. 
"Johnnie in the Cradle" tells of an infant who was "always crying and never 
satisfied." During market day, his mother asks her neighbour, a tailor, to mind the child 
for the day. While he is sitting by the fire, the child, who is only a few months old, asks if 
his mother and father are away. Then he asks for a bottle of scotch from the press. Then 
he asks for a set of pipes and, when the request is granted, plays a lovely little tune. The 
tailor is convinced that the child is a fairy and tells the parents when they return. The 
father responds by setting the griddle on high flame until it is red hot, then throws on a 
bagful of horse manure; he then threatens to grab the changeling, but it escapes and flies 
up the chimney, crying out as it flees, "I wish I had been longer with my mother. I'd a 
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kent [known] her better" (Briggs, "Johnnie in the Cradle" 290). 
The opening of this tale seems to indicate a mundane, domestic drama, and the 
"changeling," as it appears here, is simply an extremely naughty child that is also quite ill. 
However, his demand for whisky and his delight in music suggest adult and, as we 
discover, notable fairy pastimes. Moreover, the tale illuminates the ambiguous social 
position of the fairies: they are at once an aristocratic collective and a plebeian 
contingent. While one of their euphemistic titles is the "Good People" or "the gentry,"15 
which automatically associates them with the heroic fairies of ancient Britain, they are 
also obviously associated with the more mischievous, "homely" sort that engage in 
common or household activities. The individual changeling-original "fairy stock," but 
now on its own and vulnerable to the same threats as any human child-demystifies the 
notion of a fairy host, especially associated with the heroic or trooping fairies. For it was 
assumed by many Victorians, at least unconsciously, that fairies operated as a collective 
and carried out their tasks as a "faceless mob" (Silver 166); the fairies are indeed a 
"host," in the Derridean sense, but also manifest themselves quite visibly and individually 
in the form of changelings. On the one hand, Johnnie, as the child substitute, functions as 
the primary mechanism in an exchange that would clearly benefit the fairy collective: 
fairies require healthy human children in order to reinvigorate their ailing race, and they 
will steal children to suit these needs. On the other hand, Johnnie is a vulnerable fairy 
child, detached from his parents and his people and subject to all manner of abuse. Where 
do our sympathies lie in this case: with the substitute in the home or with the original 
15 Accordmg to 6 Gwlhim, both "the good people" and "the gentry" were terms of respect mdtcatmg the 
"taboo known m many soctetles on mentwnmg sacred names" ("The Fatry Behef and Offictal Rehgwn" 
201-02). 
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child who has been abducted? The point here is that a substitute is not easy to identify, 
especially since, in most changeling narratives, the actual abduction has already taken 
place before the story begins. As I suggest in the previous section, this ambivalence is 
necessary for the "transaction" to run smoothly. However, this does not mean that a 
violent conflict is inevitable. Rather, the tale reminds us that hospitality is not possible 
without conflict and, on occasion, violence. A happy outcome-the return of the 
original-is only possible after the threat of violence, and even then the substitution itself 
has undermined the preconceived notion of a human-fairy distinction. 
Another tale, "A Fairy Changeling: I," further underscores this dilemma of 
determining origins by introducing supernatural elements. Pyramus Gray and his wife 
Milly Heme have a child named Potamus. One day while she is working, Milly leaves her 
child on the grass near her. The next day, she goes "begging" with the four-month-old 
child and discovers that, when she takes her eye off it for a matter of seconds, nuts and 
cakes mysteriously appear in its little jumper. After numerous recurrences of this event, 
Milly begins to fear that her baby is a "fairy child." One day while crossing a river, she 
slips on a stepping-stone and falls in to her waist. "Oh dear, we shall be drownded!" she 
says. The child looks up into her face and responds, "Oh, no, Mammy, we shan't!" Now 
that she is convinced the child is a fairy, she asks the parson for advice. He tells her to 
spank the baby until it cries and hide behind a bush for a quarter of an hour. She spanks 
the child, and when she returns, "the baby was black and blue, but it was her own child. 
There were no more cakes, and the baby did not speak till it was the right age" (Briggs, 
"A Fairy Changeling: I" 221). 
Like the previous tale, the changeling in this one has a name which initially 
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identifies its human origin. "Potamus" seems a rather pleasant little baby who happens to 
be the focal point of a mysterious occurrence. While she is well-behaved, the appearance 
of the food in her clothes identifies her as a mischievous trouble-maker. The mother, 
Milly, is of course very suspicious, and her assumptions are confirmed by the child's 
precocious ability to speak. Indeed, the sudden exclamation, "Oh, no, Mammy, we 
shan't!" with the child looking up into the mother's face, has an eerie ring to it and clearly 
evokes in the parent a certain feeling of horror. The precocious speech may also signify 
demonic possession, which, if we recall 6 Giollain's description above, was part of the 
same "popular" interpretation of the supernatural. Such an interpretation is confirmed if 
we consider that the mother seeks the assistance of the local parson. Presumably skilled in 
the knowledge of the spirit world as well as that of the fairies, the parson nevertheless 
advises a punishment fit for a disobedient child. In what appears to be the great irony of 
the narrative, the mother and her religious advisor treat benevolence as an aggressive act 
and the exotic gifts as an insidious form of trickery. How do we account for this 
response? Certainly, as Briggs and others have noted, the fairies were known to offer gifts 
on occasion, and many considered such an occurrence with great anticipation. However, 
it was also believed that fairies offered food in particular as a way of luring humans into 
Fairyland, where, in some instances, the particular abductee is trapped for years or for the 
rest ofhis life (Bourke, The Burning of Bridget Cleary 121). On the other hand, not 
partaking of the unearthly pleasures frequently leads the returned abductees to pine for 
Fairyland for the rest of their mortal lives. While it is difficult to discern the significance 
of the mysterious food in "A Fairy Changeling: I" (beyond the initial suggestion that it 
identifies fairy agency), I would argue that it has a definitive, and therefore dangerous, 
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meaning for the human mother: if the food is being offered to her, then the gesture is 
potentially aggressive since she may succumb to the fairy power and fall into "oblivion" 
(Bourke 121). As with the previous tale, we may feel that such a reaction constitutes 
paranoia, even while, as I have stated earlier, folk legends such as these may have 
functioned as warnings against overstepping certain established boundaries. In particular, 
these two legends offer warnings to children who step out of line-who complain too 
frequently, speak out of turn, or behave in an eccentric manner-and to parents who 
allow them to do so. Taking our prompt from Linda Degh, we might now ask: What, 
indeed, "can be done about" (74) the changeling? 
In a general way legends like "Johnnie in the Cradle" and "A Fairy Changeling: I" 
supplied a metaphorical language for dealing with outsiders or those within the 
community that had transgressed established moral boundaries. An adult who was 
behaving promiscuously or who had odd habits might be called a "fairy" or said to be "in 
the fairies" (Narvaez 343), while a child who was overly cranky or precocious beyond his 
years might be called a "little changeling." Though the frequency of such epithets may 
suggest habitual communal response, the treatment of some "fairies" and "changelings" 
were sometimes violent if not downright cruel. Bourke (The Burning of Bridget Cleary 
37-39), Eberly (232-33), and others cite numerous cases from the 1820s through to the 
1890s of suspected changelings throughout Britain and Ireland who were starved, burned, 
whipped, or butchered. Yet it would be hasty to admit such evidence as an indication of 
"barbaric" behaviour, or at least to isolate these tales as an indication of a certain group's 
barbarism. Indeed, even in our contemporary period "satanic or ritualistic abuse" is "still 
widespread" (Bottoms, Shaver and Goodman 1 ), and there are plenty of "fictional" 
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examples (particularly in films like The Exorcist [1973] 16 and Frailty [2001] 17) to 
suggest, if not the connection between fantasy and reality, at least the figurative attempt 
to comprehend such occurrences of abuse, ritual or otherwise. So, while changeling tales 
may have been intended in some instances as cautionary messages, I would argue that 
they were also intelligent attempts to comprehend insubordination as well the human 
capacity for intolerance and violence. 
We pity Johnnie because he is a threatened child-a fairy changeling, yes, an 
upstart, certainly, but also an infant who is beguiled into friendship only to be driven out 
of his new home with the hot flame of a griddle. He is monstrous because he behaves 
almost like an adult human-an old man in an infant's body; and yet his humanity comes 
out in his final pathetic lament: "I wish I had been longer with my mother. I'd a kent 
[known] her better." Whose "mother" might he be referring to-his adopted one, or his 
"fairy" mother? While Johnnie's departure may give the parents-and the audience-a 
sigh of relief, we should remember that no human child reappears. This is certainly an 
ominous gap, and it may lead us to wonder who (or where) the real child is and, if, in fact, 
Johnnie was the original, despite the apparent revelation of his fairy ancestry. Consider 
also the conclusion to the other tale. The real Potamus is returned, we are told, but she is 
covered with bruises: while the mother only intends to abuse the alien child, she winds up 
hurting her own. One of the "messages" in these two tales might be that true hospitality 
16 In this film, the demon-possessed child, Regan, IS subjected to a ntualized exorcism-holy water, 
depnvatwn, IsolatiOn, and physical abuse-that has stnkmg similanties to the changeling tale. 
17 In this film, a father enlists the help of his two devoted sons m order to destroy the "demons" that have 
mfiltrated small-town Amenca (as a sign of the Apocalypse). After an angelic vision, the father tells his 
sons that they have been mvested with "special powers" that will enable them to "see the demons," and that 
they will be provided with "magical weapons" m order to carry out their holy task. He makes a pomt of 
explammg to the boys that "destroymg demons IS a good thmg," while "killing people IS bad" 
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cannot be restricted to one's family, community, or racial group. Understood in this way, 
hospitality provides the space for "philosophical enunciations," as Deleuze and Guattari 
say, and the crossover of conceptual personae (70-71 ). According to this perspective, both 
the changeling and the child emerge as conceptual personae, especially as they each 
contend for a particular territory: the home. I return to this issue in subsequent sections, 
especially as I move closer to a discussion of "hybridity," which provides an additional 
way of conceptualizing the crossover effect of personae and an additional way of 
answering the questions, "What is it? Why is it so? What can be done about it?" 
III: The Changeling as Monster 
As Briggs's description of the fairy economy reminds us, the fairies were often as 
vigilant in their own attempts to demarcate boundaries as were their human counterparts. 
And yet, the changeling motif locates the moment where particular borders are crossed 
and codes of conduct breached. Further, while it is true that Victorian "fiction, folklore, 
and painting all depict fairies at war with each other," and while the "internecine battles" 
in such depictions "become symbolic of fairies' anarchical tendencies" (Silver 162), the 
folk legends I discuss suggest the alternate view of a marginalized race or species 
attempting to survive the inroads of human morality and industry. As J. A. MacCulloch 
had suggested back in the 1930s, the popular legends about "dwarfs, or elfins, migrating 
usually because of men and their ways" suggest '"the oppression and expulsion of an 
actual aboriginal race by newcomers"' ("Were Fairies an Earlier Race of Men?" 371).18 
18 MacCulloch does not mdtcate wtthm the essay who he 1s quotmg m th1s mstance, although h1s last cited 
source, Sr. H H. Johnston, IS a hkely possibility. 
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Moreover, both the Victorian portrayals and the individual folk legends underscore the 
primary disadvantage of a group that may be on the verge of extinction: child 
substitutions certainly suggest acts of desperation, however ugly or unpleasant they 
appear to the victims and their parents. At the same time, and given the subtlety of 
legends like the two previous ones, fairies do not act only out of revenge or desperation. 
Abductions, while inherently violent, also indicate the fairies' intention to negotiate with 
human communities. The changeling may then be understood as both the impasse and the 
opening up of future relations-the failed progeny on the one hand (fairy substitute), and 
the thriving progeny on the other (human infant). If the fairy economy is a human 
creation and represents human anxieties, as suggested in "The Fairy Wife," then the 
changeling legend speaks to communities and perhaps individuals that also feel 
marginalized and vulnerable to the effects of declining economy and health. While the 
disobedient or precocious child in "Johnnie in the Cradle" or "A Fairy Changeling: I" 
may evoke in the parents a certain sense of outrage, the sick or deformed child in other 
versions of the legend certainly evokes in the same parents a definite sense of awe and 
horror. Moreover, the changeling seemed to demarcate a congenitally afflicted child 
whose disease was itself emblematic of the tension between a residual primitive world 
view that employed myth to articulate mysterious phenomena and a dominant scientific 
world view that sought to diagnose what otherwise remained unutterable. 
Two brief examples can help to elaborate on this link between changelings and 
physical monstrosity. 
"The Caerlaverock Changeling" tells of a newborn infant "observed on the second 
day after its birth, and before it had been baptized, to have become fractious, deformed, 
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and ill-favoured." At times, the child would bite at his mother's breasts, and on other 
occasions he would lie eerily still in her arms or in the cradle. The mother asks the servant 
girl to mind the child for the day. She complains aloud in the child's presence that now 
she will be unable to tend to her regular chores. Without hesitation, the newborn jumps 
out of its cradle and sets to work on the chores (winnowing the com, grinding the meal, 
and so forth). The mother is worried when she is told of this, but the servant girl knows 
what to do. That same night, she blows up the fire until it glows, undresses the infant and 
tosses it onto the blazing coals, then exclaims: "In the name of God, bring back the 
bairn." Immediately, the window flies up, the real child is laid on the mother's lap, and 
the "wee de[ v ]il'' flies up the chimney laughing (Briggs, "The Caerlaverock Changeling" 
194). 
"The Fairy Changeling: II" tells of a baby that never grows, is always hungry, 
never satisfied, and lies in its cradle year after year, unable to walk. Also, its "face [is] 
hairy and strange-looking." The mother's older son comes home from war and notices the 
change: this is not his brother, the older son tells her. He gets an egg, blows out its 
contents, fills it with malt and hops, and then begins to brew it over the fire. At this, a 
laugh comes from the cradle. "I am old, ever so old," says the "changeling," "but I never 
saw a soldier brewing beer in an eggshell before." When the soldier goes for him, the 
child gives a shriek, jumps up out of the cradle, and vanishes through the door. When the 
soldier goes out after him, he meets his "long-lost brother," now a "fine and healthy" 
young man of twenty-four. As the young man tells them, the "fairies had kept him in a 
beautiful palace under the rocks, and fed him on the best of everything! He should never 
be so well off again, he said, but when his mother called him, he had to come home" 
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(Briggs, "The Fairy Changeling: II" 221-22). 19 
Both the children in these tales exhibit eccentric behaviour and suffer from 
debilitating illnesses, and therefore provide both inward and outward signs of 
supernatural agency. As a further indication of the "syncretism" of popular religion, the 
deformed bodies of the unnamed changelings may have signified the work of Satanic 
forces, as Jenkins has said in regards to nineteenth-century interpretations. Back in the 
sixteenth century, as it has been well-noted by a number of scholars, Martin Luther 
described a changeling he had seen in Dessau, Germany that possessed similar 
characteristics, and felt with much conviction that the creature was "diabolical in origin"; 
in fact, he made no clear distinction between the incubus and the changeling (Hartland 
1 09; Munro 264; Silver 61 ). Both tales beg for this interpretation given the fact that the 
child in "The Caerlaverock Changeling" is specifically described as not having been 
baptized, while the "nameless" child (which we find in both tales) also indicates that it 
has not been christened (Munro 256): the baptism of a newborn child was considered an 
important ritual in both the Christian and pagan religion, for the reason that an 
unchristened child was vulnerable to both demonic and fairy powers (Skjelbred 215-26). 
Moreover, it is a special mark ofthe changeling's persona that its physical deformities in 
particular designate it as unnatural, and, given Luther's testimony, explain why it has the 
capacity to proliferate into other forms. Indeed, to adapt what Deleuze and Guattari have 
19 This legend IS often Identified by the motif, "The Brewery of Eggshells." While some scholars attnbute 
the tale to Bnttsh collector Ella Mary Leather (1876-1928) or the Australian folklonst Joseph Jacobs (1854-
1916), others attnbute It to the older Insh folk populanzer, T. Crofton Croker (1798-1854). See, for 
example, W. B. Yeats's Irzsh Fazry and Folk Tales, pp 66-68. As a "migratory legend" (see Degh 56), the 
"brewery of eggshells" was clearly a vanant known to the Gnmms, for a tale very similar m structure to 
"The Fatry Changeling: II" 1s to be found among therr other Haus-Marchen (see Complete Fazry Tales, No. 
12, p. 37). 
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said in regards to conceptual personae, both the child and the changeling, once they have 
been exchanged, refer simultaneously to each other (What Is Philosophy? 70). And if we 
consider those first two changeling tales, such proliferation makes it difficult to identify 
each persona: this changeling presented for the Christian, as it did for the pagan, a 
chimera-or, to be more precise, a monstrosity. 
While the various religious interpretations presented here (including the 
"spiritualist" ones fashionable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) are part 
and parcel of "fairy belief," there was an additional interpretation that could perhaps 
make the best claim for veracity. As both Eberly and Munro discuss in provocative 
articles, folk legends about changelings were considered by doctors to be explanations for 
birth defects. After citing several legends similar to the two described above, Eberly 
poses the question: Is it legitimate, at least from a scientific point of view, to argue that 
the children/changelings featured in these tales actually have congenital disorders? Citing 
scientific evidence-"today [early 1990s] about one baby in twenty is born with a 
congenital anomaly" (235)-Eberly asserts that "changelings" were likely folk 
descriptions of children that suffered from mental retardation, central nervous system 
disorders, and physical malformation. For example, the "wild dance" of the changeling in 
tales where the creature is partial to music "may in fact describe the movements of a 
person with severe cerebral palsy" (236). Eberly offers further examples: spina bifida, 
which leads to an enlarged head, often due to hydrocephaly or "water on the brain," may 
correspond to another common changeling feature: an ugly and enlarged head (235); 
progeria, a premature aging syndrome, may correspond to the changeling's "old man" 
appearance; Williams's syndrome, hypercalcemia, or "Elfin facies" syndrome, may 
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explain the changeling's pretty, elfin, but retarded appearance (237); lastly, Hurler's and 
Hunter's syndromes (formerly called "gargoylism"), which involve gradual 
transformations over time, where the "normal" child changes to a ugly, hairy, sallow, and 
retarded one, may in fact explain to some degree the sickly and hairy appearance of the 
changeling (237). As a final note, it was observed in the medical profession of the 
twentieth century that a child with Williams's, Hurler's, or Hunter's syndrome bore more 
resemblance to another similarly afflicted child than to its own parents. "Perhaps," Eberly 
conjectures, "it was in drawing conclusions about the similarities among such 'different' 
children that people arrived at their descriptions of some of the fairy 'races"' (23 7). 
Here, then, the changeling comes more into view for us: s/he is not simply a 
naughty child but a monstrous one, and both religion and science can claim to offer proof 
on the matter. In fact, Munro in particular demonstrates how medical science in the first 
half of the twentieth century appropriated the "changeling" as a convenient diagnosis for 
the otherwise inexplicable phenomenon of congenital disease: before this time, doctors 
could only identify such children as cases of "a failure to thrive" (265-75). If we come 
back to the last two legends discussed, we find curious descriptions of a child who is 
"fractious" and "deformed" ("The Caerlaverock Changeling), and of another who "never 
grows," "never walk[s]," is "always hungry," and whose "face was hairy and strange-
looking" ("The Fairy Changeling: II"). According to Eberly's description, while the first 
series of characteristics may correspond to any number of congenital diseases (spina 
bifida perhaps?), the second series may very well refer to the once very common 
condition of a "wasting disease" like polio and tuberculosis, which had the linked 
symptoms of"ravenous appetite, irritability, failure to thrive, [and] small size" (Eberly 
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238). Additionally, it is very possible that this second changeling suffered from a case of 
Hurler's or Hunter's disease, considering its hairy appearance. The folk legend-scientific 
parallel is, then, striking and, to some degree, convincing. Munro notes that appropriate 
medical treatment was often not widely available in the nineteenth century, and that the 
foundling hospitals of the early twentieth century-intended as asylums for real 
"changelings"-were so poorly organized that, of the children who were admitted before 
the age of one year, "almost one hundred percent did not live until their second birthday" 
(Munro 265). Such facts may encourage a more nuanced view towards changeling tales 
and the real-life stories of changeling abuse, and should reinforce the idea that the legends 
functioned at least partially as traditional diagnoses of conditions that otherwise had no 
name (279). An unnamed disease that was simultaneously manifested made the 
changeling a visible threat. The very fact that there was a "standardized" description of 
changeling children-i.e., particular physical and mental characteristics that clearly 
identified a "changeling" as such-offers some support for the argument that parents 
were already diagnosing what the physicians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
could not yet name. Taking their cue from these legends and the parental interpretations, 
Munro says, doctors could tackle the problem of congenital disease by accumulating the 
already established list of recurring features, and then go one step further and establish 
names, diagnoses, and possible treatments. Moreover, like the congenital afflictions that 
involve transformation (e.g., Hurler's or Hunter's syndrome), the conceptual persona of 
the changeling experiences a metamorphosis under the "medical gaze" (Munro 253), now 
branching off into an additional persona: the monster. 
Referencing David J. Hufford's argument, Munro argues that modem medicine's 
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"relatively recent concern with the failure to thrive syndrome suggests that in this case, 
'folk knowledge is sometimes well in advance of scientific knowledge"' (252). Such an 
assertion denotes the historical frame of reference in which the changeling operates, 
giving us a sense of the chronological passage from one taxonomy to another. However, 
medical science's "appropriation" of folklore could not have only been a one-way 
transaction. In fact, rather than confining the changeling to a single new paradigm, 
medical science adds a new complexity to this conceptual persona by both contributing a 
new taxonomy ("cerebral palsy," "Hurler's" and "Hunter's" syndromes) and 
acknowledging the legitimacy and value of an older taxonomy (the "fairy changeling"). 
Eberly's and Munro's arguments for a parallel between the two "fields" of knowledge 
denote also the conceptual frame of reference in which the changeling operates, giving us 
a sense of the movements from one terrain to the next, and, most notably, the potential for 
crossover and fusion. In other words, our second attempt to answer the questions, "What 
is it?" and "Why is it so?" does not eliminate our original answer; and we should refuse to 
believe, as Munro does, that changeling tales relate primarily to "the failure of the parent-
infant bond" (252), which is itself a psychiatric imposition that would eliminate the 
complexity of the legends we have already considered. When we look back to the two 
legends, "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II," we can identify 
individual personae: the child, who is "ill-favoured," "never satisfied," and who upsets 
the entire household with its irritability and its "long crying sessions"; the fairy, who in 
one instance magically flies up the chimney, and in another gives an eccentric speech on 
its age before it vanishes out the door; and the monster, who frightens the parents with its 
peculiar hairy face. The more interpretations we introduce, the more conceptual personae 
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appear. So, if, by the mid-nineteenth century, "changeling traits, physical ugliness-
especially large heads and stunted bodies-sallow skin and dark hair, gluttonous 
appetites, and disruptive behaviour were, in effect, codified" (Silver 62), the individual 
laws, rules, and classifications formulated by the medical profession depended upon 
collective personae to give them form. If most dictionaries define "changeling" as a child 
secretly exchanged for another at infancy or a person of deficient intelligence,20 they 
identify two important features of the changeling: it has both human and nonhuman 
qualities, and for this reason is a species either beneath or beyond human scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, far from narrowing the range of investigation, changeling tales 
that feature visible deformities actually expand our view; and if we opt for a more 
powerful microscope, we are still forced to follow in terrible tangents the personae 
scurrying under the lens. 
The similarities between the afflicted children that contributed to the 
conceptualization of "some of the fairy 'races"' (Eberly 23 7) also contribute to the 
potential alliance between the changeling and its related personae (child, fairy, and 
monster). As Silver suggests, the noted changeling traits that were taken to be 
descriptions of congenital malformation indicate that this entity was something akin to the 
dwarf who was generally described as "ancient-looking," ugly, hairy, and wizened. 
"Often responsible for changelings," Silver adds, "they were sometimes themselves the 
substitutes" (124). The abductions, then, reinforce the tricksy nature ofthe fairy folk and 
the difficulty of categorizing them into social or racial classes. The "good" people, 
moreover, were not always fair in appearance, and so the emphasis on the apparent 
20 See note 3. 
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deformity of the changeling indicates once again the popular-and usually colonial-
strategy of stigmatizing the racial "other." But the changeling remained a resilient 
persona for the reason that, in the larger corpus of British narrative, it generally signified 
change, substitution, and exchanging one thing for the other, rather than a particular 
racial type. Moreover, if as Carl Haffter notes, "The changeling was the child of nature 
demons of semi-human form which lived under the earth or in the water, of brownies, 
pixies, fairies and the 'good people"' (56), it was also, by definition, a human substitute, 
or the healthy infant abducted and carried away into Fairyland. The changeling, that is, 
enunciates the dynamic alliance between conceptual personae. 
A tale such as "The Fairy Changeling: II" moves closer to what Derrida calls a 
radical hospitality by underscoring the limits of hospitality as it is usually understood 
(and here I echo a point made earlier): while a human can potentially alienate himself 
from his own kind if he shows too much hospitality to the fairies, he can alienate himself 
from the fairies if he shows too much loyalty to his own kind. While the younger son is 
ultimately recovered-from both his affliction and the "custody of the fairies" (Munro 
260)-he expresses some regret at having to leave his benevolent hosts who "fed him on 
the best of everything!" This regret may also signify the "recovery" of the human-fairy 
relation, which at the beginning of the tale was characteristically hostile, and a 
redefinition of the boundaries that would normally constrain the interaction ofboth 
human and fairy. Even if we can isolate singular movements of each persona, the 
movement of one corresponds to that of another; and if we translate "changeling" into 
"child" (deformed or not), we cannot banish the one without doing the same to the other, 
especially when we look back to a tale like "A Fairy Changeling: I" where both 
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changeling and child suffer from the mother's lashing. By this account, then, we cannot 
go the other way and translate "child" into "changeling," at least not without humanizing 
the changeling in the process. Moreover, changelings have this remarkable feature: by 
initiating a breach in codes of conduct, they also initiate the perversion of purity. It is this 
perversion that allows us to sympathize with the insubordinate or deformed changeling-
as-fairy, and to sympathize with the subaltern fairy community's fertility problems 
(Bourke, The Burning of Bridget Cleary 41): reading these legends quite literally, we can 
say that the fairies abduct human children because they are rarely able to produce their 
own healthy infants. Reading the legends metaphorically, we discover a narrative about 
human fertility problems. The changeling, then, simultaneously straddles the human and 
fairy worlds: it is a substitute, waiting in limbo, detached from its fairy parents, and 
finding neither comfort nor care from its adopted parents. It is truly, according to the 
definition, a monster: an "imaginary creature that is large, ugly, and frightening"; "an 
amazing event or occurrence; a prodigy, a marvel"; "a fetus, neonate, or individual with a 
gross congenital malformation, usually of a degree incompatible with life."21 The 
changeling's nonhuman origin makes it possible to conceive ofthe human and 
underscores the notion that any origin as such is "monstrous" since we are, all of us, 
substitutes of substitutes-not spontaneous creations but bloody, pulpy works in progress, 
"formless, mute, infant, and terrifying" (Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences" 534). The human comes in the form of the nonhuman. 
The changeling tale, then, presents a fictional narrative that explores human origins 
through interaction and exchange with a nonhuman species. 
21 See entry in the online OED. 
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IV: The Changeling as Hybrid 
Given the prominence of the theory that the "fairies were in part recruited from 
the peasantry since they were thought to include dead ancestors" (Jenkins 314 ), it could 
be further argued that these folk legends narrate the very process of human evolution, 
from an ancient and legendary species to a modern one. On the one hand, this belief 
seemed to be reinforced by a Social Darwinist view: "In both fantasy and reality," Silver 
argues, "changelings were increasingly associated with the Darwinian notion of groups or 
races that had not ultimately triumphed, particularly with 'inferior human experiments' of 
which only a few examples had 'survived'" (85-86). This perspective also gave rise to the 
belief that the peasantry who believed in such tales was therefore a primitive underclass, 
uncivilized and barbaric in its behaviour, capable of the type of anarchy and savagery 
described in fairy legend. In fact, the well-documented cases of "changeling abuse," 
which occurred among poor or working-class Irish and British families, helped to bolster 
"feelings of superiority" among the Anglo-Saxon peoples: "The barbarous tests to which 
members of 'inferior' groups subjected children were really proof of how backward and 
primitive they themselves still were-evidences of their kinship to savage tribes and even 
to lower primates" (67). On the other hand, Silver does not mention the fact that 
Darwinian theory posed a threat to the entire social order by undermining the biblical 
account of creation and the theory of separate and specialized variations, and that all 
humans were the product of the slow and sometimes unforeseen modification of formerly 
nonhuman species. As Darwin writes: "Indefinite variability is a much more common 
result of changed conditions than definite variability, and has probably played a more 
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important part in the formation of our domestic races" (Origin 26). The arbitrary 
acceptance of only certain kinds of variation (i.e., Anglo-Saxon, Caucasian, and 
Christian) was therefore a clear sign of racial and moral prejudice, which consisted in the 
arbitrary acceptance of some forms of violence (the colonization and oppression of 
"lower" races) and rejection of other forms (ritual abuse derived from pagan beliefs 
among the "lower" races). I have already noted this hypocrisy above. Darwin himself, 
early in the Origin, had once characterized the conflict between indigenous groups and 
their oppressors with some sympathy: "And as foreigners have thus in every country 
beaten some of the natives, we may safely conclude that the natives might have been 
modified with advantage, so as to have better resisted the intruders" (111 ). In such a 
scenario, the human attempt to impose its will on the environment is undermined by 
nature's "preservation" ofvaluable characteristics and survival skills; as Darwin adds, 
nature "cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they are useful to any being." 
Such a theory, which helped to "relate man to the 'under-world of life,"' was useful to the 
underclasses in Britain (Desmond and Moore 508), as well as those throughout the British 
Isles that chose to believe in the fairies-another underclass whose methods (abduction, 
for one) had all the markings of tactical warfare. 
Silver's remarks on Social Darwinism do not, however, miss the mark if we 
consider the degree to which fallacious theories of evolution influenced the study of 
pagan religious customs and ultimately helped to justify imperial expansionism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. While Christianity may have ultimately lost its 
authority, the scientific authority that replaced it (and permeated everything from folklore 
to the legal system) often had little sympathy for the groups that were considered to be 
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culturally obsolete. To begin with, evolutionary science from the 1840s onward was 
heavily influenced by "progressionism," or "ideas ofbiological progress[ ... ] extrapolated 
from ideas of social progress" (Amundsen 515). The Swiss-American 
palaeoichthyologist, Louis Agassiz, had apparently discovered, some years before the 
publication of the Origin, a "unifying thread" of"progress" in the evolutionary 
development of the species-"from simple to complex, from the uniform to the highly 
differentiated, from monad to man" (Ruse 112). With such a schema, it became possible 
"to order beings along some kind of scala naturae, from the invertebrates up through the 
primates, and eventually to humankind." Herbert Spencer was instrumental in 
popularizing the progressionist perspective, offering his own notion of"dynamic 
equilibrium," "a kind of progressive force upwards, from simplicity to complexity, from 
the valueless to the valued" ( 61 ). Certainly, by the mid-1860s, Darwin himself accepted 
the Spencerian view "that the optimal outcome ofhuman natural selection would be the 
triumph of 'the intellectual and moral' races over the 'lower and more degraded ones"' 
(Claeys 237); such a view, which was influenced by socio-economic theories ofthe 
"survival of the fittest," ultimately made Darwin a progressionist and, by proxy, a Social 
Darwinist. In fact, references to "savages" as "lower forms" scatter the pages of Darwin's 
later work, The Descent of Man (see, for example, 62, 125, 134, 148, 158-59,227, 608, 
621, 623). The problem, then, is that Darwin began to speak of"savage" and "civilized" 
as separate species, even while his theory of natural selection (first sketched out in the 
Origin) actually contradicted this. Intelligence, like a physical characteristic, is the 
product of a very gradual process of modification and selection, but, as Darwin would 
have to admit, does not always assume the same form. True, there is a certain consistency 
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in a society whose combined tastes and habits push evolution in a particular direction. By 
Darwin's account, however, the dominant tendencies (say, industrial, class-based) tend to 
minimize the success of other, less dominant tendencies (say, agricultural, tribal-based): 
only after the fact did Darwin make the conclusion that this "struggle for existence," and 
the concomitant victory over certain variations (i.e., races), was what ought to be in the 
grand scheme of things. Any diligent Darwinist would likely cite Hume's "naturalistic 
fallacy," and note that Darwin's theory of natural selection, as "proposition," is related to 
an "is or is not" rather than an "ought or ought not" (see Rachaels 67). First, I would 
assert that Darwin's acceptance ofprogressionism implied a moral view, even ifhis 
propositions could still exist as facts outside his preference. Second, I would note that by 
insisting on the distinction between "savage" and "civilized," Darwin could not or refused 
to see the facts: that every human variation has "savage" tendencies, and that 
"intelligence" was likely a crucial factor in the development of each variation (Descent 
633-34). 
Despite the limitations of Darwin' s-and Darwinist-theory, it provides a way of 
perceiving the differences among similar groups (those between the human races) as well 
as the similarities among different species (those between humans and nonhumans). As I 
have suggested, in acknowledging our monstrous origin we can account for the second 
relation and for the fact that monstrosity itself is a form of species variation: 
At long intervals of time, out of millions of individuals reared in the same country 
and fed on nearly the same food, deviations of structure so strongly pronounced as 
to deserve to be called monstrosities arise; but monstrosities cannot be separated 
by any distinct line from slighter variations. All such changes of structure, 
whether extremely slight or strongly marked, which appear among many 
individuals living together, may be considered as the indefinite effects of the 
conditions of life on each individual organism, in nearly the same manner as the 
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chill affects different men in an indefinite manner, according to their state of body 
or constitution, causing coughs or colds, rheumatisms, or inflammation of various 
organs. (Origin 26; original emphases) 
Such a description may explain why changelings were identified by late nineteenth-
century scientists as species "reversions," "missing links," and microcephalic "idiots" 
(Silver 83), even while it also reinforces the notion that all species proceeded by "strongly 
pronounced" variations. Doesn't the Neanderthal look monstrous to the human? Here lies 
a pronounced variation. Doesn't the Down's syndrome child look monstrous to another 
human? Here lies another variation. John Langdon Haydon Down, in the 1860s, came up 
with the diagnosis of "Mongolian idiocy," a theory which argued that cretinism in white 
Caucasian children represented an "evolutionary throwback" resembling Africans, 
Malays, American Indians, and Orientals (Silver 82-83). While the "resemblance" is 
likely accurate, it does not entail a "throwback," especially since Africans, Malaysians, 
American Indians, and Orientals (meaning "Asians") all represent intraspecies variation, 
just as a congenital disease does. "Species" itself, Darwin argues, can be defined as "the 
unknown element of a distant act of creation" (Origin 65), an unforeseen series of 
modifications and proliferations. As Deleuze and Guattari have said, evolution consists in 
a relation between "territory" and "earth" (What Is Philosophy? 86) in which both the 
animal and hominid "wrest" themselves from the earth in order to create and recreate 
territories (67-68). Humans, monsters, and animals (as I discuss below) are not so much 
the product of their environment as they are that environment's production-the 
organisms that populate and give shape to that environment. The changeling, another 
interesting variation, carries with it the deterritorializations and reterritorializations that 
have marked its evolutionary path, from child to monster to animal. 
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While I have suggested that "radical hospitality" reinforces the common 
experiences ofboth fairy and human (disease, deformity, reproductive problems), it also 
reinforces the contingent unions of disparate forms. It would be inaccurate, then, to say 
that radical hospitality, and the relation between human and monster or human and 
animal, succeeds by finding correspondences discovered at the level of descent or a 
common genetic structure (in the way that evolutionary progressionists confidently 
ascribe stages to the "descent of man" from ape to Neanderthal to Homo sapiens, and then 
speak of these earlier stages as "regressions" if they appear in a later stage). If this chapter 
proceeds by way of finding relations among various personae, it does so not in order to 
claim a common descent (i.e., changeling>child or vice-versa) but rather to claim a 
tactical alliance. While I have assembled my personae in a particular order-child, 
monster, and animal-there is no intended gradation or stratification. While the 
changeling tale narrates a stage of human growth, before the infant matures and assumes 
the usual human characteristics, and offers a concentrated version of species evolution, 
from primitive to civilized primate, it also disrupts these easy scientific explanations by 
suggesting that the changeling, as "hybrid" production of fairy and human, may be an 
advancement in human evolution rather than a "throwback" or reversion. By 
"advancement" I mean both in the biological sense that a new form is now made possible 
and in the philosophical sense that a new alliance has been fashioned. Moreover, the 
political implications of the changeling-insurgent, as seen in tales like "Johnnie in the 
Cradle" and "A Fairy Changeling: I," are reiterated with new emphasis on the monstrous 
anarchical body in "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II." The 
hybrid body is effective inasmuch as it functions as a foil to the dominant systems ofthe 
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family and the State. 
Postcolonial theory since Homi Bhabha has interpreted the marginalized or 
othered identity as both emergent and belated, that is, in an "in-between" or "hybrid" 
state. First popularized by Bhabha in essays such as "Of Mimicry and Man: The 
Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse" and "Signs Taken For Wonders," and rearticulated 
throughout his immensely popular book The Location ofCulture,22 the concept of cultural 
"hybridity" was conceived as a foil to the notion that colonized subjects were passive 
victims and did not take any initiative in identity formation during the colonization 
process. As defined by Bhabha in "Signs Taken For Wonders," hybridity is "the 
revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory 
identity effects," and it "displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites 
of discrimination and domination" (112). The moment ofhybridity occurs when the 
representation of the colonized subject is revealed to be in excess since the colonial 
powers require the native to mimic white Christian ways (the example Bhabha uses). As 
Bhabha frames it, this "excess" constitutes the "failure" of the colonial project, even 
while colonization continues to work on more subtle levels, displacing and rupturing the 
wholeness of originally "native" communities. And yet, Bhabha's key argument is that 
the colonial process demands wholeness, "identity, stasis," even while the "counter-
pressure of the diachrony of history" produces "change, difference" (86). The great irony 
here is that "hybridity is intrinsic to colonial discourse itself, and consequently colonial 
discourse potentially undoes itself' (Coombes and Brah 11 ). Hybridity, then, signifies the 
22 The earlier essays are included in The Location of Culture, and all my citations ofBhabha's work come 
from this later text. 
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phenomenon in colonialism where the organizing principle of "Truth," at least as the 
colonizing power understands it, is radically displaced by inassimilable voices (Bhabha 
1 05). This displacement occurs when the colonized "other" articulates the discourse of 
colonial enlightenment with different accents, emphases, and sounds, transforming the 
originary language (English, for example) into a mongrelized or hybridized one. 
This critical perspective owes something to Raymond Williams's description in 
Marxism and Literature ofthe traditions, institutions, and formations of the cultural 
process. His use of the terms "dominant," "residual," and "emergent" to describe the 
"internal dynamic relations of any actual process" (121) has been influential on 
postcolonial studies of dominant post-enlightenment culture, for example, and the 
residual effects of this domination on the bodies of colonial subjects in the decolonization 
period as well as disenfranchised subjects living under the dominant rule of the State. By 
"residual" Williams means something that has been formed in the past "but is still active 
in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an 
effective element of the present" (122). The residual may be confused with the "archaic," 
Williams notes, in the very celebration of cultural difference, which national cultures 
currently categorize as "multicultural." But if an identity is residual, it is neither whole 
nor can it be completely effaced since it leaves its traces in the very institutions that 
comprise "dominant" culture. Dominance necessitates and requires the incorporation of 
the residual (123) as the very sign of its power in the historical process. As I have 
suggested, the fairy economy is one of the more notable examples of such a residual 
process, but it also pushes the limits of the system through which it finds its expression 
and its operations. In particular, the changeling persona exploits the system for its own 
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ends, gathering its allied personae, or its "pack," as Deleuze and Guattari would say (A 
Thousand Plateaus 241 ), in order to infiltrate the residual territories and create new ones. 
After all, domination always leaves a residue of some original identity or marginal mode 
of production, and perhaps it is this notion of partiality that Bhabha speaks of in his 
articulation of cultural hybridity.23 Moreover, the "emergent" is precisely what attempts 
to break free of the dominant, to come into view as an oppositional, and not merely a 
"novel," practice (Williams 123-24); as an extension of the residual, the emergent is 
precisely what rejects incorporation, which articulates itself as "recognition" and 
"acceptance" (125).24 
What all of this suggests is that hybridity, in its very condition ofheterogeneity, 
cannot be restricted to a single meaning since it is both a violent imposition and a 
transitory state that opens up rather than closes off relations between "hosts" and "guests" 
and between conceptual personae. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, I 
specify hybridity25 as a(n enforced) mode of production linked specifically to the fairy 
economy, which involves, among other transactions, the exchange of fairy children for 
23 See particularly "OfMimicry and Man" where he discusses '"partml' presence" (86) and "the 'partml' 
diffusiOn ofChnstiamty" (87). Bhabha acknowledges the Importance ofWilhams's termmology mat least 
two places m The Locatwn of Culture (148, 252), but the tenmnology seems to resonate throughout the 
whole work, as I have attempted to show. 
24 In his discussion of the "diversiOnary tactic" of"la perruque," which means "to borrow," Michel de 
Certeau seems to approach the questiOn of the residual and the emergent, as they function wzthzn a dommant 
system of productiOn He asks, "on what grounds can we call this 'art' [I e., !a perruque] different?" (The 
Practzce of Everyday Life 24). Perhaps, as Williams suggests, It IS a matter of distmgmshmg between the 
residual "borrowmg" from the hegemomc structure and the emergent "bncolage" or "makmg do" with the 
fragments of that structure that have broken free m the process 
25 I emphasize my own specificatiOn here and do acknowledge a whole other range of scholarly study on the 
concept ofhybndity that this chapter could not address m full. An Impressive example IS Charles Stewart's 
analysis of the "vocabulanes of mixture" m "Syncretism and Its Synonyms: ReflectiOns on Cultural 
Mixture." See also the special Issue on hybndity m The Journal of Amerzcan Folklore 112 (Summer 1999), 
an example ofwhich-Bnan Stross's "The Hybnd Metaphor: From Biology to Culture" (254-67)-I have 
referenced bnefly Another notable contnbution IS Hybrzdzty and Its Dzscontents Polztzcs, Sczence, Culture 
(London. Routledge, 2000), edited by Avtar Brah and Annie E. Coombes 
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human ones. The folkloric sense of "hybridity" refers to a kind of "supernatural 
intervention" and a belief that "human beings can, and frequently do, have sexual 
relations with nonhuman beings to produce offspring" (Eberly 230). This plot provides an 
additional explanation of the changeling motif: the encounter, identified usually as an 
abduction, leads to the birth of a hybrid product of the "union." Each group experiences 
ruptures and breaches (of moral codes, of established contracts, of the physical body 
itself) but each group also borrows something from the other. In some cases, moral 
pressure forces the breach to end the transaction. This is at least partially the case in "The 
Fairy Wife" where the husband alienates himself from his community by marrying a 
foreigner and ultimately producing a hybrid child. As Briggs has noted, fairies "are near 
enough in kind to mate with humans-closer in fact than a horse is to an ass, for many 
human families claim a fairy ancestress" (Briggs, The Fairies in Tradition and Literature 
95; emphasis added). This proximity "in kind" is reinforced by the fact that women were 
frequently abducted for the purpose of suckling fairy children (O'Sullivan, "Notes to the 
Tales" 273), which confirms the notion that fairies also required human aid. In terms of 
Darwinian evolution, fairies are interested in perfecting (by variation) rather than 
purifying (by similitude) their stock, and we could interpret fairy abductions as a program 
of genetic mutation in which children are abducted, acculturated in the new culture, and 
eventually paired up with a fairy man or woman: the changeling is the successful hybrid 
of such a program (Rojcewicz 493). While the husband in "The Fairy Wife" is rebuked 
for allowing one of the fairies to insinuate herself in the community, we can consider the 
fairy wife's departure, with child in hand, as a successful abduction. At the same time, 
however, this man, whom I have (perhaps uncharitably) described as a "dupe," can be 
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seen as playing an important role in sustaining the human-fairy relation. The storyteller 
makes no mention of any additional children, so we might also add that the fairy woman 
herself plays an important role in sustaining a bloodline and providing the man with his 
only heir. 
Hospitality, then, is fundamentally concerned with hybridity since it involves, in 
at least one description, the hosting of the stranger in the body and the contingent 
blending of two entities. The changeling, which in European folklore is the substitute for 
the human child and thus the breach in the filial chain (Derrida, "Hostipitality" [2002] 
412), is the ultimate test to the host because it pushes the limits of what is normally 
understood to be hospitality. The abduction of a child in this scenario means a gain for the 
fairies whose ailing stock can now be invigorated with healthy human blood. On the other 
hand, the birth of a changeling means a loss for the human whose bloodline is considered 
either contaminated by foreign genes or diseased by some inexplicable mutation. 
Changelings then signified both the frailty of human life and also the possibility of 
defying such limitations. Thus, my anticipation of genetic mutation (which I discuss in 
subsequent chapters) is relevant here: hybridity, to come back to my discussion ofBhabha 
and Williams, delineates a residual loss and an emergent gain, a loss of purity and an 
increase of (hybrid) vitality. The fairy realm is the height of human potential. Similarly, 
the changeling is the positive alternative: a withered child that could be nurtured and 
nursed to the point of rejuvenation. Additionally, the adoption of the changeling can 
allow two species to thrive. 
One folktale, which I discuss at length below, offers an initial example of 
hospitality as the conflicted response to hybridity, which, in its first sequence, takes the 
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form of a mysterious foundling. The second sequence presents a further variation on the 
changeling motif in that characters assume forms that we have not encountered so far: 
animals. Given its elaborate structure and its profusion of fantastical occurrences, "The 
Speckled Bull" is notably distinct from the other, more homely changeling legends. As 
Rohrich argues, "Legendary figures belong to a real otherworld," while "folktale figures 
have become part of a fantasy world and are no longer truly 'demonic,' and therefore not 
truly 'otherworldly' in the same sense as the legend" (22). Accordingly, while part of the 
drama in legends derives from the very encounter with the "otherworldly," the tension 
between the human and nonhuman elements seems to be almost non-existent in the often 
highly stylized folktale. But "The Speckled Bull" is a special case, for its first sequence 
proceeds without any suggestion of magical happenings, only the interactions between 
mortals, while its second sequence includes a number of magical transformations that 
suggest an altogether different genre. While it is not categorized under "animal" tales or 
tales about the "people of the otherworld" (as "The Fairy Wife" is), it draws on both by 
including animals, changelings, human-animal transformations, couplings, and hybrids. 
As Briggs reminds us, fairies are reputed to be "the dead, or certain of the dead, some 
fallen angels, some nature spirits, and some 'spiritual animals'" ("Fairies" 175): for this 
reason, the title character may in fact be one of the fairy folk in animal form. While "The 
Speckled Bull" cannot be identified distinctly as a "changeling" tale, its focus on 
reproduction and monstrous children suggests that it at least shares a thematic 
commonality with legends such as "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "Johnnie in the 
Cradle." Because the tale is rather lengthy, I will discuss it in two parts, beginning with 
the substitution of a child. 
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The tale tells of a king' s son who is sought after by all the women of Ireland. He 
becomes particularly friendly with two sisters, but ultimately chooses and marries the 
younger, and perhaps more nubile, of the two. The older sister becomes jealous, and when 
the younger one gives birth, while her husband has gone hunting, she abducts the child 
and throws it into the river. When the prince arrives home, she explains that her younger 
sister has given birth to a kitten and that she has disposed of it. He accepts the story and 
grieves for his wife. A short time later, when he is also conveniently hunting, his wife 
gives birth to another healthy child, and the older sister steals it once again and sets it 
down the river in a basket. This time, when the prince arrives home, the older sister tells 
him that his wife has given birth to a puppy, that she has once again disposed of it, and 
adds, "If you had married me[,] things wouldn't be this way[ ... ] I'd have borne proper 
children" (O'Sullivan, "The Speckled Bull" 119). Convinced by the woman's concocted 
tale, the prince banishes his wife and marries her older sister. When the prince is once 
again out of sight, his new wife casts a spell on her sister, making a "green stone of her." 
Meanwhile, an elderly fisherman finds the second discarded child caught up in bushes on 
the bank of the river (a scenario reminiscent of the story of Moses) and takes it back to his 
frugal home where he and his wife decide to adopt the foundling. Because the couple has 
been childless for so long, news of the child spreads until the prince's new wife gets wind 
of the discovery. She decides to visit the fisherman's wife, determined to eliminate the 
proof of her betrayal. When she enters the home, she discovers the child "lying in a cradle 
near a fire" and begins her trickery anew: 
"Isn't he a fine child, God bless him?" said she. 
"He's a good boy, thank you," said the fisherman's wife. 
"What a pity that he isn't your own," said the other. 
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"Of course, he's my own. 'Tis unmannerly of you to come into my house and say 
a thing like that. I don't know who you are or where you're from." 
"I'm not telling any lie," said the prince's wife. "And to prove it, you will have to 
kill that child. You think that he is a normal child ofthis world, but he isn't. He's 
a changeling that the hill folk have left with you, and unless you take my advice, 
you'll regret it for many a long day." (120) 
Upon convincing the fisherman's wife that the child be removed, the prince's wife 
promptly takes the child away and slits its throat. 
Like the changelings discussed above, this substituted child signifies both a gain 
and a loss. It provides (at least the appearance of) a miraculous fertility for the elderly 
couple and fills a real void in their lives; and yet its absence provides the older sister with 
a substitute story of a monstrous birth and, by default, proof of infertility since the 
younger sister has nothing to show for her pregnancy. For a short time the changeling also 
raises the status of the rural family, signifying as it does a fusion of noble and peasant 
blood. Further, the adoption is a gesture of hospitality, as Derrida describes, where a 
stranger is taken in from the cold with no questions asked. That they may experience 
"regret," as the prince's wife suggests, may mean that this supposed changeling has 
contaminated the home with his foreign heritage. The only regret, of course, is losing the 
child in the first place-the ultimate experience of both the younger sister and the elderly 
couple. This tension between loss and gain is, we will recall, related to the function of 
hybridity. As with "The Fairy Wife," "The Speckled Bull" comments upon the 
consequences ofblending of two cultures, or more accurately, two social classes: a 
peasant family and a noble family. From the elderly couple's perspective, the fusion adds 
a certain vigour to their lives, even while it likely disturbs the prince's wife who is 
aggressive in her assertion that this child is not their own, could not be their own, since it 
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is nobly born. 
The most notable detail in this piece is the way in which a character uses the 
changeling tale as a manner of expression. This self-conscious story telling may be a 
response to the charge that folk legends were uncouth responses to the inexplicable 
mysteries of life; after all, a noblewoman, not a peasant, uses a folk motif to justify 
violence. Interestingly, the prince's wife forgets (or does not know?) that a changeling 
would not stand being so close to a fire! (Consider "Johnnie in the Cradle" and "The 
Caerlaverock Changeling.") Then again, this is no ordinary changeling. In any event, the 
tale includes subtle commentary on class hierarchy in its depiction of a gentry that 
banishes and murders babies. While the audience would know that the child is a 
"changeling" only in that it has changed hands, listeners of this tale also see the irony of 
the situation: that a lowly fisherman's wife is scolded when she is actually more suitable 
to care for a child of the gentry than the gentry itself. The changeling, however, is 
"illegitimate" for several reasons: it was stolen from its original cradle; it is not naturally 
the son of the fisherman and his wife; it is associated with monstrous births; and it is not a 
"normal" child since it has the capacity to incriminate a respectable individual. As an 
example of another "bifurcation" (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 76), the 
"changeling" does not appear in the form of a fairy but rather as a signifier-as the 
expression of jealousy over a woman's fertility, but more particularly as a means to 
designate illegitimacy. This bifurcation also leads to the creation of new personae: 
animals, in the form of a kitten and a puppy. Of course, as far as we are told, the prince's 
original wife did not really give birth to two animals. However, since the child in 
question has been substituted, and since the kitten and the puppy briefly assume the role 
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of the substitutions (the fictional remainder of the woman's birth), these animals may be 
understood as changelings themselves, reterritorializations of the child and additional 
conceptual personae. 
The title, "The Speckled Bull," refers to the magical progeny of a speckled cow. 
This birth comes about in the following way. After the murdered child is buried, a tree 
grows up from the plot bearing many different kinds of fruit. This tree is located within 
the grazing area of the prince's cattle, and one specimen, a curiously speckled cow, eats 
of the fruit and, without the help of a bull, gives birth to a male speckled bull-calf. The 
prince's wife hears of this new bull and its supernatural qualities (including its ability to 
fly), and realizes that the truth of her treachery may yet be revealed. She then pretends to 
be ill and bribes a doctor to tell the prince that she may only be saved if she is given the 
heart and liver of a speckled bull. However, the prince's men fail to capture the bull and it 
escapes all the way to the "east," where it is discovered by the King of the Eastern world. 
This king' s daughter, who is "under geasa"-that is, "solemn injunctions of a magical 
kind" (O'Sullivan, "Glossary" 289)-"never to leave the palace unless her eyes were 
covered" lest she marry the first man she sees ("The Speckled Bull" 123), faints when she 
sees the bull, telling her father when she is revived that he is actually a strikingly 
handsome man. She is then obligated to marry the speckled bull and discovers that he, 
too, is under geasa to remain a bull for half the day (although it is not exactly clear who is 
responsible for the injunctions in either case). He gives her the option of being a bull in 
the day or at night, and she chooses the day, making love with him as a man in the 
evening. After consulting a druid, the King of the Eastern world discovers a way to 
transform the speckled bull back into his original form for good. Once the prince assumes 
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his original form, he returns to his homeland in the west and elicits a confession from the 
treacherous woman who was responsible for his metamorphosis in the first place. When 
her treachery is finally uncovered, the prince's wife is granted the opportunity to choose 
her own punishment: perhaps as a reflection ofher abandonment/murder of those 
children, she asks to be "put up on the highest chimney top of the palace, faced towards 
the wind, and [to be] given no food but whatever small grain the wind might blow to her 
and no drink but whatever drop of rain she could catch on her tongue" (129). The 
punishment is duly granted. No one hears of the prince's wife thereafter, while the 
prince's son and his new wife, the daughter ofthe King of the Eastern world, live out the 
rest of their lives contented. 
The tale, however, ends on a rather inhospitable note when the narrator concludes, 
"I can't say what happened to the woman that was left on the chimney top, but if she 
suffered what was laid down for her, she well deserved it and nobody would have any 
great pity for her" (O'Sullivan, "The Speckled Bull" 130). In many ways, then, this 
woman is an aberrant form, a woman-monster who perverts the sacred institution of 
marriage and reproduction by producing, conceptually or virtually, monstrous children. 
However, her initial alliance with the changeling "pack" (child-kitten-puppy) ultimately 
fails when she tries to liquidate it (in two attempted drownings and one successful 
murder) in order to strengthen a filial tie (by marrying the prince). If the tale does not end 
on a note of forgiveness, the prince's wife makes a gesture of hospitality by substituting 
her own legitimacy when she puts herself in the position of the abandoned and the 
abducted; she is a changeling but, as the narrator concludes, never the foundling. 
But "The Speckled Bull" is abundant with other becomings. It is worth noting 
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how much animals play important roles in the movement of the plot, providing the 
prince's wife with the story of a monstrous birth (woman gives birth to kitten and 
puppy!), and then becoming the central focus of a potentially monstrous union (woman 
mates with speckled bull!). One presumption to be made-although the narrator never 
clarifies this-is that the speckled bull is, in fact, the murdered child. Another possibility 
is that the blood of the dead child somehow brings about the birth of another child/calf, 
the speckled bull. Either way, the changeling-child (already disposed ofby the older 
sister) has the ability to cross over the threshold of death and assume another form. 
However the title or tale may be interpreted, the speckled bull itself is clearly a hybrid 
creation: based on the (somewhat ambiguous) description of his birth, he is the hybrid 
product of a dead human child and a speckled cow who, we might suggest, ingests some 
of the child's blood or flesh when she eats of the bountiful fruit that grows up out of the 
grave. This magical birth returns us to the opening sequence of the story, although we 
discover that the union (between dead child and cow?) is successful and that the hybrid 
itself is welcomed, despite the third attempt to do him in.26 This persona, then, possesses 
a "hybrid vigor" (Stross 256-57), which allows it to proliferate into several forms and into 
the aberrant becoming-child-changeling-kitten-puppy-bull. Abductions, hybrid births, and 
magical transformations all suggest the work of the "little people," and even while the 
narrator never suggests this, there are enough similarities between "The Speckled Bull" 
and other, less ornate tales, to suggest that the former is indeed a changeling tale, which 
concerns a fairy that assumes the form of a "spiritual animal" (Briggs, "Fairies" 175). 
26 If we are to believe that the speckled bull is the child who is first discovered by the fisherman, then he has 
been disposed of twice already and survives the third attempt when the King of the Eastern world returns 
him to human form through a magic ritual. 
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More than this, supernatural interventions associated with changeling legends were 
sometimes attributed to the "pairing of humans with animals[ ... ] to produce offspring" 
(Eberly 230). Further, as we have already seen, changelings were considered "borderline 
creations" and "species midway between humans and the brutes"; "their howls, snarls, 
grimaces, inability to use language, and destructive actions revealed their kinship with the 
lower vertebrates" (Silver 83). But what Silver takes to be a disparaging association, we 
might interpret as an optimal alliance. In any event, the changeling motif runs throughout 
the tale, beginning with the abducted child in that first, relatively unadorned section, and 
ending with the hybrid bull-human, in the richly ornate section. Despite the predominance 
of magic in this tale, there is still a notable tension between the human and fairy worlds 
and between the human and animal worlds, reinforced by the suggestion that the "hill 
folk" may or may not be responsible for the mysterious appearance of the changeling 
child. Also, the hybridized man-bull in the second sequence is still neither really a bull, 
nor is he imitating one. There is an alliance between the two, which becomes more 
"imperceptible," Deleuze and Guattari would say, as it becomes more "intense":27 it 
appears too man-like to be a bull and too bull-like to be a man. And yet, the story's 
conclusion includes a final transformation as the man is released from his geasa. The 
original alliance has been reterritorialized since, unlike the older sister in the tale, the 
recovered man-bull returns to his family and opts for an "affiliation" by marrying a 
human.28 
27 The subtitle of chapter 10 of A Thousand Plateaus 1s "Becommg-Intense, Becommg-Ammal, Becommg-
Imperceptlble." 
28 
"The Speckled Bull," hke most folktales mvolvmg human-ammal marnages, mcludmg all of those found 
m the Gnmms, does not deptct bestlahty. As Rohr1ch says m regards to tales about man-ammal 
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Despite these shortcomings, the sophisticated style of story telling, discovered in 
the wry self-conscious use of the changeling narrative itself, also indicates a sophisticated 
"conceptual world" that requires a multiplicity of interpretations. The conceptual 
personae from the previous sections have undergone changes so that, in my discussion of 
"The Speckled Bull," the changeling itself (that "withered," "wizened," atrophied 
creature of fairy origin) has become a nearly umecognizable and imperceptible persona. 
But it is "recognition" that oppresses in the first place, as Bhabha has argued, based as it 
is on definable categories, taxonomies of type, classification, and even "motif." The 
changeling tale has now revealed its tendency to branch off and proliferate-not simply 
by altering its focus (from insubordinate children to magical fairies to frightful monsters 
to animals) but by refusing to be bound by its type, by its motif. "The Speckled Bull" 
moves beyond the restrictions of its geme in its appropriation of the changeling motif and 
in its discovery of new uses for the conceptual persona of the changeling. 
Conclusion 
The present chapter has argued that the changeling, as its name suggests, became 
a vehicle for exchange between the fairy and human communities in the Victorian period. 
To be sure, as Marcel Mauss has noted, "the market is a human phenomenon[ ... ] familiar 
to every known society. Markets are found before the development of merchants, and 
before their most important innovation, currency as we know it" (2; emphasis added). 
However, the fairy market, as one component of the little folk's economy, functions as a 
transformation, "no marriages between a human and an animal are consummated. It always turns out 
'really' to be a marriage between a man and a woman, and transformation back into human form occurs 
before they actually consummate the marriage" (Rohrich 83). 
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parallel to the human institution, for it underscores the fact that the items in our habitual 
"exchanges" are not only material goods but "courtesies, entertainments, ritual, military 
assistance, women, children, dances and feasts" (3). In other words, the fairies were more 
interested in sustaining hospitable relations than in accumulating or circulating wealth. 
The fairy economy, then, is a rather residual institution since it became incorporated into 
the human economy and, thereafter, modified. Conrad Arensberg's description of folk 
"survivals" in Irish culture suggests that elements like the fauy economy and the "good 
people" are residual because they have an important role in the "organization ofhuman 
lives" (163).29 As the changeling legends suggest, the fairy economy enunciated the 
problem of offering hospitality to complete strangers, especially if they appeared hostile 
or unwilling to follow the household rules. But the continual engagement with fairy 
legend in the Victorian period indicates the possibility of negotiation-between social 
groups as well as species. 
While folklore scholars do not make any such claim, I would contend that the 
fairy economy consists of a conceptual exchange where one belief system (that of the 
human, the familiar, the habitual) is overturned by another (the arcane, the unfamiliar, 
and the unusual), and where new concepts are introduced as a result. Folk narratives, 
according to this perspective, comprise smaller units called "concepts," which enact the 
flows and transfers, breaks and ruptures between human and fairy, speaker and listener. 
Moreover, rather than simply a "model of the symbolic universe," as Bourke suggests 
29 Indeed, his explanatiOn of the resilient nature of folk belief sounds very much like W dliams 's descnptwn 
of the "residual": 'The anthropologist [Robert Ranulph] Marrett smd once: 'Survivals are no mere 
wreckage of the past, but are likewise symptomatic of those tendencies of our common nature which have 
the best chance of surviVmg m the long run'" (qtd. m Arensberg 163). 
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(The Burning of Bridget Cleary 31), these narratives present a schemata or diagram of 
lived existence, which can only be expressed through impressions, notions, and ultimately 
theories about what that existence signifies. The schemata, the legend itself, is a 
configuration of concepts, which are naturally borne of previous ones that have, at one 
point or another, crossed and fused with each other, exchanged and changed (as witnessed 
in the series of tales I have discussed). Such is the nature of an economy that works 
through insinuation, expropriation, and borrowing. If, as Deleuze and Guattari describe, a 
"concept" has the following components: "possible world, existing face, and real 
language and speech" (What Is Philosophy? 17), it is my argument that 1) folk legend 
becomes the filling out of this world, this face, and this speech, and that 2) this concept-
creation is a philosophical practice. 
The legends that comprised the "survivals," which so fascinated folklorists and 
anthropologists in the nineteenth century, contained scenarios and characters that were 
not completely unrecognizable to the general populace in England, Ireland, Scotland, and 
elsewhere. Indeed, as negotiators of truth claims, the legends gave expression to anxieties 
regarding the position of children whose insubordination was seen as a symptom of an 
awful transformation. Related to this domestic concern were the precarious infertility and 
infant mortality rates (see Woods), not to mention the rising occurrence of congenital 
malformations. That the legends featured both insubordinate and deformed children 
suggested a general belief that deviance could be physically manifested and therefore 
easily diagnosed. Not surprisingly, these changeling monsters provided a new lexicon for 
the medical profession who could make the invisible visible (Munro 252-53). 
Consequently, the naughty child, who had transformed into a dwarf or brownie and then 
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into a medical monster, finally became equated with lower forms on the evolutionary 
scale. Moreover, folklore collectors, scientists, and the original disseminators of fairy 
legend collectively understood that changelings were no mere fantastical creatures but 
were analogous to children, subalterns, medical monstrosities, and individuals ofhybrid 
identity. But, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, we can go further than this, for conceptual 
personae are not mere metaphors or even models for social behaviour; rather they "carry 
out the movements that describe the author's plane of immanence, and they play a part in 
the very creation of the author's concepts" (What Is Philosophy? 63). For the Victorians, 
the child was, in fact, a "changeling," or could become one if certain precautions were not 
taken; at the same time, and as part of this conceptual exchange, the changeling would 
become something entirely different-no longer simply a folk entity but, as in the case of 
Pinocchio, a real boy (or girl). "Social fields," Deleuze and Guattari elaborate, "are 
inextricable knots in which the three movements [of seeking a territory, carrying out 
deterritorializations, and reterritorializing] are mixed up so that, in order to disentangle 
them, we have to diagnose real types or personae" (What Is Philosophy? 68; original 
emphasis). The point here is that the "persona" is vital for the enunciation of the "type"; 
and so I have spent three sections delineating at least three types of changelings, or three 
types that the changeling persona enunciates: the child, the monster, and the animal. If we 
find certain important distinctions between the child and the monster, say, or the child and 
the animal, it is also accurate to say that the monster helps define or redefine the child, 
just as the animal gains a new clarity as a result of its proximity to the child: children 
could be better understood as "little monsters" since they seemed so distinct from their 
human parents who were more physically and mentally developed. Similarly, the child's 
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early development was a reminder of the vital "animal" element in the human organism 
since it made no bones about howling or regressing if it served a tactical purpose. The 
child was a nexus of concern for the Victorians, but so was the changeling whose hybrid 
identity aligned it with the social and racial underclasses of the society, and whose 
primary tactic was the deterritorialization of previously occupied territories. 
In some ways, deterritorialization/reterritorialization is an evolutionary or, to be 
more accurate, "neoevolutionary" concept (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
239) that gauges the ways in which humans and animals alike (and therefore conceptual 
personae) become attached to various territories and then move off from them to create 
new ones, or new unforeseen pathways branching off from these territories. "Divergence" 
itself first manifests itself in the form of a reterritorialization: we fall back or become 
temporarily immobile, and this enables us to move in a new direction; the next move, 
however, completes the process of divergence as long as it proceeds along the new path 
and refrains from simply going backwards, which would constitute a kind of absolute 
reterritorialization. "Becoming" is the contingent moment in which a conceptual persona 
is moving away from one territory (one conceptualization) towards another, falling back 
in order to move off in a new direction; as I indicate in my introduction, this becoming is 
not so much an act ofwill as it is a tactical reaction to a given territorial (or indeed, 
evolutionary) change. Conceptual personae like the changeling appear to be always in a 
state ofbecoming-neither here nor there-because of the intensity of their 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing campaigns: they are attached to other personae and 
so move about in several divergent directions, making new alliances along the way. 
While such personae are divergent, they also frequently form packs and hence 
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concentrate, or intensify, their efforts within territories, as guerrillas might swarm an 
occupied camp. An alliance would then be the opposite of an affiliation since no single 
conceptual persona can be said to be attached or connected to another. Packs are not 
affiliations; otherwise they would be institutions (like the family). Rather they are 
disparate groups of personae that can diverge from the current path or territory at any 
moment. 
Williams's three terms-the dominant, the residual, and the emergent-have 
provided a further way for us to gauge the various "becomings" of conceptual personae as 
they infiltrate, emerge, and reemerge in various forms (child, monster, animal, and so 
forth). The changeling pressures the dominant systems (the family, the Church, the State), 
but is not bound by affiliation or the problems of reproduction since it creates its own 
divergent art through "contagion" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 247). This 
is to say that "hybridity" concerns contingent unions that are fruitful only once, and result 
generally in sterility and, on occasion, mutation. Recall the fairy tactic of abduction: 
substitutions never lead to the further propagation of either humans or fairies, but 
plentiful deviations, or hybridizations of both species. Such a tactic, demonstrated most 
notably in "The Caerlaverock Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II," allows the 
fairies (and therefore humans) to proliferate "over and over again every time, gaining that 
much more ground" (A Thousand Plateaus 241) because they are not bound by filial ties. 
Once again, abduction and the infiltration of the changeling initiate a breach and thereby 
open up new territories, new alliances. The emergent subject might then be understood as 
the acknowledgement of the fact "that no mode of production and therefore no dominant 
social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all 
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human [and fairy] practice, human [and fairy] energy, and human [and fairy] intention" 
(Williams 125; original emphases, my interpolations). In terms of the fairy economy, 
hybridity could then be understood as "an ethics of tenacity," as "countless ways of 
refusing to accord the established order the status of a law, a meaning, or a fatality" (de 
Certeau 26; original emphases). The six previous folk narratives reinforce such an 
interpretation by showing that hybridity has a certain dynamism when it is allowed to 
flourish. Heterogeneity is what gives hybridity its particular force. As Deleuze and 
Guattari might say, hybridity as a concept contains great "intensities" (Anti-Oedipus 20, 
39), shifting components of various speeds, with the added complexity of tensions 
between disparate components (or the "parent groups" that initiate the union in the first 
place). For this reason, the most vigorous personae are those that carry with them the 
most divergent characteristics, such as the changeling-as-deformed child, which consists 
of the series changeling-child-monster. Further, changelings are "the demonic animals, 
pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale" (A 
Thousand Plateaus 241 ), and leave behind their bastard, nomadic tribe. 
The final remarkable tale, "The Speckled Bull," explores the dynamics of crossing 
thresholds-life and death, the human and fairy communities-and discovers in this 
aberrant path new territories for the changeling; and explores the dynamics of crossing 
species-humans and animals-and discovers in these biological aberrations new 
relations for the changeling. The tale's focus on radical hospitality brings forth, in great 
abundance, new, and sometimes fabulous, forms. These forms can be understood as 
bifurcations (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 76) of the changeling, and they 
problematize the notion that conceptual personae proceed by cause-and-effect; on the 
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contrary, they proceed by rupture and discontinuity, branching off and proliferating in 
unforeseen directions (66, 71). 
Deleuze and Guattari make it abundantly clear that philosophy is neither 
meditation nor reflection and that it continually strives towards the "nonphilosophical" 
(What Is Philosophy? 41). For philosophy to work, it needs to create concepts, and it must 
search for new components or, more accurately, previously ignored components of older 
concepts. I have attempted to traverse the plane of folklore as the source for an old 
concept: changelingism. That this neologism appears in the language of ideology 
indicates the history of its being, its roots in a doctrine of inferiority and evolutionary 
degeneracy. Yet, if the concept reveals its historicity it must then be part of an active 
process, a practice, as well as a state or condition; this we must acknowledge if we are to 
understand the full sense of the suffix "ism." My interest in the "changeling" is two-fold. 
First, "changeling" denotes a folkloric or supernatural figure and has yet to be really 
conceptualized beyond a phenomenon in contemporary medical science:30 a changeling 
today denotes a person with deficient intelligence (Goodey and Stainton 223), a child 
with a congenital disease, or a child who has been exchanged for another. These various 
personae reflect, in fascinating ways, the memories, fetishes, and dreams (What Is 
Philosophy? 68) of the Victorians. It is my contention that it can (and does) denote much 
more: accordingly, in subsequent chapters I consider science fiction as the genre that 
reconceptualizes the folklore changeling as the mutant. Second, studies of the changeling 
3° Karen O'Connor-Floman's dtssertatwn, The Naturalzzed Changelzng m Vzctonan Lzterature of 
Chzldhood Fazry Razds on Realzsm (2005), ts perhaps one of the few full-length studtes of the changehng 
as a cultural phenomenon m the Vtctonan penod. The mam body of her study considers what she terms 
"the 'naturahzatwn' of the changehng, a process whereby the folklonc changelmg ts accommodated to the 
conventwns ofreahsm and used to explore a parttcular 'otherness'-bodtly or mental, class or socw-
economtc, and ractal or natwnal-that the folklonc changehng already embodtes" (2-3). 
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are dependent upon notions of miscegenation, interbreeding, and hybridization on the one 
hand, and folk interpretations of generosity and hospitality on the other. Fairy belief 
involves the transfer of disparate beliefs and philosophies, which, when fused, create a 
certain hybrid energy and a creativity for future exchanges. Accepting the changeling 
comes in the form of a certain conceptualization. Evans-Wentz, a notable early twentieth-
century scholar of Irish fairy belief, once remarked that in "the internal aspects of the 
Fairy-Faith the fundamental fact seems clearly to be that there must have been in the 
minds of pre-historic men, as there is now in the minds of modem men, a germ idea of a 
fairy for environment to act upon and shape" (26; emphasis added). We could add that the 
fairy-and the changeling-has, in tum, acted upon that very environment, that plane of 
immanence, which I have located in Victorian culture, in order to set out forthwith and 
establish new territories, operations, and alliances with the monsters and hybrid children 
of modem SF. Moreover, this chapter initiates its own concept-creation. The economy I 
have described requires the various breaches and ruptures that the conceptual persona 
introduces in order to open up relations (between humans and changelings) and to find 
them again in the future. 
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Chapter 2-Sublime Changelings in Gothic Fairylands: 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
[W]hat will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall a defect 
in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind (the far more noble and, in the 
common phrase, the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose or a 
neck make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of 
reason and understanding not? [T]his is to place all in the shape, and to make the 
measure of a man only by his outside. 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 489-90 
The creature appeared quite horrible with his monstrous head and little body, as he 
rubbed his hands slowly round, and round, and round again-with something 
fantastic even in his manner of performing this slight action-and, dropping his 
shaggy brows and cocking his chin in the air, glanced upward with a stealthy look 
of exultation that an imp might have copied and appropriated to himself. 
Charles Dickens, The Old Curiosity Shop 69 
Introduction 
The changeling is, as I have suggested, the persona par excellence of the legend 
because it answers fundamental questions about human origins and the "others" that 
occupy the same space or plane. Because the actual answers to these questions necessarily 
expand our perspective, the changeling is not the only persona that concerns us, and the 
legend not the only "plane of immanence." To begin with, the legendary changeling-
outside its attendant personae, the child, the monster, the animal-comprises multiple 
fairy personae: the dwarf, the goblin, the boggart, the elf, and so forth. We might say that 
personae like the boggart and the dwarf comprise the component parts of the changeling's 
performance, given that they each contribute notable "changeling traits" (Silver 62), such 
as a wizened, hairy, and deformed appearance, a contrary personality, an insatiable 
appetite, an ambiguous ancestry, and an ambivalent relation to the domestic realm; and 
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that boggarts were frequently attached to homes, while dwarves would enter the home in 
order to steal human children (124). But the changeling is also associated with the 
sometimes symbiotic relationship between the human and animal kingdoms, if we 
consider "The Speckled Bull." The latter tale especially reinforces the fact that a single 
conceptual persona has "features that may give rise to other personae" and that most 
personae tend to "proliferate" and "bifurcate" (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy? 76). This dynamic aspect leads to the inevitable crossover of conceptual 
planes: the legend is just one of these, even while it remains crucial to the larger 
investigation. Like the folklorists of the same period, novelists in the nineteenth century 
became fascinated with the "truth" claims of folk narrative and began to adapt some of 
the well-known legends about the fairy folk and their changeling offspring. Some notable 
bifurcations of the folkloric changeling in the Victorian novel include the dwarfish Daniel 
Quilp from Dickens's The Old Curiosity Shop (1841 ), the elfin title character of Charlotte 
Bronte's Jane Eyre (1847), the demonic Heathcliff from Emily Bronte's Wuthering 
Heights (1847), the hybrid human-fairy Tom in Charles Kingsley's The Water Babies 
(1863), and the dwarfish Mr. Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886). These literary changelings are the savage substitutes of 
human organisms, and, for the most part, they assume the characteristics of "lower" 
forms: while Quilp has inhuman appetites (Dickens 86) and Heathcliff is known for his 
cuckoo nature (Bronte 26), Tom acquires "external gills" (Kingsley 54) and Hyde is said 
to exhibit "ape-like spite" (Stevenson, Jekyll and Hyde 70). 
Changelings in Victorian fiction reflected the combined traditions of an older, 
gothic interest in heredity and degeneration and the more modem anthropological interest 
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in the "savage" elements of certain racial types. As I suggest in the first section of the 
chapter, this crossover of fantasy and empiricism produces some of the first notable 
examples of science fiction, and it is these bifurcations of the changeling that most 
concern me. The unnamed "monster" of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818) is itself a 
variation on the folkloric changeling, a more "homely" sort of fairy creature (Briggs, The 
Personnel of Fairyland 83) formed in the laboratory rather than in the womb. His 
deformed appearance also hints at his status as a congenitally afflicted child, another 
lower form that would, however, substantiate the new scientific possibilities of 
automation in the era of the industrial revolution. Hyde's emergence at the end ofthe 
century reinforces both the residual power of European folk legend and the dominant 
influence of both the biological sciences and evolutionary theory in British fiction. The 
changeling, then, enunciates the crossover and intermixing of categories, promises the 
revaluation of individual modes, such as the folk legend and the gothic romance, and 
anticipates the creation of new ones, such as SF. 
Among other notable texts of the nineteenth century, Frankenstein and Jekyll and 
Hyde demonstrate the ways in which-to adapt Deleuze and Guattari again-the folk 
personae of British legend "proliferate and branch off, jostle one another and replace each 
other" (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 71). As I argue in section II, this 
process is vividly presented in Shelley's work through the cross-section of multiple 
bodies that comprise the monster's fearful symmetry; as I argue in section III, this process 
is presented in Stevenson's work through the linked "polar twins" (Jekyll and Hyde 56) 
that comprise the entity Jekyll-Hyde. In each case, multiple personae seem to jostle for 
position within the same body, like a Leviathan splitting apart at the seams as it refuses 
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the unification imposed by its "artificer" (Hobbes 19). Drawing on the influence of the 
"ghost story" (Shelley, "Introduction" 170) and the contemporary scientific treatise (171-
72), Shelley orchestrates the "shapeless substances" of thought out of chaos (171) in order 
to send forth her "hideous progeny" (173), which could function as the representative of 
lower-class discontent in the early nineteenth century. For, as H. L. Malchow has argued, 
"It is now commonly accepted that the Gothic literary genre of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries represents, if remotely and unconsciously, the central tensions 
of an age of social liberation and political revolution" (90). Through Shelley's novel, the 
changeling becomes incorporated into the segment of European society that, in the wake 
ofthe failed French Revolution and the dashed liberal hopes for a "world reborn" (Wein 
1 09), occupied the position of the corpse-in-the-cradle (Shelley, "Introduction" 172)-not 
so much dead as deformed upon arrival. In this way, Shelley's monster crosses over with 
the folk changeling, posing as both a "solitary fairy" who infiltrates the domestic realm 
(Eberly 242) and a congenitally afflicted automaton (or "stock") whose position is clearly 
subaltern. While it is likely that Stevenson's persona is an "urban gothic" (Spencer 200-
201) variation on Shelley's monster, Hyde can also be viewed as an entirely separate 
bifurcation of the folk changeling, another fairy of the homely sort who is all the more 
subaltern because he poses as a bourgeois Victorian gentleman (Rago 77). In a way the 
Hyde persona is more complex, for Stevenson himself identified the "body" or "vehicle" 
for his tale as the "sleepless brownies" that "manage man's internal theatre" (Stevenson, 
"A Chapter on Dreams" 139, 141). Stevenson's artistry relies largely on the performance 
of his conceptual personae who, the author seems to suggest, may run rampant across the 
stage if they so desire it. The conjured evil entity Mr. Hyde, with his "wicked-looking" 
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and "ape-like" appearance, evokes for the alert reader a post-Darwinian changeling whose 
deviant tendencies are reminiscent of the spiteful dwarves of British folklore (Jekyll and 
Hyde 16, 41). Following this second conceptual plane, Stevenson's atavistic persona 
refigures the class deformation inspired by Thomas Malthus's paranoid body politics: 
Hyde enunciates, on the one hand, the moment in which the lower-classes and the "non-
British community" threaten the "essential 'soundness' of the British race" (Dryden, 
"Stevenson's Gothic London" 255) and, on the other, the space in which the "faceless 
mob" (Silver 166) of folk legend becomes the vehicle for a subterranean/subaltern 
eruption. In his evocation of Shelley's biologically engineered bogie, Stevenson refigures 
London as a gothic Fairyland. 
Given my outline so far, it should be no great surprise that novels such as 
Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde have been enjoyed as both good old-fashioned tales of 
terror and highly sophisticated "science-fictional" parables. The first section ofthe 
chapter attempts to specify the ways in which the gothic and SF genres contribute to a 
richer understanding of the changeling persona as an emergent conceptual persona, or as 
the filling out of worlds, faces, and enunciations (territories, roles, and events) in the late 
Romantic and Victorian periods. It was the intent of the previous chapter to emphasize, as 
far as possible, that while the changeling had assumed particular "roles" or "functions" in 
Victorian society, it also could not be easily separated from the Victorians themselves: the 
changeling was no mere metaphor for subversive or monstrous behaviour but was part of 
the very fabric of daily life. While we may hesitate to agree that changeling tales offered 
literal "explanations" for congenital diseases and sexual promiscuity, we cannot simply 
ignore the reality that, to a certain degree, changelings did exist-in the unofficial 
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medical lexicon of the late nineteenth century, in the households of peasant and working-
class families alike where "changelings" were frequent visitors. The human deviations of 
the Romantic period were, in Edmund Burke's terminology, "sublime" creations, in 
which, as the philosopher felicitously argues, "beauty is found indifferently [ ... ] without 
quitting its common form" (Enquiry 90). For all of his conservative views, Burke 
anticipated the natural science of Erasmus Darwin (1790s), the teratological work of 
Etienne and Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1820s and 1830s), and the updated 
evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin (1850s to 1870s): each of these scientists 
possessed the "sense of wonder" that derived from the Romantic and Burkean fascination 
with the sublime, that later characterized the best SF of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and, most importantly for the present discussion, that confirmed the theory that 
"monsters" were, if not the same as us, at least "part of us, of our flesh" (Aldiss, Billion 
Year Spree 135).31 I tum now to Burke's and Erasmus Darwin's era where the articulation 
of the monster and the changeling is inextricably tied up with the philosophical concept of 
the sublime and, more particularly, the monstrous sublime. In many ways, the gothic 
novel retreats to the mythical and pagan realm of the folktale; but what emerges in both 
Shelley's and Stevenson's works is a far more complex organism than anthropologists or 
folklorists have encountered before. 
I: Nineteenth-Century "Gothic SF" and the "Monstrous Sublime" 
I have already suggested in the previous chapter that the changeling was a great 
31 Aldiss's comment iS actually about Wells, but I appropnate it herem order to suggest that Shelley and 
Stevenson were explonng a Similar theme m their work. These shared mterests m monstrosity and m the 
subversive potential of hybnd personae become more evident m the next chapter. 
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source of fascination and fear for the Victorians, a figure of astonishment who defied 
religious as well as medical authorities with its savage behaviour and terrifying form. 
Romantic writing in the early nineteenth century supplies some philosophical 
conceptualizations of this fear, revealing that the radical shift in attitudes towards science 
in the previous century had begun to redefine the boundaries between the "monster" and 
the "human," and more generally, what practical steps one could take to determine these 
differences. The human body became the new subject of scientific study as philosophers 
began to theorize on its inner "essence" or "innate principles," which Locke had 
considered to be beyond the scope of human knowledge (1-25). As Robert Olorenshaw 
argues, "[t]owards the end of the eighteenth century new taxonomic principles were 
forged that were determined not so much by visible surfaces but by the inner dynamics of 
living beings" (162). A major consequence of this development, heralded by Georges 
Cuvier's studies in comparative anatomy and Erasmus Darwin's creation of a system of 
pathology, was that the human organism lost its distinction as a sacred vessel, as the 
temple of God. All the same, the burgeoning interest in the biological sciences enabled its 
practitioners to confirm the biblical premise that the mortal creature was indeed "fearfully 
and wonderfully made": beneath the surface of our bodies there lurked a dark abode of 
fibrous contractions, arterial circulations, and chemical convolutions, all of which opened 
up the possibilities of further research and therefore further discoveries. And a work such 
as Darwin's Zoonomia (1794-96) really did open up the body to the intellectuals of the 
day: the breathtaking first sections on the "motions" of the human organism must have 
provided one of the lightning flashes for the Byron-Shelley group who gathered in 
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Geneva in 1816.32 Moreover, ifthe Romantics succeeded in dislodging the transcendent 
divinity of the body, their writings presaged the "eruption of imminent forces" within 
(Olorenshaw 162-63); and this philosophical shift became one of the guiding principles of 
the most popular genre of the period, the gothic novel, which played a crucial role in 
introducing psychological terror as well as "scientific romance" to the nineteenth-century 
world. And so if the bogies and spirits of the Medieval and Renaissance periods could be 
dismissed by the authority of the British empiricists in the seventeenth century, other 
popular figures of fantastic literature gained new prominence as the result of 
Enlightenment and Romantic science and the "fearfully" new presentation of the human 
body. 
The gothic novel was the first fictional genre to capitalize on this exciting era of 
scientific discovery; however, it did not simply produce a scientific fantasy (comparable 
to Wells's works of the late-nineteenth century) but rather a "hesitation" between 
"natural" and "supernatural" phenomena, as Tzvetan Todorov describes in his definition 
ofthe "fantastic" (33). As one form of the fantastic, the gothic, or at least early genres of 
"horror," produce in the reader emotions of fear and terror (33-34, 92). In the first preface 
to The Castle ofOtranto (1764), in which the author Horace Walpole employs the 
fictional persona of a translator presenting an anonymous work to his reading audience, 
we are given the first basic principle of the gothic, as we now know it: "Terror, the 
author's principle engine, prevents the story from ever languishing; and it is so often 
32 See, for example, the provocative descnption of"sensonal motiOns" and, m particular, this suggestive 
passage. "When we recollect, that the electnc flmd itself iS actually accumulated and given out voluntanly 
by the torpedo and the gynmotus electncus, that an electnc shock will frequently stimulate mto motiOn a 
paralytic hmb, and lastly that it needs no perceptible tubes to convey it, this opmwn seems not Without 
probabihty; and the smgular figure of the bram and nervous system seems well adapted to distnbute it over 
every part of the body" (Vol. I, p. 10). 
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contrasted by pity, that the mind is kept up in a constant vicissitude of interesting 
passions" (100). The second preface to Otranto, in which the author shyly admits his 
authorship, reinforces the idea that Walpole's novel and gothic fiction itself is a different 
species than pure-that is, medieval-romance: "It was an attempt to blend the two kinds 
of romance: the ancient and the modem. In the former, all was imagination and 
improbability; in the latter, nature is always intended to be, and sometimes has been, 
copied with success." He then offers what may be the slogan of the eighteenth-century 
gothic romance when he states that he wishes to "conduct the mortal agents in his drama 
according to the rules of probability" (102). Here Walpole strives to emphasize how 
romance itself was changing from pure "imagination" to a mixed combination of fantasy 
and empirical speculation. Moreover, if science appears to be outside the realm of the 
gothic, it nevertheless hovers over the framework of the gothic novel (as invented by 
Walpole) in the form of occulted knowledge, or the forbidden territory of the Faustian 
. 33 
enterpnse. 
A key concept related to this genre was the sublime, which was later used to 
describe the atmosphere of terror in works such as Walpole's The Castle ofOtranto, 
William Beckford's Vathek (1786), and Anne Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho 
(1794). Here is Burke's preliminary definition, as offered early in his Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757): "Whatever is 
fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any 
33 Th1s mot1f1s especmlly prevalent m Wllham Beckford's Vathek An Arabzan Tale (1786), m wh1ch the 
t1tle character g1ves up ills soul m exchange for supernatural powers, and m Lord Byron's play Manfred 
( 1817, pubhshed JUSt a year before Frankenstezn ), m wh1ch the sage-hke tltle character defies both socml 
conventwn (mcludmg most notably the Church) and the seven spmts he conJures before he 1s finally 
vanqmshed. Perhaps not surpnsmgly, Byron clmmed that Vathek was h1s "B1ble" (Ald1ss, Bzllwn Year 
Spree 18). 
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sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to 
terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which 
the mind is capable of feeling" (36; original emphasis). Walpole and his literary inheritors 
strove to employ this powerful engine in their fictional works-but always with an 
ambivalent attitude, that is a hesitation, towards the "terrible" object of enquiry. For the 
sublime is related to the "astounding" and the "awe-inspiring," which may refer to some 
divine or, on the contrary, "terrifying" object; of course, one might just as well be 
terrified by the divine as by the monstrous, and the former was quickly losing ground to 
the latter with the burgeoning interest in the biological sciences and comparative 
anatomy. 
The fantastical creatures of folk legend had been assimilated into the popular 
imagination long before they found a place in the medical lexicon, but Burke's Enquiry is 
a notable early scientific appropriation of such conceptual personae. Indeed, his 
description of the sublime itself articulates a sort of gothic character; or rather, it finds its 
best expression in the form of the "monster" who seemed to inspire both divine terror and 
primordial horror. Consider, for example, the following passage: 
There is a dwarfish size of men and women, which is almost constantly so gross 
and massive in comparison of their height, that they present us with a very 
disagreeable image. But should a man be found not above two or three feet high, 
supposing such a person to have all the parts of his body of a delicacy suitable to 
such a size, and otherwise endued with the common qualities of other beautiful 
bodies, I am pretty well convinced that a person of such a stature might be 
considered as beautiful; might be the object oflove; might give us very pleasing 
ideas on viewing him. The only thing which could possibly interpose to check our 
pleasure is, that such creatures, however formed, are unusual, and are often 
therefore considered as something monstrous. The large and gigantic, though very 
compatible with the sublime, is contrary to the beautiful. It is impossible to 
suppose a giant the object oflove. When we let our imaginations loose in 
romance, the ideas we naturally annex to that size are those of tyranny, cruelty, 
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injustice, and every thing horrid and abominable. We paint the giant ravaging the 
country, plundering the innocent traveller, and afterwards gorged with his half-
living flesh: such are Polyphemus, Cacus, and others, who make so great a figure 
in romances and heroic poems. The event we attend to with the greatest 
satisfaction is their defeat and death. (Enquiry 143; emphasis added) 
While his final admission grants a certain revulsion towards such monsters, Burke 
expresses a certain degree of sympathy towards these beings who, despite their monstrous 
forms, express a finer sense of intellectual capacity (as Shelley's monster would in the 
next century). We may interpret Burke's tone as patronizing, but we should also take note 
of his subtle criticism of his contemporaries: he is aware that diminutive or large men and 
women are "considered" to be monstrous and that such social stigmas are perpetuated 
when we "let our imaginations loose." At the same time, he designates them with 
alternate terms, "dwarf' and "giant," which partake of the "romance" he then weaves into 
his academic performance. This constitutes a certain hesitation, which becomes more 
prominent in Burke's later political writings as an ambivalence but which manifests itself 
here as a spirited and open-minded conceptualization of a new conceptual persona: the 
sublime monster. This awe-inspired hesitation in the presence of the sublime body 
constitutes an intelligent critique of romance, which characterizes the Romantic gothic 
novel in Shelley's era. 
But the gothic genre had a significant conservative strain, hence its association 
with "patriotic indoctrination" (Wein 3) and the paranoid fears of demonic and/or foreign 
contamination. And so a discussion of the sublime and the monstrous sublime would not 
be complete without a brief mention of Malthus and the "dismal science" of his 
population theories (Boulding vii). Malthus's Essay on Population (1798) is significant 
for the present discussion because it enunciates the late eighteenth-century fear of the 
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mass uprising, which was manifested graphically after 1793 in France. In a sense, 
Malthus was able to reaffirm the later conservative reaction to the Revolution in Burke's 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), but from the vantage point of the late 
1790s, when the Reign of Terror had successfully transformed the country into the 
"monstrous tragicomic scene" that Burke had foreseen (Burke, Reflections 11 ). Of course, 
Malthus wrote his Essay with all the passionless style of an economic report, as dry and 
fact-ridden as Swift's "A Modest Proposal" (1729) and with the same attention to the 
unpleasant but inevitable body horror that comes with an ever-growing mass of a lower-
class population. So while his eye was on the Revolution in France it was also on the 
daily threat of overpopulation in his own England. But he did not possess the passionate 
sympathy of a Swift, nor was his satire directed towards the true source of the "evil" in 
his society-as Godwin accurately argued in his Political Justice (1793), the government 
institutions that not only starved their own but placed formidable "checks" on the 
development and self-government of the colonies they acquired. Malthus's central 
argument, which he reinforces mercilessly, is that 1) if population increase leads to the 
greater degradation of humankind, then sexual abstention is a positive (necessary) evil; 
that 2) sexual promiscuity therefore produces a series of"conspicuous" evils (23); and 
that 3) this situation requires "moral restraint." While he argues that it is possible to alter 
the outcome ofthe current human misery if"some decided change [could] take place in 
the physical constitution of our nature" ( 49), he continually returns to the dystopian view 
that the "vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation" ( 42), that 
"selfishness would be triumphant" anyhow (58), and that even the poor laws "spread the 
evil over a much larger surface" (89). The growing insistence of his melancholy view 
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leads to the recurrence of the "gothic" trope of immeasurable population growth, 
suggesting that the monstrous appetites of the lower classes have the capacity to 
completely unhinge society. Moreover, as Clara Tuite argues, Malthus was fully engaged 
with a Burkean gothic sublime or at least found in the "principle of population" a "new 
formula for the monstrous sublime" (148). While I have given more space here to Burke, 
and especially the younger Burke's more optimistic writings, Malthus's Essay remains an 
importantjootnote in the chapter, especially considering the resurgence of interest in his 
ideas in late Victorian culture (and particularly, in Stevenson and Wells), when his 
prophecies appear to have come true. 
So it is, then, that, by the early nineteenth century, the gothic became more closely 
associated with speculations on the future and, in particular, the sublime possibilities of 
humanity's evolution as a species. In one of the pioneering essays toward Shelley's 
literary rehabilitation in the 1970s, Ellen Moers insists that Walpole may have placed too 
much emphasis on the "ancient" elements of romance in his definition ofthe gothic-and 
perhaps not enough on the more modem understanding of the "sublime," as first analyzed 
by Burke in the 1750s. As a matter of correction, Moers argues that the intent of gothic is 
not to "reach down into the depths of the soul and purge it with pity and terror (as we say 
tragedy does), but to get to the body itself, its glands, epidermis, muscles, and circulatory 
system, quickly arousing and quickly allaying the physical reactions to fear" (Moers 214). 
Her reference to the anatomy rather than the soul directs attention to the primordial desire 
to scare and to be scared, suggesting that the best kind of horror makes our heart beat fast 
or our blood coagulate in the veins. But Moers may also be referring to Shelley's unique 
emphasis on the body as an empirically validated organism, which has specific parts 
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(glands and muscles and a circulatory system) that function a certain way, according to 
close scientific inspection, and which has a certain principle, "according to the rules of 
probability" (Walpole 1 02). 34 In her evocation of these anatomical images, Moers also 
underscores the ways in which Shelley's gothic anatomy re-presents the human body in a 
defamiliarizing way-as a monstrosity. But such a (re)presentation diverged from the 
dystopian vision offered in Malthus's Essay and underscored the radical possibilities of 
de territorializing a traditionally conservative genre. Shelley's incorporation of the 
Burkean gothic sublime and rejection of the Malthusian geometrical sublime anticipated 
if not SF itself, then the aesthetic and philosophical circumstances-the new emphasis on 
empirical proof or science, as well as the motif of the "monstrous" sublime-that would 
prepare the way for fiction dependent upon scientific speculation or extrapolation. 
Reflecting in particular the burgeoning scientific interest in evolution and monstrosity, 
Shelley discovers that science itself can produce and name the horrors that the gothic 
novel still seeks to identify. We are, then, not far from the focus of the last chapter, which 
considered the various ways in which the horrors of infant insurgency and congenital 
disease were given a name in the form of the "changeling." For this reason, we could say 
that SF implicates its own discourse ofknowledge in the process of its narrative: science 
is offered as the both the explanation of the disease and its very source. Far from being 
the handmaiden of technological advance, or a conservative literature that functions as a 
sort of "research and development arm" of governments (Malzberg 7), SF-or its 
34 In lus Illummatmg study A !zen Encounters Anatomy of Sczence Fzctwn, Mark Rose remforces this 
connectwn between the gothic genre and the science fictwn genre by specifymg the histoncal conditions 
that would enable a "scientific romance" to emerge out of the prevwus "romance" genre, already 
populanzed by gothic fictwn. As Rose argues, Walpole's attempt to fill "the space between[ ... ] the 'two 
klnds of romance'" IS comparable to the nmeteenth-century cntlc's attempt to fill "the space between the 
opposed forms of the new reahsm and 'pure' fantasy" (19-20). 
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prototypes, the scientific gothic romance and the scientific romance-has consistently 
critiqued uncontrolled scientific progress. Both Shelley and Stevenson cause science to 
undergo a significant change through their gothic fictions, employing the folkloric 
changeling in order to further occult the scientific progress of their eras. 
Critics since the 1970s have based their definitions of SF on the degree to which a 
novelty or innovation dominates a science-fictional narrative, indicating how other gemes 
such as fantasy and gothic contribute to or, indeed, diminish the quality of the work. My 
primary example, with which I engage throughout this and subsequent chapters, is Darko 
Suvin's now famous axiomatic claim that "SF is distinguished by the narrative 
dominance or hegemony of a fictional 'novum ' (novelty, innovation) validated by 
cognitive logic" (Metamorphoses of Science Fiction 63; original emphasis). In particular, 
Suvin elaborates, SF is a "literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are 
the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal 
device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author's empirical environment" 
(7-8; original emphases). Throughout the first part ofhis study, Metamorphoses of 
Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre, Suvin strives to 
elaborate upon his central terms "estrangement" and "cognition" in order to distinguish 
SF from other literary gemes such as the folktale, the gothic, and fantasy. These other 
gemes, he maintains, tend to depend largely on "anti-cognitive" devices, such as 
supernatural occurrences and magical weapons, and they are usually bound by a fixed or 
pre-ordained world view that either remains unchanged by the fictional "novum" or 
changes in a manner that cannot be scientifically explained. Such gemes are at the far 
extreme of realism and have a tendency to descend into pure infantile sensationalism, 
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whereas, Suvin stresses, "significant" SF is legitimized by a "scientific validation" (68) 
that anticipates and comments upon "the future of human societies and relationships" 
(77). 
Perhaps we could place Walpole and the "giant helmet" ofhis gothic romance in 
the category of the "anti-cognitive," whereas Shelley would seem to reside in the 
"cognitive" category, despite the lack of an explanation of Frankenstein's scientific 
method. How might we categorize the six folk narratives discussed in the last chapter, 
given the oblique rather than direct references to fairies, Fairyland, and fairy magic? 
There is a subtle sense that these references operate in a coded way, perhaps 
superstitiously, for the purpose of warding off what cannot be easily explained. However, 
it is notable that in these talesfairies appear only in the form of human-like creatures or, 
we might legitimately argue, "humanoids." In other words, in reading the folk legend 
(perhaps more than even hearing it, where the general audience is largely "in the know" 
and may have already assumed supernatural agency), we are given very little detail to 
confirm the presence of the supernatural: indeed, part of the tension in every tale is 
whether or not fairy involvement can be proven, and therefore whether or not the 
"creature" should be treated as an alien or as part of the family. "The Speckled Bull" 
reinforces this tension by having a character-the prince's second wife-employ the 
changeling motif for the purpose of working mischief. Here "estrangement" is operating 
in a rather sophisticated way, and for this reason, Chapter 3, using Wells as support for 
the argument, offers a critique of Suvin's disparaging remarks on the folkloric and fantasy 
genres. However, a more subtle critique is initiated here through the discussion of 
Shelley's gothic-cum-folkloric-cum-science-fictional Frankenstein and Stevenson's 
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similarly hybrid Jekyll and Hyde. As Suvin himself argues, Shelley's critique of 
"'objective' post-Baconian science," which would exclude from its philosophical system 
warm fellow-feeling as well as politics, required the generic-and anti-cognitive-
"horror" theme in order to conceptualize the Promethean "overreacher" (read: scientist) 
whose creation is "demonically destructive of all values" (Metamorphoses 129). 
Similarly, Stevenson's engagement with criminal anthropology, which was predisposed 
towards Malthus's dystopian view of the degenerate mass (that is, lower class) 
population, re-imagines the Frankenstein figure Jeykll as the demonic source for his 
creation, Hyde. In both cases, gothic and folktale elements introduce estranging novelties 
for the purpose of transforming the author's "empirical environment." 
Suvin's further elaboration of his terms, particularly in later studies, allows us 
(despite his insistence to the contrary) to find in both gothic and folktale elements new 
and perhaps "residual" ways ofboth critiquing society and imagining "possible new 
relations among people" (Suvin, Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction 47). It 
is with this additional modification in mind that I tum to one final element of Suvin's 
definition, which seems to have something in common with Deleuze and Guattari's 
designation of the conceptual persona as the philosophical vehicle for real discoveries in 
the material world. Suvin states, "When we read a text we should understand not only its 
internal narrative articulation but also its relation to wider paradigms. The result is that 
the text inescapably amounts to a given interpretation or model of the extra-textual 
universe" (46; original emphases). As he had argued in the previous work, the "novum," 
which could include an invention, setting, agent, or relation (Metamorphoses 64) that is 
extrapolated through the scientific method, transgresses an ontological norm by entering a 
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plane of existence that is parallel but also "alternate" to the author's environment (70-71 ). 
Examples of this transgression would include the exploration of alternate times (time 
warping, time-travel), places (travel to new continents or planets), species (discovery of 
extraterrestrial races, such as Martians), and genetic mutation (biological engineering, 
hybridised progeny of a union between different species). "Significant" SF uses a 
"cognitive logic" (the scientific method or existing scientific developments in the author's 
epoch) in order to verify connections between the "active forces" (protagonists of the SF 
tale) and the "obstacles to be reduced" (the novum) (79). In other words, any SF text that, 
for example, introduces a gadget or exotic species for sensational purposes-to avoid 
plausible explanation of a phenomenon, catastrophic or not; to avoid broaching the 
question of human-alien or self-other relations-limits the opportunity for the author to 
view his/her own environment from a new and critical perspective. Once again, for Suvin, 
the particular novum still needs to be validated through its correspondence to a "scientific 
paradigm" (81 ), and this requirement leads him to the conclusion that Stevenson's Jekyll 
and Hyde is an "early example of 'science fantasy'" (69). This assessment has much to do 
with the pseudo-scientific use of the magical potion, which is discussed in more detail in 
section III. I would insist, however, that 1) the novel is more accurately an example of 
"urban Gothic SF" and that 2) Jekyll's chemical experiment is not as significant as 
Stevenson's psychological experiment, which amounts to saying that, like Shelley, 
Stevenson was engaging with the new sciences of his day, however feebly he managed 
the older sciences (or hocus-pocus) of yesteryear. Moreover, it is Hyde himself (just as it 
is the monster in Shelley's work) who constitutes the "novum" (agent) in the work rather 
than the specific scientific materials involved in the experiment. What Brian Aldiss has 
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argued in regards to Frankenstein we could also say in regards to Jekyll and Hyde: that 
the narrative is precariously "balanced between the old and the new" (Billion Year Spree 
26), with one foot, as it were, in the world of gothic romance and the other in the world of 
scientific speculation. 
From the "geophilosophical" point of view (Chapter 1, Introduction), these two 
works contain a vast cross-section of interrelated themes, not the least ofwhich includes a 
vital current of gothic "terror" infused with Burkean sublime. The monstrous sublime, as 
derived from Burke's youthful indulgence in proto-Romantic aesthetics (Enquiry) and his 
later curdled reaction to the chaotic Revolution (Reflections), becomes a popular trope in 
both Romantic and Victorian writing, especially as evolutionary theory gains new 
popularity in the mid-nineteenth century. On first appearance, the "sublime" seems to be 
operating on a very different plane than "estrangement" for the reason that the former 
traditionally indicates a supernatural force that seizes us in a sort of traumatic paralysis. 
But as Burke's Enquiry suggests, the sublime also offers the possibility of a physical 
transformation, validated in some way by the complex but "invariable" laws of nature. 
The gothic novel after Walpole tended to emphasize the "terror" element of the sublime, 
using the supernatural as its main generator of a traumatic intrusion or invasion. The 
Romantics, however, made it their task to re-explore the sublime in its fullest Burkean 
sense, believing that science and evolution had a major impact on the contemporary 
world's terrible and astounding events, including the catastrophic French Revolution, the 
discovery of the inner volition ofhuman bodies (E. Darwin's Zoonomia), and the 
burgeoning science of biological monstrosity or "teratology" (Etienne Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire's Philosophie anatomique). As the central expression of the philosophical shift 
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towards "cognition," Shelley's novel of reanimation provided a new vehicle for the gothic 
sublime, science fiction, which employed a scientific discovery or a sudden 
environmental change as the novel basis for a fictional narrative. 35 Moreover, in light of 
Shelley's repositioning ofthe gothic as an exploration of physical/social metamorphosis 
and monstrosity, the sublime now appears to have some affinity with Suvinian 
"estrangement." Indeed, Suvin himself suggests that estrangement manifests itself as a 
"shock" to the reader's own cognitive norms (Positions 142).36 Having revisited the realm 
of the Burkean sublime, Shelley and Stevenson lay out a new conceptual plane: a gothic 
Fairyland populated with folkloric personae like the solitary fairy and the dwarf. 
II. Frankenstein: Solitary Fairy or Revolutionary Insurgent? 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein marks the first notable "science-fictional" 
conceptualization of the changeling. First of all, Shelley enters the generic realm 
previously occupied by Walpole, Clara Reeves, and Radcliffe, but refuses to employ the 
gothic merely as "the gentler face of patriotic indoctrination" (Wein 3), choosing instead 
to employ a deformed pseudo-human (and, by proxy, foreign) entity as the reluctant 
spokesperson for are-imagined national identity. Second, Shelley's engagement with the 
Rev. Malthus's geometrical notions of population increases and checks, and the 
inherently destructive character of"nature" (Malthus 58, 61,207-08, 213-15), anticipates 
the (Social) Darwinist preoccupations ofboth Victorian folklore and SF, including 
35 I follow Aldtss' s argument that "the greatest successes of sctence fictiOn are those whtch deal wtth man 
[and woman] m relatiOn to hts [and her] changmg surroundmgs and abthbes: what mtght loosely be called 
env~ronmentaljictwn" (ongmal emphasts). I would also agree wtth hts follow-up clatm that "the baste 
tmpulse of sctence fictiOn ts as much evolutiOnary as technologtcal" (Bzllwn Year Spree 12). 
36 In a stmtlar vem, J.P. Vemter argues that Wells's emphasts m hts early sctenhfic romances was not on 
"moral and soctal consequences" but on "shockmg hts readers out ofthetr complacence" (75). 
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especially texts by Kingsley, Bulwer-Lytton, Butler, Stevenson, and Wells. By 
incorporating and re-evaluating Burke's Enquiry and Malthus's Essay, Shelley 
reproduces her own form of the monstrous sublime, which, as Tuite accurately notes, 
engages with the "relocation of monstrosity from aesthetic discourse (as grotesque or 
sublime) to medical discourse and the public spectacles of natural science" (150). I would 
suggest, following Marie-Helene Huet's study, Monstrous Imagination, that Frankenstein 
gathers into its narrative the necessary materials for a "science of monstrosity," and 
therefore anticipates the creation of teratology in the 1830s (Huet 1 08). Shelley's 
combined interest in both gothic and scientific monstrosity reproduces a British national 
identity that is haunted by its double, that is, by the excess of its own fetishistic dreams in 
the post-revolutionary period. Some scholars have circled around the teratological angle 
by discussing female monstrosity (Gilbert and Gubar 221-47, Huet 129-62), monstrous 
birth (Moers 214-24), and the doppelganger motif (Dryden, Literary Doubles 38-40)-all 
concepts that, as Chapter 1 has shown, are associated with folk legends concerning 
human-fairy encounters and British preoccupations with origins and the state of the 
burgeoning empire. It is these speculations (on motherhood, reproduction, monstrosity, 
exchange, and the production of monstrous species) that give rise to the additional 
interpretation that Shelley's monster is a changeling: it comprises a grotesque hotchpotch 
of human parts and is therefore a mimic-human; it infiltrates human domestic life and, 
while it intends only to learn by imitation and mimicry, disrupts the order of the family by 
its very perverse and unaffiliated origin; its subsequent insurgency threatens to proliferate 
new monstrous forms and thereby constitutes a revolutionary gesture. More than this, as a 
conceptual persona, the monster does not simply express his author/creator's thought but 
115 
comprises the very movement of thought: he is the necessary agent for both Shelley's 
larger philosophical enunciation and the enclosed (changeling) narrative to Walton; and 
the monster (rather than Frankenstein) is also the creative spark (the sublime 
estrangement) that gives life to the whole assemblage of constituent personae comprising 
Shelley's post-Enlightenment/Romantic gothic preoccupations. 
Victor Frankenstein begins his narrative by first establishing his own legitimacy 
and his family's distinction (Frankenstein 17f.), thereby setting us up for a dramatic 
reversal of fortune and, more importantly, the intrusion of an illegitimate agent. For 
Victor's intention to penetrate the boundaries of empirical knowledge requires him to 
shed his affiliation with the accepted norms and values of his society by isolating himself 
in his laboratory in Ingolstadt and devoting his time to modem works of "natural 
philosophy" (27). While he eventually abandons these outmoded texts for modem ones, 
Victor's pursuit is monstrous because it seeks to probe the mystery ofbirth, which, as 
male philosophers had consistently argued, is itself a monstrous process (Huet 1-7). When 
he has accomplished his chimerical experiment, he describes the human he has pieced 
together from the corpses of numerous bodies: 
How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch 
whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form? His limbs 
were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! -Great 
God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; 
his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but 
these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that 
seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, 
his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips. (Frankenstein 34) 
The suggestive quality of the narrative has already allowed us to conceptualize the 
monster as an imitation-human, a doppelganger, or interloper. The yellow skin, while 
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clearly associated with the complexion of previously dead tissue, also evokes the image 
of the changeling's sallow and sickly countenance. We should note here that Victor is 
expressing both the motherly horror of giving birth to a deformed child and the general 
parental paranoia of raising an unruly son. Additionally, Victor's reaction establishes the 
character of the "mad scientist" of subsequent SF who either fails to build the creature he 
has sketched or is simply unable to define or "delineate" the creature at all: the result is an 
abortion, a monster, a nonhuman travesty-indeed, a changeling. This connection is 
reinforced by the fact that changelings were linked, in medical theory, with children who 
failed to thrive and, in folkloric theory, with the dead-and it is quite likely that the 
corpses Victor unearths bear the marks of jaundice and other consumptive diseases. 
As Eberly has argued, changeling narratives may also have provided another form 
of grieving for a deformed or dead child. "The actual time of birthing," she notes, "was 
seen as fraught with dangers, physical as well as spiritual, no doubt because death in 
childbed was so common" in the nineteenth century (231 ). High mortality rates for 
pregnant women and newborns were even more common in the eighteenth century, a fact 
that is underscored in that most famous description of the monster, as well as the equally 
famous passage that describes Victor's dream of embracing his dead mother: 
I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom ofhealth, walking in the streets of 
Ingolstadt. Delighted and surprised, I embraced her; but as I imprinted the first 
kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared to 
change, and I thought I held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms; a shroud 
enveloped her form, and I saw the grave worms crawling in the folds of the 
flannel. I started from my sleep with horror; a cold dew covered my forehead, my 
teeth chattered, and every limb became convulsed: when, by the dim yellow light 
of the moon, as it forced its way through the window shutters, I beheld the 
wretch-the miserable monster whom I had created. (34-35; emphasis added) 
In a certain sense, the dream presents an inversion of Victor's act of creation, by 
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describing a transformation from "the bloom of health" to the "livid" "hue of death"; 
although it is apparent that we are meant to see parallels between the monster himself, 
monstrous births, and the monstrosity of the female form here. And yet, it does not matter 
that this passage comes right on the heels of the previous one: there is no doubt that 
Victor identifies his experiment as an act of reproduction. He has created life, and in that 
creation, a means to destroy life; the vision of his dead fiancee and mother is also the 
image of dead creators, female givers ofhfe. 37 While these may not be unique 
interpretations (see Moers, Gilbert and Gubar, Johnson, and Mellor), they also correspond 
to the folkloric belief that physical transformations could be attributed to a supernatural 
agency. Elizabeth's alteration, which is initiated by the "embrace," is a figurative way of 
comprehending Victor's perverse conception of a "changed" child: he has abducted 
bodies (from their graves) and fashioned them into the "stock" likeness of a human being, 
which, while it has some of the characteristics of humanity, bears also the frightening 
signs that it is actually a substitute for a human. It is at this point, where folklore and 
science meet, that we find the gothic, and particularly Shelley's appropriation of the 
gothic tradition, operating most notably: Victor's study of the sublime human body, much 
akin to Burke's youthful dalliance with physical forms in the Enquiry, produces its own 
37 One conspicuous Issue, which I can only note m passmg here, IS VIctor's gesture of appropnatmg the 
female reproductive functiOn. There IS certamly no shortage of studies of this sort, especially smce the 
1970s when authors such as Ellen Moers, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, and Mary Poovey (see Works 
Cited) began the pwneenng work of constructmg a femmist poetics, which was grafted onto the largely 
male-dommated canon of European literature. More recently, Steven Lehman argues that "womb envy" and 
the subsequent appropnatwn of female "procreative power" are the central concerns m the novel (49-50), 
and he, m fact, goes on to pnvilege this readmg over other political and philosophical readmgs-by Gilbert 
and Gubar, U. C. Knoepflmacher, and Kate Ellis. However, my focus IS bound to the mvestigation of 
genenc correspondences and the mtersection of specific motifs, such as those found m changelmg tales and 
gothic novels. I am well aware that another chapter of this sort could be devoted to the theme/motif of 
female monstrosity. In any event, my concern IS with the (frequently male) changelmg figure rather than 
only the details ofhis/heriits birth 
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excess, so that the human form is not only replicated but magnified-in size, strength, 
and emotions. Appropriating the powers of Fairyland, the laboratory has now become the 
main apparatus of metamorphosis. But, like the folkloric changeling, the monster 
becomes the very site of physical transformation and a hybridized presentation of the 
human and nonhuman: the metaphor has becomeflesh.38 Moreover, if Victor is the initial 
source of the monster's volitiOn, the monster's sublime form exceeds the boundaries of 
parental authonty as well as scientific extrapolation: his monstrosity is continually 
presented in the form of excess, failure, perversion, and the powerful intrusion of an 
exterior force. 
While it is certainly Shelley's point that the monster is the spirit of rebellion that 
Frankenstein himself conjures up from his own soul, or his "own spirit let loose from the 
grave" (Frankenstein 49), this metaphor is discovered to be a disguise-if not for a literal 
truth, then perhaps for an analogical one: creator and creation are physically linked 
through an act of artificial procreation. Shelley employs the Burkean theory of the 
sublime in order to contemplate both the terrible powers of human ambition and the 
terrifying interruption of that ambitiOn by a monstrous entity. But, as the works of 
numerous Romantics demonstrate,39 science could be both the analytic tool for the 
38 For this reason, the monster iS not so much a "psychic mamfestatwn [ ] of trauma" (Peterson 16) as he 
iS a physical anomaly, analogous to the sideshow freaks, medical subJects, and deformed children of 
Shelley's day 
39 Particularly m Byron's Manfred, the gothic genre has been revised as a Romantic vehicle for a 
Promethean rebelhon m the midst of the new era of conservatism m post-Napoleomc Europe In a 
declamation that will be echoed by Victor Frankenstem, Manfred boldly rebukes the spmts who doubt his 
superhuman Will "The mmd, the spmt, the Promethean spark,/The hghtmng of my bemg, iS as 
bnght,/Pervadmg, and far-dartmg as your own,/ And shall not yield to yours, though coop'd m clay'" 
(1.1 154-57) Here we have the slogan of the new Prometheus, the new Faustus, for the new gothic era, 
which prophesies a new world and a new people conJured not by mere magic but by the "hghtmng" of 
scientific discovery Earher m the scene, the Seventh Spmt's speech announces to us that we are no longer 
m the world of medieval gothic (or pre-Ptolemaic philosophy) 
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sublime discovery and the very source of the sublime; the human itself, with its 
unexpected physical alterations, is a biological testimony to the fact that the sublime is 
simultaneously a power from without (it is beyond our control, out of our hands) and a 
power from within (we, in a sense, produce it or engender it). For these reasons, the 
Romantic gothic sublime, as it is presented in Frankenstein, establishes the conditions for 
a science-fictional art and accomplishes this through the conceptual persona of the 
changeling, now "made over" into an artificial human, a transformation that anticipates 
Jekyll's conjured doppelganger Hyde (section III), Moreau's vivisected and programmed 
Beast-Folk (Chapter 3), and the Rossums' engineered Robots (Chapter 4). 
The star which rules thy destmy 
Was ruled, ere earth began, by me: 
It was a world as fresh and fmr 
As e'er revolved round sun m air; 
Its course was free and regular, 
Space bosom'd not a lovelier star. 
The hour arnved-and It became 
A wandenng mass of shapeless flame, 
A pathless comet, and a curse, 
The menace of the umverse; 
Still rolhng on with mnate force, 
Without a sphere, without a course, 
A bnght deformity on high, 
The monster of the upper sky! 
And thou! beneath Its mfluence born-
Thou worm! whom I obey and scorn-
Forced by a power (which IS not thme, 
And lent thee but to make thee mme) 
For this bnefmoment to descend, 
Where these weak spmts round thee bend 
And parley with a thmg hke thee-
Whatwouldstthou, ChildofClay! with me? (11.110-31) 
The metaphoncal analogy here of the flammg comet IS pure scientific romance woven mto a dark gothic 
fantasy; and If Manfred IS the "worm" born under this blazmg cosmological opera, he IS also the bold 
conductor, the "monster" and the "deformity" Itself reachmg for the stars. Havmg adapted the central 
character from Walpole's The Castle ofOtranto and the Faustian plot from Beckford's Vathek, Byron steers 
the gothic closer to the form that Mary Shelley would produce one year later, motivated as It IS by 
"Philosophy and science, and the spnngs/Ofwonder" (Manfred 1.1.13-14), "sciences untaught" (2 2.84), 
and a "long pursued and superhuman art" (2.2 148). The dark broodmg nature of the play also 
acknowledges Its engagement with the subhme-that unfathomable hfe force or "spark" that charactenzes 
the evolutiOnary Impulse. 
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The crucial point in all of this is that Shelley's monster does not simply shed the 
characteristics of past personae, and past territories: if we find the "scientific" details of 
Victor Frankenstein's experiment a little unsatisfactory, we should still remember that 
both the gothic and folktale genres have informed his conceptualization of the monster. 
The third narrative sequence of the novel, in which the monster relates his experiences to 
Frankenstein (Frankenstein 68-97), introduces the second conceptual influence, and 
Victor's gothic imposition is delayed by the intrusion of a solitary fairy. 
After being spumed by both his creator and the villagers he first encounters upon 
fleeing the laboratory, the monster conceals himself in a hovel adjoining a small cottage, 
where he observes the "gentle manners" of simple folk. He longs to "join them," but his 
memory of his treatment at the hands of the "barbarous villagers" (Frankenstein 73) 
makes him hesitate before revealing himself. He therefore begins his career as an 
invisible and "solitary being" (74): he hides in order to conceal his ugly appearance but 
absorbs all he sees and hears in order to compensate for that ugliness through his own 
"gentle manners." He begins to perform labours for the family, collecting firewood and 
clearing away snow, gestures that lead the De Lacey family to believe that they have been 
aided by a "good spirit" (77; original emphasis). This choice of epithet may anticipate the 
moment where the monster discovers that he is rather akin to the "evil" spirit, Lucifer, but 
it also suggests the "popular" belief in fairies common throughout Europe in the 
eighteenth century. According to Eberly's description, the monster resembles the "solitary 
fairy" "who lived, usually, by a well or stream; who hunted, fished, or scavenged for 
sustenance; and who was a sort of genius loci to a particular place" (242). Such figures, 
Eberly argues, seem to be related to the "person who has mental retardation and who is 
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often physically different as well; the different person whose nature was believed to be 
supernatural, if only in that he or she received unusual respect as a 'luck-bringer'-
whether to a farm, a particular pool, moor, or orchard." One notable example of such a 
fairy is the boggart, "A squat hairy man, strong as a six-year-old horse, with arms as long 
as tackle poles, and not too bright" (243). Pleased by the family's response to his labours, 
the monster continues to perform tasks around the cottage, and, through his efforts, he 
helps the family to thrive despite their apparent poverty. To any observer, the monster 
would have appeared to be both deformed and retarded (or "differently abled"), especially 
given his crude grunts and articulations as he learns to speak their language. If he differs 
physically from the boggart, the monster is still something of a "nature fairy," attached to 
a place rather than to a specific family, and likely cautious about revealing himself or 
becoming affiliated with anyone. Also, the monster is a "luck-bringer"; but there are, of 
course, limitations to this comparison since the monster is only respected as long as he 
remains hidden. Moreover, Shelley's monster-changeling possesses a certain cunning that 
may remind us of the clever (if mischievous) fairies featured in "The Caerlaverock 
Changeling" and "The Fairy Changeling: II." In fact, this "solitary fairy" is more cautious 
in his movements and, instead of simply invading the home for comfort and sustenance 
and inflicting "pain on the cottagers," he "obtain[s], and satisfie[s] [him]selfwith berries, 
nuts, and roots, which [he] gather[s] from a neighbouring wood" (Frankenstein 74). Like 
his folkloric counterpart, the monster tries to initiate a certain kind of hospitality, with the 
added difference that he does not make demands on the household. However, he 
discovers, to his great anguish, that the De Lacey hospitality is limited by the rather 
predictable human aversion to otherness. 
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As I have suggested, the monster is only "solitary" as long as he has to be: his 
initial desire is to be loved and accepted, like the blind old man he observes from his 
hovel. Reflecting the Romantic preoccupations of Shelley's day, the monster is clearly a 
changeling of "fine sensations"-a trait that even Victor perceives by the time the 
creature has concluded his narrative (Frankenstein 99). Given his preference for 
fellowship, the monster also bears a likeness to the "social fairy" of British legend who 
"lived in close company with humankind" (Eberly 243). Yet, already fearful of intruders, 
given the fact that the family members are themselves political exiles, the De Laceys are 
not prepared to host anything that appears to threaten their livelihood. While the monster 
is not aware of this inherent human trait, he is conscious of the impact that his deformed 
appearance might have on the family. Shortly after his arrival at the cottage, he happens 
to see his reflection in a puddle, and, in anticipation of his one and only encounter with 
the family, exclaims, "Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable 
deformity" (Frankenstein 76). As readers, of course, we recall Victor's vivid description 
of the monster's "yellow skin," "shrivelled complexion and straight black lips" (34), and 
then imagine what it would be like to encounter this creature and hear it speak our own 
language. The horror of such an event is comparable to the moment when the changeling 
first speaks. It is no surprise, then, that he chooses to first approach old De Lacey himself 
whose blindness would at least initially prevent him from perceiving the monster's 
deformity. Moreover, he discovers that the poor "that stopped at their door were never 
driven away" (89), and so comes to believe that he will receive the same treatment, 
despite his appearance. While the old man is the only De Lacey who is sympathetic 
towards the monster, we can say that his blindness deceives him into believing that the 
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monster is a "human creature" (91) and that, as Locke would say, the body is not the only 
"measure of a man." Before the creature is able to finish the "particulars of his tale," Felix 
returns with his wife Safie and immediately attacks and drives him from the home. Like 
the tales featured in the last chapter, this domestic sequence ends with the changeling's 
exorcism. There is no torture, no elaborate ritual involved, and yet the banishment itself is 
torturous enough. 
Before his banishment, the monster is in a delicate position: 
[W]here were my friends and relations? No father had watched my infant days, no 
mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses; or if they had, all my past life 
was now a blot, a blind vacancy in which I distinguished nothing [ ... ] I had never 
yet seen a being resembling me, or who claimed any intercourse with me. What 
was I? (Frankenstein 81) 
We might again recall a similar moment in "Johnnie in the Cradle," where the changeling 
laments, "I wish I had been longer with my mother. I'd a kent [known] her better" (Briggs 
290). We are not certain who Johnnie's "mother" actually is: in his present circumstance, 
he is an abandoned child with no relations, no benevolent host to bless or caress him, and 
no "being" that resembles him or wishes to converse with him. The monster's speech, of 
course, is directed to the creator himself who once fancied that his "new species" would 
"bless" him (Frankenstein 32): now, and especially after the monster makes his demand 
for a companion "of the same species" (97), Victor is disturbed and infuriated by the 
monster's stubborn mimicry of human behaviour and his refusal to conform to the role of 
the gothic "demon." After all, unlike his creator, the monster does not possess a name, 
and like the folk changeling, he is therefore unchristened, which casts suspicion on his 
ancestry and marks him as a vehicle for demonic activity (Mumo 256; Skjelbred 215-26). 
At the same time, the monster is composed of multiple identities, multiple personae, and 
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so possesses the ability to proliferate into different forms when the circumstances require 
it. Like Johnnie and other changelings, the monster will "cause fear" if he cannot "inspire 
love" (Frankenstein 98); yet, while he is "inflamed" by an instinct for revenge (which 
perhaps marks him as more human than the average changeling), the monster's ultimate 
desire is to be left alone, if he cannot be tolerated. This is to say that his vengeful feelings 
function, as they have for humans, as a primitive method of survival. He would like to be 
accepted among humankind, but understands that he would find more acceptance from a 
being "as hideous" as himself (99). Not uncharacteristically, Victor initially accepts the 
proposal but only on the condition that the creature promises "to quit Europe for ever" 
(100). 
Moreover, it is not enough that the creature is deformed-an abomination that 
Victor should have destroyed as soon as he brought it to life; it is not enough that the 
creature has tried to insinuate himself into human society-a further perversion in that the 
creature does not look like a human and yet tries to behave like one in his actions and 
speech: now the creature wants to be left to his own devices, to have a mate, and to 
possibly produce more monstrous beings like himself. As Victor contemplates, "one of 
the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would be children, and 
a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth, who might make the very existence 
of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror" (Frankenstein 114). 
Paranoia aside, Victor's response indicates the natural revulsion to a being whose 
ambitions threaten to pervert the "natural" ties of filiation and the sacred institution of 
marriage. This perversion is fully manifested when the monster, who is robbed of his 
future after Victor destroys his potential female mate (115), strangles Elizabeth on their 
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wedding night (135-36). The dream-prophecy on the eve of the creature's birth has now 
been fulfilled, even while it is apparent that Victor's greatest evil is not the creation of a 
monstrous child but rather his refusal to be a father to it. As Moers has argued, "[ m ]ost of 
the novel, roughly two of its three volumes, can be said to deal with the retribution visited 
upon monster and creator for deficient infant care" (218). However, the monster's "failure 
to thrive" (Eberly, Munro) is not the result of a lack of familial sentiments but rather the 
naturally oppressive nature of the family itself which cannot abide aberrant forms. 
Moreover, whether or not the creature is sterile, as most "monsters" were thought to be 
(Huet 1 08), his basic threat is to English moral and political values: he mirrors lower class 
discontent as well as the combined lower- and upper-class violent excesses (Suvin, 
Metamorphoses 128), but he also parodies the paranoid gothic plot of conservative 
thinkers like the later Burke and Malthus both of whom relied upon the concept of the 
monstrous sublime and therefore the conceptual persona of the monster to enunciate their 
philosophical investigations. For the reason that Shelley implicates the monster's birth in 
the discourse of both radical and conservative politics, the potent exploration of"new 
social relations" (Suvin, Positions 45), and the possibility of a hybrid vigour in the form 
of a monstrous progeny, is not simply "borne away by the waves, and lost in darkness and 
distance" (Frankenstein 156). 
Perhaps as an ironic nod to Shakespeare, Shelley's monster also echoes Caliban's 
threat in The Tempest, that he will "people" "else this isle" with monsters. In the wake of 
the French Revolution and Malthus's influential study of population increase, 
overpopulation was frequently viewed as "problem of illegitimacy, and as a specific 
problem of the labouring class" (Tuite 149). As most scholars have acknowledged, 
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Frankenstein's fear of the monster's potential reproductive urges mirrors-or, as I would 
suggest, schematizes-the post-Revolutionary fear of "the mob" and the growing 
mobility of the lower classes. Considering the gothic emphasis on the hereditary nature of 
sins, as first established by Walpole in the original preface to The Castle ofOtranto 
(1 00),40 we could say that Victor Frankenstein effectively brings a curse on his entire 
family but also appears to reproduce his dark Faustian desires in the monstrous laboratory 
experiment. At the same time, and as an indication of Shelley's break from the older 
gothic tradition, the monster confirms his own break from the family structure by first 
adopting a new family in the form of the De Laceys and then by eschewing all relations 
in his ascetic flight to the ice-world. If he does carry out an act of vengeance that 
resonates with the old gothic family curse, he does so as both an insider/interloper (as a 
deformed changeling child or solitary fairy) and as an outsider/revolutionary, exiling 
himself from the sedentary, affiliated lifestyle of the Frankensteins in order to carve out a 
nomadic existence in the sea of ice where, we might imagine, he rarely rests but quite 
literally leaps from ice floe to ice floe. In such a scenario, Fairyland has been transformed 
once again-this time, into a sterile, barren realm in which, however, the warm and 
40 As Walpole states m the first preface to his Otranto, the premise of his tale IS that "the szns of the father 
are vzslted on thezr chzldren to the thzrd and fourth generatzon" ( 1 00; ongmal emphasis). This, the second 
part of Walpole's defimtwn of the "gothic," specifies a particular plot element, which we could paraphrase 
as the heredztary nature ofszn-a now recogmzable element m Radchffe's ltahan romances and even m the 
V Ictonan gothic works of the Bronte sisters. This element, which Walpole understands to be a weak 
premise for a fictwnal work, not only underscores the Gothic obsessiOn With the famtly structure and Its 
vulnerabihty to the changmg sexual mores of European culture m the late eighteenth century (Backus 93), 
but also anticipates the mneteenth-century mterest m the hereditary transmission of bzologzcal 
charactenstlcs. Indeed, the hereditary nature of szn, or the bwlogical transmissiOn of degenerate 
charactenstlcs, becomes a promment theme m key SF novels of the nmeteenth and even twentieth centunes, 
mcludmg not only Frankenstezn and Jekyll and Hyde, but also Wells's The Island of Dr Moreau (1896) 
and Karel Capek's R U R (1920). In these latter two works (discussed m Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 
respectively), the "mad scientists" evoke, through their biological expenments on ammals and humans, the 
Frankenstem complex and, therefore, the potentially ternfymg-and therefore "gothic"-element of any 
new scientific discovery. 
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cloying intimacy of the earthly family is exchanged for the cool and unearthly alliance 
with the sublime elements of Chamounix. As Victor reflects in his resuming narrative, "a 
creature who could exist in the ice caves of the glaciers, and hide himself from pursuit 
among the ridges of inaccessible precipices, was a being possessing faculties it would be 
vain to cope with" (Frankenstein 100). By this account, the monster dwells within the 
gothic realm but continues to exceed it, just as the sublime resists all attempts to control 
it. 
Despite Suvin's hesitation to grant the novel a position as "representative for 
world trends" (Positions 75), I would insist that the novel is well ahead of its time, not for 
its "scientific" content so much as its philosophical probing of the post-Revolutionary 
family unit. The revolutionary's declaration of a new fraternity, and its violent 
manifestation in the Terror (with the added warning, aula mort!), is recast in the novel 
when the new species of humanity (as initiated by Victor Frankenstein) is degraded to the 
position of a monstrous mob ("a race of devils," as Victor proclaims). Further, 
Frankenstein strives towards the exploration of its own "empirical environment" (as 
Spivak has asserted, the British imperialist project [262-63], and as we could add, post-
Revolutionary politics and proto-Darwinism) by juxtaposing it to an alternative one (a 
world of"social engineering" [Spivak 264] and, in its focus on "natural philosophy," 
biological engineering). From the SF purist's point of view, the novel's weakness may lie 
in its reliance on supernatural pre-destination, which effectively pre-determines the plot 
outcome: Victor's dream turns out to be a prophecy. The very condition for Shelley's 
speculations-the gothic novel form-would then undermine both the scientific and 
philosophical vision of an unknown future, and delimit the ability of the "thought-
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experiment" to proliferate into new forms and new species. On the one hand, the text's 
evolution from the 1818 edition to the revised 1831 edition indicated the unfortunate 
effects of Shelley's own gradual "conservative" leanings (Poovey 252), which were 
related in part to the conservative tendencies of the gothic genre itself. On the other hand, 
the excisions (and the moralistic 1831 Preface) do not efface the fact that Shelley had 
built her monster from radical political and social philosophies, and that her literary 
creation is part and parcel of a powerfully conceived conceptual persona, one of whose 
"integral and constituent parts" (Deleuze 17) is the changeling. This first "literary" 
(gothic, science-fictional) excursion, following the folkloric one of Chapter 1, moves 
through and sometimes beyond the territories of the changeling persona into those of the 
"natural man" (Locke), the "noble savage" (Rousseau), Adam, Eve, and Satan (Milton), 
Prometheus (P. Shelley), and Manfred (Byron). The changeling, in tum, moves through 
and beyond these territories, reiterates himself in the new languages, and, when he has 
exhausted all attempts to fit a pleasing mould for his creator ("Remember, that I am thy 
creature: I ought to be thy Adam ... "), chooses the default role of evil ("I am rather the 
fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed [ ... ] I was benevolent and good; 
misery made me a fiend" [Frankenstein 66]). But even these personae are abandoned 
when the monster discovers that they only serve to reinforce the theological model of 
"good" and "evil" and the conservative doctrine of the "monstrous sublime." Indeed, 
every evocation of "nature" "appears to produce only the monstrous" (Brooks 591 ), as 
when Victor calls upon the "[w]andering spirits" ofthe "aerial summits" ofMont Blanc 
only to discover the approach of the "wretch whom [he] had created" (Frankenstein 65). 
The monster's ultimate feat lies in his subversive repetition of the whole assemblage 
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(English literary and religious motifs, especially in Milton; Enlightenment and Romantic 
philosophy/aesthetics), a perverse parody in the form of grotesquely eloquent speech 
reminiscent of some of the greatest minds in the Age of Reason. While he falls back on 
the Miltonic narrative of the Fall, his own rebellion amounts to a reiteration of 
Rousseau's Social Contract: You may be my creator, the monster tells Frankenstein, but 
remember that "children remain attached to the father only so long as they have need of 
him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved ... 
[T]he family itself is kept together only by convention" (Rousseau 8). The monster has 
already mocked Locke's pious belief in the spiritual "measure of man" (Locke 490), has 
assumed the role of the empiricist "changeling" but only insofar as he is "intractable": the 
cannibalization of various texts and philosophies suggests also the intense and divergent 
quality of his (and thus Mary Shelley's) intelligence. Further, by infiltrating the domestic 
realm and the institution of the family, the monster finds more comfort in the brief 
communication with old man De Lacey; this is an unnatural bond since De Lacey is not 
the monster's father, but it is also an alliance since the old man is also a wounded (blind) 
exile. 
III. The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Degenerate Dwarf or Evolutionary 
Ape? 
Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde offers an urban variant on the changeling tale, even 
as it returns to the Romantic gothic themes of class deformation, illegitimacy, and 
monstrosity. Adapting the style of the detective novel, while also incorporating the 
crowded-city complex that Malthus had anticipated in Shelley's day, Stevenson 
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concentrates his tale into a "white hot" pace that can be contrasted with the slower, 
brooding progression of Shelley's narrative. One reason for this difference in tonality and 
rhythm may be attributed to the special chronotopic conditions of the novella form, which 
concerns itself with a "secret" rather than the "discovery" of some event in the past. As 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, the novella "evolves in the element of 'what happened?' 
because it places us in a relation with something unknowable and imperceptible (and not 
the other way around: it is not because it speaks of a past about which it can no longer 
provide us knowledge)" (A Thousand Plateaus 193). The final revelatory chapters answer 
the question of "What happened?" on the one hand, by unravelling the theories about 
Jekyll/Hyde that have constituted the bulk of the narrative and, on the other, by 
questioning the validity of Jekyll's own testimony, which is itself, after all, a themy 
(Jekyll and Hyde 57, 58). The other reason for the stylistic differences in Stevenson's 
work lies in the urban setting of the novel, which we might understand as a 
conceptualization of the "nightmare city" predicted by Malthus and feared by many 
bourgeois Victorians. Having imbibed the traditions of Romantics like Radcliffe and 
Shelley and early Victorians like the Bronte sisters, Stevenson constructs a tale whose 
chiaroscuro evokes an exotic gothic space now partially illuminated by the gas lamps of 
the fin de siecle city. In other words, this "modem" gothic, prominent in other novels such 
as Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891) and Bram Stoker's Dracula (1897), 
"shifts the geographic location of such horror fiction from the remote landscapes and 
ancient ruins of earlier forms to the streets and structures of the modem metropolis" 
(Dryden, Literary Doubles 16). Thomas Alva Edison's invention of the first practical 
incandescent lamp in 1879 promised to make the streets safer and crime detection more 
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effective, but it also responded to the larger scientific attempt to penetrate the dark chaos, 
to shed light on the most gothic oflocales: the human mind. Accordingly, British 
scientists and law enforcement officials eagerly adopted the ideas of the Italian 
criminologist Cesare Lombroso, who argued that crime detection was most successful 
when it sought the nature of the criminal rather than the crime. As Lombroso states in the 
third part of his final work, Crime: Its Causes and Its Remedies, "The born criminal 
shows in a proportion reaching 33% numerous specific characteristics that are almost 
always atavistic," and many of "the characteristics presented by savage races are very 
often found among born criminals" (365). Jekyll and Hyde, then, registers the full impact 
of the "relocation of monstrosity from aesthetic discourse (as grotesque or sublime) to 
medical discourse and the public spectacles of natural science" (Tuite 150). Understood 
as a conceptual plane, Stevenson's novella schematizes the concentration of urban space 
in late nineteenth-century London, presenting through an atavistic "ape-like" persona the 
image of an overpopulated, impoverished, and morally repressed society. As the science-
fictional novum of the work, Mr. Hyde performs the function of a psychological 
experiment, which, while it appears to confirm Lombroso's criminological synthesis, also 
reveals the resurgent bourgeois cravings for sensational monsters. This "dual" function 
corresponds analogically to Jekyll's own position as a "double-dealer" (Jekyll and Hyde 
55) and his society's own fear of the "beast within" (Dryden, Literary Doubles 16). But 
like Shelley's monster, Mr. Hyde assumes various roles, including the gothic demon, the 
Darwinian "throwback," and the folkloric dwarf, each of which intersect and branch off 
as the situation demands, each of which add a new dimension to our changeling persona. 
Hyde's mimicry, infiltration, and perversion of the Victorian family also constitutes a 
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revolutionary gesture since it threatens the staid institution cherished by the engineers of 
the British imperial enterprise in the second half of the nineteenth century. As an 
indication of the bourgeois gentleman's delicate position, Jekyll's "account" comes at the 
very end of the tale, after we have followed the nearly imperceptible and largely 
untraceable trajectories of Mr. Hyde, and after Jekyll's friends have tried-and failed-to 
protect his reputation. 
An exemplary passage from Stevenson's work-involving the lawyer Utterson's 
first attempts to find the connection between the gentleman Jekyll and the rogue Hyde-
will serve the purpose of demonstrating the great intensities of this taut narrative, which 
seems to anticipate the development of the cinematograph ten years later. In particular, 
the passage exemplifies Stevenson's conceptualization of the city and announces a return 
of the repressed Malthusian "monstrous sublime" (Tuite 148) in the form of a degenerate 
inner-city dweller: 
Six o'clock struck on the bells of the church that was so conveniently near to Mr 
Utterson's dwelling, and still he was digging at the problem. Hitherto it had 
touched him on the intellectual side alone; but now his imagination also was 
engaged or rather enslaved; and as he lay and tossed in the gross darkness of the 
night and the curtained room, Mr Enfield's tale went by before his mind in a scroll 
of lighted pictures. He would be aware of the great field of lamps of a nocturnal 
city; then of the figure of a man walking swiftly; then of a child running from the 
doctor's; and then these met, and that human Juggernaut trod the child down and 
passed on regardless of her screams. Or else he would see a room in a rich house, 
where his friend lay asleep, dreaming and smiling at his dreams; and then the door 
of that room would be opened, the curtains of the bed plucked apart, the sleeper 
recalled, and lo! there would stand by his side a figure to whom power was given, 
and even at that dead hour, he must rise and do its bidding. The figure in these two 
phases haunted the lawyer all night; and if at any time he dozed over, it was but to 
see it glide more stealthily through sleeping houses, or move the more swiftly and 
still the more swiftly, even to dizziness, through wider labyrinths oflamplighted 
city, and at every street corner crush a child and leave her screaming. And still the 
figure had no face by which he might know it; even in his dreams, it had no face, 
or one that baffled him and melted before his eyes; and thus it was that there 
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sprang up and grew apace in the lawyer's mind a singularly strong, almost 
inordinate, curiosity to behold the features of the real Mr. Hyde. If he could but 
once set eyes on him, he thought the mystery would lighten and perhaps roll 
altogether away, as was the habit of mysterious things when well examined. 
(Jekyll and Hyde 13) 
Stevenson does a masterful job of rendering the increased intensity ofUtterson's dream-
his obsession growing "apace" as he tries to follow the swift and dizzying traversals of 
his object of pursuit. The language of the passage may suggest "the mechanization, 
jerkiness, and rush of modern times," as depicted in cinema (Kern 117), but it also 
focuses the movement of thought through the conceptual persona of the doppelganger 
Hyde who "melts before" Utterson's eyes even as he reappears in a new street in this 
lamplighted city. In the remarkable whirl of this multi-claused, labyrinthine paragraph we 
have a schematic ofboth 1) the late Victorian city (which Robert Mighall has described 
as an "'allegorical' approach to London geography" [xxxii]) and 2) Stevenson's 
conceptual plane upon which-and through which-images of the city and city-life cross 
and criss-cross at a sometimes dizzying pace. This is not to forget the novels (such as 
Joyce's Ulysses [1922], Dos Passos's Manhattan Transfer [1925], and Woolfs Mrs 
Dalloway [1925], among others) that attempt to dislocate the reader from the linearity of 
chronological time through rapid snap shots of city-life. Stevenson's "intensities" lie in 
the simple method of layering concrete images through the connective tissue of repeated 
words and sudden shifts in direction: "He would be aware of the great field of lamps of a 
nocturnal city; then of the figure of a man walking swiftly; then of a child running from 
the doctor's; and then these met, and that human Juggernaut trod the child down and 
passed on regardless of her screams. Or else he would see a room in a rich house." 
Appropriately, the last clause in the first sentence piles up the action (of the Juggernaut's 
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trampling) with three quick conjunctions (and-and-and), giving a picture oftrampled 
child, trampled narration, and trampled thought. Consider another passage: "and if at any 
time he dozed over, it was but to see it glide more stealthily through sleeping houses, or 
move the more swiftly and still the more swiftly, even to dizziness, through wider 
labyrinths of lamp lighted city, and at every street comer crush a child and leave her 
screaming." Stevenson's use of repetition, alliteration, and assonance bring the narration 
to a heady pitch, which, rather than unwinding or spending itself, becomes all the more 
tangled up in the "labyrinths of lamplighted city" and in the sudden encounters with 
several Hydes rather than simply one. Unable (or afraid) to anticipate Hyde's 
manipulation of space, Utterson is utterly stumped.41 
The nightmare image of Hyde invading Jekyll's bedroom and commanding him to 
act on his behalf may also remind us ofVictor Frankenstein's own fears that his conjured 
monster will rebel against the creator and even enslave him. And yet, this revealing 
fantasy (which, we must remember, has been conjured by another "respectable" man, 
Utterson) offers a reversal of the city environment in which the lower classes are 
themselves "trampled" by overpopulation (Malthus would insist that this was related to 
uncontrolled sexual appetites in the labouring class [261-62]), and reflects the new 
fashion among architects for constructing crowded ghettoes on the outskirts of the rich 
and commercial districts. While this particular nightmare is conjured by Mr. Utterson and 
represents his own superimposed fears, Stevenson suggests that the nightmare reflects 
every respectable gentleman's fears-of the unruly, unpredictable lower classes; of the 
ways in which scandal may touch an individual to his core when he least expects it; and 
41 As Jane V. Rago puts it, "Utterson fails to utter Hyde" (282). 
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ofthe ways in which the disclosure of scandal may degrade the gentleman's position to 
the level ofhis inferiors (Rago 279). In the first chapter, "The Story of the Door," the 
very suggestion that Hyde has entered Jekyll's house (through the dingy, unkempt back 
door) casts a shadow of suspicion on the good doctor. That Jekyll has a "very great 
interest in poor Hyde," a "great, a very great interest in that young man" (Jekyll and Hyde 
20), suggests both his sympathy for the man's fate and his intimate association with 
London's dark underworld. The particular images in this passage of a "great field of 
lamps of a nocturnal city" and of the "labyrinths oflamplighted city" emphasize how 
much the city, or at least its less savoury districts, were associated with sin and iniquity, 
and with the hellish afterlife promised to those who would not repent. Hyde, of course, 
begins to present for Jekyll a demonic force in his own living hell on earth, and carries 
out his operations, Mr. Enfield suggests, as cool as Satan (Jekyll and Hyde 8). 
The nightmare city, with Soho as its realistic geographical representative, may 
very well function as an "inverted world" for Stevenson, and certainly Hyde is the entity 
that allows its effects to be felt on the surface world of upper class respectability. The 
sudden appearance of a "dwarf" in London underscores the deforming atmosphere of an 
industrial society expending its energies on capital accumulation, as in the case of 
Dickens's Quilp; but it also enunciates the ambivalent side of Fairyland, with its 
alternative time and its unearthly pleasures. In the latter scenario we find the popular 
folkloric and also gothic motif of the subterranean world in which chthonic and primitive 
undercurrents (fairies or the "little people," including dwarfs; demon-lovers, caliphs, or 
vampires) threaten to taint a modem civilized society through the abduction and 
subsequent hybridization of its inhabitants (usually women and children). As a variation 
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on the demonic persona, already introduced in Frankenstein, Hyde offends Victorian 
sensibilities by refusing to adhere to the rules of the rationalized "terror" of gothic 
romance and the sanitized violence ofthe fairy tale (which was often a toned down 
version of the folktale). 42 All the same, Hyde is more of a reproductive threat than 
Shelley's monster; but his promiscuity is intended to be analogous to the increasing 
geometrical ratio of population growth in the fin de siecle-the increase, that is, ofbirth 
deformities, of poverty and disease, and, therefore, of scientific investigations 
(psychology and criminology). The thirst for romance in the same period (Spencer 201-
203; Dryden, Literary Doubles 20-24; Reid 8, 14) generated the need for new monsters, 
and so we have Utterson's nightmare in which several Hydes crush several little match-
girls. The "fuzziness" of Stevenson's narrative "nucleus" (Suvin, Metamorphoses 69) lies 
in the difficulty of distinguishing where Hyde really resides: in the urban ghetto or in the 
paranoid minds of respectable gentlemen. The relationship between Jekyll and Hyde 
offers a metaphorical-nay, an analogical-rendering of the passage between the two 
seemingly disparate worlds. Hyde's particular strength lies in his ability to manipulate 
space horizontally (to move across segregated districts) in order to achieve vertical 
supremacy over his surprised opponents (to suddenly "pop up," in rhizomatic fashion, in 
this wealthy house or in that dingy apartment). As a subversive force, Hyde invades the 
rich houses, secure bedrooms, and wealthy districts of these men-Utterson, Lanyon, 
Jekyll, Carew-and even enters their "smiling" dreams. 
In other words, the crowded and intensified landscape of the city offers new 
42 As Jack Z1pes argues, "[T]he fairy tales for chlldren [m the late e1ghteenth and early nmeteenth centunes] 
were samtlzed and expurgated vers10ns of the fairy tales for adults, or they were morahstlc tales that were 
a1med at the domest1cat10n of the 1magmat10n" (Fauy Tale as Myth/Myth as Fazry Tale 14). 
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potential for subversion, especially as Jekyll's conjured changeling has access to all of the 
pleasures and possibilities of the upper class: unlike Shelley's monster, whose body is 
cobbled together over a period of time and who must conceal himself on the borders of 
the civilized world, Hyde simultaneously occupies the same space as his creator, and the 
intrusion of space becomes absolutely imperceptible. In his swift movements from 
gentlemen to degenerate, from upper to lower class, from celibate to sexual pervert, 43 and 
from bourgeois reformer to proletariat anarchist, Hyde deforms the straight lines and 
well-defined borders of the class hierarchy. Certainly Hyde's deformed appearance marks 
his degeneracy and lower-class position, and yet Utterson and others search in vain for 
the right description: Mr. Hyde gives "an impression of deformity without any nameable 
malformation." As Utterson reflects to himself after seeing Hyde for the first time, "God 
bless me, the man seems hardly human! Something troglodytic, shall we say?[ ... ] 0 my 
poor old Harry Jekyll, if ever I read Satan's signature upon a face, it is on that of your 
new friend" (16). The elusive Hyde is frequently "collared" (7) by these random and 
hesitant diagnoses, reflecting the almost habitual absorption (and rhetorical combination) 
of "popular psychology" and Christian morality in the standard Victorian lexicon: Hyde 
assumes the persona of the prehistoric cave dweller from the pages of Darwin's Descent 
of Man, and the demon from Christian mythology. But the diagnoses do not stop here. 
Elsewhere, Hyde is described as "small and particularly wicked-looking" (23), and, at 
both the beginning and end of the tale, as a "dwarf' (7, 41). Additionally, Hyde is the 
result of a physical metamorphosis, resulting from the consumption of a strange chemical 
43 Two excellent articles that consider the "queer" and "perverse" side of thmgs m Jekyll and Hyde are 
Andrew M. Butler's "Proto-Sf/Proto-Queer: The Strange Cases of Dr. Frankenstem and Mr Hyde" and 
Chris West's "Pervertmg Science FictiOn. Thinking the Ahen Withm the Geme" 
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concoction (again, a revelation that is only given at the end of the novel). In this way, the 
folkloric changeling makes its appearance once again, with many of its recognizable (but 
also unrecognizable) related personae-the child, the doppelganger/double, and the 
Darwinian monster. 
To begin with, Hyde is associated with the rebellious "youth" of his society-a 
younger, more reckless, and evidently anarchical segment that threatens to supplant the 
old bourgeois order. A variety of men, including Jekyll's loyal butler Poole (Jekyll and 
Hyde 17), the lawyer Utterson (19) and the good doctor himself (20), emphasize Hyde's 
youth with the half amused, half disapproving tone of the elder whose authorial position 
becomes dubious the longer Hyde frustrates or de-articulates their "medico-juridico-
scientific" diagnoses (Rago 282). Indeed, this triad of authority figures automatically 
implies a parental function, which not only advocates suggested punishment but invents 
domestic "cures" for insubordinate children, as evidenced in the legends discussed in the 
previous chapter. But Hyde's partial resemblance to these men and especially Jekyll 
forces them to question their vigilance: for Hyde is, in a certain perverse sense, one of 
their own. This connection between the crotchety bourgeois and youthful lower-class is 
certainly reinforced by Jekyll's own testimony that the Hyde form made him feel 
"younger, lighter, happier in body," and that he was acutely conscious of a "heady 
recklessness" (57). The "child" here conceptualizes the "father"'s parental neglect but 
also its own subsequent tactic of parasitism. By Jekyll's own description, the Hyde 
personality is understood as a changeling-like figure that lives in the body of Jekyll and 
feeds off the host. He is, moreover, a double or deformed substitute "bound together" 
with the original: but this is the "curse of mankind," "that in the agonized womb of 
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consciousness, these polar twins should be continuously struggling" (56). At this stage in 
his testimony, Jekyll seems to suggest that this "curse" is also in some way a blessing in 
disguise-a perpetual reminder of how tightly bound humans are to each other, despite 
class or racial categories, but also an acute warning about the dangers of assimilating 
types, of trying to re-organize society into a single cellular unit. The "racking pangs" of 
Jekyll's first experimentation (57) reinforce the fundamental separation of child and 
parent during birth, when the little parasite bursts out of the mother's body to find its 
freedom. Subsequently, this separation necessitates "bonds of obligation," which would 
corral the disparate parties-parent and child-and form an alliance. Indeed, as a parent, 
Jekyll requires such an alliance for the reason that his infant Hyde cannot be controlled as 
an automaton might. As Jekyll writes later on in his testimony, "That part of me which I 
had the power of projecting had lately been much exercised and nourished; it had seemed 
to me oflate as though the body of Edward Hyde had grown in stature, as though (when I 
wore that form) I were conscious of a more generous tide of blood" (62). Hyde's 
divergence is easily noted by any who come into contact with him, but here (in the slower 
unravelling denouement of the tale) Stevenson reveals the fact that Hyde derives from 
Jekyll's own deviation from the norm, as a result of his hospitality towards this hostile 
"other." Stevenson discovers that in order to "disentangle" the "inextricable knots" of the 
"social field," "we have to diagnose real types or personae" (Deleuze and Guattari, What 
Is Philosophy? 68; original emphases). But despite the initial attempt at a controlled 
experiment, Stevenson's conceptual persona turns out to be a "polity" of"denizens" 
(Jekyll and Hyde 56)-not so much "sleepless brownies" as anti-social dwarves. 
Hyde's dwarf-like characteristics, of course, reinforce his position as a 
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changeling, especially given his "pale" (Jekyll and Hyde 16) and hairy appearance, his 
striking deformity, his apparent gluttony and "ungovernable spirit" (Silver 60). A 
substitute himself, he is also the mechanism for the substitution (124). As a sublime 
monster, then, Hyde simultaneously embodies the folkloric stigma of the dwarf and 
critiques it by refusing to remain submerged in folk legend. Recalling what Silver has 
said regarding the Social Darwinist influence on interpretations of folktales and folk 
belief, Shelley's and Stevenson's monstrous personae are (in both their authors' terms 
and through the rhetoric and ideologies of their respective eras) "associated with the 
Darwinian notion of groups or races that had not ultimately triumphed, particularly with 
'inferior human experiments' of which only a few had 'survived"' (85-86). As I argued in 
the fourth section of Chapter 1, the Social Darwinist perspective emphasized a controlled 
or "directed" evolution that had clear and distinct aesthetic tastes-for uniformity, 
sameness, and structural perfection-when "nature" itself demonstrated a consistent 
penchant for variability, which often manifested itself in deviations and "monstrosities" 
(Darwin, Origin 26, 65, 604; Descent of Man 46, 51, 59, 127, 443). Further, while such a 
view celebrated the great profundity of nature and encouraged procreation, the fact 
remains that "increase" is always checked by "unperceived hostile agencies" (Origin 
451): both Shelley and Stevenson attempted to give these agencies a form. 
Hyde's deformity may be intended as a sign of his racial or biological inferiority, 
but it also indicates the wider class (de)formation, or the "deforming dynamic of 
ressentiment" (Tuite 142) that, in Shelley's day, threatened to reproduce the frightening 
"mob" of the French Revolution. Indeed, the "nightmare city" of Stevenson's text is an 
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extension of Mal thus's original doctrinal views. 44 The nightmare city is also an 
anticipation of the "bloody" affairs of the Trafalgar massacres (one year after Jekyll and 
Hyde's publication) and the "Jack the Ripper" sensation (two years after the book's 
publication), which, as Mighall has remarked in regards to the latter, encouraged 
authorities to link the event to the "criminality and poverty of the district" ("Diagnosing 
Jekyll" 157). What is characteristic about these two events and others like them in 
Stevenson's day is that the victims (in the first case mentioned) and the perpetrator (in the 
second one) evoked fear in the authorities through their ability to proliferate-in terms of 
sheer numbers (in the first instance) and in terms of mobility and quickness (in the other 
instance). Yet, if a "Hyde" persona could be easily superimposed on the Whitechapel 
murderer (as he indeed was [Mighall, "Diagnosing Jekyll" 157-61]), from whom an entire 
society (upper, middle, and lower class alike) could completely dissociate themselves, 
this same persona loses some of his distinct characteristics when associated with a larger, 
variable collective, with whom many (if not most) of that same society (the middle and 
lower classes) would largely 1dentify. The point here is that Mr. Hyde's characterization 
as both an "atavistic" criminal (Mighall, "Diagnosing Jekyll" 160) and a "double" or 
"multiple" personality automatically associates him with the large and usually shapeless 
"mass" that bourgeois and aristocratic Victorians could only understand through 
"diagnosed" "types." "Popular" psychology, influenced by the eighteenth- and early 
44 I would argue that Stevenson's text IS concerned with the more protracted outcome of the Anatomy Act 
(1832) and the Poor Laws (1834), as well as the consequences of the legislators' act of"displacmg 
responsibility onto the already stigmatized medical professiOn, which could offer a scientific pretext not 
only for mstltutwnahzmg social meqmty but for recategonzmg a problem of social justice-how to deal 
with urban poverty-as a purely mstrumental problem about the avmlabihty of corpses for mspectwn and 
research" (Tmte 151-52). Certamly, Stevenson's "Body Snatcher" (1884) IS an even ear her mdicatlon of his 
progressively Malthuszan preoccupatiOns. 
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nineteenth-century theories ofMalthus and others, consciously or not made a link 
between the supposed disintegrated mind and the unintegrated lower classes (including 
new immigrants and other dislocated individuals hoping to escape poverty) who 
threatened to collapse a social hierarchy based on uniformity. Like Shelley's monster, 
who comprises numerous bodies and whose engineered structure provides strength and 
agility, Stevenson's Hyde has the ability to be in two places at the same time (here in the 
form of Jekyll and elsewhere in the concealed form of Hyde), and ofbeing two 
personalities simultaneously. However, as Jekyll surmises in his final statement, it is 
likely that "man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous 
and independent denizens" (Jekyll and Hyde 56). Hyde's ability to occupy upper and 
lower class positions simultaneously is characteristic of many "denizens" of Fairyland 
whose social classifications were nearly impossible to pin down. While Hyde is hardly a 
"heroic" fairy, his upper-class associations allow him to separate himself from the 
"homely" fairies when he conceals himself in Jekyll's body. Indeed, as we discover, these 
"different types of fairy melt into each other" (Briggs, The Personnel of Fairyland 13). 
Hyde's imperceptibility increases with every diagnosis or categorization, escaping the 
authorities by entering the streets and houses and dreams of respectable gentlemen, and 
by assuming these various roles: demon, ape, atavistic criminal, deformed "dwarf'-truly 
a changeling extraordinaire. 
Like Darwin before him, Stevenson tried to imagine the effects of increased 
population, overcrowding, and the inevitable jostling together of peoples of different class 
and race. Moreover, perhaps it is more accurate to say that, in his obsessive need to 
"diagnose real types or personae," Jekyll (and also Stevenson) inadvertently 
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"disentangles" the "inextricable knots" of the "social field" and finds the once ordered 
Victorian environment overrun by a deviant mob-like force. 
To return to the argument above, Stevenson's novella conceptualizes and 
schematizes the populous city of late nineteenth-century London, depicting a nightmare 
city that is comparable to "the subversive, lower-class form of 'inverted world"' and 
offering the possibility of "truly other relationships" (Suvin, Positions 55). This 
subversion is initially accomplished as his persona uses his distorted and undecipherable 
signature to mark each and every new territory he traverses. The brief but crucial scene 
where Utterson and the clerk Mr. Guest (who is described as a "great student and critic of 
handwriting") compare the signatures of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is another indication 
that Hyde deforms the "straight" lines of his society: as Guest remarks, the signatures are 
"identical" but "differently sloped" (Jekyll and Hyde 29). As in all things, then, Hyde's 
character shows a slight resemblance to his master-his tastes for wine and silver, for 
example, as indicated in the description ofhis quarters in Soho (24). His imitation is 
similar but "differently sloped," and his path is aberrant, labyrinthine, queer, and 
perverse. Moreover, Stevenson's is the most striking of nineteenth-century science-
fictional "changeling" tales, at least in its use of the motif of bodily substitution. Hyde's 
deformed figure and monstrous birth (as described by Jekyll in the final chapter [56-57]), 
and his manner of infiltrating upper class spaces and imitating upper class lifestyles 
marks him as a late Victorian changeling. Silver circles around this notion by suggesting 
that Hyde may be the "dark amalgam of the aboriginal pygmy, the primitive anthropoid, 
and the little goblin man that lurks within" (143), but I would add that these personae 
have already attached themselves to the changeling, as shown in Chapter 1. Recast in neo-
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gothic form, Hyde is a social parasite whose divergent characteristics (rude speech, 
slouching walk, debauched tastes, and perverse love of violence) may both recall the 
demon lovers and changelings of the Bronte sisters' novels,45 and anticipate the 
biologically engineered Beast-Men ofWells's fictwn. 46 Jekyll's initial attempts to banish 
his alter-ego Hyde are undermined by the changeling's persistence in thriving on its 
master-host's own vitality. Gleefully accepting the roles he is assigned, Hyde becomes his 
master's source of creativity, the persona through which the author explores the context 
of criminality, justice, class hierarchy, and urban life in late Victorian society, and the 
conceptual planes of atavism, Social Darwinism, and physical/psychological 
metamorphosis. 
However, this creative source also reveals itself to be part of the controlled 
experiment of an author (Jekyll ... and Stevenson?) whose fascination with abomination 
(to which Comad's Marlow would also succumb) seems to serve the purpose of 
Illustrating a moral lesson: Hyde's apparent smcide at the end of the main third-person 
narration (Jekyll and Hyde 44-45) seems to have been the result of Jekyll's guilt-ridden 
conscience. Unlike Shelley's monster, Hyde's transgressive art (evoked most vividly in 
his "differently sloped" signature and in his anarchical act ofbuming Jekyll's scientific 
papers [24]) is finally decoded in the manner of a detective solvmg a crime. If, as it was 
noted above, Jekyll's final statement unravels the previous theones offered by the other 
45 Ennly IS discussed m Silver 13, 59, 60, and 68, while Charlotte IS discussed m Silver 34, 59, 68, 106-07, 
194 
46 Moreover, another tensiOn Imphed m the novel Is that between a gothic conservatism, m which the 
demon-haunted patnarch consumes his own children m order to mamtam the old anstocratic bloodlmes, 
and a scientific radicalism, m which the oppressed child transgresses natural law m order to create new and 
aberrant bloodlines. A Similar tensiOn exists m Bram Stoker's Dracula (1897) where the Count can stand 
for the old, mcestuous anstocracy, or the new, radical underclass threatemng to mfect the old order 
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characters (Utterson, his kinsman Enfield, and Dr. Lanyon, not to mention Mr. Guest and 
the police), it also proceeds by extraction, that is, by plucking out each theory as it is 
introduced, in deductive manner, until the "strange case" is reduced to a single diagnosis 
of"morbid psychology." Stevenson's novella explores perversity only through innuendo 
and, ultimately, repressed (if revealing) references to corruption, sin, "irregularities" (55), 
and sensual pleasure. Throughout the novel, and especially in the final statement, it is 
strongly suggested that Jekyll's "sin" is of a sexual nature and that his potential fear of 
"blackmail" (9) is that of a man engaged in an "indecent," and perhaps homosexual, 
relationship (Mighall, "Introduction" xix-xx). In perhaps one of the more suggestive 
passages, Utterson contemplates that Hyde may be "the ghost of some old sin, the cancer 
of some concealed disgrace: punishment coming, pede claudo, years after memory has 
forgotten and self-love condoned the fault" (Jekyll and Hyde 17). In terms of Stevenson's 
aesthetic technique, this description is fairly accurate, although the "nature" of the 
"crime" is never uttered. This game of partial disclosure is played out in the conflicts 
between the author/creator's "productions" and the monstrous "creations": the act must 
be performed but the evidence of the act must be concealed (Mighall, "Diagnosing 
Jekyll" 154). However, in the moralistic denouement of Jekyll and Hyde, Hyde is 
revealed to be an instrument of allegory and his multiple (and linked) personae are 
reduced to mere "representations" of an essential evil-the "devil" that comes "roaring" 
out of the "good" gentleman (Jekyll and Hyde 64). We should recall from Chapter 1 that 
changelings were thought to be the product of a Satanic influence, even while the popular 
belief often put the blame on the "Good People." When Hyde's recklessness turns out to 
be more than Jekyll bargains for, he falls back on Christian theology and identifies the 
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agency as demonic. But this is Jekyll's theory, and it is already contested by the 
possibility that the human organism consists of a "polity" of personalities or, I would 
argue, conceptual personae. 
Stevenson, then, presents a very difficult "case" for us, since his post-Darwinian 
changeling seems to function as an allegorical figure of "evil" or sinfulness. And so there 
are two ways of reading Jekyll's final synthesis. On the one hand: As a way of measuring 
Jekyll and Hyde's "success" as an "optimal" thought-experiment, we could suggest that 
the author/creator compensates for "lack of control" in his experiment (Suvin, Victorian 
Science Fiction 94) by reaching for pseudo-scientific strategies, derived from the then-
current "criminal anthropological" works (mainly by Lombroso ). While it is true, as 
recent SF critic Chris West has noted, that "the absolutely other always lurks as a 
potential" in Stevenson's novel (1 07), the conceptual persona of Jekyll/Hyde (who is 
"perverse" and, to a certain degree, "queer") is reterritorialized in the manner of the 
folkloric changeling whose fate it was to diagnose mental deficiencies. Ultimately, the 
creations (lesser-evolved men in Victorian England and Stevenson's allegorized "essence 
of evil," Hyde) lose out in this struggle not only through their creators' decision to 
embrace popular applications of Spencerian Social Darwinism (as adopted by criminal 
anthropology and "morbid psychology") but also through the resulting disconnection 
between the imaginative world and the author's empirical environment. In other words, 
because Stevenson resists a full Darwinian exploration of primitive "man," Hyde 
becomes a proper Sunday school lesson of moral uprightness, and a ghoul for the fetishes 
of the Victorian reading public. The initial "estrangement" of Stevenson's empirical 
environment does not readjust late Victorian conventional views but adopts them as 
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convenient ways of"expressing" and "representing" certain "types" of"evil." This is, at 
least, one side of the story. On the other hand: If Stevenson's writing appears to be tinged 
by such gothic paranoia, it puts both the monster and its creator(s) on display: Jekyll's 
secret protects his reputation, but his final statement reveals the fact that Hyde is an 
intimate part of Jekyll, and that he is as much at home in Jekyll's body as he is in sordid 
Soho. Further, the scanty details of the experiment (Jekyll and Hyde 56-57) indicate both 
the impossibility of pinning down "evil" through a scientific apparatus and the necessity 
of producing theories ofhuman behaviour, which, as I argued in Chapter 1, are dependent 
upon fantastical tropes-not simply gothic tropes of monstrosity and demonology but 
folkloric tropes of metamorphosis. Moreover, if Stevenson was placing emphasis on 
Jekyll's final statement as the affirmation of a particular "truth," he effectively 
undermines both Malthus's and Lombroso's theses; for Hyde is an intimate part of the 
society that tries to drive him out: Jekyll produces Hyde and is a moral hypocrite for then 
blaming his creation for the resulting misery, degradation, and degeneration. 
Conclusion 
While it is true that Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde have occupied ambiguous 
positions as "limit case" SF, given their reliance on gothic themes and moral allegory 
(Suvin, Positions 75 and Victorian Science Fiction 94), the dalliance with these "anti-
cognitive" genres (Metamorphoses ix, 7-11) produces "fruitful couplings" and suggests 
the potential to find "pleasure in the confusion ofboundaries" (Haraway 150). The 
contamination of the boundaries of genre and category constitutes some of the best 
science-fictional forays, as demonstrated in our two examples. The SF novel, as it 
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emerges out of the gothic and urban gothic landscapes of Frankenstein and Jekyll and 
Hyde, constitutes a new "plane of immanence" for the changeling persona's divergent 
couplings and alliances, especially given SF's larger focus on the effects of new 
technologies on social organization and its re-imagining of the "Good People's" program 
of genetic mutation (Chapter 1, Conclusion). The concept that emerges from this folk 
motif of abduction/substitution is changelingism, which, as I stated in the previous 
chapter, was intended to indicate both the Victorian ideology of degeneracy (fleshed out 
to a degree in the present chapter) and the scenario in which a human is abducted by 
fairies, which itself leads to a process oftransculturalization, hybridization, and mutation 
when human and fairy mate and produce a "hybrid" child. Shelley's and Stevenson's 
"mad scientists" carry on the work of their fairy ancestors, but now have the power to 
conjure up new changelings for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of a human and 
nonhuman alliance and, perhaps, a symbiosis-one of the concepts employed in 
subsequent chapters as a more general variation on "changelingism." These 
experiments-conservative, in the sense that they seek to control or engineer; radical, in 
that they unintentionally initiate unforeseen alliances-also succeed in producing 
conceptual personae and in hybridizing genre in the process. Enter the SF changeling. 
Beginning with Shelley, we see a radical philosophical vision at work: a tearing 
away of the old gothic form through science-an initial evocation of divine destiny and 
the natural world as the source of goodness and morality, and a subsequent anti-social and 
almost anarchical rejection of the established authorities of Church, Academy, and 
Family. At the same time, Shelley's evocation of evolutionary theory (Malthus, Erasmus 
Darwin) reterritorializes the superstitions of old in the form of Victor Frankenstein's 
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programmed biology, which is, from a certain (perhaps retrospective) position, an 
anticipation ofthe Social Darwinist (and therefore criminal anthropological) belief in a 
directed evolution-the return to a pseudo-religious enthusiasm for power, control, and 
family resemblance. All the same, the monster's failure to achieve an alliance with his 
creator and the human world does not diminish the great conceptual force of the monster 
as a deterritorialized "natural man" (Locke )-or as a deterritorialized "man," period-
who diverges into a Darwinian monstrosity, which needs to be understood as the sudden 
leap that characterizes evolution as an unforeseen, if roughly calculated, process. In this 
scenario the proto-Darwinian changeling defies his own engineered biology by exhibiting 
undirected evolutionary adaptation that is the state of play in the origin of all species: not 
simply the struggle for existence, but the "survival of the most divergent" (Deleuze 248). 
Recent studies by Robert Mighall, Linda Dryden, and Julia Reid have argued 
convincingly that Stevenson's tale was critically engaged with the fin de siecle obsession 
with "degeneracy" and was not simply a passive receptacle of contemporary 
psychological theory. Very recently Reid has insisted that Stevenson was offering a 
critique of evolutionary theories of degeneracy: "Implicitly questioning the power of 
heredity, the tale explains devolution rather in terms of environmental influence" (97). 
She goes on to argue that "Stevenson uses Jekyll's dilemma to exemplify the hypocrisy of 
a professional class whose idol is reputation, and whose business is to deny the primitive 
or animal side ofhuman nature" (98). Especially in his final statement, Jekyll expresses 
the desire to separate the two sides of his personality, ultimately isolating his "animal" 
self through a ritual deriving from folklore: transformation via magic potion. But Jekyll 
remains inconsistent in his attitude towards Mr. Hyde, describing him in one instance as 
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"natural and human" and as a "livelier image ofthe spirit" (Jekyll and Hyde 58), and in 
other instances as a "child of Hell" (67) and as "inorganic" (69). To be sure, Jekyll is 
registering his own devolutionary slide from "a large, well-made, smooth-faced man" 
(19) to the "slime of the pit" (69); but this realization only underscores the fact that 
Jekyll's environment, with its repressed mores, is the source of the degeneracy rather than 
only the hereditary transmission of characteristics. Further, the Jekyll-Hyde entity 
involves a territorial conflict between two worlds and the subsequent transgression of the 
boundaries that separate them: Hyde assumes the folkloric role of the "wicked" fairy 
interloper, making demands on his human host. Such a "relation" constitutes what 
Derrida has called "radical hospitality": a situation in which a "hostile" force is welcomed 
and housed by the "master" of the house who, by accepting the "h6te" (or the guest as 
invading host) undermines his own authority ("Hostipitality" [2002] 360). Alternatively, 
in undermining the very possibility of"hospitality" (by "hosting" the uninvited guest), 
Jekyll initiates an alliance, which emphasizes a contingent partnership rather than a long-
lasting affiliation that demands "house rules." His oblique reference to others who "will 
follow" and "outstrip" his psycho-chemical studies (56) suggests that there is more work 
to be done (a notion that contemporary literary critics have seized upon), and that his own 
theory is too limited, too narrow, and too dependent upon contemporary science: Jekyll's 
experiment ultimately looks to the future, even if it gets caught up in the present 
(Lombroso and morbid psychology) or the past (the paranoid gothic plot). 
On the one hand, the gothic expresses a revolutionary spirit that haunts the 
established structure of authority, and we discover that Shelley's pseudo-human figure, 
while it certainly constitutes an element of the "monstrous sublime" associated with the 
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gothic, is also very much the product of 1) political upheaval in the late eighteenth 
century and the early nineteenth century, and 2) philosophical speculation in this same 
period on the nature ofthe human organism and the consequences of its physical and 
spiritual metamorphoses. On the other hand, as Margot Gayle Backus and Toni Wein 
have argued, the gothic also presents the paranoid fears of a threatened familial and, by 
analogy, governmental authority, and is, therefore, conservative in nature since, 
considered from this perspective, the pseudo-human figure reaffirms the necessity of 
order and population control. Both Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde tip the balance in 
the direction of the conservative outcome, leaving us with just a fragment of hope in the 
form of the monster's dubious ice-raft and Jekyll's doubtful survival (only Hyde's body is 
recovered at the end of the main narrative). These texts are not, then, completely "open-
ended" in the sense that the radical novelties in each case fail to spark the further 
development of"new social relations." Nevertheless, these proto-SF works are influential 
in establishing the changeling as an agent of evolutionary change-a motif that is further 
developed by Wells and by twentieth-century SF authors. While Shelley's novel was 
published too early to respond to the cataclysmic discovery of the evolutionary 
mechanism, "natural selection," it does engage with "the quasi-evolutionary idea that God 
is remote or absent from creation" and that "man therefore is free to create his own sub-
life" (Aldiss, Billion Year Spree 29). The very open-endedness of evolution, which would 
"progress by its own inherent activity and so without divine intervention," promises that 
the concept of an engineered "sub-life" that attempts to form its own divergent 
community will live on. Stevenson's novel confirms the conceptual power of Shelley's 
vision and the manner in which the changeling persona evolves over the course of the 
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nineteenth century. During this same gestation period for what we now identify as 
modem SF (181 Os to 1890s ), the changeling-without strict acknowledgement-became 
a variation on the "culminating ape" that, for Wells, represented "natural man" ("Human 
Evolution: An Artificial Process" 217). In response to Locke's question two centuries 
before, "what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be?" Wells 
answered: a dominant narrative agent in SF and the always evolving promise of new 
articulations for new social relations. 
As it becomes especially apparent in Wells's writings, the Darwinian evolutionary 
mechanism did not describe a series of directed linear progressions but rather an 
undirected series of movements forward and backwards, reflecting the "bewildering and 
disruptive nature ofthe process" (Reid 109). Nature, as Jekyll himself proves in his fatal 
experiment, proceeds by the perpetual splitting and branching of the unicellular into the 
molecular. In Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde, the changeling is conceptualized as a 
figure of molecular force, deforming, doubling, and multiplying. The first two 
phenomena are very much rooted in the gothic fascination with monstrosity and with 
doppelganger figures; we might then consider the monster and Mr. Hyde as the demonic 
doubles that have, in a certain manner, stepped out of their masters' bodies as deformed 
repetitions. The third phenomenon adds an additional, Darwinian dimension, which treats 
the biological/philosophical result of hybrid unions, deformed progeny, and the 
unchecked multiplication of organisms. We should recall that Jekyll's own studies 
suggest that the human organism consists of multiplicities (again, even ifhe does not 
proceed further with his theories): we can take this as truth, at least conceptually. This 
divergence from one figure (persona) into two or multiple figures (personae) does not 
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indicate an evolution (that is, a becoming-more-divergent) from one text to another, for 
the conceptual persona is not bound by the "packs" it sometimes forms; if it was, the 
original alliance would become an affiliation, reterritorialized on the abstract rule of the 
Law (as we will see in the case of Dr. Moreau's Beast-Men before they revert). In this 
sense, my focus has been on the divergent characteristics in an individual persona; the 
relation between the rigid biological laws established by creators (Frankenstein and 
Jekyll) and the repetition of them by the creations (the monster and Hyde); and, finally, 
the attempts and subsequent failures to form symbiotic relations between creators and 
creations. The initial creator/creation dichotomy, enforced by Frankenstein and Jekyll, is 
only artificially intact, and we see each of these human figures mutate into the monsters 
they conjure or engineer. Despite their apparent flaws, the enduring nature of these 
thought-experiments is apparent in Wells's respectful homage, which underscores the 
socio-political possibilities of the "scientific romance," now shifting its glance from the 
demons of the supernatural world to the changelings of the natural world. 
Another sort of schema, then, arises out of the consideration of these "SF" 
novelists' conceptual worlds, and may be taken as a useful (if always shifting) paradigm 
for the larger discussion of conceptual personae in both folklore and SF: 1) the initial 
deformation ofthe system (moral, religious, philosophical, aesthetic, and so on) through 
the repetition of orthodox beliefs and attitudes (Hyde's use of the Jekyll entity as a 
counter to Jekyll's use of the Hyde entity) ruptures and leads to 2) a subsequent doubling 
effect whereby a single enunciation (Jekyll's moral philosophy, for example) 
simultaneously implies/echoes its opposite (Hyde's immoral philosophy of debauchery); 
3) the result is not simply a "dialectic" in the Hegelian sense, where "two self-conscious 
154 
individuals" engage in a "life-and-death struggle" in order to find the "truth" of their own 
selfhood (Hegel 113-14 ), but rather a "double articulation" in which the larger whole, 
understood as "society." also and at the same time reveals itself to be a teeming reservoir 
of "molecular" voices or multiplicities (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 40). 
As I have argued above and in the previous chapter, repetition, mimicry, and parody are 
strategies of creativity and invention, and while each of these tactics (in some ways 
synonymous with each other) force the writer/artist to inhabit the dominant spaces of 
society for a brief time, they also provide the materials and contingent procedures for 
striking off on a new path. "In every respect," Deleuze argues, "repetition is a 
transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or general character in 
favour of a more profound and more artistic reality" (3). This schematic series, 
deformation-doubling-multiplication, corresponds to the nineteenth-century scientific 
interest in the biological sciences, evolutionary theory, and teratology, as well as the 
Romantic interest in the sublime body and the Victorian fascination with degeneracy. If 
the primordial "terror" of exotic gothic and its "barbarous" contents was replaced by the 
naturalism and realism of the Victorian novel, the geometrical increase of urban 
population encouraged the development of "urban gothic" as a way of registering the 
horror of modernity. Both Malthus and Burke conceptualize this terror in terms of a 
monstrous doubling, and we see in their writings some ofthe first articulations of the 
gothic doppelganger figure who haunts or parasitizes his aristocratic (Walpole, Radcliffe, 
and Shelley) or bourgeois (Stevenson) host. The proto-SF elements of Frankenstein 
enable us to rethink the gothic sublime and even the "monstrous sublime" (gleaned from 
both Burke and Malthus) in terms of a "cognitive estrangement," as Suvin describes. 
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Modifying the definition somewhat, I suggest that Shelley and Stevenson each introduce 
a gothic monster as the "novum" (agent) of their work in order to resituate the 
doppelganger, and therefore the changeling, as a biological possibility. 
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Chapter 3-Rediscovering Fairyland as the "Submerged Nation" in H. G. Wells's 
The Time Machine and The Island of Dr. Moreau 
Obligate relationships are common in biology. Higher eukaryotes host a vast array 
of obligate parasites and mutualists that include both microbes and larger 
organisms. For example, numerous bacteria are obligate pathogens or symbionts, 
many bird species are obligate brood parasites and a variety of insects are social 
parasites that rely on workers of another species to raise their offspring. These 
radically distinct obligate systems share the common theme of dependence on a 
host or partner (which might be of the same or of a different species) for 
evolutionary success despite their divergent mechanisms and strategies. 
-Fiegna, N. Yu, et al., "Evolution of an Obligate Social Cheater to a 
Superior Cooperator" 1 
Absurdities they are to us, e.g. the idea of talking animals, but let us remember 
that just such things are real and possible to the savage. 
-J. A. MacCulloch, "Folk-Memory in Folk-Tales" 308 
[Mary] stood away from him and put out a finger at him. "Joe! You aren't by any 
chance a sort of fairy changeling? Not-not one ofthese Martians?" 
"You were star-begotten," he said, "and so was I." 
She nodded in agreement. If he wished it, so be it. 
"Starry changelings both," he said presently. "And not afraid-even of the 
uttermost change." 
-H. G. Wells, Star-Begotten 171-72 
Introduction 
While it is apparent that the changeling persona is not bound to a single genre or 
era, its consistent folkloric trappings signify its emergence in the nineteenth-century 
fascination with fairies and in the Victorian interest in the subterranean realm of British 
society. The concomitant interests in folk culture and in the theory that "lower forms" on 
the evolutionary scale represented the anarchical elements in society (Silver 149-55) 
reflected an older gothic interest in heredity and the unstable nature of the aristocratic 
institution of the family. As we have seen in both the folk narratives and novels discussed 
in the previous two chapters, the family unit itself, consisting of sometimes contingent 
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alliances between disparate groups and brief "matches" contrary to parental dictates, 
presents a challenge to a dominant society's authority on "convention" and "natural 
rights" (Burke, Reflections 67-68). Indeed, both Shelley and Stevenson employ the gothic 
mode to explore the social unrest in nineteenth-century European society. Particularly in 
Stevenson's day, the division between the capitalist and the labouring classes had helped 
to create an ever-growing labyrinth of urban slums, which, by all appearances, were truly 
the realm ofthe damned, capable of producing an entity such as Edward Hyde. Moreover, 
the socio-political landscape of folk narrative is such that we find the institutions of 
Victorian culture curiously parodied. The most prominent example would be the fairy 
economy and its quaint "market" practices oflending and borrowing. Stevenson's Jekyll 
and Hyde in particular demonstrates the critical potential of conceptualizing a "gothic 
Fairyland" in which the lower orders rise up and appropriate the position of their masters. 
While it is true, as Briggs tells us, that the fairy races are difficult to classify (The 
Personnel of Fairyland 13, 14), British authors like Dickens, Bronte, and Stevenson saw 
the socio-political possibilities of depicting two sorts of fairy folk and therefore two sorts 
of "Fairylands" in late Victorian culture. On the one hand, there is the dark abode of 
monstrous goblins and dwarves, and on the other, there is the lavish underground 
kingdom of the beautifully elfin "Good People," the fairy Queens and Kings. 
Nevertheless, despite the appearance of a class hierarchy, it was well-known that the 
Good People relied upon and recruited some of their population from the peasantry 
(Jenkins 314 ), abducting healthy human infants and replacing them with their own 
deformed children who appeared more dwarfish than elfin, and sometimes more human 
than dwarf. Moreover, the changeling constitutes a transitional stage between the lower 
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and upper, between the fairy and human worlds. It is in the complex intersection of the 
gothic underworld and the folkloric otherworld that we also find some of the most 
stimulating science-fictional forays of the second half of the nineteenth century. As a sort 
of companion piece to the first section of Chapter 2, which focused largely on the gothic 
genre, the first section of this chapter returns to folk narrative in order to suggest that 
modem SF, especially since Wells, has consistently explored the changeling motif as a 
further method of what Suvin calls "cognitive estrangement." Like the changeling itself, 
then, the SF novel of the fin de siecle is the hybridized product of a generic interchange. 
Sections II and III, which constitute the core part of the chapter, consider how H. 
G. Wells's The Time Machine (1895) and The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) employ the 
gothic-cum-folkloric motif of the underground nonhuman community as a configuration 
of the "submerged nation" (Aldiss, Billion Year Spree 132), which threatens to supplant 
the ruling class in society. Like "non-state nations," which have the structure of nation-
states but are not recognized as such (Bertelsen 2), submerged nations behave as 
sovereign states even while in international politics they remain invisible or submerged. 
The Fairyland of folk narrative schematizes such a submerged position, especially given 
the ways in which its subterranean inhabitants enunciate the political dissatisfaction of the 
"real" types living on the surface world of Victorian England. As "liminal" figures 
(Narvaez 337-38) who straddle the human and nonhuman worlds, fairies "force us to face 
the problems of the relativity ofknowledge and human estrangement from the world" 
(Rojcewicz 481 ). For this reason the fairy-long before the alien-became crucial in the 
science-fictional exploration of "cognitive estrangement," which gauges the spatia-
temporal co-ordinates of "new social relations." 
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While Wells was aware ofthe gothic genre's socio-political potential, exemplified 
with particular skill in Shelley's Frankenstein, he was intent on replacing the alchemy of 
Frankenstein's laboratory with an "ingenious use of scientific patter" (Wells, "Preface" 
viii). Accordingly, The Time Machine employs the device of the time-travelling machine 
and its attendant theory of time as the "fourth dimension," while Moreau explores radical 
experiments in animal vivisection and related theories of the "plastic" qualities of 
mammalian superstructure: both romances offered speculations on the future 
development of physics and biology. In the first novel, which I discuss in Section II, a 
bourgeois scientist-adventurer who travels to the year 802,701 initiates a conceptual shift 
in conventional notions of time and the theory of evolution, both of which were 
understood especially in Social Darwinist terms to be linear and progressive. The 
Traveller discovers that this futuristic world consists of what appears to be a two-world 
system of the plutocrats and the proletariat, who have developed into two distinct races, 
the fey-like Eloi and the ape-like Morlocks. In a horrific reversal of the Victorian class 
hierarchy, the monstrous and deformed underground dwellers are revealed to be the 
predators and the delicate leisurely upper-worlders the prey. Returning to the socio-
biological lexicon in its exploration of a surgeon's radical experiments on animals, 
Moreau takes us into the well-known SF realm of biological engineering. Unlike Jekyll 
and Hyde, however, Moreau is fully entrenched in the scientific spirit of the late 
nineteenth century, and the "Beast Folk" are no more evil spirits than the deformed 
entities littering the laboratories of England's colleges (in both Shelley's and Stevenson's 
eras as well). Despite its exotic island setting, Moreau narrows the distance between the 
textual and "extra-textual" worlds by specifying the plausible ways in which the lower 
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orders of society could be successfully engineered. As a sort of thematic sequel to The 
Time Machine, however, Moreau's return to a subterranean motif, when the protagonist 
Prendick encounters the Beast Folk living in a sort of hellish underworld, reveals both the 
variety of the animal kingdom and its varied hybridized forms, and therefore reinforces 
the blurred boundaries between the "two nations" of"man" and "beast." 
Despite and because of these "urban gothic" and folkloric elements, both novels 
offer further conceptualizations of the SF changeling, in all of its radical 
"deterritorializations": reaffirming the "submerged nation" as the site of transformation, 
the Morlocks shed their subservient roles as mechanical automatons and assume the 
insurgent position of Fairyland's lower orders (goblins, brownies), parasitizing the more 
politically powerful class that has oppressed them for eons; in a still more subversive 
gesture, Moreau's Beast Men employ their newly acquired gait and speech in order to 
produce a revolutionary "becoming-man" that is more hopeful than Swift's pessimistic 
conclusion to the Age of Unreason. As I argue below, the significant link between The 
Time Machine and Moreau is their similar concern with "mutation," genetic 
manipulation, and, more generally, the anxious response to spontaneous human 
metamorphosis, described so vividly in changeling legends. As Brad Buchanan has 
argued more recently, the "loss of confidence (no doubt spurred by the decline of 
religious authority and the rise of evolutionary biology) produced a profound anxiety 
about the problem ofhow to recognize and represent humanity" (33). Focused as they 
were on the predator-prey relationship in a highly industrialized England, Wells's 
thought-experiments were responses to Darwinian theory and Thomas Huxley's 
prodigious scholarly analysis of Darwin's work in the second half of the nineteenth 
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century. Throughout his several scientific romances, especially those published between 
1895 and 1904,47 Wells offers one of the most sustained attempts to apply this same 
scientific-cum-sociologicallexicon to the creation of fictional worlds. In particular, The 
Time Machine and Moreau imaginatively develop Wells's own scientific reflections as a 
way of re-imagining the gothic doppelganger and the folkloric changeling as biological 
possibilities and revisiting the sublime biological series, evolution-revolution-
monstrosity. If we argue that Frankenstein has had a dominant influence on SF of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then we must concede the possibility that 
Frankenstein's monster contributed-and continues to contribute-to the 
conceptualization of all the aliens, robots, and changelings oflater SF. Indeed, in Wells's 
The Time Machine and Moreau we should recognize the subterranean revolt of the 
Morlocks and the savage reversion of the Beast Folk as an echo of the monster's demonic 
rebellion. Regardless of(and perhaps due to) Moreau's biological tampering, the Beast 
Folk in particular act out the revolutionary gestures of the Romantic-era automaton, for 
they resemble the engineered working-class labourers whose very limbs have been 
enslaved to the machine of the industrial revolution. 
Friedrich Engels's great anthropological study The Conditions of the Working 
Class in England (1845, 1892), which preceded (in its first edition) his collaborative 
effort with Marx by just a few years, confirms the fact that the ape-like (or brownie-like) 
industrial aggregate featured in The Time Machine and the hybrid human-animal 
automatons featured in Moreau are conceptual enunciations of the human complement 
47 These mclude The Tzme Machzne (1895), The Island of Dr Moreau (1896), The lnvzszble Man (1897), 
The War of the Worlds (1898), When the Sleeper Wakes (1899), The Fzrst Men zn the Moon (1901), and The 
Food of the Gods (1904) 
162 
forced to live in "cellar" dwellings in the great industrial towns of the mid-nineteenth 
century (Engels 68-11 0). Indeed, the "submerged nation" theme, which SF author and 
critic Brian Aldiss associates with a British tradition of imaginative writing throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Billion Year Spree 131-32), had one of its sources 
in the appalling conditions of England's urban centres, including the poor ventilation, 
sanitary conditions, and sewage systems that were the norm of industrial workers' 
housing in the mid-nineteenth century. Engels's description of the dense population of 
workers who inhabit "subterranean dens" in the "manufacturing towns" of Manchester 
(83) is echoed later in the Traveller's discovery that "the Morlocks, subterranean for 
innumerable generations, had come at last to find the daylit surface intolerable" (The 
Time Machine 67). The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that "subterranean" has 
historically signified both "natural" and "man-made" structures and has alternately 
referred to "animate" persons and "inanimate" objects, "natural" and "supernatural" 
underground dwellers. In other words, in their respective evocations of working-class 
conditions, Engels and Wells explore a conceptual plane that reveals a teeming reservoir 
of jostling and proliferating personae (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 71)-
underground workers (colliers, tinsmiths), devils and spirits, mythological and folkloric 
figures, natural but abysmal creatures, all of whom suffer the conditions of the lower 
stratum. Both Engels and Wells were acutely aware of the imminent revolt ofthese den 
dwellers as well as the inevitable cross-over of classes and populations. Moreover, 
Engels's modification of Malthus' s theory of geometrical population increase, echoed 
once again a half-century later by the Traveller, was shrewdly aware of the evolutionary 
forces at work in his own day: "The workers have taken it into their heads that they, with 
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their busy hands, are the necessary, and the rich capitalists, who do nothing, the surplus 
population" (282). We may rightly say, then, that a new slogan presents itself in the wake 
of such a discovery: Subterranean creatures of the world, unite! Evolutionary theory, 
which had become the new modus operandi of Victorian SF authors such as Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton and Samuel Butler, not to mention Stevenson, provided a new cognitive 
locus for utopian speculation and what Wells himself called the "rediscovery of the 
unique," which, in the case of The Time Machine and Moreau, meant the eruption of an 
insurgent segment of British society genetically altered by the long sojourn in an 
industrial Fairyland. 
I. The Changeling as Emergent SF "Agent" 
As it was argued in Chapter 2, both the gothic mode and folk narrative constitute 
two imaginative strategies for subversive social commentary and, in the enunciation of 
occulted worlds that intermittently come into view, two forms of "cognitive 
estrangement." Such an argument may contravene Suvin's axiomatic delimitation but 
only insofar as it expands the definition of "estrangement" in order to allow for its 
implicit meanings to come to light. As noted in Chapter 2, Suvin argues that SF is a 
"literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and 
interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author's empirical environment" 
(Metamorphoses 7-8; original emphases). Suvin continually stresses in his two critical 
studies that cognitive estrangement cannot effectively operate in a narrative whose main 
formal device uses imagined worlds, agents, and relationships for the purpose of 
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substituting one novum for another rather than placing the imagined and actual worlds 
side by side (Positions 142). In such a scenario, in which the occulted world or agent 
simply fades from the narrative without affecting the actual world, that is, without 
pointing towards the cognitive limitation of the author's empirical world, the novum itself 
has only a sensational purpose. As Tatyana Chemysheva has argued, there "was a time 
when mentioning the folktale and science fiction in one breath would have seemed silly, 
or even blasphemous" (35), for the presence of such literature implied a "baseless" set of 
ideas or hypotheses, which could only serve the purpose of entertainment. The suggestion 
here is that the persistence of the folkloric influence on SF throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries implied an impurity in the genre, a fantastical element that perhaps 
also indicated SF's immaturity. However, because SF (according to Suvin) depended on a 
certain tension between the fantastical anomaly and the proven scientific fact, it could be 
argued that this impurity was part of its strength, that is, the very basis for its best plots 
and most sophisticated ideas. More than this, SF was in competition with the mainstream 
"realist" novel, and, despite a well-documented period of "optimal development" between 
1893 and 1900 (Suvin, Victorian Science Fiction 263), the burgeoning genre, like the 
folktale, usually fell short of the realm of "serious" literature. The appearance of the 
changeling persona in late nineteenth-century SF anticipated a new era of folklore 
influence and proved that the genre's strength lay in its ability to adapt, modify, and even 
pervert mainstream literature, just as the folktale had previously absorbed and modified 
elements of the legend. Further, the science-fictional use of folk narrative implied a 
paraliterary and, to a certain degree, subaltern strategy of estranging a rationally and 
empirically determined world. More than this, the emergence of the changeling persona in 
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the late Victorian period demonstrates a conceptual force that effectively transformed 
both folk narratives and SF narratives into vehicles of social change. 
Of course, the general consensus on folktales has been that they operate on a 
supernatural or "metaphysical" principle that cannot be validated except through a 
pseudo-mythological belief system. Suvin has elaborated upon this notion in the 
following way: 
Estrangement differentiates SF from the "realistic" literary mainstream extending 
from the eighteenth century into the twentieth. Cognition differentiates it not only 
from myth, but also from the folk (fairy) tale and the fantasy. The folktale also 
doubts the laws of the author's empirical world, but it escapes out of its horizons 
and into a closed collateral world indifferent to cognitive possibilities. It does not 
use imagination as a means of understanding the tendencies latent in reality, but as 
an end sufficient unto itself and cut off from the real contingencies. 
(Metamorphoses 8; original emphasis) 
There is no doubt that the folktale "doubts" the rules and regulations of the empirical 
world, especially as that world-view functions as a centralizing force in dominant culture. 
However, this refusal to adhere to established "cognitive possibilities" is often an 
unavoidable result of the folktale's status as oral literature, or as a version of a folk 
legend. Since folktales are often oral transmissions, there is no author per se, nor is there 
a particular central text, only versions, variations, renderings, translations, retellings, and 
transcriptions.48 When we study a folktale, our analysis tends to focus on the details of 
one version or variation, which is likely a retelling of a retelling. Moreover, the cognitive 
laws that are supposedly violated may actually reflect a particular version's violation: the 
fantastical element that is "indifferent" to logic may have been added by a particular story 
teller and may not reflect the original intention (i.e., of the legend). Considering that 
48 In Theory and History of Folklore, Vladimir Propp considers the issue of authorship in his discussion of 
"folklore and literature" (5-9). 
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Suvin has conflated the "environments" of the folktale and the (rather stereotypical) fairy 
tale (using the "flying carpet" as a representative example of the former [Metamorphoses 
8]), he has already determined the direction and purpose of the fantastical elements to be 
found in the folktale: to "escape" logic and the "real world," to be blithely indifferent to 
the logic ofthe real world. What Suvin has failed to notice is that the folktale-and its 
allied form, the legend-was appropriated by religion, medical science, and evolutionary 
theory, and that it became associated with the empirical worlds and cognitive possibilities 
of the Victorian period and of the contemporary period. As the well-known folklorist 
Stith Thompson has argued, "Literary critics, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, 
and aestheticians are all needed if we are to hope to know why folktales are made, how 
they are invented, what art is used in their telling, how they grow and change and 
occasionally die" (6). While Suvin is right to point out the cognitive limitations of the 
folktale, he fails to take into account its close association with the legend and its 
philosophical influence on distinctly "cognitive" works, such as those by Wells. If folk 
narratives must be disparaged for their lack of "cognitive logic," let us reconsider their-
sometimes earnest, sometimes mischievous-attempt to assimilate elements of the "real 
world": Johnnie's appeal ("Johnnie in the Cradle") lies in his inelegant parody ofhuman 
speech, and our laughter is the nervous kind that sees a little "realism" in the changeling's 
insubordinate, deformed rage. 
This is to say that folktales and folk legends focus also on the "mundane" aspects 
of quotidian life and not only the fantastical elements that have no direct relation to the 
folk (whether this include the rural peasant, rural proletariat, or artisan class). In the 
particular corpus of tales that have concerned us (Chapter 1), the tension is between a 
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familiar and an unfamiliar horizon, and escaping the former realm is not easily done, or at 
least not without a profound consequence (including transformation and/or death). As 
Stephen L. Clark has argued, some SF tales "urge what folklore also urges: it is folly to 
wish for more than can be naturally provided" (22). The textual/empirical environment of 
the folktale, which Suvin would disavow, contains within it subversive undercurrents 
associated at once with a rural underclass and a "little folk" driven underground by 
colonization as well as industrialization. Suvin himself argues early in Metamorphoses 
that the history of SF corresponds to the history ofparaliterature, or the "popular, 'low,' 
or plebeian production of various times, particularly since the Industrial Revolution" (vii). 
The folktale is very much the product of a plebeian or lower-class art and must therefore 
be understood as another form ofparaliterature. As Vladimir Propp has argued, "Folklore 
is, first and foremost, the art of the oppressed classes, both peasants and workers, but also 
of the intermediate strata that gravitate toward the lower social classes" (5). As it turns 
out, the visions, or as Suvin would say, the "cognitive horizons," (Positions 51, 59, 87) of 
folk narrative and SF frequently intersect in interesting ways. 
The changeling persona is not restricted by genre, and has the true "novelistic 
spirit" (Bakhtin 22) in its penchant for mimicry, parasitism, and proliferation: it imitates 
for a while, then moves onto a new form in order to draw from it (new human forms, new 
expressions), and finally spreads out, trailing behind it and before it the traces of past and 
future forms. Indeed, the remarkable feature in the changeling is its ability to assume 
various voices (the author's, a human child's, and so forth). The subsequent sections of 
this chapter examine how the Victorian SF novel in particular provides the heteroglossic 
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materials for a changeling voice to be heard once again. 49 As I argue, the impact of 
Wells's folkloric adaptations is such that the abbreviated form ofthe folk legend 
undergoes a transformation into a "full-fledged" metaphorical structure in which "new 
meaning, accessible to us in no other way, is [ ... ] formed and thus explored" (Suvin, 
Positions 188). Indeed, the strength of the legend lies in its repetitiOn of an ambiguous 
denouement-the exorcism of the changeling and, in some mstances, the failure of the 
human child to return-and its brevity, both of which leave much to the imagination: the 
legend therefore always remains m a certain sense the seed of a larger idea. This "seed" 
can be connected to the "subterranean" theme ofboth folk legends and nineteenth-century 
British SF, and Wells has been largely responsible for watering this seed even as it 
nourishes his own works with startlmg and estranging novelties. 
II. The Time Machine: the Changeling as Subterranean Proletariat 
Wells himself was no slave to genre, for he employed the Romantic gothic model 
in order to carve out his own mode of fictional art: the scientific romance or "scientific 
49 Of course, thematically the changehng has always had a vo1ce w1thm the hterary trope of metamorphoszs 
As Bakhtm has noted, 
The folktale 1mage of man-throughout the extraordmary vanety of folklonc narratives-always 
orders 1tself around the motifs of transformatwn and 1dentity (no matter how vaned m 1ts tum the 
concrete expresswn of these motifs m1ght be). The motifs oftransformatzon and zdentzty, wh1ch 
began as matters of concern for the md1v1dual, are transferred to the entire human world, and to 
nature, and to those thmgs that man h1mselfhas created (Bakhtm 112, ongmal emphas1s) 
One way of gaugmg the development of the changehng motif from folktale to novel (mcludmg 1ts 
prommence m nmeteenth and twentieth-century SF) 1s to cons1der how the larger plot of metamorphosis 
altered from a mytholog1cal account of m1raculous transformatwn to the development and maturation of the 
md1v1dual-and human-self(Bakhtm 114-15) For the changelmg 1tselfs1gmfied both a supernatural 
creature and a deformed human, and anticipated the kmd of psychological metamorphosis explored by late-
nmeteenth and early-twentieth century novehsts, mcludmg especmlly Hardy, Conrad, Lawrence, Kafka, and 
Joyce Metamorphosis may then be understood as the folklonc figure's deterr1tonahzatwn of1ts own ongm, 
as a teanng away (De leuze and Guattan, What Is Phzlosophy? 1 09) of 1ts oppress1ve 1dentity m order to find 
a new pathway for surv1val 
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fantasy," as Wells's critics called them ("Preface" ix). Wells discovered that the gothic 
was not "gothic" at all but rather a domesticated version of the fantastic, and that the 
gothic body was not ghostly but rather composed of flesh and blood (albeit deformed and 
artificially constructed): the scientific romance, as loosely defined by Wells in 1933 in his 
now well-known "Preface," constitutes this very discovery. "Hitherto," Wells states, 
"except in exploration fantasies, the fantastic element was brought in by magic. 
Frankenstein even, used some jiggery-pokery magic to animate his artificial monster. 
There was some trouble about the thing's soul. But by the end of the last century it had 
become difficult to squeeze even momentary belief out of magic any longer" (viii). 
Clearly, Wells is referring to the gothic form here and Shelley's employment of a certain 
kind of "magic" to construct her monster, but he is also noting the shifting critical 
response to the gothic form and his own society's refusal to believe an impossible 
possibility. This is to say that, while Shelley's gothic offered some cognitive possibilities 
(i.e., in the novel presentation of reanimation), most versions of the genre did not. Wells, 
of course, inverts the typical gothic principle by offering his readers a possible 
impossibility: "It occurred to me that instead of the usual interview with the devil or a 
magician, an ingenious use of scientific patter might with advantage be substituted. That 
was no great discovery. I simply brought the fetish stuff up to date, and made it as near 
actual theory as possible." What better example of this new form than The Time Machine, 
which shrinks the distance between the textual and extra-textual worlds by first setting us 
down in the midst of an informal lecture on physics and time as the fourth dimension. 
While it is perhaps reminiscent of Jekyll's "full statement," the Time Traveller's "patter" 
in the first chapter is more thoroughly engaged in the empirical manipulation of the 
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impossible, especially since we are allowed to gauge the initial reaction of the Traveller's 
gentlemen audience and their final response to his complete narrative. As Wells suggests, 
such a narrative intends to hold its listeners as well as any "good gripping dream" 
("Preface" vii). Once the connection, or the "identity" of the setting, has been established, 
Wells has his Traveller send us reeling into the future. But what we discover is not so 
much urbanized gothic-for the initial setting is fairly lacking in the urban sprawl of the 
Traveller's world-as an urban world that has been gothicized from within by the 
proletariat segment who have now assumed the old role of the "night-time horror" 
(Dryden 159), the demonic doubles oftheir aristocratic betters. In Wells's version of the 
urban gothic, the city has been submerged beneath the earth as a sort of hellish industrial 
underworld. As inheritors of the class division offin de siecle England, and as the 
plausible products of a biological devolution projected some eight hundred thousand 
years into the future, the Eloi and the Morlocks constitute the penultimate personae of the 
urban gothic text. 
In his dedicated exploration of Darwinian themes, and in his imaginative 
displacement of a bourgeois gentleman in a sort of insidious! y paradisial arcadia, Wells 
made another important discovery: instead of the usual gothic apparatus of demonic or 
supernatural horror, the folktale could "with advantage be substituted." For, as the 
Traveller discovers, the London of the eight thousandth and third century is a vast garden 
filled with ruined magisterial structures and studded with curious circular wells, beautiful 
fey-like little people and deformed dwarfish creatures: this constitutes the conceptual 
plane of a society whose declining birth-rate, racial anxiety, and political subservience to 
capitalist masters was enunciated in the language of traditional folk narrative. Again, in 
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Wells's hands, the "gothic" becomes unrecognizable, since it is related to what he calls 
"scientific patter" and guided by a folkloric sensitivity to the dark hither side of 
hospitality. Wells would really perfect his grafting techniques when applied to Moreau's 
vivisecting laboratory, but we catch a glimpse of this deft skill in his manner of welding 
together gothic, scientific, and folkloric elements in The Time Machine. 
More recently The Time Machine has been identified as a species of "imperialist 
romance," in that it involves an "intrepid British explorer['s] encounter [with] an exotic 
civilization" and "with strange and often bizarre customs that seem the antithesis of the 
European way of life" (Cantor and Hufnagel37). Certainly Wells drew upon such a 
tradition in his depiction of the indigenous Eloi and the Morlocks, but these exotic 
subalterns also clearly have prototypes in the older folk traditions of England. 
Accordingly, The Time Machine is also often interpreted as a parable adapted for the 
purpose of scientific speculation (Suvin, Metamorphoses 224), or as a species ofwhat 
Patrick Parrinder calls the "scientific fairy-tale" ("Introduction" 1 0). 50 I modify these 
claims somewhat by suggesting that Wells constructed his future world of the year 
802,701 with the components of British folk narrative in mind. The folktale, as I have 
noted above, overlaps the category of "legend," which always involves the negotiation of 
truth claims. The British folk narratives discussed in Chapter 1 appear to present a 
supernatural element in plausible terms or a mundane occurrence in supernatural terms. In 
the case of the legend, the supernatural element frequently escapes from our direct view 
50 As Parnnder writes m his mtroductory essay to H G Wells The Crztzcal Herztage, "Zamyatm, an 
unorthodox ex-Bolshevik who had been tramed as an engmeer, saw Wells as a writer of urban fmry-tales 
based on a qumtessenhally modem combmatwn of science and a heretical socialism" (28). As Istvan 
Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. affirms, Zamyatm "mtended the phrase precisely and admmngly" (1). 
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or fades as soon as we attempt to scrutinize it, like the Fairy People themselves, who 
invade and retreat imperceptibly. Accordingly, legend introduces a sort of speculative 
tension between two worlds, the human and the nonhuman and, in the case of the 
changeling motif, the ambiguous blending of the two worlds. This tension is made 
possible by the fact that fairies generally appear in the guise of the human, or we might 
say in science-fictional terms, the humanoid, for they possess characteristics akin to homo 
sapiens: with the exception of diminutive stature and perhaps a distinct "elfin" 
appearance, they possess eyes, nose, mouth, hair, two arms and two legs, sentient minds 
and social manners. Wells's use of folkloric figures such as the Eloi and the Morlocks 
acknowledges the cognitive possibilities of the folktale and the sociological possibilities 
of remapping Victorian industrial England as a Fairyland consisting of two nations. 
The scientific-cum-folkloric element is soon apparent when we consider how 
Wells structures his futuristic tale. Sitting amongst his audience ofbourgeois gentlemen, 
having piqued their interest in his "dusty and dirty" clothes (The Time Machine 14), as 
well as his apparent "lameness" and "blood-stained socks" (15), the Traveller begins his 
extraordinary tale; but to do so, he must descend retrogressively into the past even as his 
narrative lurches forward into the future. On the one hand, the telling of the tale instigates 
a conceptual shift in the conventional understanding of space-time, where the listeners 
remain physically fastened in their seats but are analogically thrust forward and beyond 
the spatia-temporal coordinates of their entrenched scientific thinking: such, we might 
say, is the Traveller's way of coming through on the promise that he "will have to 
controvert one or two ideas that are almost universally accepted" (1 ). On the other hand, 
the telling of the tale analogically points to the unexpected reverse progress of evolution, 
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or the devolution of the species in the year 802,701, as well as the traumatic shock of 
having descended into an otherworld (as in the case of Odysseus's or Dante's sojourn). 
Given that the tale is encapsulated within a larger first-person narrative, the Traveller's 
story is presented as a first-hand account or memorate offered second-hand, providing 
some distance for readers as well as the faint suggestion of a well-aimed scientific 
parable. Suvin has famously linked parable to SF narratives, although his definition 
brings to mind the folk narrative's creation of a fictional world parallel to the actual one. 
The "ultimate aim" of the parable, Suvin argues, "is the shock of estrangement 
reorienting the reader's perception-in modem times, making her recognize the alienated 
world she lives in. It is not an allegory in that it does not substitute one thing for another 
[ ... ] but sets one thing by the side of another, the explicit by the side of the implicit" 
(Suvin, Positions 142; original emphases). The Traveller achieves this aim by introducing 
his listeners, and ultimately Wells's Victorian readership, to a juxtaposed "two-world 
system" (Huntington, "The Science Fiction of H. G. Wells" 35), or what Istvan Csicsery-
Ronay, Jr. calls a "two-world universe divided between the everyday and the 
extraordinary" (3). In a general way, he sets his own extraordinary narrative alongside the 
everyday scenario of the drawing room, with its clocks and mantelpieces, its late dinners 
and its accompanying intellectual discussions: this is the attention-grabber, the hook, and 
the story teller's basic technique. In a more specific way, after he has gained his 
audience's complicity, the Traveller establishes another set of parallel worlds that exist 
within his own story and therefore within the drawing room world in which he narrates 
and therefore within Wells's late Victorian world: the upper world of the Eloi and the 
underworld of the Morlocks. The shocking sight of the bloody socks in the drawing room 
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is meant to be analogical to the Traveller's own shock in the world ofhis tale, but it is 
also meant to be placed alongside the blood-shod feet of the subterranean workers of 
Wells's day. In other words, these encapsulated narratives (Wells's, his first-person 
narrator's, the Traveller's) function less as nested eggs, in which the first shell is never 
touched by the third, and more as linked coils, in which the first one sends a shockwave 
through both the second and third and receives a shock in tum. In this analogy I intend to 
suggest that the Traveller's fantastical tale works on his audience, and has the capacity to 
work on Wells's audience, through its "residual" effects, that is, through its function as a 
seemingly harmless piece ofparaliterature deployed for the purpose of entertainment. The 
tale of the future is residual because it sounds vaguely familiar, like a folktale told and 
retold generation by generation, and because it is therefore already part of a cultural 
tradition, sustained by virtue of the feedback loop that maintains its popularity. 
The Traveller, then, reintroduces his audience to a recognizable formula-the folk 
legend scenario in which a human discovers what appears to be a hidden world of 
beautiful, elegant little folk, and the utopian scenario in which a world-weary traveler 
encounters an earthly paradise. In a move that reinforces Wells's fundamental break from 
the gothic form, the Traveller describes how, when he is first thrown violently from his 
time machine onto a plot of grass in the middle of storm, the sight of a massive "winged 
sphinx" (The Time Machine 23) and "other vast shapes-huge buildings with intricate 
parapets and tall columns" (24) had at first "seized" him with a "panic fear"; and then 
how, upon seeing his hosts, he "suddenly regained confidence" (25). Indeed, the 
recognizably gothic "shapes" are not at all what they appear: when the storm passes and 
his sight is clear, the Traveller discovers that they are the mere skeletal remains of an 
175 
older civilization and play no imperial role in the lives of the new one. But his hosts do 
present to this "old-world savage animal" (24) a picture of elegance and nobility, as 
indicated in his initial descriptions of the Eloi he encounters. His first encounter is with a 
male member of the race: "He was a slight creature-perhaps four feet high-clad in a 
purple tunic, girdled at the waist with a leather belt" (25). As he then surveys the larger 
community of the Eloi, the Traveller summarizes his first impression: "something in these 
pretty little people [ ... ] inspired confidence-a graceful gentleness, a certain childlike 
ease" (26). In these brief passages the Traveller establishes a vague folkloric connection, 
emphasizing the diminutive height, slender shape, and childlike appearance often 
associated with the fairy folk, especially in the British (and specifically Welsh) tradition 
(Gwyndaf 160). He also reiterates the idea that these gentle folk-like their grand but 
crumbling structures-do not inspire dread or awe, but display only a quaint sense of a 
"Dresden-china type of prettiness" (The Time Machine 27). His subsequently more 
detailed description of the Eloi's physical features confirms Wells's deference to the 
British folk tradition with which he was evidently quite familiar: 
Their hair, which was uniformly curly, came to a sharp end at the neck and cheek; 
there was not the faintest suggestion of it on the face, and their ears were 
singularly minute. The mouths were small, with bright red, rather thin lips, and the 
little chins ran to a point. The eyes were large and mild; and-this may seem 
egotism on my part-! fancied even that there was a certain lack of the interest I 
might have expected in them. (27) 
The pointed and "sharp" features here suggest an elfin quality once again coupled with 
the other "minute" characteristics, ultimately aligning them with the children of the 
Traveller's own world. This repeated emphasis on the childlike and fragile qualities of 
this race begins to construct for us a basic outline of the Eloi's social structure, but the 
176 
emphasis on the "mild" and uninterested eyes confirms that the Eloi are a very leisurely 
and indolent culture; and the Traveller states this explicitly after he has spent more time 
with them (31). If we recall Briggs's description of the "fairy economy" (Chapter 1, 
section 1), these secondary characteristics suggest that Wells's "little people" are notable 
departures from their legendary prototypes. While it is true that the Good People often 
maintain a superficially aristocratic demeanor in their dealings with humans, they are also 
a very industrious race. To be sure, there are indications that a class hierarchy is at work 
in the fairy world, but folk narrative continually emphasizes that the fairy folk exist 
alongside or "side by side" humans (0 hOgain 185; Bourke, The Burning of Bridget 
Cleary 31; Jenkins 314) and that they engage in typically plebeian activities involving 
typically lower-class or working-class trades and routines. There is no such visible 
"transaction" or traffic involved in the Eloi' s social structure, and this is the first sign of 
the declining culture of future humanity. 
Through the course of his initial discoveries, the Traveller is able to conclude that, 
despite the indolence and indifference of this fey-like race, their paradisial world suggests 
a utopia, perhaps even a "communist" one (The Time Machine 32). This conclusion, 
which constitutes the Traveller's first theory, nods obliquely to William Morris's News 
from Nowhere (1891) in which the protagonist, William Guest, discovers an earthly 
paradise composed of a leisurely, communistic society (Suvin, Metamorphoses 212), 
existing in a future London (as in The Time Machine). But the Traveller's subsequent 
theory that he is witnessing humanity "on the wane" (The Time Machine 34) suggests a 
critique of utopia, even before the Morlocks arrive to confirm the Traveller's suspicions. 
Unlike their folktale counterparts, the Eloi live a rather static life, seemingly bereft of 
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burdens or fears; they are also clearly deficient in intelligence (27, 28) or intellectual 
vigour (37): they are, in fact, the intellectual equivalent of"five-year-old children" (27) or 
perhaps the intellectually effete classes ofWells's day. If the Traveller's discovery that 
they are still affected by the old-world fear of"the dark" (50) introduces a certain 
ambivalent element in their society, it only serves to reaffirm their passivity and 
"purposeless energy": the "shadows" and "black things" strike fear into the Eloi but do 
not spur them on to action or change, and so their life continues on in a consistent (if 
gruesome) routine. In a certain sense, then, Wells flips the two-world division of "the 
everyday and the extraordinary" in his futuristic world by having the Traveller first 
encounter the "extraordinary" world of the Eloi. His acclimatization to the new 
environment sets him up for a shock when he encounters the "everyday" world of the 
Morlocks, whose monstrosity is such a contrast to these fragile creatures of "hectic 
beauty" (25). Further, and this constitutes another of Wells's modifications: the static 
nature of the initially extraordinary world of the Eloi demotes it to a rather mundane 
topography-really, less a nowhere than a still-here. The effect of this inversion 
domesticates the Eloi to such a degree that they really are like "five-year-old children" 
(27), indeed, like the ineffectual plutocrats of Wells's own society, rather than the 
ambiguous fairy folk of British legend. The most notable departure from folk tradition is 
really the most apparent one: these "little people" live above ground, not below. And this 
begs the question for the Traveller, "what was hidden down there[ ... ]?" (54) The curious 
sight of "circular wells" and "subterranean ventilation" ( 46) prepares us for the author-
narrator's next twist: the true "fairies" and "changelings" of this society are those which 
the aristocratic segment wishes to keep hidden but who insist on emerging nevertheless. 
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While it is true that there are several theories regarding fairy origins, there seems 
to be some consensus that the fairies are not celestial spirits but rather an earth-dwelling 
and subterranean species (Hartland 95; Briggs, Dictionary of Fairies 131 and The Fairies 
6, 8, 12, 23, 24). In this respect, Wells's depiction of the Morlocks is in keeping with the 
British folktale tradition, although he was evidently aware of the specific gradations that 
occurred within Fairyland, including the suggestion of a sort of class hierarchy. The 
degree to which other, lowly segments within the fairy population are enlisted for the less 
pleasant jobs (tinsmithing and especially the various sorts of mining) has been noted by 
folklorists and is evident in certain branches of folktales, such as those concerning 
"buccas" or "knockers," who inhabit caves and engage in mining (Briggs, "The Fairy 
Tools or Barker's Knee" 242-43), or brownies, who tend to engage in household chores. 51 
The brownie in particular tends to be a helpful but rather uncouth creature, while the 
knockers are often irascible and rather careful to prevent humans from spying or intruding 
on their work. As Briggs notes, the influence of Romantic folklorists such as Sir Walter 
Scott and James Hogg, coupled with the burgeoning interests in the Irish and Scottish 
Highland folklore traditions, led to the dissemination of fairy traditions and the popularity 
of fairy personae like brownies in the Victorian period (Briggs, The Fairies 170). 
Briggs's description of the plebeian contingent of Fairyland suggests that the Morlock 
design may have been based in part on the British brownie (and not just Moloch, the 
Canaanite and Phoenician deity). The later form of the British brownie was "small, 
51 See, for example, "The Brownte," "The Brownte ofBodsbeck 1," "The Browme ofBodsbeck: II," "The 
Browme of Cranshaws," "The Browme ofDalswmton," "A Brownte Legend from Lmcolnshtre," "The 
Browme and the Mtdwtfe," and "The Brownte and the Mtlk-Bowl," all mcluded m Bnggs's A Dzctzonary of 
Brztzsh Folk-Tales zn the Englzsh Language, Incorporatzng the F J Norton Collectzon. 
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wizened and shaggy, clad in rags or naked"; it "often took animal form" and was 
"generally grotesque to look at"; tended to resemble a small child, "naked or wearing a 
white tunic"; was often invisible but also mainly an "expert in hiding and lurking that [it] 
hardly need exercise it"; was highly industrious; and finally, was often "moved by 
personal friendships and fancies" (38). This "later" brownie was likely the best-known 
sort of lurking fairy in the Victorian period, considering George MacDonald's familiar 
use of these creatures in his subversive fairy tales and the casual reference to them in the 
work of Charlotte Bronte and Robert Louis Stevenson. 
It is tempting to suggest that Wells had at least some ofthese brownie "traits" in 
mind when he fashioned his Morlocks, especially given their pale or white skin, their 
naked, hairy bodies, their animal appearance, and finally their position as underground 
labourers. Further, while the boggart seems to fit the Morlocks' temperament better, 
since, as Briggs's notes, it "is like a mischievous type ofbrownie" (The Personnel of 
Fairyland 193), there are indications that the Morlocks are, in fact, less aggressive than 
the Traveller makes them out to be. At the least, the Traveller's early impressions of the 
Morlocks suggest a variation on one of the lower-order, subterranean fairies, who likely 
exhibited some of the "subhuman characteristics" associated with racial inferiors (Tuerk 
520). One day when he seeks out shelter from the heat in a "colossal ruin," the Traveller 
suddenly sees amidst the shadows a "pair of eyes, luminous by the reflection against the 
daylight without,[ ... ] watching me out of the darkness" (The Time Machine 52). When 
he gets a better look at the creature, he notes that it "was a dull white," "had strange large 
grayish-red eyes," and "flaxen hair on its head and down its back" (53). When he later 
reflects on their strange eyes, and thinks ofthe "White fish of the Kentucky caves," cats 
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and owls, he concludes that "[p]lainly, this second species ofMan was subterranean" 
(55). This theory is confirmed when the Traveller discovers the significance of the 
circular wells that dot the landscape like ancient fairy forts and when he discovers that his 
time machine has been hidden within the hollow of the white sphinx. This discovery, in 
tum, leads the Traveller to develop his second theory (as a modification of the utopian 
socialist one [32]) that Morlocks are the "have-nots" of this world, the resentful, 
malicious changelings and therefore a sort of folkloric "submerged nation." Indeed, this 
folkloric connection is strengthened when we consider that the Traveller also theorizes 
that the Morlocks are the end result of some species modification, a uniformly 
congenitally afflicted race. Nodding now towards Marx (rather than the utopian Morris), 
we have the new theory: the Eloi are the capitalists and the Morlocks the working-class 
labourers (56). That the Traveller frequently compares the Morlocks to animals indicates 
Wells's Darwinian preoccupations, even while for the moment the Traveller maintains, in 
his scrupulous way, a clear zoological division: Man had "differentiated into two distinct 
animals" (54). IfWells's "little people" happen to live above ground rather than below, 
this only confirms the fact that these fairies were linked in Wells's mind with the same 
humans who ruled the upperworld in 1890s England, while the other fairies-the 
brownie-like Morlocks-were linked in his mind to the subterranean humans forced to 
live in "cellar" dwellings in Manchester and Liverpool. 
But the strict Marxist theory survives only as long as it takes the Traveller to 
descend into the Morlocks' realm and catch a glimpse-albeit a fleeting one-of the 
"artificial Under-world," which seems to provide the Eloi with their comfortable lifestyle 
(The Time Machine 55). After he clambers down a "shaft of perhaps two hundred yards," 
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having left behind his little Eloi friend, W eena, the Traveller presents to his bourgeois 
audience perhaps the most estranging vision of all. As he describes: "The thudding sound 
of a machine below grew louder and more oppressive. Everything save that little disc 
above was profoundly dark, and when I looked up again Weena had disappeared" (61). 
After his strenuous descent, he nearly falls asleep in a "slender loophole in the wall" until 
he is approached by some of the Morlocks. 
Living, as they did, in what appeared to me impenetrable darkness, their eyes were 
abnormally large and sensitive, just as are the pupils of abysmal fishes, and they 
did not seem to have any fear of me apart from the light. But, so soon as I struck a 
match in order to see them, they fled incontinently, vanishing into dark gutters and 
tunnels, from which their eyes glared at me in the strangest fashion. (62) 
Then we are given the hazy image ofbig machines appearing out of the gloom, and the 
"dim spectral Morlocks" moving about. The peak of this unpleasant adventure seems to 
be marked by the sight of a large "red joint" at the Morlocks' eating table ( 63 ), after 
which we notice the increasing shrillness of the Traveller's voice, characterized by the 
repeated exclamatory sentences: "It was all very indistinct: the heavy smell, the big 
unmeaning shapes, the obscene figures lurking in the shadows, and only waiting for the 
darkness to come at me again!" (63). The culmination of this horror is reached when he 
finally comes face to face with the inhabitants: "You can scarce imagine how 
nauseatingly inhuman they looked-those pale, chinless faces, and great, lidless, pinkish-
grey eyes!" (64). As he weakly clambers back up the deep shaft to the bright upper-world, 
the Traveller carries with him the components of a new conceptual world to taint his 
complacent faith in his own world. 
This most striking sequence may confirm the Traveller's Marxist theory of a 
proletariat-capitalist division but it also offers physical evidence that the hierarchy is not 
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quite what it appears. On the one hand, this connection between a subterranean nonhuman 
species and the subaltern position of disenfranchised groups in contemporary England is 
clearly one ofthe benchmarks of Victorian SF, an achievement not quite equaled in 
Wells's day, even by Edward Bulwer-Lytton's The Coming Race (1871) and Samuel 
Butler's Erewhon (1872), utopian works which also explore the "submerged nation" 
theme. The success of this analogy between the fantastical and real worlds is established 
through the brief but suggestive details of a highly mechanized culture that seems to 
enslave rather than liberate the workers who operate it. While it is never explicitly spelled 
out, it is strongly implied that the Morlocks provide the Eloi with clothing and perform 
the menial tasks necessary for the luxurious society of the upper-world to run smoothly. 
The ominous "thudding" of the machines accentuates the oppressive and seemingly 
automated lifestyle of these pale grotesque creatures. On the other hand, Wells was not 
content to see the world in strictly Marxist terms since it could not account entirely for 
nature's continual modifications: the emergent nation of the Morlocks is the natural 
consequence of a subterranean eruption. Ifproto-SF authors like Bulwer-Lytton and 
Butler were satirizing the violence implied in the evolutionary "struggle for existence," 
Wells (at the prompting ofT. H. Huxley) was satirizing the beliefthat the struggle for 
existence would always favor the so-called "higher species." The larger picture in The 
Time Machine hardly convinces us of a passive aggregate of subservient labourers and 
instead emphasizes the tactical flight of a "molecular" population, "vanishing into [the] 
dark gutters and tunnels," which supply both escape routes and points of attack. The 
zoological references also furnish the idea that the Morlocks are not even human, and the 
Traveller ultimately links the "red joint" to two subsequent theories: 1) the Morlocks have 
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reversed the hierarchy and effectively rule the society composed of both lower and upper 
worlds; 2) the Morlocks and Eloi exist in a predator-prey relationship in which the 
Morlocks run the operation of society in exchange for a regular supply ofEloi meat. 
Significantly, the second theory reveals the fact that the Morlocks and Eloi are distinct 
species. This discovery means that we cannot simply call the Morlocks cannibals, for they 
seem a combination of human and animal, and require the flesh of their docile prey in 
order to survive, just as lions may feed on different species such antelopes, gazelles, or 
zebras. The grotesque symbiosis between the two species may indicate the workings of a 
capitalist supply and demand, but the "relation" is also strongly tied to the "struggle for 
existence" that has arisen out of the environmental conditions and is not simply a 
depiction of "class war. "52 It is apparent, then, that these modified folkloric personae 
subvert the system through their aberrant appetites and physical characteristics rather than 
their consciously proletariat position. 
Despite Wells's departure from the strict view of a "fair" "Good People" residing 
beneath the earth, his portrayal of a subhuman underground community that rules from 
below is in keeping with the traditional belief in the dark side ofthe fairy "character"-
the barbarian tendency of a community whose formation frequently resembled a "mass" 
or horde. How does one single out a "changeling" who is both part of a collective and 
who is, by definition, always in a state of flux, always changing? If fairy legend informs a 
52 As Paul Cantor and Peter Hufnagel argue m the1r ms1ghtful article, "The Empire of the Future: 
Impenahsm and Modermsm m H G. Wells," The Time Machme presents a "re-onentahzed" London wh1ch 
has succumbed to the same environmental pressures that d1stmgmshed the exotic locales depicted m 
1mpenahst "South Seas" narratives Wells seems to be suggestmg that "Bntlslmess may be more an 
accident of chmate than anythmg mherent m the Bntlsh natwnal character" (Cantor and Hufnagel43). 
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politically subaltern voice, it achieves this through the deformed bodies of its narrative 
agents who resist strict affiliation with either the human or fairy worlds. 
While the Traveller's accumulated descriptions demarcate the Morlocks as the 
fairy equivalent of goblins or brownies, or as the dark counterparts to the fair, elfish Eloi, 
they also emphasizes the opacity of this division: the Morlocks are, after all, frequently 
described as "white," "gray," and "creatures ofthe half-light" (The Time Machine 51), 
and their world as "indistinct" (63). I would argue, then, that the Morlocks operate as the 
"changelings" in this futuristic world and therefore as Wells's first notable articulation of 
such SF personae because the changeling was associated with the always shifting 
boundaries between individual fairy groups, and between individual classifications of 
human and fairy, human and animal. If Wells was consciously modifying the folkloric 
topos for scientific purposes, that same topos also informed his world view in a feedback 
loop that was inevitable. As I have suggested, changelings disrupt the notion of class 
divisions, given the fact that they often functioned as the intended substitutes for human 
peasant children (Jenkins 314). In other words, while they are initially presented as the 
dispossessed segment of society, they also occupy the ambiguous and shadowy comers of 
this paradisial world. If they are sensitive to light and remain largely submerged beneath 
the earth's surface, they clearly have the mobility and curiosity to cross the threshold of 
the lower and upper strata and obviously abduct individual Eloi on occasion. The 
abductees of culture have become the abductors, but the reversal leaves the two races 
utterly transformed, as the physical evidence suggests. For example, the Morlocks are 
variously described as "grayish animal[s]," "ape-like creatures," "creatures ofthe half-
light," "ghosts," "white figures" (The Time Machine 51), "human spider[s]" (53), 
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"worms," and "vermin" (58); they are also "ant-like" (72) and possess "strange large 
grayish-red eyes" and long "flaxen hair" (53). Here Wells has interspersed both gothic 
and folkloric imagery to add a certain metaphorical richness to his text, but he is also 
intent on emphasizing the Morlocks' morphological (read: analogical) relation to lower 
creatures on the evolutionary scale. 
In regards to this developing Darwinian lexicon, there are a few items to note. 
First of all, Wells's lexical shift from folktale descriptors to biological ones is more 
pronounced in his presentation of the Morlocks, and this, I would argue, indicates the 
particular sociological-or socio-biological-role of these monstrous figures. While the 
Eloi move languidly in their wispy way, the Morlocks leap about, Hyde-like, with 
ungraceful but vigorous and very purposeful energy. The Traveller's scattered 
descriptions, ranging from gothic to folkloric to biological or anthropomorphic 
references, indicate a larger portrait of a monstrous species but are in no way as definitive 
as his detailed sketch of the Eloi (The Time Machine 27). Despite his abject horror, then, 
the Traveller involuntarily gives deference to the "bleached, obscene, nocturnal Thing," 
which "was also heir to all the ages" (54). Here we can see that, as Suvin has argued, 
Wells intended to use his "powerful biological species as a rod to chastize Victorian man" 
(Suvin, Metamorphoses 209). However, in the depiction of a give-and-take relationship, 
in which the Morlocks supply labour while the Eloi supply nourishing meat, Wells posits 
these modified folkloric personae as agents of symbiosis. In a certain sense, Wells 
actually rescues the concept of "symbiosis" from the "socialistic sentiment" of what he 
calls in one of his essays "pulpit science" ("Bio-Optimism" 208), which would render the 
"harmony" of nature as simply part of God's plan, and returns it back to the evolutionary 
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context, which would reassert the sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful relations 
between God's creatures-both great and small. From a biological perspective, Wells 
demonstrates that the symbiotic relationship in nature is sometimes mutual and 
sometimes parasitic. The Morlocks are the parasites in The Time Machine, as the 
Traveller describes at one point: "These Eloi were mere fatted cattle, which the ant-like 
Morlocks preserved and preyed upon-probably saw to the breeding of' (72). But while 
they are not a passive aggregate, as the passage certainly underscores, their parasitism can 
hardly be classified as "socially exploitative," a sociological term that has been 
incorporated into contemporary science writing (see Fiegna, N. Yu, et al. 1 ). 
On the one hand, the symbiosis is natural, since it commonly occurs in nature; on 
the other hand, the symbiosis is unnatural in that the two species have apparently 
devolved from a single and probably more superior species, and therefore the parasitism 
seems wrong in some way, seems outside of nature. The Morlock-Eloi society represents 
a biological divergence that has split an entity into two: the result is that the two races are 
"disjoined segments," "the pieces of a broken social machine" (Manlove 229-30). 
Moreover, the Morlocks may not be so distinct from the Eloi, despite some of their more 
obvious physical differences. As Tuerk argues, despite the Traveller's aversion to these 
uncouth creatures, they, much like the Eloi, respond to him in "gentle ways" (521). The 
Traveller himself describes how, when he falls asleep in the loophole of the wall, he is 
"roused by a soft hand touching [his] face" (The Time Machine 62) and then, a little later 
on, how his clothes are "gently" plucked (64). We may say that the Morlocks and the Eloi 
are the necessary parts of the same conceptual persona, now split apart, segregated as a 
result of the "anxieties produced by racial and cultural intermixture" (Buchanan 34). The 
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Time Traveller's eventual war against these "nauseatingly inhuman" creatures, in defense 
of the fragile Eloi, aligns him with the Empire who could justify exploitation on the basis 
of the monstrous appearance or appetites of its subjects (Tuerk 520-21 ). In other words, 
even the Traveller's shift from sociological to biological terms has its limitations, as his 
tendencies to anthropomorphize encourage him to side with the Eloi who are, he feels, 
more "human" than the Morlocks (The Time Machine 57-58). As presented by Wells, 
then, Fairyland is arbitrarily divided into the two common colonial stereotypes of the 
"good tribe" and the "evil tribe" (Cantor and Hufnagel 38): on the one hand, the elegant, 
childish, and indolent subaltern, whose quaint culture is simply a matter of curiosity; on 
the other hand, the uncouth and atavistic subaltern, whose savage customs revolt and 
justify punitive measures, including extermination. I would suggest here that Wells was 
engaged with what Homi Bhabha has called the "forked" tongue of colonial discourse 
(Bhabha 85) which situates the "other" as almost human but "not quite" (86). As Bhabha 
elaborates, however, the repetition of such "hybrid" identity only serves to underscore the 
colonizer's failure to represent since it relies upon either an exaggerated or "partial" 
portrait of the other. The Traveller's own "hazy" narrative can only offer such a partial 
view, even while it is strongly suggested that the complete view is actually a composite 
one of a "bifurcated" persona. 
Set side by side as evolutionary models of biological advance and retreat, the 
worlds of the Eloi and the Morlock imply the third option of the Traveller's own world, 
which, according to our previous description, can complete the narration by adding the 
"absent paradigm," as Marc Angenot argues, and thereby allowing the SF-cum-folkloric 
narrative to accomplish its cognitive estrangement. As Angenot writes, the SF writer 
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"leads the reader to believe in the possibility of reconstituting consistent paradigms-
whose semantic structures are supposedly homologous to those in the fictive textual 
'world"' (13). The Traveller at least partially achieves this goal by first formulating and 
presenting a set of plausible rules, i.e., the theory of the fourth dimension, and then 
subsequently reversing expectations (oflinear time, of social progress) by offering 
another set of plausible rules, i.e., the theory of evolutionary regression or devolution. 
These paradigms are effective because they are a recognizable part of Wells's empirical 
world (in physics, biology, and so forth) and because they enclose the absent paradigms 
of time-travel and extreme biological regression: as a result ofWells's subtle 
modifications, the sociological thrust of the Eloi-Morlock episode is successful because it 
is now entirely possible, within the new SF paradigm, to imagine a future where the rich 
could become fatally indolent and the poor monstrously resentful. The Morlocks are 
horrible but they have been forced to live in horrible conditions. Cognitive estrangement 
occurs when the science-fictional world causes the reader to both identifY and shudder; 
the shock itself, that is, the subsequent reformulation of the SF paradigms offered, 
constitutes the third option, the reader's own world, which is now transformed in a 
significant way. As we have suggested, the cognitive shudder is first initiated by the 
Traveller himself who spares no affection for the Morlocks with their "pale, chinless 
faces, and great, lidless, pinkish-grey eyes." Further, the Traveller's decision to defend 
the Eloi, to invade and set fire to the Morlocks' world, may lead us to question how far 
the Morlocks are successful in their insurgence and to what degree the Traveller's 
interference will affect the outcome of the Morlock-Eloi relation. On the one hand, the 
devolution of the species has already begun and will continue with or without the 
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Traveller's help: this is what seems to be suggested by the bleak conclusion, in which, 
during his desperate escape from the Morlocks, the Traveller accidentally travels thirty 
million years into the future to find the human species entirely extinct and replaced by 
giant crabs (The Time Machine 94-97), and then, after a further leap, the organic world on 
the verge of extinction (97-99). On the other hand, the Traveller embraces the paranoid 
gothic plot in which the subterranean demons must be vanquished in order to find honour 
and to reassert manly (and in this case Victorian) values. His joyous bloody battle with 
the Morlocks, which finds these spider-monkeys nearly as helpless in a fight as the Eloi 
(84-89), reaffirms their subaltern position and effectively reverses the folktale scenario in 
which the hero defends the downtrodden and oppressed. Further, his final discovery of the 
time machine hidden inside the hollow sphinx statue, oiled and partially repaired (92), 
suggests that the Morlocks are not simply stupid brutes: despite their apparent 
inhumanity, the Morlocks possess the lion's share of intelligence in this world of 802,701 
and are therefore-ironically-the more human of these two divergent species. 
This description of cognitive estrangement, which clearly relies upon the dual 
structures of the folk narrative and the scientific investigation, can be broken down into 
the following loose formula: folk narrative+science=scientific parable. As we have 
argued, the legend is "open-ended" because it is brief(section I). All the same, the longer 
narrative structure of The Time Machine allows Wells to develop more fully the parabolic 
possibilities inherent in the legend: accordingly, Wells achieves this effect by using 
scientific "patter" but not necessarily scientific "validation." To be sure, "estrangement," 
as Suvin understands it, refers to the utopian thought of Ernst Bloch and therefore to a 
specifically Marxist or socialist paradigm (see Metamorphoses 6-7, 39, 42; Positions 34, 
190 
42, 58, 76-77). In his own way, without using these precise terms, Wells understands 
estrangement as a socialist theme, especially given the way it informs the Traveller's own 
theory of the class division. Consider, for example, the Traveller's reflection, which 
occurs before he has descended into the Morlocks' world: "Even now, does not an East-
end worker live in such artificial conditions as practically to be cut off from the natural 
surface of the earth?" (The Time Machine 56) This rhetorical question once again invites 
the Traveller's gentlemen audience, the narrator's implicit audience, and Wells's 
bourgeois readership to add in the absent paradigm: East-enders=Morlocks, ergo, 
Morlocks=East-enders. 53 Significantly, this sort of cognitive estrangement through the 
translation of a conceptual world is much more successful in The Time Machine than in 
Jekyll and Hyde, since the latter still relies so heavily on moral allegory. The Time 
Machine is perhaps the first really consistent articulation of this new narrative agent, the 
SF changeling, because it offers the most thorough exploration of the folkloric conceptual 
plane from which it acquires its "submerged nation" theme. But this is only half the story 
here, for the Traveller's descriptions of the Morlocks (perhaps more so than those of the 
Eloi) are couched not only in Marxist but in Darwinian terms. The estranging qualities of 
the scene also derive from the Traveller's discovery that a sociological and even a strict 
evolutionary theory cannot account for the unforeseen deviations and regressions of 
species, the terrible pull of cosmic forces on human agency. Wells-at least in his early 
SF thought-experiments-offers his own conceptualization of what Deleuze and Guattari 
53 As Elame Showalter argues m her artlcle, "The Apocalyptic Fables ofH G. Wells," the East end was 
strongly ahgned m the V1ctonan mmd w1th other dark and labynnthme "eastern" locales. G1ven the frammg 
dev1ce of The Time Machzne, m wh1ch the protagomst sees the future mghtmare "m the London streets," 
"the world elsewhere 1s a mghtmare proJectwn of the domestic world" (70-71 ). 
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call "geophilosophy" or the process of reterritorialization-deterritorialization": "living 
species have varied along divergent lines from intermediate forms, and [ ... ] not 
necessarily m an upward direction" ("Zoological Retrogression" 159). 
III. The Island of Dr. Moreau: the Changeling as Animal-Human Hybrid 
As a sort of thematic sequel to The Time Machine, Moreau carries on the Wellsian 
project of adapting and mod1fymg popular genres for the purpose of scientific 
speculation, but it removes itself further from the old gothic and perhaps even the newer 
"urban gothic" m its fusion of Darwinian theory and folkloric motifs. This shift, already 
apparent m the earlier work, comes in the novel's emphasis on science as the legitimate 
tool for a utopian world-creatiOn. As Bernard Bergonzi has argued, Wells's conceptual 
grafter, Moreau, is "Frankenstein-the would-be creator oflife-in a post-Darwinian 
guise" (1 08); I would suggest that he is also Jekyll-the would-be social engineer-in a 
post-Darwinian guise. 54 By evoking these two generic "mad scientists," Wells announces 
that his adaptation of the gothic "jiggery-pokery" of Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde 
will also be something new under the sun-in effect, a changeling persona of different 
stripes, a hybrid animal-human whose physiological as well as cosmetic makeover owes 
something to Darwin as well as Aesop. But while the Beast Folk of Moreau's island walk 
upright and speak, they are no mere stand-ins for human foibles, for they analogically 
present the end result of biological engineering, or the grafting of skin and bone for the 
54 Robert M Ph1lmus argues that, at least m h1s earhest draft of the story, Wells "clearly meant The Island 
of Doctor Moreau to be a goth1c mystery on the model of The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde" 
("The Satmc Amb1valence of The Island of Doctor Moreau" 2) But Wells was not content to merely 
1m1tate Stevenson, and, m h1s final draft of Moreau, he saw fit to ehmmate the "morahzmg" tone that made 
h1s early draft "appear as an allegoncal abstract10n" (6) 
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purpose of transforming mammalian morphology and physiology. For this reason, I 
would insist that the folktale and folk legend rather than the fable provide the conceptual 
plane for Wells's world-creation in Moreau. The novel certainly has elements of the 
"animal tale," as featured in European folklore: such tales focus on the "symbiotic 
relationship between man and animal in terms of their sympathetic connection" (Rohrich 
73). However, we also should recall from Briggs that fairies themselves were often 
"reputed to be [ ... ] 'spiritual animals"' ("The Fames" 175), but also that the ammal is a 
notable bifurcation of the changeling persona and a crucial vehicle for narrative modes 
like the parable. There is a sense, then, that Wells's personae in Moreau derive from 
more than one form of folk narrative. Accordingly, Wells uses a first-person narrator in 
order to present a sort of memorate or first-hand account of an adventure; but, unlike the 
Traveller, Edward Prendick, our noble protagonist, does not offer his tale as an 
illustration of a scientific theory, which would have the purpose of "controvert[ing]" 
"universally accepted" ideas (The Time Machine 1). He is, on the contrary, simply adding 
information concerning "the loss of the Lady Vain" or, to be more precise, information 
about the four men who were supposed to have perished after the shipwreck (Moreau 1 ). 
Moreover, if anything, Prendick's narrative promises to be an adventure tale, 55 which is 
all the more effective in that it conceals the shocking discovery of the island and its 
inhabitants and therefore the implied scientific parable. In terms of the previous 
description (section II), the parable "sets one thing by the side of another" for the purpose 
of altering the reader's complacent views (Suvin, Positions 142). The scientific parable, it 
55 As Deanna Kretsel has argued more recently, the "shock:mg events" mvolvmg "ammahsm" serve as "a 
kmd of antidote to ennm" (21 ), whtch, we mtght say, ts charactenstlc of other "modemtst" texts of the 
penod, mcludmg espectally Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1899). 
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was suggested above, combines an otherworldly landscape of the folk legend with a this-
worldly landscape of scientific extrapolation. Placed side-by-side, these modes do not 
replace one another but are, through the process of the narrative, altered; the narrative 
agents are, in tum, altered as a result. The brilliance of Moreau lies in its manner of not 
simply setting "man" beside "beast" (as in The Time Machine) in the form of"ironic 
balances and oppositions" (Huntington, "The Science Fiction ofH. G. Wells" 40) but of 
also narrativizing the process by which man becomes beast and vice versa. For this 
reason, the changeling represents the possibility of devolution, which runs counter to the 
progressionist trend of Victorian culture. The changeling, who analogically points to the 
"accidental" nature of evolution, the possibility of sudden, unforeseen alterations in the 
human organism, and the close proximity of the human and animal kingdoms, is perhaps 
the conceptual persona par excellence in significant (meaning cognitively estranging) 
Victorian SF. 
Through the medium of a scientific parable disguised as an adventure, Moreau 
explores the sociological application of scientific theories regarding the evolutionary links 
between humans and animals. In his adaptation of the "man-animal" transformation motif 
(Rohrich 73-92), Wells reinforces the notion that folk narratives depict the very process 
of human evolution, from an ancient and legendary species to a modem one. These 
evolutionary links are subtly suggested through the first five chapters (Moreau 1-16) in 
which Prendick describes how, as the lone survivor of the three men confined to a dinghy, 
he was eventually picked up by a vessel, the Ipecacuanha, containing a drunken 
belligerent captain, a jovial but mysterious trader named Montgomery, and his "black-
faced," "misshapen" companion (6). Here we are presented with more than one "stage" of 
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evolutionary progress, although the remaining chapters work towards undermining the 
belief in progressive biological development. When Prendick arrives on the unnamed 
island and finally meets the enigmatic doctor, he is presented with a scientific lexicon that 
begins to name the horrors that he witnesses. Based on the progressionist premise that 
humans are higher on the evolutionary scale (see Chapter 1, section IV), Dr. Moreau 
proposes to use human-derived moral principles to condition these "lower types"-
pumas, monkeys, apes, dogs, boars, and others. Of course, the great proliferation of 
"laws" in human society urges Moreau to apply the same moral structure in the animal 
kingdom, using the relative success of the institution of "the Law" as a justification for its 
success in any and all situations. While the bemused narrator, Prendick, condemns the 
vivisection of the animals, their mutilation is on a level with the branding that all humans 
experience under the force of the Law. And the Law, of course, demands the complete 
obedience of the bodies it has claimed under its jurisprudence. Each and every humanized 
animal has the mark of Moreau: 
His is the House of Pain. 
His is the Hand that makes. 
His is the Hand that wounds. 
His is the Hand that heals. (43) 
Moreau is an exoticized Dr. Jekyll, a creator, witch-doctor, and "hollow-man" who 
anticipates the fetid horrors of Conrad's "heart of darkness" (Cantor and Hufnagel 53): 
his is the hand that initiates the metamorphosis of the animal, and that moulds and 
fashions new changelings in this wild vegetable world. Moreau's creations may appear to 
be fabulous monstrosities, fancies conjured up by the overwrought narrator, Prendick, and 
yet the doctor's scientific extrapolations allow these horrific creations to walk upright: his 
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program of genetic mutation is genuine, anticipated for centuries in British folk narrative 
but re-imagined through the persona of a modem "fairy doctor" whose "cure" is perhaps 
no less brutal than those depicted in folk legends and sensational changeling "cases." 
Moreau succeeds in his experiments by grafting the human onto the inhuman, a 
manifestation ofWells's own "sui generis game of 'possible-impossible"' in which "a 
plausible explanation of strange, almost miraculous events [ ... ] is immediately retracted" 
(Chemysheva 36). This juxtaposition between "exotic" and "quotidian" aspects indicates 
once again the workings of a "two-world system," already implied by the generic 
intermixture of folk narrative and science. At the first peak of the novel's rising action, 
where Prendick escapes the claustrophobic world of the biological station only to find 
himself subject to the insane ceremonies of the Beast Folk's cave world, Wells has begun 
to work out a Darwinian "struggle for existence" between the human scientists and the 
island's quasi-human inhabitants whose proliferations and aberrations make them as 
unpredictable and changeable as the entities in "The Caerlaverock Changeling" or "The 
Speckled Bull." 
As an indication of the novel's folkloric whimsicality, both Montgomery and 
Moreau enunciate Wells's game of "possible-impossible" by teasing the beleaguered 
Prendick with partial truths, successfully occulting the island's horrific experiments until 
Prendick takes the initiative to uncover them. Having already caught sight of 
Montgomery's disfigured "black-faced" companion, he is then followed through the 
forest by "bestial-looking creatures" who "gibber in unison" (Moreau 29). When he later 
demands to know what these "things" are, Montgomery goads him: "From your account 
[ ... ]I'm thinking it was a bogie" (35). As Briggs describes in The Personnel of 
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Fairyland, a "bogle" is the Scottish version ofthe "boggart," which itself is a 
"mischievous type ofbrownie" (193). Ifwe cross-reference this once again, we discover 
that the brownie itself is a diminutive but industrious "ragged and shaggy" hobgoblin, 
attached usually to a specific locale and, in most cases, a particular household (194). This 
rare explicit reference in Moreau indicates Wells's subtle adaptation of the folktale form, 
as the Beast Folk version of the bogle derives from a specific locale, becomes attached to 
a "household" of sorts, but is also artificially induced to perform these tasks. All the 
same, ifPrendick's folkloric interpretation is wrong, so is his conventional evolutionary 
one: "I did not know yet how far they were from the human heritage I ascribed to them" 
(Moreau 40). In a sequence that parabolically echoes The Time Machine, Prendick 
attempts to clarify his muddled perceptions of the Beast Folk's heritage by descending 
into their lair. Unlike the Traveller's descent, Prendick's is inspired by a truly speculative 
search for an alternative to the static upper world, ruled by the fanatical and inhumane 
scientist Moreau and his own heritage of "mad" extrapolation. This means that the 
"submerged nation" of the Beast Folk may very well be not so much a parallel of the 
Morlocks' subterranean world but possibly the "absent paradigm" or third option 
suggested in the Morlock/Eloi opposition. Consider the following passage, which 
highlights through color-patterns, geological and physiological detail some fundamental 
differences between the subterranean abodes found in each text: 
The path coiled down abruptly into a narrow ravine between two tumbled and 
knotty masses of blackish scoriae. Into this we plunged. 
It was extremely dark, this passage, after the blinding sunlight reflected 
from the sulphurous ground. Its walls grew steep, and approached one another. 
Blotches of green and crimson drifted across my eyes. My conductor stopped 
suddenly. "Home," said he, and I stood in a floor of a chasm that was at first 
absolutely dark to me. I heard some strange noises, and thrust the knuckles of my 
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left hand into my eyes. I became aware of a disagreeable odour like that of a 
monkey's cage ill-cleaned. Beyond, the rock opened again upon a gradual slope of 
sunlit greenery, and on either hand the light smote down through a narrow channel 
into the central gloom. ( 41) 
While it is true that the Morlocks' realm obfuscates and blurs the boundary lines between 
the upper and lower worlds through its pattern of grays and shadowed light, the pathway 
described here is full of greens and reds and even "sunlit greenery," suggesting the 
organic quality of their "home" and its healthy animal vitality. Absent here are the dreary 
"machines," replaced in this passage by "blackish scoriae," or volcanic rock, which 
promise natural eruptions, both geological and metamorphic. As a way of confirming this 
transformation from human to animal kingdom, Prendick instinctively knuckles his eyes, 
a distinctive animal gesture that appropriately leads to the next olfactory image of the 
monkey's cage. 
These preliminary proceedings are followed by yet another passage that seems to 
offer a curious parallel to the Morlock episode. As Prendick describes: "Then something 
cold touched my hand. I started violently, and saw close to me a dim pinkish thing, 
looking more like a flayed child than anything else in the world" (Moreau 41 ). Compare 
this to the Traveller's shrill description of the "nauseatingly inhuman" Morlocks who are 
also described as pale and pink (The Time Machine 64): instead of moving us 
retrogressively from the human to animal (from Eloi to Morlock), Prendick goes in the 
opposite direction, humanizing this creature and comparing it to a tortured child. Despite 
their monstrous appearances, the Beast Folk evoke images of humanity and, in particular, 
the liminal states between organisms and personae. The sloth-like creature that becomes 
his "conductor" into this strange underworld is, conceptually, comparable to the 
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changeling and its related personae, the child, the animal, and the monster, for it is a 
composite of all three entities and, for all Prendick knows, a "bogie" (Moreau 35) or 
"spiritual animal" (Briggs, "Fairies" 175). Similarly, the other "horrible cripples" he 
meets during the frenzied recitation of Moreau's Laws (Moreau 43) possess, in their own 
fashion, elements of the infantile human and the beast, and the supernatural aura of 
monstrosity. And herein lies Wells's own sympathy and satire: that the beast of the jungle 
could find humanity while the human in the jungle would simultaneously lose It. This 
scientific-cum-folkloric satire is carried much further in the subsequent sequence in 
which Prendick finds himself caught up in the chanting of the Laws, which, while 
indicative of the Beast Folk's current enslavement to an ideological ideal, exposes the 
ludicrous claims that these creatures are indeed "men" and therefore questions Prendick's 
own humanity. Transformed, at least for the moment, Prendick flees not from the insane 
and bestial ritual (43-45), which after all displays the variety of the animal kingdom and 
its aberrant crossover into the human one, but from the "dark" and "awful" figure of 
Moreau himself ( 45), the prophet of biological uniformity. 
As the first of his many "reversions," Prendick ultimately returns to the sphere of 
his human hosts, having failed to find pleasure in his brief alliance with the animal-
human hybrids. The chapter entitled "Doctor Moreau Explains" (Moreau 51-60) 
analogically halts the pace of the narrative and effectively puts a stop to Prendick's 
rebellion: he re-emerges from the submerged bestial nation. 56 However, fuelled as it is by 
56 It may also be worth menhonmg here that, as Bergonzi has noted (1 04), this chapter was ongmally 
pubhshed by Wells as an essay, entitled "The Limits oflndividual Plasticity," and may very well mdicate 
Wells's own shift towards the artificial process of conditiomng human evolutiOn. Indeed, from a certam 
perspective, Moreau presents the utopian possibilities ofbwlogical engmeenng as an alternative to the 
199 
both a Darwinian and folkloric sense ofbiological wonder, there are still more eruptions 
to occur in a text that seems to be constructed as an artful game of deterritorialization-
retemtorializat10n. As Moreau explains to Prendick, in his description ofhis three-part 
procedure, "There is building up as well as breakmg down and changmg" (Moreau 52). 
His rational explanation of the typical operation is more lucid and cognitively plausible 
than anything offered in either Frankenstein or Jekyll and Hyde, although Prendick is all 
the more horrified by the Imphcatwns: "Monsters manufactured!" he exclmms (53). 
Moreau responds by legitimizing the "operations of those mediaeval practitioners who 
made dwarfs and beggar cripples and show-monsters," although it was not uncommon for 
Victorian practitioners to display such changelings in "circus sideshows" (Silver 61 ). 
Further, Moreau's monstrosities correspond to the actual monsters studied by scientists in 
Wells's day: the "real-life cases offeral humans" were additiOnal examples of"animal-
human hybrid[ s ]" (Kreisel 23) and, therefore, late-Victorian changelings. While 
Frankenstem succeeds in creating a veritable sideshow freak, Jekyll manages to conjure 
up a half-domesticated ape-man whose form is still that of a dwarf and cripple. 57 Both 
amateur anatomist and amateur chemist are, after all, using primitive and "impure" 
science in an age that demands radical change to compete with industrial progress. 
envtronmentalmfluence on human soctety as deptcted m The Time Machzne But tfwe acknowledge that 
such a phtlosophtcal shtft prectpttated m Wells's programmatic utoptan thtnklng, we should also remember 
that there was clearly a time-lag m the transttlon from sczentific proposztzon to artzstzc or phzlosophzcal 
conceptualzzatzon, and that even the enthustastlc sctence ofvtvtsectlon and bwlogtcal engmeenng ts 
countered by the parabolic structure of Moreau. 
57 It ts apparent that Wells ts deliberately msertmg Moreau mto thts genealogy of "mad sctence" but 
specifically for the purpose of demonstratmg the "sharp break brought about by Darwtmsm and the 
emergence ofbto-tdeologies" (Gomel416). Moreover, Moreau perfects the work of VIctor Frankenstem by 
usmg lzvzng subJects wtth active mmds and funchomng organs, and perfects the work of Dr Jekyll by 
"bummg" out the savage mstmcts of the ammal-man and tempenng the former "Impunties" of the 
expenment with the latest chemical transfusiOns Agam these are descnbed with plausible techmcal detml 
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Moreover, despite the sophistication of the conceptual worlds, Shelley's and Stevenson's 
personae are in some ways still of the order of the codified changeling, which, as a sign of 
its link to medical as well as religious doctrine, reveals its ancestry at every tum: in the 
monster's initial desire for "relations" and in his infiltration of the domestic realm; in 
Hyde's "dwarf'-like stature and in his monstrous "birth" out of the body of a human 
parent. 
What Moreau has accomplished, on the other hand, is a new race of 
metamorphosed animals, using his advanced knowledge of comparative anatomy to 
"transplant tissue from one part of an animal to another or from one animal to another, to 
alter its chemical reactions and methods of growth, to modify the articulations of its 
limbs, and indeed to change it in its most intimate structure" (Moreau 53). Anticipating a 
work like OlafStapledon's Sirius (1944), in which the embryo of a female dog is 
genetically altered in order to create a hybrid species that has a human conscience, Wells 
establishes a new conceptualization of the folkloric "transformation," which led to a new 
resurgence in the more "cognitively"-based SF works of the day (Chemysheva 39-47). As 
Chemysheva argues, "the very thought of man's transformation into animal, or vice 
versa, stems not only from Darwin's theory of evolution, but also from the most ancient 
folktale metamorphoses" (38). As it was suggested in the previous chapter, the changeling 
motif is linked to folkloric, scientific, and novelistic enunciations of metamorphosis: as 
presented in Moreau, the changeling persona re-emerges in an entirely new form (just as 
"The Speckled Bull" stands out among most folk narrative renderings of the changeling 
motif), no longer exhibiting its usual fairy- or dwarf-like appearance, no longer associated 
with a distinct "domestic" realm, and no longer obsessed with discovering the origins of 
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its birth. At the same time, the cognitive (or empirical) world of these Beast Men is 
estranged through the introduction of a metamorphosis, the effects of which are still 
unforeseen. However, as a way of maintaining control over this shifting paradigm, 
Moreau's parley with his most "dictatorial guest" (Moreau 51) is designed to sell this 
island of vivisected changelings, and, in a certain manner, to promote the enlightened 
practices of biological engineering and demystify the shadowy and fantastical nature of 
the apparently exotic locale. The good doctor's lecture (51-60) also has the purpose of 
liberating the imagination from the shackles of traditional science (Chemysheva 39) and 
demonstrating the utopian possibilities of vivisection. Despite the frightening implications 
of Moreau's genetic manipulation, he is playing up the Wellsian "sui generis game of 
'possible-impossible'" and daring his "materialist" guest (Moreau 54) to scoff at the 
wonders that his fantastic science is now capable of producing. 
In a language refined by the lectures ofT. H. Huxley, Wells convinces us that 1) 
Moreau's experiments are entirely plausible within the realm of the current field of 
biology, chemistry, and comparative anatomy, and that 2) Moreau's experiments have 
both a "rational" and a "utopian" basis. After all, Moreau's project is to pursue "the 
extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape" (Moreau 56), a pursuit that evokes both the 
scientific impetus as well as the folkloric/fantastical possibilities of metamorphosis. On 
the other hand, like his conceptual predecessors Frankenstein and Jekyll, Moreau wants a 
"controlled experiment," unchecked by nature's tendency to vary or "revert."58 As Elana 
Gomel argues, however, unlike Frankenstein, who clearly has some sympathy towards his 
58 I would reiterate my earher remark that, at least m thts early scientific romance, Wells was still testmg 
out his scientific proposthons. 
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monstrous creation, Moreau "is brutally indifferent to the Beast Folk," and instead of 
striving to conceptualize the "split psyche," like his Romantic heir, Moreau intends to 
fashion a new self that is "unified, impermeable, [and] supreme" (416). Moreau 
ultimately takes the "religious" view that animal instincts require purging, and that the 
violent tendencies which characterize thousands of years ofhuman evolution are 
ultimately evil and should be cleaned away as one might remove a stain. But it is the good 
intentions of this mad scientist that facilitate the mad lurchings and aberrant perversions 
of the Beast Folk. The "seat of the emotions" (Moreau 58), which psychologists and 
philosophers might identify as the portion of the human mind that first articulates its 
sense of freedom, is, for Moreau, an evil tide that requires suppression-"a strange hidden 
reservoir [that will] burst suddenly and inundate the whole being of the creature with 
anger, hate, or fear" (58) if it is not first burned out by vivisection (59). Moreover, by 
manipulating the "struggle for existence," Moreau attempts to establish man's dominance 
over the animal kingdom, consequently delimiting the "cognitive horizon" that would 
allow "truly other relationships" (Suvin, Positions 55) in the form of animal-men. 
However, despite the heinous brutality of Moreau's vivisections, they help to foster 
hybrid relationships between humans and animals, and powerful alliances the likes of 
which we see in the remarkable folktale "The Speckled Bull." Moreau also has the added 
feature of a first-person narrator who is not a title character, and who is, in fact, often at 
odds with the eponymous protagonist. Prendick's narrative perspective and moral 
position, which shifts between disgust and fascinated sympathy, reinforce the conflict of 
Wells's "two-world" system and, through the ironic twists that comprise the tale's 
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denouement, the possibility ofbridging (Huntington, "The Science Fiction of H. G. 
Wells" 39) these seemingly dichotomous environments. 
As we follow Prendick's perambulations from the biological station to the dense 
forest to the volcanic cavern of the Beast Folk, we are able to gauge the degree to which 
the submerged nation has altered the two-world structure by blurring the boundaries 
between civilization and savagery. But unlike the non-state nation (see Bertelsen), the 
Beast Folk's world is not completely bound by sovereignty or autonomy; despite 
Moreau's best efforts to hypnotise them (Moreau 61), they maintain fairly loose alliances 
with both other beasts and with the humans who have given them their guttural speech. If 
Moreau has appeared to impose his will on the wild jungle, the jungle in tum is constantly 
encroaching upon the scientific enterprise so that a "station" is hardly distinguishable 
from a "den": they are both outcrops of the natural environment, burrows for scientist and 
subject alike. More so than the Morlocks, who emerge from their subterranean abode 
during the nocturnal hours and then only infrequently, the Beast Folk are both wild 
indigenes and members of the island project. For example, M'ling, a bear-dog-ox hybrid 
(63), is Montgomery's chief assistant but is only artificially separated from the other 
Beast Folk who inhabit dens while he occupies a "kennel." Prendick insists on classifying 
the inhabitants as "inhuman monsters" (60) in an exaggerated attempt to maintain the 
biological distance from these creatures; but the proximity of the two worlds remains, as 
indicated in the environment itself. As an echo of the earlier sequence in which the 
protagonist ritually descends into the folktale underworld, Prendick learns from 
Montgomery that the entire island is of "volcanic origin" and that, on occasion, "a faint 
quiver of earthquake [could] be sensible" ( 61 ). Again, there is a suggestion that both 
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geological and biological eruptions are inevitable as the Beast Folk are "perpetually 
breaking" the Laws that Moreau has tried to implant in their minds. These subterranean 
and subaltern eruptions are not only contagious among the Beast Folk themselves but also 
among the human inhabitants as well. Indeed, Prendick himself discovers his 
morphological relation to some of the Beast Folk: "my eye became habituated to their 
forms, and at last I even fell in with their persuasion that my own long thighs were 
ungainly" (62). This "persuasion," which we might call Houynhnhnmesque since, in this 
instance, a human patterns himself after a talking beast (as in Gulliver's Travels), 
underscores also the "law of sympathy" between humans and animals, as featured in 
folktales (Frazer 12; Rohrich 57-60, 64-67, 73). Prendick repeats that he has truly become 
"habituated" to the Folk, adding that he is even "affected" by Montgomery's sympathy 
towards them (Moreau 63). Montgomery himself has become so habituated to the altered 
beasts that he no longer recognizes nor likes "men." The degree to which Prendick is 
"affected" by such sentiments becomes clear as the story reaches its climax, but it is 
apparent that he has, in the eyes of the Beast Folk themselves, undergone certain changes 
since he was picked up by the Ipecacuanha; for he is twice identified as another beast-
man (40, 65). 
It may be accurate to say that Prendick constantly "reverts" in his attitude towards 
the Beast Folk-at times sympathizing with their plight, and seeing something human in 
the "gleam" of their animal eyes (Moreau 72), at other times shivering in cold disgust at 
their "horrible caricature" (75) of the human form. He begins his sojourn on the island in 
complete ignorance, and condemns the experiments he knows nothing about; yet, while 
he at first objects to Moreau's rationalization of the project as a scientific mission of 
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enlightenment (51-60), he comes to understand the necessity of Moreau's use of force and 
of the bodily branding of the "Law" (64-72). In many ways, then, Prendick exhibits the 
"animal" fear of pain that Moreau wishes to extinguish from the human form: this at 
times "dictatorial guest" cowers in his first hovel when he is set adrift by the mad captain 
of the Ipecacuanha and is forced to swim ashore, then escapes to the forest; hides in 
fright from the Beast Folk, then boldly shoots three or four of them "between the eyes" 
(73, 81, 90, 99)-certainly a gesture of cold, rational, and brutal human superiority, but in 
a basic, primordial sense, a tactical expression of the animal survival instinct (which the 
Beast Folk themselves "remember" in their eventual reversions). As Moreau himself 
seems to suggest, one of the things that distinguish men from animals is the presence of 
claws in the latter: "The human shape I can get now," he explains to Prendick, "almost 
with ease, so that it is lithe and graceful, or thick and strong; but often there is trouble 
with the hands and claws-painful things that I dare not shape too freely" (58). And yet, 
one of the marked developments in human evolution is the acquiring of weapons, which, 
from Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, can be understood as a reterritorialization: the 
organism relies upon (or falls back on) objects in order to carry out an operation. Even 
more so than the animal, the human reverts by resorting to tools that do not derive from 
the body; the animal, on the other hand, evolves by carrying out its operations through its 
basic locomotion and its ability to wrest itself from the earth, testifying to the resilient 
nature of duration. In any event, both animal and hominid, through their linked 
evolutionary struggles, allow us to see that the "more we study the nature of time, the 
more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the 
continual elaboration of the absolutely new" (Bergson 11 ). It is the follow-up 
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deterritorializations that both emancipate and animalize the human. In one of his 
optimistic reversions, after the Leopard Man has been killed for disobeying Moreau, 
Prendick takes the Darwinian view of the beautiful complexity of the "tangled bank" 
(Darwin, Origin 648-49) and all of its reterritorializations and deterritorializations. 
Despite the "grossness" and "grotesqueness" of the Beast Men's forms, Prendick 
confesses, "I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole 
interplay of instinct, reason, and fate in its simplest form" (Moreau 73-74). In this brief 
moment of sympathetic contemplation, the narrator can respect the Beast Folk's vicious 
will to survive despite-or because of-their physical deformities. 
After both Moreau and Montgomery are killed, during the bloody "revolt" of the 
Beast Folk (Moreau 75-87), the narrator's sympathies shift again. To be sure, we are 
more likely to believe in Prendick's horror and rationalize his violent and terribly 
effective mode of self-defence-the revolver, which he uses to kill several Beast Folk, 
including the remaining organisms left in the laboratory (82). The "struggle" here is not 
an allegorical one, but resembles in some way the God-less and uncontrolled environment 
of Shelley's "sea ofice" (Aldiss, Billion Year Spree 29) and, of course, the deceptively 
automated world of the Morlocks. As David Y. Hughes has argued, "To contemplate the 
cosmopoietic energy [of the 'garden'] is edifying and beautiful. To be sentiently involved 
in it-as in fact man is-may well be a nightmare of pain and suffering" (50). We feel 
Prendick's horror and pain when he is stranded in his dinghy and forced to contemplate 
cannibalism (Moreau 1-3), when he is picked up and then stranded again by the 
Ipecacuanha (14-17), when he is forced to shoot the Beast Men, and when Montgomery, 
in his own reversion, burns the boats to prevent anyone from escaping the island (88). We 
207 
also feel the Beast Folk's pain through Prendick's description-the puma whose screams 
can be heard throughout the island (25-26, 34), not to mention Moreau's other 
"mistakes." Perhaps one of the more compelling aspects of Jekyll and Hyde is the way in 
which the eponymous characters are linked through the shared experience of pain: each 
metamorphosis-from Jekyll to Hyde, and from Hyde back to Jekyll-produces the 
"most racking pains": "a grinding in the bones, deadly nausea, and a horror of the spirit 
that cannot be exceeded at the hour of birth or death" (Jekyll and Hyde 57). Similarly, the 
Beast Folk's metamorphosis from animal to man and back again produces a painful 
dislocation, which is linked to parallel scenes where Prendick, Montgomery, and Moreau 
are each forced to "trespass" the very same laws that supposedly demarcate the "human" 
(Huntington, The Logic of Fantasy 65). Of course, like Frankenstein, Moreau trespasses 
the boundary between human and "beast" in the instant of his "monstrous" experiment: 
he assumes the role-and inhabits the textual/extra-textual world-of the "primitive 
underclass" whose "barbarous tests" (changeling exorcisms-cf. Silver 66) are duplicated 
in his own attempt to exorcize the animal from the man (as Jekyll tries to extricate his 
own animal nature). Ultimately, however, in the aftermath of their revolt (Moreau 88), 
Prendick claims that the Beast Folk have been punished for giving into the instincts that 
constitute their being; while for him this statement is a survival tactic, in the larger 
scheme of things, his reference to (and reverence for) the "Laws" reaffirms the religious 
authority that Moreau established in his House of Pain. Prendick gains power insofar as 
he is able to reduce the Beast Folk to a menagerie gone wild. Like Moreau, and like 
Jekyll, Prendick jeopardizes the "new social relation" in every instance that he reaffirms 
the singularity of the "human": his dismissal of Montgomery for his animal behaviour 
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("You've made a beast of yourself' [83 ]), for example, constitutes an "exorcism" in its 
own right. 
Within the spectrum ofutopian fiction since the Renaissance, Wells's work 
operates as a tension between bleak nihilism (Swift's Gulliver's Travels [1726]) or 
ideological recuperation (Bellamy's Looking Backward [1888]), especially in Moreau 
where the Morlockian revolt of the lower orders, as presented in the "far future" sequence 
of The Time Machine, comes to fruition in the "near future" sequence ofWells's later 
text. The narrator Prendick foreshadows this revolt with his own ambivalent statement 
about Homo sapiens: "But I asked him [Moreau] why he had taken the human form as a 
model. There seemed to me then, and there still seems to me now, a strange wickedness 
in that choice" (Moreau 54). What exactly is so wicked about this act? Is it that these 
inelegant creatures are being tortured with the promise of a higher evolution, or is it that 
they are perverted by law-loving humanity? Prendick answers this question for us later 
on, when he notes that the Beast Folk were in the "shackles of humanity" (74), perhaps 
one ofhis more philosophically enlightened moments: the human mind itself, he suggests, 
is a torture device for the animal and creates the utmost horror for the hybrid Beast Folk. 
Wells presents for his readers a potential changeling revolution in which the monstrous 
creations of the civilized laboratories tum the adaptations ("amputation, tongue-cutting, 
excisions" [52]) to their own ends, biting the "Hand" that "makes" and "wounds" and 
"heals." The moment of their revolt is stimulated by their reversion back to their animal 
instincts-a reversion, I would argue, that is more properly a transformation and a 
metamorphosis that allows the Beast Folk to escape the shackle of humanity. However, 
Wells's Swiftian conclusion that man's animal nature needs to be purged, since it has the 
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capacity to foul his "shining soul" (104), devolves Moreau's experiments into ridiculous 
and dangerous scientific games, like the fruitless novelties of the Grand Academy of 
Lagado. On another plane, Prendick fails to see that the Frankensteinian mistakes 
(M'ling, Hyaena-Swine, Leopard Man, the Hairy Grey Thing) serve the purpose of 
new-if monstrous-social relationships, and that the Hyde-like reversions provide the 
physical means to resist oppressive affiliations and "family resemblances." 
Prendick's final escape from the island drives home for the protagonist the 
necessity to "bum out" the animal, and his initial sympathy for the Beast Folk turns to 
revulsion for the abominable creations that they are. However, while he has returned to 
his original and familiar environment, Prendick has not escaped the nightmare of 
Moreau's island, and we are given every reason to believe that its horrors ("estranging" 
novums that do not, however, come to fruition) are firmly imprinted on the narrator's 
mind as he concludes his tale. We do not forget the words of Moreau's most fascinating 
(if unofficial) Beast Man, Montgomery: "We can't massacre the lot,-can we? I suppose 
that's what your humanity would suggest? ... But they'll change. They are sure to 
change" (Moreau 83). Already, and now again, Wells uses his conceptual personae to 
evoke and disarticulate (and, in fact, distintegrate) the "human" by suggesting multiple 
notions of that category: whatever Prendick has assumed about Montgomery's 
"humanity," in this moment (in which Prendick himself could easily be shot between the 
eyes), Montgomery proves to be the most humane. And the other Beast Folk will change, 
as changelings do, despite Moreau's (or Prendick's) best efforts to civilize them. For this 
reason, I would disagree with Michael Pinsky's argument that "Moreau creates the 
population, providing them with subject status (making them 'human'), even as he 
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exercises his skill at vivisection upon them, diminishing their singularity" (63; my 
emphases). In a certain sense, Moreau attempts to codify a population (Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 52), which, he feels, is collectively susceptible to the 
precise cuts of his scalpel; but he in no way gives them "subject status" since their 
reversion ultimately refuses subjectivity and the anthropomorphic imposition of the 
"human." Moreover, while it is true, as Gomel also suggests, that Moreau attempts to 
"diminish singularity," he actually succeeds in proliferating new divergences of single 
orgamsms. 
As a way of both concluding this section and reiterating my argument since 
Chapter 2, I would note that divergence from space or place, from institution or 
affiliation, cannot lead ultimately to freedom if the struggle itself is abandoned; that is, 
the formation of alliances and packs in particular may come about as an attempt to flee-
and therefore findfreedom-from some confining organization (political, familial, or 
otherwise) but may end up leading to the mobilization of new ideologies. If the excessive 
violence of the French Revolution led Shelley to conceive of her monster as an 
embodiment of the revolutionary masses run amok (Suvin, Metamorphoses 128), that 
same original upheaval provided one of the "divine sparks" through which the monster 
could enunciate the "radical rhapsody," as Suvin calls it, of fraternity and, as I would see 
it, the unfettered alliance between disparate groups. The monster is certainly a 
revolutionary but he is not an obsessed militant: the monster only gradually turns to 
violence, and even then commits his heinous acts as an (albeit savage) expression of his 
will to survive and hopefully reproduce. The case of Mr. Hyde suggests, on the one hand, 
the puerile tricks of the most banal changeling type, and on the other, the ingenious 
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subterfuge of the most revolutionary changeling type, as seen in Shelley's creation. Yet, 
because Jekyll's experiment is rooted in an attempt to purge the animal from himself, his 
changeling remains (at least in the space of Stevenson's brief narrative) an ape-like 
conjuration with no future. Nevertheless, in the case of both the monster and Mr. Hyde, 
the individual entity threatens because he deforms the uniformity of thought and 
consequently doubles the original articulation-of morality, of truth, of anything singular 
or universal (see Chapter 2, Conclusion). Of course, with small exception (Old De 
Lacey's brief sympathy with the monster, Jekyll's original "great interest" in Hyde), the 
missing ingredient in each case is the successful formation of an alliance or a series of 
alliances. Moreau may be understood as an initial attempt to remedy this situation, even 
while Wells shrewdly understood the consequences in his day of coding populations of 
rebels and revolutionaries, and of courting a "revolution of the body," which would bring 
about a "New Man" only at the expense of genocide (Gomel 394-95). Moreover, despite 
(or because of) the fact that Moreau has assumed, and quite noticeably perfected, the role 
of the inventor-scientist-adventurer, before which both Frankenstein and Jekyll must bow 
with reverence, Moreau's Beast Men are the nightmarish manifestation of Frankenstein's 
fears that the engineered monster might succeed in proliferating itself and forming a 
whole community of mimic-men. The key advancement for Moreau is the (at least 
initially) successful creation of pseudo-religious "Laws," through which the Beast Men 
become a frightening menace of controlled savagery. Prendick rightly regards the 
attempted conversion as a "wicked" enterprise, and we must view his position as 
comparable to that of the Traveller who witnesses with horror the economic devolution of 
the future in which the beast-like Morlocks (a fully independent tribal community of 
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spider-monkeys) feed on the fey-like Eloi (a dependent commune of delicate "little 
people"). In other words, the far future upside-down world may very well begin with 
Moreau's near future island of vivisected men. Animal savagery, once used for survival, 
has now been directed towards moral perfection: had the experiment not failed, had they 
not reverted, the Beast Men may have decided that it was morally good to annihilate those 
who were their inferiors. At the peak of Moreau's power, then, the original biological 
alliance of beast and man has been reterritorialized as a binding affiliation, with Moreau 
at the head of the family. In the end, however, the Beast Folk's reversion unsettles 
Moreau's hierarchical position and deterritorializes the controlled violence into a vital 
struggle for survival once again. 
Conclusion 
The notion of a "changed" or "changeable" organism certainly dominates all 
manner of folklore, SF, and fantasy, but finds a connective tissue in Frankenstein, Jekyll 
and Hyde, The Time Machine, and Moreau through the conceptual persona of the 
changeling whose characteristics are a tendency towards variation as well as a 
proliferation of perversity and "contagion." Indeed, as Rohrich has shown, the motif of 
"contagious magic," in which a human maintains an intimate connection with an animal 
through some "part" of it (saliva, hair, blood), is widely diffused in numerous European 
folk traditions (58-60). While sexual alliances between the species rarely occur in such 
tales, since the animal ally frequently turns out to be "really" a human after all (83), the 
recurrence of the contagious connection indicates a traditional fascination in a conceptual 
"bond" between the kingdoms (75). Perhaps best illustrated in Wells's Beast Men, whose 
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hybridized forms would have shocked the bourgeois public, changeling "perversity" (as 
argued and reiterated in the final section of Chapter 1) is "fruitful" even while it does not 
reproduce itself. Alliances may be (and very frequently involve) sexual relations, but 
usually lead to hybridized and therefore sterile progeny. The point of these relations is not 
to proliferate from a single and uniform source but to advance spatially, to find new 
relations in new territories, to leave no offspring, and to move on to other territories, 
repeating the same procedure, but always with different results (for who knows who one 
might meet if one keeps moving?). 
But the changeling has "features that [ ... ] give rise to other personae" (Deleuze 
and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 76): the subsequent authors that I explore in Chapters 
4 (Karel Capek) and 5 (OlafStapledon) evoke the changeling motifthrough the familiar 
personae of the lonely/ambivalent "symbiote" (Capek's The War with the Newts [1936]) 
and the deformed/special child (Stapledon's Odd John [1935]). Writing in a post-
Wellsian era, these authors (among a larger cluster that includes Ray Bradbury, Arthur C. 
Clarke, Theodore Sturgeon, John Wyndham, James Blish, Philip K. Dick, and Octavia E. 
Butler) nevertheless resume the exploration of "new social relations," as Suvin has 
described, now in the context of the inter-war years and the Nazi rise to power (Capek), 
and WWII and the consequences of controlled genetic mutation and atomic power 
(Stapledon). Such social relations, again following the paradigm established in Wells, are 
often the manifestations of "thought-experiments," and are usually "tested" on a small 
community, sometimes artificially constructed, sometimes located on an unmapped island 
(a scenario played out in nearly all the subsequent novels under consideration). The 
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exploration for new social relations, then, seems to have reached a new intensity in Wells 
and in the "submerged nation" motif. 
Throughout his writing career Wells continued to revisit what has now been 
identified as the folkloric motif of changelingism, or the hybridization of the human 
species through contact with an otherworldly or extra-terrestrial species. IfWells was 
concerned with fleshing out a new Fairyland, he was also intent on giving plausible shape 
to biological experiments aided by the ever-advancing field of genetics, which had begun 
to blossom especially in the 1930s. In anticipation of this direction in the Wellsian 
oeuvre, the third epigraph for this chapter comes from a much later work of Wells, when 
he was writing his programmatic utopias and when the changeling persona had been 
subsumed in order to fulfill the role of the socially and biologically engineered human. To 
be sure, Star-Begotten (1937) constitutes Wells's most direct exploration of the 
changeling persona, for the word "changeling" appears in at least two places (31, 171-72) 
and functions more obliquely throughout the work as a concept for societal change, hence 
its subtitle, A Biological Fantasia. For example, in the second chapter, which is entitled 
"Mr. Davis Learns about Cosmic Rays," Davis imagines that the Martians themselves 
have already planned a programme of genetic mutation: "Suppose they say up there: 
'Let's start varying and modifying life on the earth. Let's change it'" (49). Here, Wells 
has resorted to discussions of science-fictional themes and has almost completely 
abandoned the artistic vehicle of the scientific romance. Admittedly, the work does not 
present Wells at his best, and I would agree with Bergonzi, Hillegas, Suvin, and 
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Huntington59 that, especially in The Food of the Gods (1904) and perhaps as early as 
When the Sleeper Wakes (1899), Wells had begun to reduce his early scientific 
speculations into more rigid extrapolations of the perfect society. And the changeling 
motif, presented in Star-Begotten in almost mawkish fashion ("Joe! You aren't by any 
chance a sort of fairy changeling? Not-not one of these Martians?" [ 1 71 ]), seems to 
have been reduced to the role of the children's fairy tale, now co-opted once again by 
bourgeois society as a convenient representation of a fetishized otherness. Indeed, this 
new sentimental investment in fairy-tale and folktale figurations seems to have grown in 
proportion to Wells's abandonment of the scientific romance form, written mostly 
between 1895 and 1901. The Sea Lady (1902), "Mr. Skelmersdale in Fairyland" (1906), 
and "The Door in the Wall" ( 1906), for example, employ a folk motif (the discovery of a 
mermaid, the discovery of Fairyland or an otherworldly Elysium) as an embarrassing or 
nostalgic intrusion of the adult world. At the same time, tales likes these reflect the degree 
to which Wells was growing restless with his own society's game of translating the 
mysterious into the "commonplace" and the "matter of fact," and reducing it to "a matter 
of authentic and reasonable motives and of sound solid sentimentality" (The Sea Lady 
41). In his oft-quoted preface to Seven Famous Novels (1933), republished later asH G. 
Wells Science Fiction Treasury (1979), Wells complained: "It becomes a bore doing 
imaginative books that do not touch imaginations, and at length one stops planning them" 
("Preface" x). Such an attitude suggests that the author's later engagement with fairy tale 
or folktale themes may have been part of a larger satirical project, aimed at reproducing 
59 See Bergonz1, The Early H G Wells, pp. 139, 142; Htllegas, The Future As Nzghtmare H G Wells and 
the Antz-utopzans, pp 56-57, Suvm, Metamorphoses ofSczence Fzctwn, pp. 218-19; and Huntmgton, 
"Utoptan and Antl-Utoptan Logtc: H G. Wells and hts Successors," p. 122. 
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such sentimental figures as the Victorian mermaid (The Sea Lady), the genteel Fairy Lady 
("Mr. Skelmersdale in Fairyland"), the otherworldly "Playmate" ("The Door in the 
Wall"), and the "starry changeling" (Star-Begotten) in order to expose the dreary course 
of modem progress. Each of these figures constitute domesticated versions of the more 
frightening or at least ambivalent figures encountered in works like The Time Machine, 
Moreau, The War of the Worlds (1898), and The First Men in the Moon (1901): it is a 
measure of the philosophical distance between the novels of the 1890s and those of the 
1930s that the Martians of The War of the Worlds reappear in Star-Begotten as 
disembodied voices ( 49), as benevolent autocrats for the perfect society. Returning to 
Wells's preface again, I would insist that, even in his less speculative and more cynical 
novels, Wells was still at his game of domesticating "the impossible" ("Preface" viii), 
only that now, in a work like Star-Begotten, he was demonstrating the more rigidly 
defined parameters of his domesticating strategies. If British society could not be altered 
through the slow and painful process of an undirected evolution, as presented in The Time 
Machine, Wells was satisfied to suggest some possible methods for inducing a more rapid 
and therefore artificial evolutionary modification. 
As Wells was writing Star-Begotten a younger generation of European SF writers 
was already exploring the reemergence of changelings as a co-opted labour force and as 
the "little men" of fascist dictatorships. 60 But if authors like Eugene Zamyatin in Russia, 
60 Antlcipatmg Gomel's analysis of the "bwlogical subhme" mMoreau, Kenneth Sherman argues that 
"Moreau's Island IS a totahtarian state and Moreau himself a fascist; his values seem based upon the Nazi 
perverswn ofNietzsche's Ubermensch phllosophy" (871). Elsewhere Sherman suggests that Moreau IS 
"most comparable to his heirs-those SS doctors m the concentratwn camps who performed bizarre and 
needless expenments on Innocent victims" (872) Perhaps 1t IS more accurate to say that Wells ant1c1pates 
these trends, as Hitler's fascism only surfaced m the 1930s. In any event, I would support Sherman's 
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Karel Capek in Czechoslovakia, Olaf Stapledon, Aldous Huxley, and George Orwell in 
England were "attacking the Wellsian utopia," they were also "greatly indebted to it since 
much of their attack consist[ ed] of parody and caricature" (Hillegas 57). Of these five 
authors, two in particular-Capek and Stapledon-were eager to show readers and critics 
of the 1930s that Wells's "messianic delusion," as H. L. Mencken called it (qtd. in 
Hillegas 56, 83), should not diminish the power ofhis early scientific romances. 
Accordmgly, Chapters 4 and 5 d1scuss particular works by Capek and Stapledon which 
expand upon Wells's earliest SF models, motifs, and radical novelties, that is, his central 
novum of challenging the supremacy of Homo sapiens and speculating on the advantages 
of cross-breeding or mutating that same species. Moreover, we can go back to Wells's 
earlier works to discover the first traces of his sociological theories, the early speculative 
use of folk narrative or what Suvin has called Wells's "folk taxonomy" (Metamorphoses 
233), where the changeling still has the capacity to shock the bourgeois world and where 
it seems more likely to successfully insinuate itself into late Victorian society as both a 
new and undirected force of evolutionary divergence; that is, before Wells had given up 
on the notion of an undirected and open-ended evolutionary process. I would offer Star-
Begotten, then, as the most direct piece of evidence that Wells was active in fashioning an 
"SF changeling," even while the novel (and its suggestive passages) also reinforce for the 
attentive reader the fact that Wells had invested much, if not in the term "changeling" at 
least in the concept of biological "change," mutation, and the ethics of artificially altering 
the structure of Homo sapiens in many of his best works. 
general view that, m Moreau, "Wells has provided us with an astomshmgly exact and detmled analysis of 
the fascistic personality" (871). 
218 
This ethical tension, I have argued, receives its fullest and richest articulation in 
the scientific parables The Time Machine and Moreau and specifically in the human 
representatives and story tellers, the Time Traveller and Prendick, which have been 
placed here side by side. While Prendick's attitude towards the Beast Folk is divided 
between sympathy and revulsion, the Traveller's attitude remains sympathetic to the 
indolent Eloi and even finds a certain perverse pleasure in the pummeling strokes of his 
crowbar, which kill and maim several of the Morlocks during his final battle. One factor 
here might be the distance involved in each case: while Prendick witnesses the beast-
human mutation in process, the Traveller witnesses a post-mutation scenario in which the 
bestial side of humanity is most prominent, and he can only speculate as to the conditions 
that brought this change about. As an indication that Wells was working through his neo-
Darwinian paradigm over the course of the two works, the second work reinforces both 
the bestial nature of humanity as well as the difficulty of defining boundaries between the 
human and animal kingdoms; after all, the most remarkable metamorphosis occurs in the 
personage ofMontgomery, perhaps Wells's most fascinating "changeling": ifPrendick 
himself falls back on the conclusion that Moreau's experiment was a noble enterprise 
after all, and that man should in fact attempt to extricate his animal instincts, Montgomery 
exhibits the most extraordinary "character development" in that he effectively works on 
both sides of the struggle, operating on the one hand as Moreau's hired henchman, and on 
the other as a champion of the Beast Folk's cause. In contrast, the Traveller is almost 
immediately seduced by the bourgeois dream of the paradisial utopia of the Eloi, and, 
despite his strong sense that they have devolved at least in intelligence and in the animal 
struggle that characterizes his own nineteenth-century society, he becomes the sole 
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champion of their passive "struggle" with the Morlocks. In effect, the Traveller destroys a 
more bestial version of the human type that he actually admires;61 but he also exposes his 
own revulsion at the lower classes by first invading their subterranean world and later 
setting fire to it. In this ironic twist of the paradise-hell scenario, it is the noble-hearted 
human, and not the demonic pseudo-human, that manifests destruction: the Traveller 
himselfbrings the fire down to the Morlocks' world and, in effect, transforms it into a 
living hell. The Traveller's initial analysis of the two-world situation (to which he still 
adheres after he discovers the truth about the prey-predator relationship) "represents [ ... ] 
a romantic and pessimistic variant of orthodox Marxist thought; the implications of the 
class-war are accepted but the possibility of the successful proletarian revolution 
establishing a classless society is excluded" (Bergonzi 52). To be sure, Prendick is not 
given the choice of either paradise or hell (as much as the Traveller realizes that the two 
boundaries in the world of802,701 might soon become blurred): he is, from the start, 
thrust into a world of pain and bestiality, and he is forced to accept the struggle for 
existence as the only philosophy oflife. The difference, I would now insist, is that the 
struggle for life on Moreau's island unsettles the dichotomy that is so rigid in the two-
world structure of the Eloi/Morlocks; it is therefore more variegated and suggests some of 
the finer moments of Darwin's evolutionary philosophy, including nature's beautiful 
adaptations and the possibilities of unforeseen variations in the human-animal structure. If 
we can say that The Time Machine presents a shock to the bourgeois fantasy of a linear 
evolutionary progression towards physical perfection, Moreau presents a series of shocks, 
61 The greatest irony is that he even admits that it is "inhuman[ ... ] to want to go killing one's own 
descendents!" (The Time Machine 78). 
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which prolong the nightmare of a life struggle by refusing to provide for the protagonist 
an easy escape route-such as a time-travelling device. Once again, Moreau presents a 
more advanced stage ofWells's neo-Darwinian thought since it exchanges the gothic 
terror of the bestial reversion for the folkloric wonder of the unexplained and potentially 
liberating transformation. 
In the end, however, each work needs the other, for the beautiful adaptations and 
wondrous reversions of Moreau could only be appreciated in light of the grotesque 
cannibalisms and routine indolence of The Time Machine. As I have suggested, Wells 
goes further than either Shelley or Stevenson (and especially the latter) by introducing a 
nightmarish reversal of the bourgeois fantasy of control-by-diagnosis and control-by-
exorcism, placing his conceptual personae within the believable, if novel, scenario of two 
"submerged nations": a futuristic exoticized London and a biological station, each 
overtaken by monstrous "experiments." While Dr. Moreau's explorations of new 
knowledge and new science heartlessly expend the lives or livelihood of numerous 
animals, the good doctor's experimental hybridization ofhuman and animal leads to an 
unforeseen and potentially revolutionary alliance between two species, and in that 
alliance, a new conceptualization of the folkloric changeling. Of the three novelists, then, 
Wells offers the best possibility for a "new social relation," which means for me, the 
development of a community of unlike peoples, animals, organisms in which cooperation 
between disparate groups rather than dominance of one over the other becomes the 
organizing principle. A reading such as mine entertains the possibility that folk 
narratives, and particularly their residual presence in SF, comment upon this-worldly and 
not only otherworldly alliances, including especially the often troublesome relations 
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between the colonized and the colonizers (Silver 57) or between non-state nations and 
Nation States. Such a reading, moreover, allows us to discover the otherworldly within 
the mundane, the "submerged nation" within the visible one. 
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Chapter 4-Karel Capek's "Little Men": Changelings for a New Fairyland or 
"New Men" for a Technotopia? 
Meet the new boss 
Same as the old boss 
-The Who, "Won't Get Fooled Again" 
Fascist mentality is the mentality of the subjugated "little man" who craves 
authority and rebels against it at the same time. It is not by accident that all fascist 
dictators stem from the milieu of the little reactionary man. The captains of 
industry and the feudal militarist make use of this social fact for their own 
purposes. A mechanistic authoritarian civilization only reaps, in the form of 
fascism, from the little, suppressed man what for hundreds of years it has sown in 
the masses of little, suppressed individuals in the form of mysticism, top-sergeant 
mentality and automatism. This little man has only too well learned the way of the 
big man and now gives it back, enlarged and distorted. The Fascist is the top-
sergeant type in the vast army of our sick civilization. 
-Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism xi 
This one's optimistic 
This one went to market 
This one just came out of the swamp 
This one dropped a payload 
Fodder for the animals 
Living on an animal farm 
-Radiohead, "Optimistic" 
Introduction 
Considered today to be one of the most significant Czech writers of the first half 
ofthe twentieth century, Karel Capek was the author of numerous short stories and 
essays, several plays, and a handful of novels; his reputation, however, still rests on the 
futuristic melodrama R. U R. (Rossum 's Universal Robots), which was written in 1920 
and first staged in 1922, and the satirical, dystopian novel War with the Newts, which was 
written in 1936, just two years before his death. While he is usually placed within the 
history of science fiction-somewhere between H. G. Wells and the so-called "Golden 
Age" of American SF in the 1940s (see, for example, Scholes and Rabkin 28-31)-Capek 
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had a wider field of interest that included philosophy, journalism, and his own Eastern 
European folk traditions. Indeed, Capek's life-long interest in traditional oral storytelling 
(Dolezel17) and his fascination with the magical transformations of the fairytale (for 
example, Nine Fairy Tales and One More Thrown in for Good Measure, written with his 
brother Josef) are abundantly apparent in his depiction of artificial humans brought to life 
in a factory (R. U R.) and salamanders who learn to walk upright and speak human 
languages (War with the Newts). It seems likely that R. U R. in particular was partly 
inspired by the Jewish/Czech figure of the "golem," the clay statue brought to life through 
a magic ritual. Capek's use of such folktale elements also places him among the ranks of 
other SF writers (Shelley, Stevenson, Wells) who have employed folkloric concepts and 
conceptual personae. Moreover, Capek's oeuvre suggests an intellectual relationship 
between Eastern and Western Europe. On the one hand, Capek's plays and novels were a 
distillation of his own Eastern European background, shaped continuously by the 
tumultuous events such as the Nazi rise to power and its threat to the liberty ofhis 
Czechoslovakia. As Darko Suvin has suggested, "some of [Capek's] most stubborn 
values and prejudices can be traced back to traditional peasant confidence in the 
immediately available, secure, everyday things and relationships of the little people, as 
opposed to the hubris of the hustling and bustling modem industry and the swift changes 
it brings about" (Metamorphoses of Science Fiction 270). On the other hand, Capek's 
examination of the exploitation and co-option of the "little people" in his society 
indicated his familiarity with the diminutive and grotesque figures ofWells's The Time 
Machine and The Island of Dr. Moreau. Indeed, in both R. U R. and War with the Newts, 
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Capek explores the Wellsian nightmare in which bourgeois society finds itself in the role 
of passive prey of the monstrous labouring classes. 
Like his predecessors, Capek creates personae that appear to be further variations 
on the changeling persona (Robots, Newts), combining as he does the folk motifs of 
metamorphosis with the "hard" scientific facts about evolution and biological mutation. 
These personae form the basis for a philosophical investigation of the mechanisms of 
evolution and invention, and modem economic and political systems. As suggested in the 
three previous chapters, the changeling has oscillated between ideological recuperation 
and radical reinvention, in each case embodying the most frightful visions of traditional 
class and racial anxieties. On the one hand, the changeling has served the purpose of 
edifying "man" (Jekyll and Hyde); on the other, he has threatened the dominance of 
"man" (Frankenstein and The Island of Dr. Moreau). But "reversion" does not always 
constitute recuperation, especially given the fact that deformities, monstrosities, and 
mutations frequently disrupt notions oflinearity and controlled progress-the sought-
after mechanisms of any dominant State. Moreover, Capek's Robots and Newts explore 
the dynamics of burgeoning political ideologies-Communism, National Socialism, and 
global capitalism-and the possibility of new social relations, that is, in particular, the 
development of a community of unlike peoples, animals, organisms in which cooperation 
between disparate groups rather than dominance of one over the other becomes the 
organizing principle. The persistence of the changeling, or at least its constituent parts 
(attributes, significations, enunciations), is bound up with the plebeian upheavals and 
moments of discontent in the past, which, as Raymond Williams has rightly noted, are the 
residual elements of critique and protest struggling to emerge as utopian responses to 
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persisting societal ills (126). As Suvin has argued, "paraliterature" has thrived as the 
"popular, 'low,' or plebeian production of various times, particularly since the Industrial 
Revolution" (Metamorphoses vii). Whatever can be said ofSuvin's objections to folk 
narrative (Chapter 3, section 1), this genre has had an important role in the formation of 
SF both within and outside the academy. Moreover, if, as Suvin argues, SF "has always 
been wedded to a hope of finding in the unknown the ideal environment, tribe, state, 
intelligence, or other aspect of the Supreme Good (or to a fear of and revulsion from its 
contrary)" (5), the folktale has contributed much to SF since it first conceptualised the 
Otherworlds-the Elysiums, Lands of the Dead, and Fairylands-that the later genre has 
since re-configured. 
For the Victorians, there was a correlation between the anarchical behavior of the 
fairies, as depicted in art and literature (Silver 162), and that ofthe discontented 
underclass, which quickly lost ground to the rising middle class in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Another view of folktales and legends suggests a utopian striving 
towards a better world and a fairer economic system: while Fairyland itself presented the 
impossible fantasy of perpetual bliss, echoed in the Terrestrial or Earthly Paradises of late 
Victorian SF (see Suvin, Metamorphoses 170-204), its inhabitants (the Good People) 
brought the message of this land and, through the exchange of their progeny, the 
possibility of communion between worlds. The new slumps and depressions throughout 
Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, as well as the new technological devastations ofthe first 
quarter of the twentieth century, brought the old liberal vision of equality to a crisis point, 
and subsequently made both "fairy" and utopian literature somewhat suspect. Capek's 
writings ofthe 1920s respond to the dystopian scenarios of factory labour and the search 
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for an "absolute" in a period of increasing religious doubt (see not only R. U R. but also 
The Factory of the Absolute, also translated as The Absolute at Large [1922], and 
Krakatit, also titled An Atomic Phantasy [ 1924 ]). His habitual employment of the folk 
motifs of metamorphosis and symbiosis respond to the upheavals of a new plebeian 
segment, the mimic-men who would replace the exhausted labourers or "little men" and 
who would be employed by the "middle men," the businessmen and factory managers of 
the hyper-industrial age. These "middle men" exploit the weak, the deformed, and the 
unaffiliated-in short, the changelings of their society. Capek's middle men-the 
engineers and managers who run the universal Robot production in R. U R., the business 
tycoons who exploit the salamanders in War with the Newts-have, in a sense, supplanted 
the roles of the "mad scientist" so prevalent in Shelley, Stevenson, and Wells. In terms of 
their "utopian" vision, they surpass all of these Romantic and Victorian scientists and 
conjurers, focused as they are on exploiting as far as possible the radical novelty (Robots, 
Newts), first conceptualized in the realm of folk narrative, for the purpose of mass-
producing a race of pseudo-humans. 
The next two sections offer an elaboration of these issues, focusing in particular 
on Capek's exploration ofthe radical novelty and ofthe metamorphoses (evolution) of 
humankind. In the first section on R. U R. I consider the issue of scientific and 
technological innovation and its ability/failure to transform an already degraded society. 
In twentieth-century SF, and first in Capek's works, changelings emerge as tacticians, 
incorporated as they often are into the labour force and the military: here we have another 
key evolutionary leap in which changelings are not simply driven out but assume 
significant positions in society. In the next section I consider the inevitable problems of 
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such recruitment, or co-option, as it occurs in War with the Newts, and the overwhelming 
force of the "mass movement"-the original molecular aggregate that becomes absorbed 
as an apparatus ofthe State. In the form of political critique and satire, a form and style 
that Capek uses to great effect, the changeling appears in reterritorialized form both as a 
manipulated tool of fascism (as developed in Italy and Germany) and as an original 
menace (Nazism) that was nurtured rather than rejected. Perhaps in the spirit of 
Nietzsche, Capek explores the ways in which class and racial deformities of the "httle 
man" lead to a powerful and obsessive ressentiment. In Capek, then, changelings (Robots 
or Newts) are both empowering and enslaving conceptual personae, enunciating the 
beginning ofthe "Unnatural Pseudo-Man" and the end of"Natural Man" (Suvin, 
Metamorphoses 270). 
I. R. U R.: the Changeling as Automated Human 
While it is true that Capek's failure to find an "Absolute" amid the ash and smoke 
and drudgery of modem life had led to a "discovery of a sympathy for man" (Harkins 62), 
it also led to a discovery of man's petty and exploitative nature. R. U R. is Capek's major 
theatrical contribution to modem SF and his first major attempt to answer Swift's 
question, "What is Man?"62 Part of Capek's answer comes in his introduction ofthe word 
"robot," which was first coined by his brother Josef as robota, meaning "servitude, forced 
62 I acknowledge Darko Suvm's excellent histoncal analysis mMetamorphoses ofSczence Fzctwn, which, 
m the second part of the book (and through some eight chapters), demonstrates the connective tissue 
between Swift's Gulhver's Travels (1726), Shelley's Frankenstem (1818), Wells's The Island of Dr 
Moreau (1896), and Capek's satmcal masterpiece War wah the Newts (1936) I add to this hst R U R. 
(pubhshed some fifteen years before the latter novel) m order to suggest that the play was an early attempt 
to address Swift's questiOn, and to contemplate the role that Yahoos, monsters, and Beast-Men of all kinds 
have had to play m the great prulosoprucal questions of modem Western society. 
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labour," and rab, meaning "slave."63 From one perspective, robots are what humans had 
become by the end ofWWI-a massively mobilized work force and war machine subject 
to the big "powers" that now ruled the world. From another perspective, the robot is a 
conceptual persona, the necessary "agent" in the movement of an author's thought 
(De leuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 64-65), exploring in particular the operations 
of the labouring classes (the mechanism of modern labour and of the automated human) 
and the possibilities of optimal social relations (the use of speed and the creation of 
intensities for the purpose of finding "lines of flight" [Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 65] in 
the machinic assemblage or modern mechanized society). Capek's exploration of these 
conflicting perspectives adds an important dimension to our previous discussion of the 
changeling persona, which, like the Robot, is an imitation human, or organism consisting 
of both human and nonhuman attributes, promising (for better or worse) an improvement 
on Homo sapiens. Before discussing Capek's play in detail, it seems appropriate for the 
moment to consider the twentieth-century exploration of Swift's question, especially as it 
related specifically to contemporary concerns with the burgeoning field of eugenics and 
biological engineering. 
In the previous century, Wells had restated Swift's question in evolutionary terms. 
As Robert Philmus and David Hughes argue in their discussion ofWells's developing 
scientific thought, after his cycle of scientific romances in the 1890s "he ceased to 
speculate in biological terms of how man became man or will become any other entity, 
and turned instead to cultural evolution, which he labelled 'The Acquired Factor"' 
(Philmus and Hughes 184-85). For Wells, as for Stevenson before him, humans possessed 
63 See the entry for "robot" in the online OED. 
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a "dual nature," but the two sides-the "polar twins," as Jekyll calls them (Stevenson, 
Jekyll and Hyde 56)-were not "good" and "evil" but rather the "inherited" and 
"acquired" (Wells, "Human Evolution, An Artificial Process" 217). 64 The tension was 
therefore between natural selection and "reasoned thought," as Wells would argue in 
"Human Evolution, An Artificial Process," an essay published in the same year as 
Moreau. The personae that enunciate this tension are the "natural" man and the 
"artificial" man, and Wells was quickly losmg fatth in the future of the former when 
"reversion" could mean the sullying of man's "shining soul" (Moreau 104 ). Moreover, if 
the "speculative" approach to human history (as employed in the scientific romances) 
valued the open-ended scenario in which humans could work out their evolutionary future 
in unrestricted fashion, then Wells, especially by the early 1900s, felt that it should be 
replaced by the "extrapolative" approach of the programmatic utopia in which biological 
change is induced rather than simply nurtured. "[M]an-making," Wells now felt, "was a 
human enterprise rather than a natural process" (Philmus and Hughes 186). So it is, then, 
that Capek's play about "artificial" humans speculates on the consequences of instituting 
the Wellsian programmatic utopia in twentieth-century European society: "man-making" 
turns out to be frighteningly simple. 
If Capek was evoking Wells in his portrayal of automated humans, he was also 
evoking Shelley in his focus on the sublime aspect of the body and its relation to the 
unknown forces of nature. In particular, Capek's pseudo-humans are presented as the by-
products of a "mad" science invested in engineering a replacement for the primitive 
64 Deanna Kreisel draws attention to this particular focus m Wells's thought m her Illummatmg article, 
"Wolf Children and Automata: Bestiality and Boredom at Home and Abroad" (27). 
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human animal. But as Elana Gomel has shown, the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century interest in constructing supermen had a "logical" and "consistent" investment in 
the science of "self-transformation" ( 40 1-02). Eugenics, or the "science of human 
breeding" ( 401 ), may be understood as the most efficient method for coding a population 
since, at least in theory, the splitting and branching of single organisms is not only 
controlled by the eugenicist but also contained. In such a scenario, which we must 
differentiate from that described in Frankenstein, Jekyll and Hyde, and even Moreau, the 
deforming, doubling, and multiplying processes (Chapter 2, Conclusion) are absolutely 
intentional, planned, and a necessary part of the experiment. The botched superman is, 
therefore, no Frankensteinian mistake but rather a sublime horror, a species of the 
"biological sublime" that is the main ingredient for the "factories of pain" (Gomel404) 
constructed in Auschwitz and the Russian Gulags during and after WWII. To be sure, 
evolutionary theory announced the scientific subversion of religion; but, as Gomel 
demonstrates, in the case of some eugenics programs, the god of religion was simply 
replaced by a deity of pure science. As she states: "The biological sublime [was] an 
attempt to harness the sweeping changes inaugurated by evolutionary biology to a 
particular modality of subjectivity" (398; my emphasis). As both a monstrous divergence 
of the human genetic structure and a programmed "substitute" for a human infant, the 
changeling enunciates such a "modality": the consistency of folk legends suggests that, 
while the changeling figure may be unforeseen by the human family, it is likely 
engineered by the Good People themselves. 
But the similarities between the "fairy economy" and eugenics are limited when 
we clarify the meaning of this word "engineer," for it relates specifically to controlled 
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experiments and planned, protracted results rather than contingent operations that are 
usually impossible to control. If the subterranean species featured in folk legends institute 
a "program of genetic mutation," as suggested in Chapter 1, they do so for the purpose of 
increasing species intermixture and the possibility of future relations between the upper 
and lower worlds, which tum out to be analogical to both geological and social strata, as 
suggested in Chapter 3. There is no sense that such a program intends to create a new 
dominant species, and where there is pain, there is also the beauty of unexpected 
alliances; if the family is shocked by the intrusion of a changeling, the changeling's 
parents might be equally shocked when it is, on occasion, nurtured and cared for rather 
than burned, starved, or butchered. We cannot say the same for "negative eugenics," 
which, as instituted by the Nazis in the 1930s, was organized on the principle of 
eliminating the "unfit" (Gomel401). To be sure, the true accounts of changeling "cases" 
demonstrate the human capacity for sadism, but then so do the true accounts of colonial 
occupations in which the "savages" who believe in fairies and other "superstitions" are 
eliminated for being deemed "unfit." The changeling enables an impasse in which the 
pre-planned scenario is shattered by the intrusion of a monstrosity; but the "New Man," 
which enunciated the "idealized image of self' in the wake ofWWI (394), intrudes only 
to engineer monsters-and then to shatter them as part of the fascist "revolution of the 
body." 
Gomel's portrait ofthe "biological sublime," which was the offspring of"fin-de-
siecle discourses of biology" (395), suggests a terribly bleak future for the "artificial" 
human, already encountered in Shelley, Stevenson, and Wells. As she argues, where the 
eugenicists' intention was to create supermen, the result was the production of "pitiful 
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monsters whose only function [was] to suffer" (401). However, I would argue here that, 
particularly in twentieth-century SF, the changeling becomes the antidote for the "New 
Man," the "scientific Ubermensch" (394). The disfigured changeling, a composite 
persona of child, monster, and animal, rejects the ideology of uniformity inherent in 
fascism. But, then, we should not be surprised by this reemergence of folkloric personae, 
for the folk legend is a virtual breeding ground for "bifurcations" of all kinds and a 
residual expression of subaltern discontent. The human's "dual nature" turns out to be the 
central focus of changeling legends, which have always urged its readers or listeners to 
wonder to what degree our actions are inherited or acquired and therefore to what degree 
we are "natural" or "artificial." 
The question of what constitutes the "human" and the "nonhuman" in the Robot 
is, of course, part of the drama of R. U R. The play opens with the arrival of the 
President's daughter, Helena Glory, who visits the factory ofRossum's Universal Robots 
with the hidden motive of inciting the Robots to rebellion. The factory's general manager, 
Harry Domin, offers a guided tour of the plant, explains the history of the two Rossums, 
including Rossum Sr.'s "chemical synthesis to imitate the living matter known as 
protoplasm" (R. U R. 4), introduces her to the other managers of the plant (Dr. Gall, Mr. 
Fabry, Dr. Hallemeier, Mr. Alquist, and Consul Busman), and pontificates on the utopian 
possibilities of universal Robot labour. When she reveals her intentions (she is a member 
of the "Human League"), the men laugh at the idea that the Robots would ever revolt 
since, as Hallemeier, the Head of the Institute for Psychological Training, says: "They've 
no will of their own" (R. U R. 14). Act II is set ten years later after Helena has married 
Domin and settled into her life on the island. Reflecting something of Capek's experience 
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and fascination with the journalism of his day, the dialogue that ensues between Helena, 
her maid N ana, and the managers of the plant includes fragmented references and 
recitations from newspapers about the Robots and their role as law enforcement officers 
during labour disputes and strikes, and ultimately about their rumored national 
organization. Disgusted by the unending production of Robot labour, which she identifies 
as the cause ofthe world's new era of strife, Helena bums old Rossum's manuscript 
containing the formula for the creation of new Robots. Confirming Helena's fears, it is 
discovered that the Robots have armed themselves: proclaiming "man" as the enemy and 
declaring a pogrom on all of humankind, the Robots commandeer the Ultima, the ship 
that was originally intended to protect Helena, and surround the factory. Act III brings the 
play to its climax. First, Dr. Gall, Head of the Physiological and Experimental 
Department, reveals that he had, under the request of Helena, "changed" the Robots in 
some way, and that this change (which allowed them to experience "irritability" [41]) 
must be the reason for their revolt and for their hatred of humankind. Following this, the 
managers discover that they cannot use Rossum's Robot formula as a bargaining ploy 
since Helena has burned the manuscript, and hereafter follows a series of tragic paeans to 
"man." Lastly, the Robots storm the factory and kill all but Alquist who, as an architect, 
"works with his hands like the Robots" ( 49). The Epilogue details the events of one year 
later when Alquist-for all intents and purposes, the "last man"-has settled into his role 
as a human advisor and technician for the new Robot race. The Robots have discovered 
that, without the crucial details of the Rossum manuscript, they cannot reproduce 
themselves. After all, as Domin had first explained to Helena, the Robots were only built 
to last for twenty years, after which time they could easily be replaced by new ones. Now 
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without the manuscript, after humankind has been all but extinguished, Alquist must 
resort to dissecting the Robots to discover the source of their existence-a task that he has 
no stomach for. 
Unlike either Frankenstein or Moreau, which begin with the travel narrative that 
has been a staple of SF since Poe and Swift, Capek's play is notable for its "semi-
domestic" atmosphere, especially in the first two acts, and the overall "macabre farce" 
(Naughton 75) in which the traditional elements of melodrama blend unevenly with the 
paraliterary elements of utopian SF. This narrative strategy, which we might identify as a 
characteristically modernist one, provides an effective way of satirizing the naively 
romantic perceptions of the inventor and of the capitalist enterprise of mass production 
and automation. The first sequence of the first act is filled with general manager Harry 
Domin's bombastic declamations to Helena about the Rossum legacy and his reverent 
descriptions of the "secret process" of Robot manufacture (R. U R. 2)-a comic interlude 
that is heightened by the fact that Domin has no "aptitude for dates" (Bengels, "'Read 
History': Dehumanization in Karel Capek's R. UR" 14), no accurate historical 
knowledge, and therefore no real sense of the upheaval that such an industry will create. 
Indeed, even ten years later (Acts II and III), when the Robots are politicized, armed, and 
when they have surrounded the factory, Domin and most of the other managers seem 
surprised by the rebellion of these mimic humans and their ability to organize so 
effectively. (While it is true that the men know about the Robot rebellion, since the 
newspapers give reports on the events every day [Act II], they fall back on their original 
belief that the Robots could either be controlled or eradicated if the need arose.) It is 
ironic, then, that, early on, Domin disparages "Old Rossum" as a "fearful materialist" (5) 
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when his engineer son has not the ability to see in his successes the possible creation of a 
menace. To be sure, Old Rossum, whose attempt at an "artificial dog" turns into a "sort of 
stunted calf' ( 4 ), is a parodic nod to Shelley whose Frankenstein was himself something 
of a materialist and the creator of a botched superman. However, as part of the satire (or 
"macabre farce"), Domin just assumes that newer is better and that the "physiological 
horrors" (5) of the father would not be visited upon the son. John D. Naughton has argued 
that "Capek portrays the danger that man's mventlveness linked to materialist economic 
imperatives presents to his very survival as a species" (73). I would add that Capek also 
satinzes the ways in which creativity IS reduced to utility or what Wells had called the 
"acquired factor," and, in an anticipation of SF's ghettoization in the pulp magazine 
mdustry of the later 1920s and 1930s, the ways m which utopian critique IS appropriated 
for profit. 65 
Like the Robots themselves-these "machinic assemblages" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 88) of the late machine age-the history ofR. U. R. and of 
the two Rossums in particular has been "sewn or mixed together" (R. U R. 4). Domin 
suggests as much when he states: "What the school books say about the united efforts of 
65 Hugo Gemsback's Amazzng Storzes, launched m 1926, offered a type offictwn that was consciOusly 
"sctentific," hence Gemsback's cumbersome neologtsm "sctentifiction," whtch had bnef populanty before 
gtvmg way to "sctence fictwn" m the late 1920s The magazme placed great emphasts on tales that featured 
sctentific mventwns of the future and that helped to populanze sctence. Tills edt tonal preference helped 
foster the "gadget story" and, often as a consequence, sctence-fictwnal "technolatry" (Anderson, "The 
SCience" 218) and SF of very hmtted aesthetic and cogmtlve ment In The Poettcs ofSctence Ftctwn 
(2000), Peter Stockwell explores the (often narrow and confinmg) dtmenswns of "pulpstyle" (76-1 06), 
notmg how the penny-a-word payment m the 1930s forced pulp wnters to tum out as many stones a month 
as they could and, to mamtam thetr populanty wtth edt tors and sometimes fickle fans, very few stones that 
devtated from the norm. As a result, many later SF wnters and cntlcs clatm, the genre was not allowed to 
flounsh on tts own, cut off as 1t was from the hterary mamstream SF was, m effect, ghett01zed (Ashley 58) 
m tts hmtted role as propaganda for technology For a luctd and entertammg dtscusswn of the Gemsback 
era, see Mtke Ashley's mformatlve book, The Ttme Machmes The Story of the Sctence-Ftctwn Pulp 
Magazznesfrom the Begmmng to 1950 (2000) 
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the two great Rossums is all a fairy tale" (5). In his typically regurgitated style, Domin 
never stops to clarify whether what he is about to relate is itself the school book "fairy 
tale" or the truth, at least as he has been told. And, of course, here lies the (ironic and thus 
satirical) point: the history of the Robots' origin, ofthe Rossum family, and even of 
humanity is carelessly and inaccurately represented, often without even the contrived 
planning of the typical (literary) fairy tale. As part of Capek's skilled scripting, it seems 
as though the characters/actors are unaware of their part in either the ridiculous 
melodrama or the dystopian fiction. Domin continues in this fashion: 
They [the Rossums] used to have dreadful rows. The old atheist hadn't the 
slightest conception of industrial matters, and the end of it was that young Rossum 
shut him up in some laboratory or other and let him fritter the time away with his 
monstrosities, while he himself started on the business from an engineer's point of 
view. Old Rossum cursed him and before he died he managed to botch up two 
physiological horrors. Then one day they found him dead in the laboratory. And 
that's his whole story. (5) 
If this is not a fairy tale, it is certainly the stuff of gothic fiction, with its prominent motif 
of parental/offspring discord, curses on future generations, and family secrets being shut 
away (in a laboratory rather than the attic). We can only assume that both Rossums have 
since passed on, even while this is never confirmed; the "future" here is as fuzzy as the 
past. In Domin's narrative we also discover the legacy of SF and the three literary 
descendents ofthe Rossums: Frankenstein, as the materialist and creator of monstrosities; 
Jekyll, as the chemist shut away, eventually found dead (in altered form) in his 
laboratory; and Moreau, as the more skilled engineer and indeed the successor of these 
older bunglers. Unlike Moreau, young Rossum has made the profession of creating 
pseudo-humans respectable, expanding the small island operation into a world-wide 
enterprise; but like Moreau, young Rossum fails to see what dangers he is creating for his 
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own world. Like the robots, the humans in Capek's drama are "rootless, 'without history'; 
unlike the robots, who have never had a past, however, man simply can't be bothered to 
remember his traditions" (Bengels, "'Read History"' 13). 
From the business perspective, Rossum's Robots are perfected humans, 
"simplified" in their anatomy (R. U R. 5) and superior in intellect (6); from the spiritual 
side of things, the Robots are either "fallen" creatures, as Nana (Helena's maid) claims 
(20), or pre-Edenic, that is, without souls, as Domin claims (6). As changelings, however, 
the Robots appear to be both supernatural and unnatural, and they possess the uncanny 
ability (as speculative monsters, engineered or not) to behave in unpredictable ways. The 
first sign of this is an occasional malfunction, known as "Robot's cramp," in which a 
Robot throws down his work, stands stock still, and gnashes his teeth. To Domin and the 
others, this seems innocuous enough, like a slight case of epilepsy (14). For Helena, 
however, the "cramp" is the first indication of "revolt" and promises a rebellion in both 
body and mind ("a struggle within," as Helena suggests and accurately predicts). On the 
one hand, the Rossum enterprise discovers a successful way to code a massive 
population, creating a factory that produces perfectly obedient workers and effective law 
enforcement officers (as Act II reveals). On the other hand, the rootless nature of 
Rossum's Robots allows them to detach themselves from their creators, to reject their 
artificial relations with a "father" that is so only in name (Rossum): both history and 
genealogy are therefore undermined. While they may be sexless and asexual, and while 
they may not, as Nana remarks, have "any young [i.e., offspring]" (20), the Robots 
nevertheless possess a hybrid vigour (Stross 256-57), which depends on contingent 
alliances rather than conjugation. The individual Robot itself, as we see in the case of 
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Marius and Sulla, has the capacity to proliferate into other forms. Domin admits that he 
and his colleagues thought "Marius" and "Sulla" were the names of "lovers," but Helena 
corrects him on yet another of his historical inaccuracies, even while her own knowledge 
has its gaps: "Marius and Sulla were generals and fought against each other in the year-
I've forgotten now" (R. U R. 9). We can supply the date of ca. 112-107 B. C., but the 
essential point to note here is that the "coding" of these robots (which I consider in more 
detail below) is limited insofar as no real affiliation is maintained. As a collective, these 
changelings "form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale" (Deleuze and Guattari, 
A Thousand Plateaus 241 ), and ultimately a fusion of past and future personae. 
In her illuminating essay, "The Folktale, Wells, and Modem Science Fiction," 
Tatyana Chemysheva reiterates the point that the science-fictional adaptation of older 
forms like the folktale creates a new fusion, which can alter our perception of both 
traditional and modem knowledge: 
The point is not [ ... ] merely playing with folktale motifs [ ... ] The point is 
primarily that in modem science fiction, as in Wells, the folktale is an 
indispensable constructive element for creating new science-fictional imagery [ ... ] 
The ideas and figures of science fiction are created by a complex fusion of newest 
scientific and technical knowledge, fabulous wonders, and sometimes even 
medieval mysticism. ( 41) 
Capek's Robots-pseudo-humans born as test-tube babies but conjured up in the 
laboratory of a "mad" scientist (R. U R. 5)-may evoke for us the figure of 
Frankenstein's monster (with the exception ofhis seamed and scarred visage), but they 
also recall an older mythological figure: the Jewish golem (upon which many believe 
Frankenstein itselfwas based). According to the legend, Rabbi Loew (c. 1520-1609) 
formed a golem of clay and water and brought it to life "by means of Kabbalistic 
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incantation and ritual" (Comrada 245). In her article, "Golem and Robot: A Search for 
Connections," Norma Comrada lists the points of correspondence between the golem and 
the robot: "both were created by humans, their creation encompassed both material and 
mystical elements, and both were created to serve humankind" (244). Comrada concludes 
by noting that, while the Rabbi intended his creation only for good, theY oung Rossum 
has only profit and the doctrine of endless production in mind. Her brief comparative 
study leaves two points to ponder: that, as in the golem legend, Rossum perverts a 
potentially benevolent and utopian dream into a malevolent nightmare, which I would 
classify as a technotopia; and that the construction of the Robots evokes the 
Judea/Christian mythology of Eden. Moreover, in its magical conjuration from clay, the 
golem is linked with the biblical story of creation (246) and therefore gives a religious 
dimension to the production of Robots, hinted at throughout the play and reinforced in the 
Edenic denouement (R. U R. 58). But we should also remember that the changeling (of 
which, I am arguing, the Robot and the golem are two additional enunciations) was, on 
the one hand, thought to have been the result of a divine intervention, and, on the other 
(especially in the days of Luther), a mutation and imitation inspired by Satan. 
Additionally, we should recall that Frankenstein, Jekyll, and Moreau all assume god-like 
roles, but, in their willingness to dispense with accepted morality, exemplify satanic 
pride. At the same time, these creators, at least for a time (and in the case of Moreau, 
completely and fatally), lose control of their creations whose rebellion and perversity 
evoke, for the nineteenth-century reader (as for the twentieth), the characteristics of a 
fallen nature. Once again, we can attribute the success of this rebellion to the fact that 
Domin and Co. (excepting Alquist, perhaps, whom I discuss below) seem largely 
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unaware that they are following a pattern (in history, in religion, in literature) that was 
established long before them. Helena's devout maid, Nana, is convinced that the Rossum 
enterprise is "against God's will," calling the Robots "heathen," complaining that 
"Radius" is not a "Christian name" (20), and claiming that the low human birth rate is a 
"punishment" from God (24) and a sign of the "end of the world" (25). Perhaps, in a 
certain sense, Nana is right: the "world," as Domin and the others know it, is coming to 
an end. And perhaps, if we follow Chemysheva's argument, the original fantasy of 
"playing with [ ... ] motifs" has led to a "fusion" of old and new and the emergence of 
entirely unforeseen social relations. 
Capek, then, does not indulge in apocalyptic nihilism, opting for an open-ended 
and, perhaps we might even say, Wellsian conclusion to his play (if we recall how 
Prendick's world still reverberates with the memory of Moreau's island and how Wells's 
changeling personae deterritorialize in the very moment of their reversion). There are the 
moments of pathos, when Hallemeier, for example, eulogizes, "It was a great thing to be a 
man. There was something immense about it" (R. U R. 47), and, after this, when the 
Robots enter the factory and kill all but the architect Alquist ( 49). Amid the pathetic 
melodrama, we also have a genuine paean to the human spirit, which, despite all attempts 
to "simplify" it, ultimately infects the Robots with a will to survive and promises, just 
before the fall of the curtain, a new riot of creativity. Moreover, the apocalyptic gloom 
that hangs over the second and third acts derives from the realization that humans have 
substituted their humanity for automated living, and that the Robots have, quite naturally, 
assumed the vital role of "Lord[ s] of Creation" (16). What causes the most difficulty with 
this development, however, is how the Robots regress by reterritorializing on the very 
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ideology that had made them slaves in the first place: the doctrinal faith in endless 
production: "Work must not be stopped" (34). My subsequent analyses of R. U R., then, 
focus on the ways in which Capek's conceptual personae (Robots, but also Newts, as the 
next section reveals) explore the possibilities of/differences between natural spontaneous 
mutations of the "changeling" type (congenital, etc.) and unnatural or engineered 
mutations of the "Frankenstein" type. What remains for us to consider is how, in finally 
rejecting the Rossum ideology, these SF changelings evolve "into sentient beings capable 
of compassion, wonder, love-and reproduction" (Comrada 248). 
As part of the play's rising action, it is revealed that Robot soldiers have been 
mobilized (Act II). Now the Robots have assumed the roles oflabourers, law 
enforcement, and therefore State authority: the coding of a population has been perfected 
since the Robots cannot technically contradict orders. This molecular aggregate operates 
now (as the newspapers nervously report) in the form of a controlled contagion. They 
"spare no-body in the occ-up-ied terr-it-ory" (R. U R. 24), Nana reads in halting fashion. 
Are the organized Robots who commit these slaughters obeying orders? They are 
following through with their orders with brutal efficiency. If the intention ofR. U. R. was 
to replace all human workers, an exploitative system is already in place to give whatever 
entity may be employed the extra push towards rebellion. The wars may make no "sense," 
as Nana claims (24), but they have a perfect logic: code a population, institute 
exploitative labour, and condition the population into efficient "workers," whose very 
exploitation is the beginning and end of the Roboticized (human-run) regime of labour. 
Helena continues to read the reports: "During the past week there has again not been a 
single birth recorded." N ana insists that this low birth rate is a "punishment," but, again, it 
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is the logical outcome of coding a non-reproductive population that has been built in 
order to relieve humans of all labour-including, as it happens, that involving the 
creation of offspring. Sterility, then, is what comes of replacing humans with Robots-
that and the nurturing of a fascist mind: "I don't want a master," says Radius, the eventual 
leader of this proletariat dictatorship. "I want to be a master. I want to be master over 
others" (27). The Robots truly become a "contagion" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 247) in the sense that, while they are produced in droves (and operate, in some 
ways, as ant-like drones), they (like Frankenstein's monster and Jekyll's Hyde) reproduce 
nothing but their own divergent art, which involves the destruction of "statues and 
pictures" (R. U R. 20), but also the wrecking of the machinic assemblage that first mixed 
them up in "vats for the preparation ofliver, brains, and so on" (1 0). As in the changeling 
tales discussed in Chapter 1, the substitution of Robot for human, and the hybridized 
man-machine born as the result, does not lead to the further propagation of either human 
or Robot, but an unforeseen divergence ofboth species: the "Robot" (as first designed by 
Rossum, and perhaps as first coined by Joseph Capek) is not what it was intended to be. 
To elaborate, from a purely technical point of view, the Robots triumph over the 
Rossum managers (and therefore humanity) not because events do not occur as expected 
but because they happen with a velocity that is unpredictable: the Robots arrive more 
quickly than expected and from a direction that could not have been foreseen (in the form 
of a mobilized mass, which commandeers equipment and weapons, and which converges 
through apertures and open windows [ cf. stage directions, R. U R. 49]). Hallemeier at one 
point praises "punctuality": "The time-table is more significant than the gospel; more than 
Homer, more than the whole of Kant. The time-table is the most perfect product of the 
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human mind" (32). And, we could add, the time-table is further perfected by Robot 
labour. But of course Hallemeier has not figured in the passage of time, of time's 
endurance, of its physical growth and coverage of space: he has not counted on the fact 
that nature is "the antagonist of order" (Eagle 39). While Domin tries to assure Helena 
that everything has been timed (R. U R. 32), the revolution-by its very definition-
undermines this punctuality through the force of its speed: time is sped up by the 
intensive coverage of space, and the escape route is closed off by the wrong-headed 
reliance on time as an immobile calculation (Bergson 1-2). 
At this point (and, not for the first time) we need to consider how much 
ideological mystification muddles the Robot revolution (see Suvin, Metamorphoses 272) 
and how "rebellion" so easily becomes reterritorialized as war mongering, or as a 
celebration of the "New Man" who would eliminate the Old one. The Robots' operation 
as an organized war machine hinders the possibility of an enduring hybrid vigour as it 
drives towards the extermination of the species that has exploited it. This is, of course, 
part of Capek's satirical scope: that the utopian creation of artificial life would be 
accomplished only at the expense of natural life. On the one hand, Capek satirizes the 
capitalist ideology of controlled labour which would remove the physical (human) 
possibility of a proletarian revolution. On the other hand, once the revolution erupts, the 
celebration of the Robot's superiority is exposed as a fascist (both Left and Right wing) 
fetishism for purity (and this is, once again, an anticipation of War with the Newts). In 
other words, Rossum's experiment requires mechanical flaws in order for it to maintain 
adaptability, flexibility, and a rejuvenating and empowering (rather than an atrophying 
and annihilating) force. The obsession with production, then, restricts creativity and thus 
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divergence. Radius exemplifies the hubris of knowledge/power over wisdom/flexibility, 
that is, the mere accumulation of information over the adaptability of information for the 
good of all. But we must remember (as we recall Capek's satirical bent) that the Robots 
begin their career (as other changelings have in the past) by serving the needs of the 
privileged group in society who enjoys the novelty (Roboticized or automated labour) 
insofar as it can be made useful. Rossum's end product truncates the "cognitive horizon" 
(Suvin, Positions 87) of the experiment to modify the human species. Struggling to find 
answers for the disastrous tum of events, Dr. Gall speculates: "You might think that 
nature was offended at the manufacture of the Robots" (R. U R. 28-29). He may be right 
if we understand "nature" to be the force that causes organisms to evolve and diverge 
constantly rather than remain stuck in rigid schemas. Following Gall's sentiment, Nana 
reflects that all "these new-fangled things are an offense to the Lord" (29). While she says 
this in response to Helena's act ofbuming of the Rossum manuscript, Helena's intention 
is not to prevent invention (in the creative sense of mutation) but rather to encourage it 
since the papers, which contain the blueprints for Robot manufacture, serve only to 
reproduce a faceless servile mass and not individualized entities. 
Coming back to the issue of natural/unnatural invention, we find that the 
difference in the first instance is between the mechanism of evolution and the 
manipulation of that mechanism: the manipulator (Rossum) is then understood also as an 
inventor. However, "invention" also relates to the uncontrolled process by which 
organisms evolve in sometimes sudden bursts, or mutations. It is apparent, then, that 
invention can be both a spontaneous and willed event, and that the inventor is still at the 
mercy of nature's indiscernible will. For, as Deleuze and Guattari write, "Creations are 
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like mutant abstract lines that have detached themselves from the task of representing the 
world, because they assemble a new type of reality that history can only recontain or 
relocate in punctual systems" (A Thousand Plateaus 296). Recalling the final section of 
Chapter 3, we find that Wells focuses his speculations on a collective population's 
"undirected" human evolution, which, in one instance, leads to a gruesome overturning of 
the Spencerian, progressionist faith in the survival of the "fittest" where the deformed 
outcasts of society prey on the beautiful elite (The Time Machine), and, in another 
instance, leads to a liberating release from the "shackles of humanity" where beast and 
human alike are allowed to embrace their animal instincts (Moreau). As one ofWells's 
literary descendents, Capek reiterates the tendency for collectivity to rigidify into 
ideological domination when it uses the rule of Law (in the case of R. U R., the 
engineered biology of young Rossum) to tum the divergence from the norm into an 
ideology of purity, strength, and racial perfection. 
R. U R. speculates on the nightmarish possibilities of an automation that would 
produce a "hundred thousand faces all alike, all facing this way. A hundred thousand 
expressionless bubbles" (37). While the denouement is certainly dystopian in tone, both 
the near extermination of the human race and the failure of the Robots' supremacy over 
their former masters lead to a new understanding between Alquist, the "last man," and the 
Robot lovers, Primus and Helena (the Robot masters' homage to one of the few "flesh 
and blood" humans). Radius, the powerful leader of the Robot revolution, which learns to 
dominate and overcome through its collectivity, discovers that he is perhaps more 
vulnerable than his new human ally. So while it is true that humans could not be 
successful without Robot labour, Robot longevity is dependent upon human ingenuity. 
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After all, Robots were built with only a twenty-year life-span, and they cannot thrive as a 
species without the creation of new Robots. However, in probably the most touching 
scene of the play, two Robots engage in what, to most audiences, resembles human 
courtship. Hearing laughter, Alquist awakes out his present stupor and insists that he 
experiment on one of them. Surprisingly, each Robot refuses to let the other come to 
harm. Alquist, the last man and perhaps the only truly "good" man among the Rossum 
managers, discovers that, in the situation where production is limited (since the Robots 
cannot reproduce), creativity begins to blossom, and that, in the situation where the Robot 
organism is threatened (57), love and compassion begin to thrive. All along, then, or at 
least ever since Dr. Gall had "changed" the Robots by giving them more acute pain 
centers and the ability to become "irritable" ( 41 ), a transformation was in the works. But, 
as Bakhtin has argued, "Metamorphosis or transformation is a mythological sheath for the 
idea of development-but one that unfolds not so much in a straight line as 
spasmodically, a line with 'knots' in it, one that therefore constitutes a distinctive type of 
temporal sequence" (113; original emphases). The Robot cramp functions as one ofthese 
"knots," or as a spasmodic divergence from the otherwise straight line of development. 
For while the original Czech phrase for "Robot cramp," "kfec robot" (from the original 
play text), "has multiple associations," it "may be translated as 'cramp,' 'spasm,' or 
'convulsion.' Krec may be associated with pain and with orgasmic pleasure" (Kinyon 
384). Indeed, the Robots' original "irritability" signals a rebellion against automation, 
which has the goal of reducing creativity and therefore sexual drive. The "cramp" indeed 
becomes a "spasm" in the final sequence of the play when Alquist discovers, to his 
surprise, that his Robot lovers may after all have the capacity to reproduce. 
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In a parodic nod to the creation myth (and perhaps an anticipation of Shaw's Back 
to Methuselah [ 1921 ]), Capek ends his play in are-imagined garden of Eden. Assuming 
the role of the Edenic Creator, Alquist offers the Robot lovers Primus and Helena his 
blessing: "Go, Adam, go, Eve. The world is yours" (R. U R. 58). There is, of course, a 
certain wonderful irony in this command, which comes from this would-be god-in-the-
garden. For this reason, I completely disagree with Kamila Kinyon's argument that 
Alquist's evocation of the Genesis "be fruitful and multiply" sentiment re-constitutes an 
ideological investment in a dominion over the earth, which had led to the Robot massacre 
in the first place. As she argues in her article, "The Phenomenology of Robots: 
Confrontations with Death in Karel Capek's R. U R.": "Having admired the humble and 
altruistic nature of Primus' behavior, Alquist ironically reverts to an obsession with 
dominion. He claims victoriously that man will once again become lord of the universe" 
(3 81 ). Kinyon reinforces this argument in her conclusion: "in line with the progression of 
the Hegelian dialectic, a universal duty is accepted, the submission to the higher master, 
God" (395). Alquist's final statement is indeed "ironic" since it is uttered by an individual 
who is very reluctant to assume a god-like role and who is, for that matter, very uncertain 
as to his own "dissecting" skills. Unlike Moreau, Alquist is actually squeamish about 
causing these creatures pain; such an attitude already raises the Robot's status from 
automaton to human. Also, while the Robots are highly dependent upon human ingenuity, 
it is difficult to determine who or what has been responsible for the Robots' subsequent 
development: the "Robot cramp" turns out to be the equivalent of an evolutionary 
mutation, which has happened spontaneously rather than through an engineered effort. 
Moreover, far from being obsessed with dominion, Alquist is in awe of the new 
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organisms that will reclaim the earth; but they are hardly "humans": they are very much 
hybrid creatures, for while they are composed of synthetic human-like materials, they are 
of an entirely different order. So what victory does Alquist claim in this final scene? As 
the stage directions indicate, Alquist says these words "almost in tears" (R. U R. 58), 
which reinforces that he has relinquished dominion and that "man" has finally served his 
time as the dominant species. "Dominion" of one species over the other has been 
undermined by the very fact that the new inheritors of the earth are a product of a human-
Robot intermixture. It is in this hybridization of the two species that the Hegelian 
dialectic is subverted, and this subversion is announced specifically in Alquist's evocation 
of Genesis. For parody is used throughout the play to satirize faith in history, journalistic 
accuracy, and the Hegelian dialectic itself, not to mention the melodramatic mode, which 
tends to include an idealized and unrealistic denouement. Far from reclaiming the 
Hegelian dialectic, Alquist parodically repeats both the biblical and Hegelian notions of 
human dominion over "others," placing nonhuman entities in the position of the human 
"Adam" and "Eve." Following William Harkins's comments on Alquist's "philosophy of 
creative work" (93), we could conclude that Alquist and not Old Rossum has discovered 
something divine in the Robots, something miraculous in their will to survive, in their 
will to assert their individuality, and in their will to create in this raw, new world. The 
hybrid vigour of these changed Robots constitutes the "becoming" of Capek's science-
fictional changeling, that is, the evolution of a new conceptual persona, which has 
become-from C. L. Moore ("No Woman Born" [1944]) to Jack Williamson (The 
Humanoids [ 1948]) to Isaac Asimov (L Robot [ 1950] and his "Robot" series [ 1953-86]) 
to Philip K. Dick (Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep [ 1968]) to Brian Aldiss 
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("Supertoys Last All Summer Long" [1969])-one of the most recognizable SF personae 
in the genre. 
II. War with the Newts: the Changeling as Evolved Salamander 
If, as Harkins has argued, Capek's writings ofthe 1910s and early 1920s 
exemplify an "ethical relativism," or the "discovery of the freedom, richness, and variety 
of a relativist world" (72), hinted at in the conclusion of R. U R., then his writings of the 
1930s reveal the potential destructiveness that this very freedom unleashes from time to 
time. But Capek's wholesale faith in a relativist "freedom" was already changing in the 
years following the composition of R. U R .. In The Life of the Insects (1921), for 
example, the idea of a relativist world is exposed as a sham, especially when militant 
territorialism, exhibited by the ants of the third act, leads to the exploitation of the 
"freedom" touted in such a philosophy. In other words, in the relativist world, one may be 
"right" at the expense of another. To be sure, Capek's "entomological review" presents a 
rich catalogue of nature from the perspective of the minute insect world, employing light 
humor and lyric tonalities in his homage to the mysteries of evolution. On the other hand, 
his satirical use of insect personae as enunciations of philosophical problems exposes the 
dark, primeval currents in the "struggle for life" found in nature. Right from the Prologue, 
Capek satirizes the human belief that "nature" is something that can be observed from a 
distanced position, as if we could, like the Lepidopterist, discover truths simply by 
pinning butterflies to a corkboard (The Life of the Insects 6). Elaborating on this 
perspective, Capek then targets both the poet "butterflies" who "grow tired of life" 
without having lived it and the flighty "butterflies" who never grow tired of living in the 
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moment and have no thought for the future (Act I); these Aesopian figures are, despite 
their differing views on "love" and "experience," the "bright young things" of Evelyn 
Waugh's best work (Vile Bodies [1930] comes to mind) and offer a satiric portrait ofthe 
complacent ("roaring") post-WWI era. After this, Capek turns to the bourgeois beetles' 
concerns with capital accumulation, the aristocratic flies' concern with luxury (Act II), 
and the militant-fascist ants' obsession with racial superiority, deathful inventions, and 
territory (Act III). There is complexity in this "review," however; not simply the 
complexity of nature's quiet and mysterious stirrings (as in the case of the "chrysalis" of 
the play), but also the complexity of the human relationship with nature, our contiguity 
with the instinctual struggle to survive and thrive, and our willingness to exploit and kill 
in the name of survival; and not simply this, but the ways in which the beetles are both 
real beetles and also analogies to humans, the ways in which the ants are real ants and 
also analogies to a certain type ofhuman-inspired ideology. Moreover, the presence of 
the Tramp in the drama, as Capek tried to remind his readers/audiences in the preface to 
his later play, The Macropulos Secret (1927), indicated that "man" was being represented 
alongside the rest of nature ("Preface" 3): this "not only"/"but also" hermeneutic (Suvin, 
Positions 46) means that man is not only man but also man becoming-insect, and that the 
beetle is not only beetle but also beetle becoming-man. The Life of the Insects, then, is 
one of Capek's most provocative attempts at "doing philosophy," as Deleuze and Guattari 
would have it, through the conceptual personae of insects. 
His most successful and masterful use of animal personae is the great satirical 
work, War with the Newts (1936), produced almost on the eve ofNazi Germany's 
invasion of Czechoslovakia: for the Munich agreement of 1938 promised that both 
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France's Daladier and Britain's Chamberlain would not interfere with Hitler's militant 
expansionism. In this work, Capek is more suspicious of "human ingenuity" since, even 
more so than R. U R., "invention" is what ultimately leads to the destruction of the 
human world. While R. U R. seems to engage more readily with the Ubermensch 
ideology of eugenics, given its focus on the superhumans that would eventually become 
associated with the impermeable "men of steel" (Gomel 402), War with the Newts offers 
the dire warning that the "New Man" has actually begun to take shape in the form of 
National Socialism. And even more so than the 1920 play, Capek's 1936 novel depicts 
the present political climate in which the exploitation, pain, and psychical torture of the 
"little men" contribute to the "phantasmagoric wholeness," or racial purity, of the New 
Man (Gomel406). Indeed, the Newts, too, are "robots" of a kind since they are co-opted 
as a slave-labour contingent; but it is their sublime suffering that contributes to the 
wholeness of the nation-states who recruit them. Unlike R. U R., a brief summary of the 
novel will not suffice, especially given the density of events in the book, including the 
Newts' strange but frighteningly plausible (because scientifically possible) evolution. 
What follows then is a fairly detailed plot summary which takes into account the novel's 
three-book structure and the Newts' progress from exotic animal to scientific anomaly to 
sensational side-show entertainment to assimilated citizenry to labour force and finally to 
"Collective Male" horde (Suvin, Metamorphoses 278). 
Book One, "Andrias Scheuchzeri," tells of Captain J. van Toch's discovery of the 
Newts in Devil Bay, offthe island ofTanah Masa, west of Sumatra, Indonesia while 
hunting for pearls ( ch. 1 ). To his great delight, van Toch discovers that these strange 
Salamanders have the ability to grasp objects such as pearls, walk upright, and understand 
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human forms of communication. The Czech van Toch approaches his fellow countryman, 
business tycoon G. H. Bondy (chs. 3-4), to obtain some financial backing for his 
burgeoning pearl enterprise. Van Toch boasts, with a kind paternal pride, that he will 
"tame" these "lizards" to hunt pearls on other unexplored islands and as a favour will 
supply them with knives so that they can protect themselves against sharks, their natural 
predator. As a result of their new survival skills, the Newts begin to multiply at an 
incredible rate, a biological fact that is never fully considered until the Newts become a 
"problem." The two homonymous chapters in book one, "Andrias Scheuchzeri" (ch. 8) 
and "Andrew Scheuchzer" (ch. 9), focus on the scientific community's analysis of the 
Newt phenomenon and the eventual discovery by the world that Newts can acquire 
language. The first name refers to the scientist Johannes J akub Scheuchzer who 
(according to actual historical documents, cf. Test 5) discovered fossil remains of a rare 
Salamander in 1726, and whose findings seem to confirm that van Toch's "tapa boys" are 
indeed of the Andrias Scheuchzeri genus. The second name refers to the individual Newt 
who, from inside his zoo cage, begins to imitate human speech and ideas. "Andrew" then 
undergoes a series of speech tests, the results of which prove that Newts are of average 
intelligence. Sadly, Andy succumbs to "catarrh of the stomach and intestines" after being 
fed too much chocolate by visiting children; as the wry narrator concludes, the Newt 
"perished of the consequences ofhis popularity" (War with the Newts 79). After a brief 
chapter detailing the old Captain's side-show of"trained lizards" (ch. 10), and another 
speculating on the sped-up evolution ofthese "men-lizards" (ch. 11), we have the crucial 
chapter, "The Salamander Syndicate" (ch. 12), in which Bondy, the Chairman ofthe 
Pacific Export Association, proposes to transform van Toch's romantic but finally "short-
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sighted" enterprise by exploiting the "latent" labour force of this now gargantuan Newt 
population (at six million and expanding ever outward). The first book ends with a 
provocative "Appendix" on the "sexual life" of the Newts. Book two, titled "Along the 
Steps of Civilization," is partly based on a large mass of newspaper documents and 
articles collected by the only recurring character, Mr. Povondra ( ch. 1 ), the porter who 
first allowed van Toch to enter Bondy's offices. The larger "annals" of the Newts (the 
very long ch. 2) is a multi-authored compendium detailing (not always in the correct 
order) momentous events, such as the colonization of new islands (in the wake ofthe 
Syndicate of book one) and the setting up of Newt incubators (117); the persistence of a 
lucrative Salamander trade, beginning in the days of Captain van Toch (124); the gradual 
development ofthe "Newt problem" (138) related to the ambiguity surrounding their 
origin and their current political and religious affiliations; and the development of Newt 
labour and Newt-built machines for the construction of dams. Book three, "War with the 
Newts," constitutes the culmination of the "Newt problem" and the inevitable conflicts 
that occur between Newt populations of different nations. The first three chapters are 
brief reports on the outbreak of skirmishes, and are followed by a chapter on the Baltic 
Newt, which is proclaimed by German nationalists to be "superior to all the other 
Salamanders"-indeed, a "German Super-Newt" (193). While tensions rise between 
nations, and political theorists speculate on the future of both Andrias Scheuchzeri and 
Homo sapiens ( chs. 5-6), a series of earthquakes erupt in Louisiana, China, and other 
places across the world (chs. 7-8), bringing the superpowers of the world to their knees. 
Then the "Chief Salamander" makes his demands ( ch. 8) and when they are not met, the 
Newts (with their own manufactured underwater drills) proceed to make new continents, 
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effectively submerging the better part of the globe in water. In the final chapter of the 
book the author talks to his "inner voice" about how he should end the tale, and 
ultimately leaves the narrative open-ended. 
Like The Absolute at Large, War with the Newts is a variation on the roman 
feuilleton, which is a "brilliant pastiche of the most diverse kinds of writing: newspaper 
articles, memoirs, scholarly works, manifestoes, etc." (Harkins 95). Chapter eight of the 
first book and the entire second book contain excerpts of scientific reports, including a 
close facsimile of a Newt skeleton (War with the Newts 69); an eighteenth-century 
manuscript with the original typeface (87); footnotes that contain news dispatches with 
their own typeface or font (115-119, 131-33, 144-49); a report printed in an "unknown 
tongue" but which teasingly contains the words "Salaam Ander" (119-20); fragments 
from the censored Newt manifesto (158); tiny extracts from the imitation manifestoes, 
printed in various languages from the perspective of varying ideologies (159); and other 
sundry minutes and extracts of meetings and conferences. Additionally, Capek 
masterfully incorporates the heteroglossic utterances of the peoples who inhabit the 
book-everything from the brawling sea-slang of van Toch with its Czech inflections 
(which he tries to hide), to the lilting and proverbial brogue of the Irishman Dingle, who 
is one of van Toch's crew members in the early days of the Newt enterprise (ch. 5), to the 
academic-speak of the scientists and the news-speak of the journalists, and finally, to the 
strange "ts, ts" sounds that emit from the Newts before they acquire human language (52-
53, 56-57). All ofthis-the catalogue oftypeface and tongues-contributes to the 
babbling confusion of the book's middle section and its catastrophic close, and forms the 
texture of what most critics have dubbed a "dystopian" work. However, as George Test 
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noted in one of the earliest English-language articles on the book, while there are some 
now obvious connections between War with the Newts and the two other major dystopian 
satires of the era, Brave New World (1932) and 1984 (1949), 
Capek's concerns are much more mundane, fictionally speaking. His Newts fit 
into the scheme ofthings as they are. Life goes on as it always has, only more so. 
Business prospers, governments govern, education, religion and science flourish. 
But one day life ends terrifyingly in a watery grave. No one seizes power, no one 
applies behaviouristic psychology. The forces and institutions of society merely 
destroy themselves. No hedonistic new society, no pathological coercion of man's 
mind. Only God's voice over the silent deep. Who is responsible? No one. 
Everyone. We have met the enemy and he is us. (9) 
I would add to this that, like R. U R., Capek's later novel introduces into the "mundane" 
world an estranging "novum" (Suvin, Metamorphoses 64)-the Newt-which functions 
for a good deal oftime simply as sensational entertainment. Only when the world returns 
to its mundane concerns, when the Newts have been absorbed into daily life like so many 
immigrant labourers, does the novelty come into focus again, this time as a threat to the 
most deeply held values, and therefore to the cognition, of a complacent society (Mr. 
Bondy's and Mr. Povondra's Czechoslovakia) and world. While the novel itselfbrims 
with knowledge (facts, speculations, neat articulations of theories), the personae that 
populate it grasp only small portions of the text-and now the Newt-infested world-in 
which they live. 
While it is true, as Suvin argues, that the Newts enter "the life of mankind [ ... ] 
under a cloud of delusions and misperceptions" (Metamorphoses 276), there is no 
shortage of scientific studies and learned scholarly articles on Newt biology and their 
evolutionary past. Two chapters in book one ( chs. 8 and 11) as well as the Appendix 
include a handful of analyses dealing with fossil remains and theories on salamander 
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genera, the Newts' evolution, and the social and sexual life ofthe Newts. While one 
intellectual claims that the Newts are "unscientific humbug and sheer fantasy" (War with 
the Newts 67), two others speculate that the Andrias Scheuchzeri may be "antediluvian 
man" (70) or "Miocene man" (89). In these opposing views lie two kinds of warnings: on 
the one hand, an academic scolds his peers for engaging in sensational mythologizing; on 
the other hand, two academics strive earnestly to write about the facts as they appear, to 
enlighten, and to engage in a "learned discussion" (90) that may prevent future "delusions 
and misperceptions." However, one of the issues that plagues the Newt "problem" ofthe 
second book (indeed, the issue that contributes to it) is the dispute over the identity of this 
unusual salamander species. As we learn in the first scientific chapter of the first book 
("Andrias Scheuchzeri"), scientists from all across the world "discover" their own genus 
of Newts and begin to wage "a most ferocious war with the giant salamanders of other 
countries" (72). The word choice here is meant to indicate not only the "war of words" 
that erupts in the scientific community but also the ways in which the Babylonian 
confusion of tongues can undermine the goal of sharing knowledge. But Capek is not so 
prejudiced as to suggest a universal translation: indeed the proliferation ofNewt genera 
deriving from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century explorations of the South and Central 
Pacific-the Megatriton moluccanus from the Dutch Sunda islands Dgillo, Morotai, and 
Ceram; the Cryptobranchus salamandriodes from the French islands Takaroa, Rangiroa 
and Raroire; and the Pelagotriton Spencei from the English Gilbert islands (War with the 
Newts ?I)-indicates how such a translation has already been at work in the desire to 
name everything for the glory of king and empire and in the language of science. In this 
initial instance at least, the Newt is important insofar as it has distinct and verifiable 
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affiliations; the subject of the Salamander genera is important insofar as it is a legitimate 
field of study, and this status is reached when scientists become the "fathers" of their 
discoveries-Johannes Jakub Scheuchzer gives birth to Andrias Scheuchzeri, H. W. 
Spencer (perhaps a parodic nod to the noted Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer) gives 
birth to Pelagotriton Spencei, and so forth. The "war" that is waged, then, is one between 
potential patriarchs, and it indicates the ways in which chauvinistic politics instigate 
cultural wars between nations. As a result of these disputes, our narrator concludes, "right 
up to the last, on the scientific side there was not enough light shed upon the whole big 
question of the salamanders" (72). 
The great irony of the second book, "Along the Steps of Civilization," is that 
while the "progress" first initiated by Bondy's Syndicate has moved forward, much of the 
more significant research on Newt biology has been forgotten if not completely ignored. 
"Along the Steps of Civilization" really means along the steps to war (Suvin, 
Metamorphoses 278), and this war is the consequence of the failure to consider fully the 
possible "future" of the Newt. This crucial middle section, which, as the narrator indicates 
in its first chapter, consists largely of the "annals of the newts" (War with the Newts 114-
15), is a refraction of countless view points and is characterized by an almost haphazard 
fragmentation oflogic and sense. The narrator (whom we cannot so easily identify since, 
as a footnote suggests [115], the sources for the "annals" are many) apparently gives no 
thought to the matter that this history is incomplete, but confidently asserts that "the 
making of history[ ... ] takes place wholesale" (115-16). In support of old Bondy's strong 
belief that "Utopia" is possible through economic enterprise, the narrator adds that "we 
cannot simply wait some hundreds of years for something either good or bad to happen in 
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the world" (116). The control mechanism required to contain this mass of documents 
known as "history" is turned towards theN ewts themselves who remain scattered about 
the globe: through the machinery of incubators, the Salamander Trade (124), and 
universal Newt education (138-50), the Newts are organized into a "story" about human 
progress. Additionally, the Salamander Syndicate formulates its own division oflabour 
among the Newts, resulting in an almost universal "commercial slang" designating Newts 
as a "leadings" (the more intelligent Newts trained as group leaders); a "heavy" (the 
strong active Newts, usually sold in sixes, trained for the heaviest work); a "team" (the 
ordinary working Newts sold in groups of twenty, trained for lighter work such as 
dredging dams); "odd jobs" ("half wild" Newts that resemble a "lower proletariat" and 
can also be trained for other roles such as "trash," "heavy," or "leading"); "trash" (inferior 
or defective Newts whose role remains uncertain); and "spawn" (which means simply 
"Newt fry" or the young Newt tadpoles) (121-22). To be sure, the Newts appear to be the 
property of everyone, and indeed the construction ofNewt "incubators" for the purpose of 
increasing the salamander population and colonizing new islands and new worlds 
contributes to the global enterprise of a Newt-dominated world. The rational and 
optimistic narrator of the "Annals" boasts that "Nature is not and never has been as 
enterprising and systematic as human industry and commerce" (117). However, as with 
previous changelings, the Newt pops up in rhizomatic fashion, giving the skewed 
impression that he has just begun his career-as pearl hunter, film monster, dam builder, 
or circus performer-when he has been employed by Nature for centuries in any number 
of operations. After the war of words in the first book, Andrias Scheuchzeri still exists in 
a shroud of mystery, child of everyone and of no one. 
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If the "annals" are basically non-linear in structure, as the omniscient narrator 
describes in a lengthy disclaimer (War with the Newts 114), the voice of this work would 
have us believe that, as Bondy had proclaimed in the famed Salamander Syndicate, "the 
future of the Newts is beyond all doubt" (99). However, because history contains 
alternate avenues, unforeseen tangents, and dangerous quagmires; because history 
consists of co-existing planes in which time moves forward while events erupt in 
unpredictable directions; because, therefore, agents fall back on or deterritorialize in 
opposition to the course of history, a doctrinal faith in official History is not only limited 
but dangerous. Unlike the writers of the "annals," then, we must return to the moments in 
which the Newts' history already shows signs of diverging from the norm, and the 
moments in which this divergence begins to graft itself onto the history (and evolution) of 
Homo sapiens. The first moment, which occurs in Chapter 11 ofbook one, may be a 
parodic reminder of Capek's earlier "vitalist" works, sparkling as it does with the 
Bergsonian intonations about "a striking mutation in actual progress" (85) or the 
endlessness ofNature's "creative work" (86). It is perhaps too hasty to conclude that 
vitalism was a mere stage in Capek's writing, especially since much of the satire in this 
work points to the inability to foresee the workings of "creative evolution" or the "life 
force" that operates despite our belief in the eternal laws of science. "[T]here is no 
universal biological law," Bergson writes, "which applies precisely and automatically to 
every living thing. There are only directions in which life throws out species in general" 
(16). Professor Vladimir Uher, whose findings are summarized in this scholarly chapter 
provocatively titled "Men-Lizards," writes in a similar spirit when he speculates on the 
possibility that some "powerful vital elan [ ... ] suddenly [ ... ] revived the archaic existence 
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of a primitive creature"-indeed "one almost already extinct" (War with the Newts 85). 
His theory begins to blossom: If the Newt had evolved in what appears to be an almost 
spontaneous mutation, perhaps as a way of making up for "those hundreds of thousands 
and millions of years of evolution that it had missed" (89), what was it still capable of? 
Was it indeed still capable of catching up to man or, given its unpredictable "vital elan," 
even surpassing him? These are speculations, of course, exuberant ruminations resulting 
from an undated (but likely early eighteenth-century) newspaper report Professor Uher 
was given describing a crew's discovery of strange salamanders fitting the description of 
Andrias Scheuchzeri. Provocatively, the report tells of how, after the men hunt down most 
of the salamanders and slay them, two live ones are brought aboard but, as the ship is 
crossing near Sumatra, ultimately escape from the casks in which they have been 
imprisoned, climb out the windows of the "steerage," and throw themselves into the water 
(87). This fragment, while certainly apocryphal, exists alongside other similarly 
speculative theories about the Newts' history, and offers both a confirmation that some 
Newts may indeed have derived from the South Pacific as well as a counter to the belief 
that Captain van Toch was indeed their "liberator" (Test 3). In this alternate "history," the 
Newts display early signs that, like Rossum's Robots, they can "revolt" when provoked 
by either nature or man. But, Uher discovers, "man" is not interested in a story that has 
ceased to be fashionable, a sentiment that displays the first signs ofhis own dwindling 
"life force." Convinced that his readers have become "tired to death of those newts" and 
opting instead for something "fresh" (War with the Newts 89-90; my emphases), the 
editor of the Lidove Noviny rejects Professor Uher's "learned discussion" and, as a result, 
"the article on the evolution and future of the newts was never published at all" (90). 
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The irony of the editor's fickleness, not to mention the scientist's intellectual 
subservience for not disputing the editorial decision, is enhanced by the fact that Andrias 
Scheuchzeri's history has become intertwined with that of human society, and, in 
particular, its social organization has become analogical to the development of new social 
relations among humans. There is certainly no lack of comparisons between the Newts 
and homo sapiens-from the Sinhalese diver's assertion that their "hands" resemble those 
of"human beings" (War with the Newts 12), to the scientific report that Andrew 
Scheuchzer's intelligence does not exceed that "of an average [British] man ofthe present 
time" (79), to the miscellaneous items in the "annals" concerning Newt labour, language, 
and education which recall issues of discrimination/assimilation among immigrant 
groups, Jews, and perhaps even African Americans in the United States. Harkins insists 
that the Newts are symbols and that they "stand in" for this or that human foible, the same 
argument that is usually made about The Life of Insects and most SF books that employ 
"beast fables" or "Aesopian language" to disguise political satire (Maslen 88-91 ). 
However, Capek's own statement in the first edition of the novel, quoted by Harkins, 
suggests no speculation on the future but rather a '"mirroring of that which exists and the 
surroundings in which we live. [The novel] was no matter of fantasy[ ... ] but reality"' 
( qtd. in Harkins 96). Yet, Harkins still persists in his line of argument: "Thus he makes it 
abundantly clear that the world of the Newts is an allegory of the contemporary world" 
(97; my emphasis). As with Capek's insects, his Newts are no mere symbols, 
representing humanity, but are both the nonhuman inferiors to man and his ultimate rival 
in the struggle for life. For, as Bergson says, the individual is "solidary with all that 
descends from the ancestor in divergent directions" ( 43). This has already been my 
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argument in Chapters 1 through 3: that the animal and hominid comprise at least two 
divergences of an original organism, and that folklore and now SF hints at the prospects 
of a relationship between the separate kingdoms. The "Bergsonian" moments in the novel 
suggest that Capek has not rejected his youthful vitalist theories but has modified them: 
not everything that diverges is wonderful, and "invention" can be more terrifying and 
devastating when nurtured by the wrong hands. It is more accurate, then, to speak of how 
the Newts "operate" in the novel, but also to note that, in the interests of dominant 
society, they also "function" in various ways. In particular, the Newt-as-changeling 
functions as a scapegoat for society's ills and reveals the ways in which particular groups 
are segregated from society almost as if they were a separate species. In this scenario, 
which recalls that of R. U R., the lower classes become "the masses" and, as such, a 
dangerous and menacing-because undefined and shapeless-alien entity. 
Unlike other SF works of the period, the menace in War with the Newts does not 
simply invade the everyday world from "outside" but grows up out of it, from its very 
islands and underwater caves, and is nurtured by it, in its zoos, schools, work sites, and 
entertainment industries. While it is true, as John Clark and Anna Lydia Motto argue, that 
the Newts are initially "perceived from afar," understood by the Bataks to be "the work of 
the Devil" (10), I would defer to Test's remark that the Newts still fit into the scheme of 
human life, on both the biological and psychic levels. At the same time, Clark and Motto 
are correct in their assertion that "the reader is never allowed to settle for consistency and 
complacency" when it comes to the "oscillating" significance of the Newts: indeed, as I 
have suggested, the reader can track the accumulation of errors, misinformation, and plain 
negligence which contribute to the Newts' "ubiquity and multifariousness" (11). The 
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Newt menace, then, may seem to be a fantasy creation, and it is both ironic and 
appropriate that Bondy feels "as if he were in a fairy-tale" (War with the Newts 37). As in 
Wells's Moreau, the folkloric idea of the animal-human hybrid undergoes its own 
transformation in the SF form of narration or "narrative logic" (Suvin, Positions 70): both 
Wells's and Capek's talking animals are the creations of science rather thanfantasy. Their 
fantastical creatures function initially as sensational pleasures for the bourgeois audience 
but ultimately overturn the expectations of the reading/viewing public. Capek turns his 
satirical weaponry against the entertainment industries themselves, including the pulp SF 
industry (see note 65) which restricted its estrangements to gadgetry, BEMs (Bug-Eyed 
Monsters), and indulgent end-of-the-world scenarios. Capek also satirizes the 
sensationalized adventure tales of the nineteenth century, later adapted in the Right-wing 
militaristic "hard" SF of the forthcoming era in the 1940s and 1950s. The aiding and 
abetting ofNewt encroachment and domination in the final section of Capek's novel 
mirrors the ways in which writers and movie directors ofthe 1940s and 1950s employed 
monsters in order to expand book and film industries' hold on the marketplace. But for 
Capek, it is more than simply bad art or bald money-making schemes; this he satirizes 
with light melodramatic touches in R. U R. fifteen years before. What Capek targets are 
the ways in which humanity betrays its own kind in order to make a profit, and the ways 
in which, as Suvin suggests, capitalists finance "the menace to humanity (Nazis as well as 
Newts)" (Metamorphoses 277). 
As it is clearly demonstrated in the minutes of the Salamander Syndicate (War 
with the Newts 92-1 00), the eventual partnership between adventurer and financier is a 
binding one in which the Salamanders, the exploitable bait or "Newt-fry," can finally be 
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"treated decently now that they will have some value" (101). This is a partnership, 
moreover, that requires the "tapa-boys" to eventually adopt big business as their new 
parents. While it is true that they exemplify notable deviations from human civilization, 
the ambiguous history and origin of Andrias Scheuchzeri, coupled with their "linguistic 
capacity" without which they "would be impervious to exploitation" (Maslen 83), makes 
them also susceptible to ideological recuperation and a binding affiliation. Lured out of 
their islands by the promise of friendship and camaraderie, the Newts suddenly find 
themselves working for a new "boss"; this may constitute exploitation, but the Newts may 
very well have developed their own sense of kinship with a species that first protected 
them against shark attacks and then encouraged their natural skills as technicians (War 
with the Newts 106). For the businessman, Bondy, the Newt is "the body without an 
image" (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 8) onto which a new signature of authority 
can be inscribed, and into which new codes and functions can be inputted; as the author 
of the "annals" comments at one point, people "simply regarded the Newts as something 
commonplace, like counting machines or other gadgets" (War with the Newts 134). The 
mystery of why the Newts respond so vigorously to the cry, "Work must not be stopped" 
(R. U R. 34), is answered scientifically in the "Appendix: Of the Sexual Life of the 
Newts" (War with the Newts 101-1 07). The omniscient narrator cites several laboratory 
studies with male and female Newts, noting the prominence of a male collectivity, 
indicated in the peculiar mating ritual. Referring to the work of Miss Blanche 
Kistemaeckers, the narrator describes the "sexual milieu" in which males emit a discharge 
into the vicinity of the female after which she emits her own already fertilized eggs. 
While the courting of females is characterized by a rather ritualized and frenzied dance, 
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the studies prove that, beyond his acidic spermatozoa which stimulate the particular 
female "milieu," the male is rather superfluous in the mating process (1 03-04). At the 
same time, the Newt "community" is almost exclusively male-a fraternal collective who 
court the female "in unison" but then move on to the important business of technical 
undertakings (106). Perhaps, then, we might interpret the Newts' attraction to van Tach as 
one of male camaraderie: in this bond, van Tach is more successful than any mad scientist 
we have encountered thus far, including Dr. Moreau. Of course, this microcosmic view of 
stimulating a sexual milieu is analogous to the capitalist enterprise of stimulating an 
entire globe, with these little Newts now in the diminutive role of the spermatozoa, 
seeking to penetrate new continents. 
As in R. U R., while the Newts' divergent characteristics are first articulated as 
exotic, then as a scientifically anomalous, and then as a sign of that species' unique 
evolutionary path, they are finally recapitulated as an inferiority complex. The whole 
second half of the "annals" ofbook two is taken up with report after report detailing the 
inferior and maligned status of the Newt, and yet, right to the end (to the last days of the 
so-called "Golden Newt Age" [War with the Newts 171]), the Newts are congratulated for 
their willingness to work endlessly and for their slave-like work ethic. In one particular 
sequence, a Czech couple comes across a Newt that speaks their language and begins a 
conversation about Czech history. To their surprise, the Czech Newt appears to be 
hundreds of years behind in history but knows the old woeful and wretched details of the 
country's past. He speaks excitedly of the Thirty Year's War when "the Czech land was 
then turned into a desert, soaked with blood and tears," and speaks proudly of the "Three 
Hundred Years suppression" that followed (147). In this situation where hardship is 
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glorified, Capek "not only mocks his fellow-countrymen for wallowing in past sufferings 
but shrewdly shows how this kind of pride in humiliation can be fostered in others" 
(Maslen 84). In his willingness to make a myth of misery, the Newt becomes a figure of 
ressentiment, as Nietzsche described it: the resentment characteristic of a "slave 
morality," which takes the form of a stunted, dwarfish persona who wants revenge on the 
beautifully-shaped humans that rule the upper world (cf. Wells's Morlocks and Eloi). 66 
On the one hand, the Newts are indeed an inferior race, exploited by business and science 
for ambivalent purposes-greed, the enlightenment of society, the creation of a 
nonhuman labour force to replace the already massive human one. On the other hand, the 
Newts become a vengefuljraterniry bent on the total exploitation of the entire globe. The 
Salamanders multiply faster than the Robots, aided and abetted as they are by both the 
artificial invention of incubators and the natural invention of an evolutionary "vital elan." 
In this work, Suvin rightly notes, "a limit was found beyond which the pseudo-human 
became clearly evil," particularly when the Newts "grow into an analogy to the Nazi 
aggressors" (Metamorphoses 276). 
While this analogy is confirmed in the third book when German nationalists begin 
praising the superiority of the "Baltic Newt" (War with the Newts 193-97), it finds its 
earliest expression in the scenes describing Captain van Toch's encounters with the 
indigenous people around Tanah Masa and Sumatra. Much ofthis section (3-15) appears 
to function as the convenient background for the captain's fateful discovery of the Newts 
and the creation of the first known "partnership" between human and salamander. In the 
66 Nietzsche makes use of the dwarf persona m many of his texts but especially m Beyond Good and Evzl 
(sechons 58, 62,203,225, and 267) and Thus Spake Zarathustra (pp 177-79,212,215,271, and 293) m 
which the dwarf functwns as the "httle man" who craves authonty but also a slave morahty. 
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first instance, van Toch forms what appears to be a meaningful symbiotic relationship in 
which the clever little "lizards" fetch pearls for the old man and he, in tum, provides them 
with tools of self-defense. Struck by their odd movements and sounds, he begins to 
imitate them, "making ts, ts, ts, and wriggling like a lizard," he later tells Bondy, so that 
"they took me, perhaps, for some kind of a big salamander" (31 ). Van Toch even speaks 
of them as if they are his pets or indeed his foster children: "They are very good and 
sensible, these tapa-boys; when you tell them something they sit up and take notice like a 
dog does when it listens to its master. And particularly their childish paws-you know, 
my boy. I'm an old chap, and I've got no family .... Yah, an old man is lonely" (32). 
Bondy is ultimately won over by such sentimentality, and privately forms a bond with the 
blue-eyed captain whose romantic narrative about his dear tapa-boys resonates with his 
own paternal role as a business "captain." All the same, it is clear from his comparison of 
them to dogs that with this sentimental attachment also comes a patriarchal sense of 
ownership: they are his tapa-boys, and they are "good" and "sensible" when they "take 
notice" and "listen" to their "master." The humor of this meeting between van Toch and 
Bondy derives from these ironic expressions of sentiment towards a species that is not 
human and which, at first, only partially understands what the partnership involves (if it 
is, to the Newts, anything other than a game of "go fetch," "sit," or "roll over"). However, 
the captain's tale, which is the "best story" Bondy has "ever heard" (32), is driven by an 
original conviction that "the prestige of the white race was at stake" (9): the Newts 
present for van Toch an opportunity to vindicate "civilized" Europe by finding something 
"left [that is] worth a brass farthing" (4). In other words, the captain "exemplifies a 
paternalistic racism [towards the Newts], despite his generally humane attitude" (Test 3): 
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if we consider the fact that the "Chief Salamander" is really a human, "Andreas Schultze" 
(War with the Newts 240), and therefore a con artist, we might accept with a bitter laugh 
that van Toch truly is, as the Newts believe, a "big salamander." 
While he never speaks badly of his Newts, his virulent prejudice towards the 
"lousy" and "dirty" Bataks (War with the Newts 3, 5) gives the oblique message that his 
sympathies lie only with the species that can be tamed. The taming of the Newts is 
analogous to the taming of the uncivilized, non-white world, but these salamanders 
correspond to both the indigenous population and the very mechanism of that 
population's oppression. The Newts are praised for their uncanny response time and work 
ethic, but not for their weird, lizard-like appearance. Because they do listen so well, 
perhaps van Toch can forget that they are not "nice looking," are without scales, 
"absolutely naked" like "frogs, or salamanders" (War with the Newts 28). On the other 
hand, the indigenous Bataks, the Sinhalese, and his "own commercial agent" absorb most 
of his overt racist comments, which reflect his disgust for non-white races and "half-
breeds." For example, he speaks disdainfully of his agent as a "cross between a Cuban 
and a Portuguese"-"a bigger thief, heathen, and swine than a pure Cuban and pure 
White man put together" (3). In this same rant he complains about the lack of pearls in 
these parts (before he has discovered the Newts, of course), putting the blame on the "rats 
in Europe" who hire captains like him to exploit islands like Tanah Masa: "It's a wonder 
they don't ask us to look into these Bataks' snouts to see if they're not sniveling pearls" 
(4). The irony here is that his tapa-boys are themselves half-breeds, hybrid "men-lizards" 
(as ch. 11 reveals) with mutant characteristics and changeling-like adaptability. There is a 
certain, perhaps typically colonial, partial blindness in the captain's failure to see in the 
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Newt's mimicry of the human the possibility of a menace. For, the "menace of mimicry is 
its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts 
its authority" (Bhabha 88; original emphases). Ifthe Newts are animals, they behave like 
men; and if the Sinhalese are human, they behave like animals: Van Toch fails to see the 
points of correspondence between these two groups of mimic-men. Later on he describes 
the indigenes to Bondy: "Those Sinhalese in the water look something like a lizard, but 
lizards have more brains than a Sinhalese, or a Batak, because they want to learn" (War 
with the Newts 30-31 ). The great irony here is that the nonhuman functions for the captain 
as the very yardstick of human ingenuity, even while his preference for the apparently 
docile, dog-like ally, reveals his own autocratic intentions. But his comparison between 
the natives and the Newts indicates also his wish to absorb colonial difference and to co-
opt biological divergence for the glory of the mission, hence his eventual decision to 
exploit the "lizards" at the circus (79-84). What he ultimately fails to see is that the 
"civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze of its disciplinary double" 
(Bhabha 86)-in this case, the Newts-as-fascist horde. 
It is reasonable to find the answer to the Newts' aggression in their biology: the 
studies show that, in everything-in sexual courting, in community organization, and in 
industry-their society is organized by a male collective, "We, the Male Principle" (War 
with the Newts 106). But it is also fair to suggest that their evolution (at least as it is 
fictionally presented in Capek's work) has been driven by "secondary impulses," which 
correspond to the ideological abstraction of male "honour" and dominance; these 
impulses do not, in other words, derive from any biological necessity (Reich vii-ix, xii, 
130, 140, 253, 295). The Newt behaviour is, of course, comparable to that of Homo 
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sapiens, who also tries to marginalize the female population, form into male collectives, 
and court aggressively as it consumes and builds. No Newt is ever really a slave to his 
courtly aggression, just as no man is; but each organism finds that the result (the 
fertilization of eggs) will raise his own status in his particular community and contribute 
to his own feeling of self-worth. Van Toch sees something of this male pride in his "tapa-
boys," even if he is unfamiliar with their sexual life or social organization; he flatters their 
male ego (just as the "Chief' does, we might imagine) and the result is that they bind 
themselves to him and to the more successful "Male Principle" of the capitalist world. 
More so than even his Robots, Capek's Newts' "evolve" according to the demands of 
capitalism, which can proclaim with all confidence "the amazing extension and progress" 
(War with the Newts 116) and the "strong and constant ascent" of the Newts (166). Here 
we have vulgarities of all kinds-of Marxism, of Darwinism-leading to the greatest 
perversion of all, fascism. After the Newts allow themselves to be employed in the new 
hyper-industrialist milieu, when the exploitation reaches its peak, they then tum on their 
masters and carry out the destruction of the human world. So we can say with accuracy, 
"no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of 
conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that 
needs to be accounted for" (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 29). This "perversion" 
can be distinguished from its previous form-mutation, deviation, divergence-since, in 
the form it takes here, fascist desire, these characteristics are co-opted for the purposes of 
irrational hatred. For example, if we call Hyde "perverse" we understand that he is not 
only an opponent of Victorian morality but also a fetishized creation of Victorian 
morality. But a further distinction is necessary: Hyde is more successfully controlled, he 
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is more allegorical "ape" than truly one of the masses, whereas the Newts willingly 
participate in the experiment and exhibit the "emotional attitude of man in authoritarian 
society, with its machine civilization and its mechanistic-mystical view of life" (Reich viii; 
original emphases). However, Capek does not fail to underscore the irony of the (now 
amalgamated) male collective's "vainglorious" characteristics (War with the Newts 1 06): 
unlike the Newt's sexual milieu, the Salamander Syndicate's ritualized technological 
"dance" ends in the production of a sterile world, which now has at least the appearance 
of a technotopia-a society in which "perfection" is sustained through a centralized and 
mechanized form of state-run capitalism. This is not to say that a fruitful capitalist 
enterprise would have been a better alternative, especially since the constant stimulation 
of islands and continents throughout the globe allows a dominant corporation to 
ultimately run the world. Indeed, the sterility derives from the overabundance of 
production and the oppressive machinery of affiliation, which denies the possibility of 
contingent alliances-brief partnerships with real symbiotic principles of give-and-take, 
sharing, and the creation of a better world. Sterility, then, may be understood here as the 
result of a mechanized automatism which appropriates the vital energy of a working mass 
(the Newts) and redeploys it in its own systematic way. 
We do not, then, have in War with the Newts a "conciliatory happy ending" 
(Suvin, Metamorphoses 276); the Newts do not, as we can say of the Robots, ultimately 
prefer "vitalism" over "mechanism" or creativity over mere production. There are no 
heroic characters like Helena who get "to the root of things" by wrecking the machinery. 
Given time, we might speculate, perhaps the Newt master race would return to the 
original creative industry of their island-dam civilization, where collectivity could be 
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restricted to the building of communities rather than the exploitation of worlds. There is, 
moreover, a subtle Darwinian lesson implied in Capek's novel: that the beautiful 
complexity of a single (call it microcosmic) society becomes savage, destructive, and 
ultimately sterile when it attempts to impose its creativity and inventiveness on other 
societies; where it, in other words, prefers automatism over individuality. Brilliantly, 
Capek's novel illustrates how the rise of empires and of totalitarian regimes derives in 
part from the very biological impulses that drive the individual organism along its 
evolutionary path: the sexual milieu is not simply the analogy to another society (that of 
Homo sapiens) but is an earlier stage of evolution in general. The exception here, "in 
part," indicates that for Capek-as for Wells, and as for Darwin-it is not "natural" for a 
man to want to dominate and exploit his neighbors because it is not part of the human's 
"biological core" (Reich vii-viii), even though he may employ his strength and cunning 
towards this very goal when certain conditions spur him on. As Gomel elaborates for us, 
"When violent power is misread as a law of nature, it elevates itselfbeyond ethical 
judgment" ( 406). The violators-Van Toch, Bondy, and especially the ubiquitous 
Salamander "Chief'-see themselves and especially their subservient Newts as "agent[s] 
of natural order": more so than in Wells's day, Darwinism has become fully entrenched in 
political ideology as the justification for war-mongering and genocide. What produces a 
creative tension, however, is the fact that the Newts are both the oppressed and the 
oppressor, the contradictory Hegelian dialectic embodied as an evolutionary imperative. 
This tension is perfectly illustrated when we consider that the Newts' journey "along the 
steps of civilization" is deliberately misread as a justification of nature's cruel progress 
towards perfection. As a result of this misreading, the "post-Darwinian inversion of 
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benevolent natural theology into a gospel of cruelty paves the way for the sacred science 
of massacre" ( 411 ). 
The "open-ended" nature of the novel reflects Capek's Wellsian faith in an 
"undirected" evolution, leaving us with more than one possible future for Homo sapiens, 
and therefore more than one set of operations for the changeling. Indeed, the final 
conversation between the author and his "inner voice" invites us to invent our own 
ending. On the one hand, the Newt mass becomes a State apparatus comparable to a 
military dictatorship, destroying whole fleets of ships in order to construct as many 
continents as possible (in other words, breaking each of the major continents into 
multiplicities). On the other hand, the Newts operate as a molecular aggregate linked 
already to the multiple continents of the world, and to the scattering and diffusion of State 
authority. This is why the mechanism of "co-option" is so important: the typically large 
quantity of the oppressed group supplies the State with multiple organs of power which 
are fuelled by a ressentiment reappropriated from the "enemy" (you are an inferior 
bastard tribe!) and redeployed in paternal affection (you are superior legitimate sons!). 
From the State's point of view, the pathway from inferiority to superiority is a linear one, 
"striated" or punctuated in a series of steps like the most rigid model of evolutionary 
descent or ascent: such a model encourages the "little man" to see in his new affiliation 
the "natural" progression towards higher and enlightened things. From the point of view 
of the molecular aggregate, or the diffused and divergent "masses" that are "constantly 
flowing or leaking from classes" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 213), the 
pathway is "smooth" and "the points are subordinated to the trajectory" (478): such a 
model encourages the changeling (the Newt, perhaps, but most definitely the nomad) 
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persona to see legitimacy as one more stoppage, as one more damned affiliation, not to 
mention one more way to be "fucked over" (Anti-Oedipus 23). He may very well hesitate 
at the moment of the insult-you are a bastard! .... now kill and reclaim your kinship with 
the State l-and move right on to a new territory, not ruled by fascists or "little men." In 
other words, in a certain sense, the Newt understands that he is not really a man, that he 
need not be a man, but that he can deterritorialize this fascist horde, this State-driven 
production frenzy (akin to the Robots' cry of"Work must not be stopped!"), perhaps even 
this variation on Wells's "House of Pain," and be a Newt becoming-man. This type of 
becoming occurs when the Newts first learn to grasp shells to find nourishment or knives 
to defend themselves or drills to build dams. It occurs most dramatically when the Newts 
begin to acquire human languages. The "annals" narrator reports: "they were oblivious to 
grammatical endings, never learned to differentiate between 'I' and 'we,' and it was the 
same to them whether a word was masculine or feminine [ ... ] In their mouths every 
language underwent a characteristic change" (War with the Newts 143). As an analogy to 
Nazi Germany, this indifference to grammar and linguistic inflection and gender may 
reflect the imperialist and racist policy of purifying the Newt language of its foreign 
elements; but as an analogy to radical teratology, this failure to differentiate between 
individuality and collectivity may reflect the natural diffusion of centralizing (or 
centripetal) languages through the habitual utterances of the people, of the masses. The 
repetition of the various world languages leads to a mongrelization of the unitary 
language, however much the Newts appear to be gobbling them up one after the other. 
Thus, despite the dark and possibly dystopian conclusion to the novel, it is clear 
that radical invention persists nonetheless (and is dramatically played out when the author 
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begins to invent an ending): unable-or unwilling-to predict an easy outcome, the 
"author" ends his conversation with his "inner voice" and ends the novel by saying, 
" ... Then I don't know what comes next" (241). Capek's satire still reveals a remarkably 
resilient and adaptable changeling, and despite the devastating failure to achieve an 
optimal "partnership," Capek's roman feuilleton contains enough "vitalist" fragments to 
suggest that the opportunity may still exist. War with the Newts dramatizes not only 
Capek's shaken faith in human ingenuity but also his solid faith in Nature's creativity. 
Conclusion 
Despite its departure from recognizable plateaus, its tangential abandonment of 
the beaten path, and its perversion of family resemblance, the changeling appears to be 
still with us. This folkloric persona is discovered lurking in the fantastical or science-
fictional works and worlds of the twentieth century, during a period in which fascism was 
seeking to "mobilize the middle strata" (Hobsbawm 143), including the "little men," of 
society. Despite the many instances where this persona has served an ideological function 
(as a "diagnosis" for mental illness, as Chapter 1 describes, as sign of racial inferiority, as 
each of the first four chapters have shown), the changeling has also (regardless of its 
author's "intentions") turned situations to its own ends, deterritorializing almost in the 
instant of its reterritorialization. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the 
"Robot's cramp" or the "Salamander dance." In the first instance, the cramp is identified 
simply as a minor flaw, a fit of epilepsy, rather than a sign of inner revolt; and yet, the 
very fact that the Rossum design would have any flaw at all is significant and an early 
indication of humanity's failure to master its artificial creations. In the other instance, the 
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dance is interpreted as a celebration of the "cult ofthe moon" (War with the Newts 105) 
rather than an indication of collective coordination. In each case, the changeling performs 
divergent operations that are misunderstood or misinterpreted. The resilient nature of this 
organism, threatening anarchy to its own family structure, as folk narrative shows, 
suggests a remarkable and admirable tenacity, an attribute that allows it to tum any defeat 
into a victory. We discover these movements through a geophilosophical-rather than a 
purely historical-analysis. In a spirit reminiscent ofDeleuze and Guattari, Suvin writes: 
"An ideal history-especially a history of culture-would have to be a geology, 
interested perhaps as much in the hollows produced by absence of data as in the 
fullnesses produced by their presence, or a geography of the ocean depths as much as of 
the visible islands" (Metamorphoses 88). The changeling dwells within these hollows-
the caves, dens, laboratories, or "submerged nations" featured in both folk narrative and 
modem SF. 
To reiterate a point from Chapter 3, the "empirical environment" of the folktale, 
which Suvin disavows in Metamorphoses (8), contains within it subversive undercurrents 
at once associated with a rural underclass and a "little people" driven underground by 
colonization as much as industrialization. However, as I have suggested in Chapter 1, this 
little folk, known primarily as the "Good People" in the Irish tradition, are not 
comparable to the tinker-bell creations popularized by the Cottingley fairies, Walt 
Disney, and the whole tradition of fairy tales from the Victorian era onward: in most 
cases (in Irish, Welsh, Scottish, and even some Scandinavian and German variations), 
fairies operate as a-sometimes large, sometimes small-collective, aristocratic in 
appearance and taste, plebeian in work ethic and personality. Significant SF of the 
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twentieth century has attempted to reassert the complexity of this otherworldly-but also 
this changeling-personality. And so we have Capek's Robots and Newts. In the 
beginning, the Robots carry forward the program of mechanized labour presumably by 
outbidding the conventional system of organized labour, fulfilling Moreau's vision of 
coding a population of mindless automata. All the same, they form a terrifying "host" of 
mercenaries that dictate terms in autocratic fashion. The very spirit of their potential 
revolution, which seems a "rational rebellion against intolerable social conditions," does 
not ultimately go "to the root of things," as Marx would say (Reich x). Another group of 
"little people" are the Newts who also bear no close resemblance to the fairies, it is true. 
In the case of War with the Newts, Fairyland has been ransacked and redesigned by the 
capitalists, while its inhabitants have been armed and deployed as a host to frighten even 
the most "modem" of families. In this overturning of the folk legend or folktale scenario, 
Capek nevertheless returns us to the "plebeian" concerns of the "little people" by 
exposing the sham of "free enterprise" as well as the limitations of "hospitality." 
As the corpus of changeling tales suggests, fairies are interested most in forming 
(although not always maintaining) alliances, even while their manner of initiating such 
relations does not always lie within the acceptable boundaries ofhuman ethics. To be 
sure, changeling tales are characterized by a concern with hospitality-this is one of my 
general theses of Chapter 1; and yet, fairies themselves never hide the fact that they 
violate the laws of hospitality, as established in previous dealings with humans. Again, 
enter the Robots and the Newts: they destroy the very homes and machinery of their hosts 
who, at the same time, demand constricting ties and affiliations. For this very reason-
that true hospitality is virtually impossible-! have found Derrida's philosophical probing 
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of the concept important and crucial to a discussion of the changeling persona, but 
substitute the term from time to time for the more accurate (and perhaps more honest) 
"alliance." To adhere to fixed notions of moral behaviour, or indeed to demand a rigid 
moral code at all, is to fall prey to the belief that violence and conflict can-or should 
necessarily-be transcended. The Good People consistently show a-sometimes 
virulent-dislike for human morality, but in the numerous instances where a compromise 
is made, the consequences are frequently devastating: in the case where a fairy woman 
consigns herself to a domestic role and then must suffer the xenophobia of the man's 
relations ("The Fairy Wife"); or where the Newts agree to "work" for "the man" and find 
themselves marketed like so much "Newt fry" (War with the Newts 122) or clinically 
dissected for science (1 04-05). At the same time, the Good People are an incredibly 
versatile and generous organization whose methods of infiltrating, appropriating, and 
sometimes sabotaging human institutions (the family, the church, the state) are designed 
to benefit and teach the families they come into contact with. But more than this-and 
here I come to my essential point-the changeling in particular eschews both the human 
and fairy communities, claiming as it does only partial affiliation with both; in a sense the 
changeling follows through with the Good People's program of divergence by 
abandoning his original birthplace, his original home, in order to launch (perhaps only for 
the instant) his mobile territory. (And isn't the changeling constantly moving-his 
restless eyes over the strange but exciting domestic realm of these humans, his diminutive 
but vigorous legs over the surface of the kitchen?) For the reason that we do not find in 
Capek "the ideal environment, tribe, state, intelligence, or other aspect of the Supreme 
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Good" (Suvin, Metamorphoses 5), it is beneficial to return to the folk legends from time 
to time since they, and their benevolent personae, still have much to teach us. 
But if the twentieth-century SF changeling, as featured in Capek's work, bears 
little physical resemblance to the "fractious" fairy encountered in British folk legend, it 
nevertheless carries on the subversive activity of the little folk and, in its is celebration of 
hybrid identity, presents a fictional narrative that explores human evolution through the 
interaction and exchange with a nonhuman species (Chapter 1, section IV). 
To begin, Rossum's factory, with its witches' brew of great vats and "kneading 
troughs" containing the "ingredients for a thousand Robots at one operation" (R. U R. 
1 0), is Capek's science-fictional variation on an old folkloric motif: the production of 
changelings in the form of pseudo-humans without affiliation. 67 Of course, the two 
"programs of genetic mutation," as I suggested in the opening of the chapter, have quite 
different motivations. For the Good People, the abduction ofhuman infants is less a 
"program" than a tactical method of survival-for the purpose of improving the fairy 
bloodline. The mad scientists of SF (Frankenstein, Jekyll, Moreau, and Old Rossum) have 
assumed the archaic role of the Good People, selecting, refining, and building a race of 
"people" with superior minds and bodies; this "program" clearly differs since it seeks to 
perfect humanity rather than simply help it to thrive. Nevertheless-and perhaps this is 
part of both the play's flaw and the ultimate reason for its open-ended and optimistic 
denouement-the theory and the applied scientific formulas are nearly as vague as 
67 Despite Its obvwus melodramatic form, R U R contmuously employs characters as story-tellers who 
narrate events of the past m heu ofhistoncal accounts, which, as the careless Domm reveals, often leave out 
the whole "truth." For this reason, we may agree with Lubomir Dolezel that "Capek found the model of oral 
storytellmg m the folktale" (17) 
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Frankenstein's natural science; they are brilliant, Domin assures Helena, but very 
speculative in nature. Young Rossum has certainly surpassed Frankenstein in skill and 
application, and he has Moreau's organizational skills plus the manpower to expand. 
However, despite the impressive efforts of Dr. Hallemeier (responsible for implanting in 
the Robot brain the desire to function like clockwork) and Dr. Gall (responsible for 
enhancing the pain centers of the Robot brain for safety purposes [ 14 ]), none of the 
factory's senior employees are able to predict how the Robots might diverge from the 
original plan. This unpredictability is precisely the changeling factor, which counters the 
development of the fascist "New Man" every step ofthe way. 
The van Toch venture and its expanded global enterprise, the Salamander 
Syndicate, suggest to us that "artificial" humans need not be "robots" but rather "natural" 
mutants guided by the paternal hands of both unfettered capitalism and fanatical fascism. 
So it is, then, that the "New Man" resurfaces again in the form of the Newts whose 
evolutionary divergence provides cheap labour, cheap entertainment, and cheap soldiery. 
The architects of the Newt-changeling contingent possess their own technology for the 
purpose of reproducing this collective "horde"; the Newt incubators established in the 
Bay of Mexico (War with the Newts 117) ensure the "tremendous spread" of these 
industrious organisms and the utopian possibility of a new "Atlantis" (130). Capek's 
satirical evocation of Baconian divine science suggests that the twentieth century 
embraced a new scientific idealism obsessed with fashioning a new Eden, a new 
Fairyland; the chief science in this epoch is, of course, biological engineering. As Sherryl 
Vint has argued, Bacon's New Atlantis (1627) discussed in some detail the possibility of 
manipulating a god-like science and, through the tools of vivisection, engineering a new 
281 
species of humanity-that is, hybrids-for the glory of the nation (Vint 86-87). As the 
host describes to the narrator of Bacon's utopian work, "We have also parks and 
enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds; which we use not only for view or rareness, but 
likewise for dissections and trials, that thereby we may take light what may be wrought 
upon the body of man" (Bacon 291-92). Rossum's Universal Robots and the van 
Toch/Bondy Newts-not to mention Moreau's Beast Folk-are the results of this 
unchecked scientific vision in which, as Erica Fudge has argued, man's position as the 
"sovereign and commander of creation" is restored ( qtd. in Vint 86). The prominence of 
Baconian experimental science throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
helped to foster a technotopian philosophy that would produce "New Scientists" (87) as 
well as "New Men." 
But if the Newts serve a satirical and possibly dystopian purpose, warning against 
the scientific exploitation ofhumans and animals alike, they also present a rough model 
for optimal alliances between disparate groups. While we cannot claim for Capek's novel 
the status of"critical utopia," which, according to Tom Moylan, would not only "negate" 
the "nonutopian" society but would offer detailed "alternatives" (237), the work is, unlike 
Brave New World, 1984, and other dystopian SF works of the period, "anti-utopian." As 
John Huntington writes, the "anti-utopian form discovers problems, raises questions, and 
doubts"; it is "not simply satiric" but "is a mode of relentless inquisition, of restless 
skeptical exploration of the very articles of faith on which utopias themselves are built"; 
and finally, it explores "conflicts in human desire and expectation," and is able to 
"acknowledge virtues in oppressive situations even while denouncing them" ("Utopian 
and Anti-Utopian Logic" 124). While War with the Newts is much darker than any of 
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Capek's previous work, it goes a long way towards exposing the naivete of a straight 
utopian vision (like that in More's Utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis, or Bellamy's Looking 
Backward) in which "articles of faith" are accepted as doctrine and human relations 
restricted by an autocratic vision of perfection. The Newts' anomalous adaptation to 
human society and their ability to operate for a time as equal partners to their human 
counterparts suggests the sort of symbiotic relation that might have developed had the 
salamanders not been exploited for profit. Their unpredictable changeability, their 
capacity to infiltrate human society, suggests that Capek's pseudo-humans still function 
in a socially critical way. We might put the matter thus: In both R. U R. and War with the 
Newts the novelty (the Robot, the Newt) grafts itself onto certain aspects of the mundane 
or empirical world, slowly and gradually transforming it, almost imperceptibly, in the 
same way that a virus can alter the structure of any organism over a period of time. This 
literary teratology provides a way of gauging how deviations enter into society and affect 
(or infect) that society, and how "monsters" become a part ofhow Homo sapiens 
understands its own evolution as a species. Further, a literary teratology, grafted onto my 
original concept of "changelingism" (Chapter 1, Conclusion), takes into account the 
process of culture, its structures of feeling, the emergence of new genres, such as SF, or 
new personae, such as the Robot, the Pseudo-Human, or simply the "SF changeling," and 
the emergence of new social relations. 
Certainly, we cannot avoid discussing the question, what does it mean when 
discussing the changeling, for it is true that the changeling means many things to many 
people, and not only the Victorians but also pre- and post-WWI Europe (the range of 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5). However, we must not forget that the changeling is a persona 
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whose meaning is largely determined-but also contradicted or critiqued-by what s/he 
says, or enunciates; that is to say, the changeling has certain operations just as any human 
does, and herein lies the important discovery: that the changeling is fundamentally an 
enunciation of Swift's question, "What is Man?" For the changeling embodies 
humankind's potential to evolve into open communities, to diverge from the normal set of 
relations, to embrace what conservative ideologies call the "perverse" and the 
"monstrous," to reject the doctrine of ressentiment and part company with the "little 
man," and to diverge from (or deterritorialize) the laws that would seek to restrict 
mobility and change. 
284 
Chapter 5-0lafStapledon's Divine Mutant: A Changeling for All Seasons 
The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movement of evolution, 
but not its general directions, still less the movement itself. The road that leads to 
the town is obliged to follow the ups and downs of the hills; it adapts itselfto the 
accidents of the ground; but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of the 
road, nor have they given it its direction. At every moment they furnish it with 
what is indispensable, namely, the soil on which it lies; but if we consider the 
whole of the road, instead of each of its parts, the accidents of the ground appear 
only as impediments or causes of decay, for the road aims simply at the town and 
would fain be a straight line. Just so as regards the evolution of life and the 
circumstances through which it passes-with this difference, that evolution does 
not mark out a solitary route, that It takes directions without aiming at ends, and 
that it remains inventive even in its adaptations. 
-Hemi Bergson, Creative Evolution 1 02 
Introduction 
SF, which frequently bears no formal resemblance to folk narrative, nevertheless 
explores some of the same philosophical problems, which derive from the tensions that 
exist between the collective (the Good People) and the individual (the changeling) and 
therefore between ancestry and evolution, reproduction and mutation. SF, however, adds 
a scientific dimension: due to the impact of evolutionary theory in the mid-nineteenth 
century and the rapid progress of genetics, especially since the 1930s,68 twentieth-century 
(SF) changelings have begun to fulfill the utopian dream of a program of genetic 
mutation. However, if SF adds plausibility to the changeling tale by providing scientific 
rationale for biological engineering, the folk legend returns us to the primitive but by no 
means irrational reverence for the body and its biological and political freedoms. This is 
to say that the legend and the changeling motif in particular contribute to the second 
element in the well-wrought SF tale-estrangement. We cannot ignore the pervasive 
68 While the most s1gmficant developments m genetics have occurred smce Watson and Cnck theonzed 
DNA m the 1950s, I leave out th1s context smce my own concerns are w1th the pre-1950 era of sc1ence and 
SF. 
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influence of the pulp magazine era, which, of course, was uncannily obsessed not only 
with space travel, space technology and weapons, but also with the concept of genetically 
mutated humans or supermen. As Brian Stableford notes in his insightful study, The 
Sociology of Science Fiction, the "implications of Darwinism were very important in 
generating early attitudes to literary supermen, encouraging writers to think of the mutant 
superman as a threat to Homo sapiens, a competitor and nemesis" (133). For the most 
part, the pulp writers (who may or not have thought through the Darwinian ideas they 
were co-opting) had no time for social criticism (134), focusing instead on the "gosh-
wow!" exploits of their mainly "WASPy" protagonists (Stockwell 81-83) as they battled 
for supremacy with big-brained opponents. Eventually, it became just as common to find 
stories celebrating the triumph of superhuman figures who would replace the decadent 
and inferior human species. In either case, the superman provided plot material for some 
of the most indulgent militarist power-fantasies.69 At any rate, the 1930s and 1940s SF 
superman was an updated version of the mutant creatures, and therefore the changelings, 
of previous SF, such as Wells's Beast-Men, Stevenson's Hyde, and Shelley's monster. In 
contrast to the pulp writers of his era, Olaf Stapledon presents the most sophisticated 
attempt to "vary [the] surface" ofWells's original paradigm, as established in both The 
Time Machine and The Island of Dr. Moreau (Suvin, Metamorphoses 242), 
69 A E. van Vogt, for example, was perhaps one of the most popular wrtters of the 1940s (along wtth 
Robert A. Hemlem who was among the most sktlled SF authors), but hts provocatiVely titled novel, The 
Changelzng (1942), features the dtsappomtmg cover blurb, "FACED WITH INVADERS WHO 
COULDN'T BE KILLED MAN MUST MAKE A TERRIFYING CHOICE· SLAVERY OR DEATH"-
whtch, whtle 1t ts clearly an edttonalmtruswn, aptly charactenzes the clumstly crafted tale of a "toti-
potent" and hts paran01ac struggle agamst the normals ofhts soctety. The greatest dtsappomtment ts that the 
novel never really explores the operatwns of the changehng m human soctety, nor does 1t add anythmg new 
to a relatively anctent conceptual persona. Slan (1940) 1s a shghtly better-and certamly better-known-
superman tale, whtch, however, follows the same, rather predtctable plot. 
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conceptualizing new changelings in the form of a mutant superman and a hybrid man-
dog. 
What we see in most of Stapledon' s SF works is a continual process of adaptation-
modificatiOn in which the author tears SF away from ztselfby using it for the purpose of 
philosophical speculation on social relationships rather than mere tinkering with scientific 
inventions and fantastical neologisms. 70 Accordingly, the first section ofthe chapter, 
which considers Stapledon's cosmological fictiOns, Last and First Men (1930) and Star 
Maker (1937), focuses first on two human species of the future (the Second Men and the 
Fourth Men) who are, by all appearances, supermen or BEMs (Bug-Eyed Monsters) of 
7
° Cntics and biographers love to repeat the old anecdote that Olaf Stapledon dzd not read any sczence-
fictzon magazznes untz/1936, a fact that seems to suggest a certam ongmality m the field of SF or at least 
that his first few maJor works (Last and Fzrst Men [1930], Last Men zn London [1932], and Odd John 
[1935]) were not directly mfluenced by the "Gemsback era" of pulp SF (1926 through to the late 1930s) As 
ilie anecdote goes, when Stapledon finally had the chance to read Amencan SF stones m 1936, he was 
"appalled that they were generally so badly wntten" (McCarthy 28) In some ways, perhaps, he was 
unconsczously wntmg out of an established "science fictwn" tradition, wh1ch had "no actual existence 
except as a publisher's category" (Pnest 187) Hugo Gems back himself had mtroduced the category 
"sc1ent1fictwn" m 1926 and ilien chose the less clumsy "science fiction" m the early 1930s, thereby 
mventmg the geme-at least as 1t existed m the ghettmzed landscape of the pulp mdustry See also note 66 
m Chapter 4 In any event, ilie case seems to be that Stapledon employed fantasy and fantastical motifs to 
shape his philosophical ideas rather than knowmgly 1m1tate a popular form As Robert Philmus has 
suggested, "Chancmg to wnte science fiction, he discovers for h1mselfthe geme's connectiOn w1th Ideas, 
and m that sense mvents sc1ence fictwn as their vehicle More precisely, he mvents sc1ence fictwn as a 
vehicle for propagatmg what he himself might have called cognztzve (self)estrangement" (Vzszons andRe-
vzszons 115) 
On the other hand, Stapledon repeatedly acknowledged h1s debt to the Bntlsh tradition of 
speculative fiction m the form ofH G Wells (Crossley 35) whose VISIOn of the far future m The Tzme 
Machzne and whose mvadmg Martmns m The War of the Worlds receive a respectful homage mLast and 
Fzrst Men In h1s essay, "Bntlsh Science Fictwn" (1979), Christopher Pnest offers a fairly accurate reason 
for the differences between Bntlsh and Amencan SF, particularly around the 1930s unlike 1ts Amencan 
counterpart, the Bntish SF "commumty" was not dnven and dommated by an established mstitutwn that fed 
directly mto fan-based markets-magazmes run by "doctnnmre" ed1tors, mcludmg especially Gemsback 
(Amazzng Stones), but also John W Campbell (Astoundzng Sczence Fzctzon) (188) Gemsback made no 
bones about the fact that the "scientifictwn" plots should be mere "'sugar coatmg' to make the science and 
the technological speculatiOn m his story more palatable" (Stableford 48), while Campbell's preference for 
WASPy heroes led to the dommant trend of "bwlog1cal chauvmism" (112) or, as Robert Silverberg had 
complamed, "an outrageous Homo sap1ens-chauvm1st" attitude (qtd m Stableford 114) Additionally, 
because "relatiVely few books were produced m Amenca (as compared w1th Bntam), the pulp magazmes 
won a virtual monopoly over the Market for popular literature, and held that dommance for forty years" 
(47) 
287 
the pulp magazine era. However, only in isolation do we find correspondences between 
Stapledon's metamorphosed men, who undergo a vast number of minute physiological 
and psychological changes over countless millennia, and those of John W. Campbell, A. 
E. van Vogt, or Edmond Hamilton, whose telepathic mutants function more often as 
sensational monsters rather than as cognitively estranging visions of humanity in the post-
WWI era. So, while twentieth-century humanity in Last and First Men discovers that it is 
inferior to the "Last Men" of a far future era, some two thousand million years away, 
Stapledon underscores the ways in which "progress" in the future millennia is continually 
undercut by the failure to achieve optimal social relations. Venturing through his next 
cosmological excursion, Star Maker, we discover that, whereas the previous book 
explores the triumph of a superhuman race in the form of the Eighteenth Men, this sequel 
of sorts considers the scenario in which a nonhuman race (comprising "Arachnoids" and 
"Ichthyoids") achieve a truly symbiotic community. The "spiritual factor" (Swanson) is 
part of the larger "composite fiction" (Rabkin) of Stapledon's philosophical vision, but, as 
I argue in the second section of the chapter, it operates most dramatically in his two more 
conventional novels, Odd John (1935) and Sirius (1944). The malicious cripple from the 
Hebrides in Odd John is a satirical reterritorialization of the folkloric changeling (such as 
that discovered in "The Caerlaverock Changeling"), while the titular protagonist himself 
deterritorializes the poisonous ressentiment of the "little man" (akin in many ways to 
Capek's exploited Newts) in order to teach the superman (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra 41) and to proclaim the SF changeling. While the folktale changeling is 
certainly recognizable, given its prominence since the Victorian era, the SF changeling is 
not a well-known entity but rather one that I have been attempting to conjure since 
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Chapter 2. Stapledon is perhaps the first author to reach back to the folk narrative 
tradition, to reassert a folk sensibility in terms of a utopian speculation on "spirit, " and 
to resituate the folkloric changeling in a technologically advanced setting. Sirius, the 
thematic sequel to Odd John, reiterates Stapledon's earlier position in Star Maker that the 
truly "awakened" individual possesses a balance of human intelligence and animal 
instinct. Sirius, one of the first notable canine protagonists in modem SF or fantastic 
literature,71 is also Stapledon's first prominent animal-human hybrid protagonist; for he 
is, unlike Odd John, a mongrel consisting ofhuman and animal parentage whose spiritual 
awakening results not from his escape from but rather his alliance with Homo sapiens. 
With the appearance of the superhuman comes also the counter-vision of the nonhuman: 
this is the shifting set of coordinates (Swanson 288), and ultimately the geophilosophical 
scope ( deterritorialization/reterritorialization), for Last and First Men and Star Maker, 
Odd John and Sirius. 
Since Chapter 1 I have argued that changeling tales and SF variations on them 
provide articulations of "new social relations" through the personae of congenitally 
afflicted children, spontaneously mutated and/or genetically altered humans, and 
hybridized animal-humans. On the one hand, the changeling-as a particular conceptual 
enunciation of human evolution and social change (to put it in abbreviated form)-has 
often been a figure of both crippled body and crippled mind, a dwarfish figure of 
ressentiment, as Nietzsche would say, but also a fetishized creation of an even more 
deformed human species, the "vast army of our sick civilization," as Wilhelm Reich 
71 Others include the dog investigator of Franz Kafka's "Investigations of a Dog" ( 1922) and the proletariat 
mongrel Sharik of Mikhail Bulgakov's Heart of a Dog (1925). 
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announced in 1946 (ix). On the other hand, it would be no contradiction to say that the 
changeling has shown remarkable adaptability and that it frequently possesses a refined, 
almost alien, sense of ethics that enables humans to reevaluate their own limited systems 
of morality. All the same, none of the alliances we find in folk legends attain more than a 
truncated articulation, and if they are advanced, they fizzle out through the general human 
inability to suppress hierarchical behavior: the changeling, and therefore the new social 
relation, is exorcized. But if we consider the legends and their corresponding folk culture 
to be "primitive" (which, temporally, they certainly are), it is only a falsehood to believe 
that "modem" culture is more advanced (with the exception of the handful of folkloric 
and SF simulations, models, or analogies down through the ages which have exceeded the 
limits oftheir generic boundaries or linguistic registers). If it follows that the opening 
assertion of Chapter 1 holds true for Chapter 5-that is, that "folk narratives 
conceptualize inter-group relations, which concern the material circumstances of raising 
families, dealing with poverty, disease, and war, and learning to adapt to changes in both 
the environment and in the economy"-then Homo sapiens has not truly made any 
notable advance. These "relations" are hostile, irrational, hierarchical, and totally 
internecine, governed as they are by the abstractions, or "secondary impulses," that have 
always ruled the human species-"justice," "freedom," and all the rest. 
Stapledon's cosmological vision of humanity in Last and First Men confirms that 
what passes for human intelligence nearly cripples the race beyond repair; and worse than 
this, his initial self-inflicted blow (biological or nuclear warfare) causes his own race to 
limp along painfully and pathetically for thousands of millennia until he remakes himself 
out ofthe desecrated environment of past wars. But far from advancing some new 
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salvational ideology that would heal the "fractured political field" of his own "war-tom 
Europe and the fragmented psyches of its inhabitants" (Gomel 394-95), Stapledon, like 
his contemporary Capek, finds in the mongrel changeling the ultimate antidote for the 
transcendent superman. In the midst of the bitter portrait that culminates in the final 
destruction ofhumankind, Stapledon offers one of the first significant science-fictional 
attempts to articulate what it means to form "new social relations" through the symbiotic 
exchange of dissimilar organisms. And the changeling is a key persona here: for 
Stapledon's changelings are thinkers, and they are themselves inventors and creators of 
other changelings (the Third Men engineer the Fourth, the Fourth engineer the Fifth, and 
so on); they also populate the territories of new societies and new civilizations and "show 
thought's territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations" (Deleuze 
and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 69; original emphasis). For the record, this 
deterritorializing movement is also discovered in Shelley's use of Enlightenment 
philosophy, in Wells's use ofDarwinian theory, and in Capek's use of European folk 
tradition: the whole apparatus of an established tradition in a particular epoch is adopted 
in its entirety but is then rerouted and steered in an entirely different direction. It is in SF, 
and through the SF changeling, that Stapledon so eloquently reminds us that life 
"proceeds by insinuation" (Bergson 71). While we find the most detailed description of 
the SF changeling and his operations in Stapledon's later works, the future Chronicler's 
anthropological field notes on the culture of post-twenty-first humankind reveals 
Stapledon's broader interest in a metamorphosed humanity, a state which can only occur 
if a spiritual and not just a biological change can be engineered. 
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I. Last and First Men and Star Maker: Cosmological Reterritorializations and 
Anthropological Deterritorializations 
As another writer who claims direct descent from Wells, Stapledon writes what 
we may call "social science fiction" since he links the artistic creation of new worlds and 
new social relations to the optimal transformation of his own empirical environment. But, 
if he can be described as a "utopian" thinker, he is not a naive one: the new worlds of 
S tapledon' s SF are meant to correspond to, if not stimulate, a radical change in the minds 
of individuals rather than a radical reconstruction of society itself For example, while he 
was throughout his life consistently sympathetic towards Communist thought and the 
notion of a "more advanced type of government" (Moskowitz 60), he also understood the 
importance of minute but singular changes; he valued, in other words, evolution as much 
as revolution, well aware that the spontaneous changes occurring in nature on a regular 
basis could be as radical as any governmental overthrow or military coup. He is, then, 
interested in what the "controlled imagination" can accomplish (Last and First Men 9), 
aided by both the initial free range of art as well as the delimiting forces of the intellect. 
i. Last and First Men 
Last and First Men outlines the rise and fall of some eighteen species of humanity 
through some two thousand million years, amidst the incalculable duration of the vast 
struggle for life in the "slaughter-bench of history" (Geoghegan 347). As the work is too 
immense to discuss in full, I will consider just a few sequences involving a culture that is 
the first species to cultivate a new understanding of "the social relation" not hindered by 
ideological abstractions like the "State" but who succumb to a devastating Martian 
invasion (the Second Men); the genetically engineered projects of the Third Men who, 
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with their massive turret-mounted brains, manufacture the most formidable autocracy and 
totalitarian state (the Fourth Men); and the last race ofhumans, who attempt to regain the 
refinement of previous species (especially the Second and the Fifth Men), and who set 
about eliminating the five great evils-"disease, suffocating toil, senility, 
misunderstanding, ill-will" (the Eighteenth Men). The last Neptunian races in Stapledon's 
series (Tenth to Eighteenth) achieve the optimal height of human consciousness and what 
he would come to call "personality-in-community," the state ofbemg fully "awakened." 
But what exactly does Stapledon mean by "awakened"? The answer lies not in the 
transcendental realm of metaphysical philosophy-in, say, Plato's "Ideal" or in Hegel's 
"Absolute Spirit"-but rather in the material realities of living and working. By 
"awakened" perhaps Stapledon means: to awake from the drowsy inertia hastened by the 
"phantasms" ofhis society, the wholesale ideologies of particular groups that demand 
complete affiliation, whether they be Christians, Scientists, Mystics, or Revolutionaries.72 
But Stapledon's cosmic scope is not ultimately concerned with producing a totalizing 
theory of the "awakened spirit," choosing instead to fill his Cosmos-a living organism, 
stratified beyond comprehension-with a vast swarming horde of conceptual personae 
whose individual operations cannot be reduced to the dominant trends oftheir particular 
epochs. For this reason I tend to disagree with Stanislaw Lem who asserts that it is in the 
complete multi-millennial scale of humanity, rather than the smaller slices or individual 
epochs, that we find our greatest enjoyment ("On Stapledon's Last and First Men" 274). 
On the contrary, Stapledon encourages us to lament or rejoice over the individual failures 
72 These compnse the four sectwns of Four Encounters (1976), which IS a philosophical meditation on each 
personality through the narrator's encounter with a representative from each group. 
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and achievements of each species of humanity. It is within these smaller segments that we 
find the various becomings of humankind, the states that lie in between one species and 
another. In its hybrid or in-between state, humanity limps along in "crippled" fashion 
(Last and First Men 23, 41, 47, 55, 63, 78, 95, 98, 103, 108, 131, 132, 138, 192, 200, 
201), collectively enunciating a new conceptual persona: the SF changeling. 
One of the most tragic defeats for the race of humanity is the Second Men's 
conflict with the Martians who, at the height of this human civilization's evolutionary 
progress, invade the planet in search of "terrestrial water and terrestrial vegetation" (Last 
and First Men 121 ). The colonization of earth takes place over some fifty thousand years, 
with the amoeba-like Martians first descending upon the Earth in the form of greenish 
"cloudlets" (114). Gradually, the narrator tells us, the Martians are overcome by a 
"crusade" fervor for "liberating" diamonds, which have the special ability to embody 
"ethereal radiation or light" (125). This mania allows the Second Men to defeat the 
Martian crusaders in every subsequent invasion, but gradually the infiltration of this alien 
race begins to take its toll on the terrestrial inhabitants. The result is that a bacteriologist 
designs a deadly virus which wipes out all of the Martians but leaves the Second Men in 
disarray and apathy. So, like the First Men who destroy themselves through the use of 
biological weapons (73), the Second Men are driven into a new gloomy "wilderness" of 
existence in the aftermath of a devastating world war; in each case, a previously 
enlightened culture wrests itself from the earth only to tum the environment against itself. 
Moreover, it appears as though the Second Men have reverted to the tendencies of their 
immediate ancestors-the First Men as well as the species ofStapledon's own society. 
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In his depiction of a series of bacterial invasions (echoing previous epochs where 
individual races annihilate one another with microbial weapons), Stapledon produces a 
crucial variation on Wells's The War of the Worlds: whereas in The War of the Worlds, 
the Martians eventually succumb to an unforeseen Terran bacterium, in Last and First 
Men "the Martians are the fatal microbes" (Shelton, "The Mars-Begotten Men of Olaf 
Stapledon and H. G. Wells" 1). More than this, Stapledon takes the time to explore the 
mutual incompatibility of the Martians and the Terrans, and the fundamental failure for 
each group to acknowledge the other as a sentient culture. If the exchange of microbes is, 
on first appearance, simply a deadly technique of future warfare, it ultimately 
foreshadows Stapledon' s divergence from Wells's text: the creation of a symbiotic 
organism deriving from the contact between Martian and Earthling (2). But this symbiosis 
is never willed by the two cultures, and it only occurs after the Martians are completely 
annihilated by the bacteria and after their "subvital units," which enable telepathic 
communication, are imbibed and absorbed into bodies of the mammals who survive the 
war. Over time, the alien microbe wipes out the remainder of the Second Men, wreaks 
havoc on the environment, and torments animals with "pulmonary diseases" (Last and 
First Men 140). Gradually, however, something remarkable occurs in the physiology of 
the carnivorous animals, the most favoured species in the nearly desecrated Terran 
environment: 
As ages passed, certain species of mammals so readjusted themselves that the 
Martian virus became not only harmless but necessary to their well-being. A 
relationship which was originally that of a parasite and host became in time a true 
symbiosis, a co-operative partnership, in which the terrestrial animals gained 
something of the unique attributes ofthe vanished Martian organisms. (140, 142) 
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Here we have the most remarkable deterritorialization of all: the animal's adjustment to a 
previously hostile environment, which may recall our own adjustment to the chaotic 
planet after ice ages, volcanic eruptions, and the disastrous spread of deadly germs by 
hostile invaders, as well as our subsequent cultivation of the earth and our stubborn 
adaptability. But we must not forget that deterritorialization involves insinuation and, in 
this case, ingestion: for, "living matter seems to have no other means of turning 
circumstances to good account than by adapting itself to them passively at the outset" 
(Bergson 70). All the same, the "turning" of circumstances to good ends-like the 
mammals in the Martian sequence of Last and First Men-occurs when the organism 
seeks out another territory, segment, or stratum of its environment. And this 
deterritorialization occurs when the organism refuses to accord itself the status of 
"organism," and instead opens the body to "connections that presuppose an entire 
assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of 
intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 160). In such a scenario, cosmology (the 
vast force of astrological movements and planetary changes and the laws that supposedly 
govern our own planet's environment) may be modified by its counter-position, 
anthropology (the biological and cultural development of humankind and the minute but 
by no means insignificant effects of particular operations on our environment). 
Divergence occurs, then, when Stapledon's personae (his animal-men) tum their 
environment towards different ends. 
It may be worth our while to dwell on these cosmological-anthropological issues a 
little further. The Martian sequence, of course, introduces once again the concepts of 
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divergence and symbiosis, but it is not easy to distinguish where the one begins and the 
other ends: the moment of "contact" (between the animal-hominid and the earth, between 
the earth and the alien being, between the animal-hominid and the alien being) already 
presents an in-between stage in which we cannot tell whether it is the animal that has 
achieved human consciousness or the human who has learned to embrace his animal 
instincts; whether it is the earth that has been Martianized, or Mars that has been 
terraformed by the human bacteria carried back to the home planet by the fleeing 
Martians (Last and First Men 138). Both events occur, precipitating the separate 
divergence and hybridization of Terran and Martian. The physical joining together of the 
two disparate cultures is analogous to the narrator's belief that each possesses something 
that the other is lacking: for the Second Men, it is the ability to cultivate an individual 
consciousness free of the repressive public mind; for the Martians, it is the ability to view 
itself collectively, as a group consciousness that can transcend the narrow-minded single 
self. Combined, the now hybridized Martian-animals, who, we are led to believe, get an 
extra evolutionary boost from the sub vital microbes, constitute the first of Stapledon' s 
changeling personae and reside in the almost imperceptible space between animal and 
human, human and alien. 
Stapledon's most "awakened" humans possess a vigorous combination of these 
biological-spiritual coordinates, and it is the symbiosis ofTerran and Martian that leads to 
further variations on humankind, which now possesses the special telepathic technique 
enabled by the Martian subvital units. These units had allowed the Martians to 
communicate as a mass organism, even while the ideological preference for the group or 
"public" mind ultimately assimilates individual consciousness. For the Third Men, "at the 
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back of every mind was the conception of society itself as an organism of specialized 
members" (Last and First Men 155; my emphasis): at this moment in the history of 
humanity (some thirty milhon years after the eclipse of the Second Men), a new race has 
the opportunity to recapture that now ancient art of "personality-in-community," or the 
diversity of personalities within the larger community. Having set about to change 
"nature" generally-through their "vital art," which proceeds through Moreau-like 
operatiOns on various animal types-they now set about changing or "remaking" human 
nature. The result is the creation of the first of the "Great Brains," and perhaps the most 
notable of Stapledon' s changeling personae. Consider the following descnption of this 
bizarre experiment, which owes something to the large-brained Grand Lunar ofWells's 
The First Men zn the Moon (Shelton, "Mars-Begotten Men" 7), the similarly equipped 
Martians in his The War of the Worlds, and the speculative viswn of a highly-evolved 
humanity in his earlier science article "The Man ofthe Year Million" (1893): 73 
[T]he dauntless experimenters succeeded at last in creating an organism which 
consisted of a brain twelve feet across, and a body most of which was reduced to a 
mere vestige upon the under-surface of the brain. The only parts of the body 
which were allowed to attam the natural size were the arms and hands. These 
smewy organs of manipulation were induced to key themselves at the shoulders 
into the solid masonry which formed the creature's house. Thus they were able to 
73 For example, compare the passage from Stapledon's work to the followmg one from The War of the 
Worlds "It IS worthy of remark that a certam speculative wnter of quasi-scientific repute, wntmg long 
before the Martian mvaswn, did forecast for man a final structure not unhke the actual Martian condition. 
His prophecy, I remember, appeared m November or December, 1893, m a long-defunct pubhcatwn, the 
Pall Mall Budget, and I recall a cancature of It m a pre-Martmn penodical called Punch He pomted out-
wntmg m a foohsh, facetious tone-that the perfectiOn of mechamcal appliances must ultimately supersede 
hmbs, the perfectiOn of chemical devices, digestiOn, that such organs as hmr, external nose, teeth, ears, and 
chm were no longer essenttal parts of the human bemg, and that the tendency of natural selectiOn would he 
m the directiOn of their steady dimmutlon through the commg ages. The bram alone remamed a cardmal 
necessity Only one other part of the body had a strong case for survival, and that was the hand, 'teacher 
and agent of the bram' While the rest of the body dwmdled, the hands would grow larger" (350) The 
"prophecy" to which the narrator alludes IS Wells's own article, "The Man of the Year Mdhon," which was, 
m fact, pubhshed m the Pall Mall Budget m November of 1893 and descnbes this same large-bramed 
orgamsm 
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get a purchase for their work. The hands were the normal six-fingered hands of 
the Third Men, very greatly enlarged and improved. The fantastic organism was 
generated and matured in a building designed to house both it and the complicated 
machinery which was necessary to keep it alive. A self-regulating pump, 
electrically driven, served it as a heart. A chemical factory poured the necessary 
materials into its blood and removed waste products, thus taking the place of 
digestive organs and the normal battery of glands. Its lungs consisted of a great 
room full of oxidizing tubes, through which a constant wind was driven by an 
electric fan. The same fan forced air through the artificial organs of speech. (Last 
and First Men 157-58) 
We may recall from Chapter 1 that medical changelings often possessed large craniums 
but often damaged brains and pituitary glands. While the narrator ofStapledon's work 
tells us that the limbs of this creature are normal, compared to the massive brain, they are 
deformed; the brain certainly outweighs the diminutive body. We can imagine the whole 
rigging of the Brain's "home" as comparable to the hospital set-up in which tubes are 
hooked up to artificial organs to enable respiration and blood circulation in a congenitally 
afflicted child. Moreover, despite the great excitement generated by this project and its 
promise to usher in an entirely new human nature, for most readers this scene must 
produce the acute sensation of pain, recalling the ghastly photographs of children with 
Graves disease and marasmus (Munro 68, 72), or children suffering from progeria (Silver 
76).74 Compared to the folkloric (rather than medical) changeling, who has complete 
control of its environment (and escapes such tortures through its uncanny mobility), this 
"preposterous factory of mind" (Last and First Men 159) is terribly vulnerable. On the 
one hand, the science-fictional leap here proceeds by enlarging the possibilities of the 
engineered organism, first anticipated in British folk narrative, and by conceiving of an 
abnormality that is also an advance on the previous prototype. On the other hand, the 
74 For a review of other congenital disorders, see Chapter 1, section III. 
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narrator's tone ("this preposterous factory of mind" [emphasis added]) suggests that this 
new man is an utter regression; and while this new species of humanity is soon directed 
towards more successful projects (in which the first clutch of Brains build superior 
prototypes forty feet in diameter [ 159]), ultimately it becomes an instrument of autocracy 
and a socially engineered State. The "Great Brains" that constitute the Fourth Man in this 
dense cosmological fantasy anticipate the grotesque BEMs and the bulbous-headed 
scientists, not to mention the legions of supermen, of pulp magazines and cinema of the 
later 1930s, '40s, and '50s; but they also present a remarkably potent satirical sketch of 
extreme scientific materialism (McCarthy 38). 
Last and First Men, with its vast two thousand million-year cosmological cycle, 
may be seen as an expansive enunciation of Stapledon' s philosophy of "personality-in-
community" (Shelton, "The Moral Philosophy of Olaf Stapledon" 19-20), or symbiosis, 
which is finally accomplished in the era of the last nine species of Homo sapiens. Of 
course, the narrator, who is one ofthe Last Men, remarks that if"one of the First Men 
could enter the world of the Last Men, he would find many things familiar and much that 
would seem strangely distorted and perverse" (Last and First Men 214). Further, Wells's 
Moreau becomes an even more crucial text now when we consider that Stapledon's "Last 
Men" resemble "beast-like" organisms, and would, to the "primitive explorer" (perhaps to 
Prendick?), appear as "a degraded type," "faun-like, and in particular cases, ape-like, 
bear-like, ox-like, marsupial, or elephantine" (215). Unlike the "Beast-Folk," however, 
the Last Men "are both more human and more animal," and their particular operations 
(locomotion, manual dexterity, intellectual speculation, and spiritual reflection) make 
them a superbly harmonious organism in the great symphony that is humanity. Looking 
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ahead to Odd John, we might conjecture that the Eighteenth Men may very well be 
superhuman compared to the First Man since they are in such control ofboth their 
biological and spiritual evolution. While it does lack the "novel" appeal of the later work, 
the element of anticipation and speculation in Last and First Men is significant all the 
same, and it stands as one of the most skilled examples of philosophical SF. Consider, for 
example, the resolution of the confrontation between the Martians and the Second Men: 
this variation on Wells's The War of the Worlds exemplifies Stapledon's "modernization 
of the Hegelian dialectical process whereby 'antithesis' becomes 'complement' (a term 
favoured by Wells) so that 'synthesis' can become 'symbiosis' (a term borrowed from 
biology by Stapledon himself)" (Shelton, "Moral Philosophy" 16). We also discover that 
humanity's "evolution" is never a linear process but consists of terrible 
reterritorializations and wondrous deterritorializations; always, the Chronicler tells us, the 
new human species is on the "right track" when it begins to demonstrate some of the 
characteristics of the very first human species, the First Men. It may not surprise us, then, 
that Stapledon begins his second great cosmological fantasy with plain old Homo sapiens. 
ii. Star Maker 
Continuing on with the "controlled imagination" of the previous work, Star Maker 
employs the format of a loosely structured anthropological survey of alien worlds which 
serves to explore anew the possibility of achieving "personality-in-community." As I am 
focusing my attention on Stapledon's symbiotic communities, I will pass over much of 
the content of this work, which is largely concerned with the establishment of a 
"community of worlds" and the attempt to penetrate the identity of the Creator, the Star 
Maker himself. Instead, I will isolate just a handful of chapters-and in those chapters, 
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very particular scenarios-detailing the narrator's formation of a whole collective of 
"cosmical explorers," instigated by the narrator and his original ally, Bvalltu, a 
philosopher (Ch. 5.1); and this collective's encounter with the early strivings of a 
symbiotic "sub" -race (Ch. 7.1 ). The book opens with the narrator expressing his 
existential malaise: "One night when I had tasted bitterness I went out on to the hill" (Star 
Maker 11 ). While Leslie Fiedler has made the claim that this "bitterness" possibly 
suggests a "conjugal quarrel" and perhaps even "casts some light on Stapledon's complex 
relationship with his own wife" (Olaf Stapledon 11 ), I would assert that it places the 
narrator-the conceptual persona rather than simply the author's "real" voice-in his 
"cosmic setting" and amidst the flux of other social relations, which he cannot at first 
perceive in the "obscurity" (Star Maker 11) ofthe Cosmos itself. His eventual "odyssey 
among the stars" (Lem, "On Stapledon's Star Maker" 1) pulls him out of his familiar and 
habitual environment; for he has, by virtue of his prolonged meditation on the stars above, 
begun to soar away from "his native planet at incredible speed" (Star Maker 17) and 
ultimately to see through the perspective of a whole new series of extraterrestrial 
personae. I begin with one brief example. 
The cosmic travels in strange new worlds and the alliance with a pack of diverse 
organisms transform the narrator's previous understanding of home and Homo sapiens. 
Remarking on his ability to see through the philosopher Bvalltu's eyes, he describes a 
woman from the "Other Earth": 
When he looked up, I saw standing opposite us a caricature of a human being, 
with a frog-like face that was scarcely a face at all, and with the thorax of a 
pouter-pigeon, naked save for greenish down. [ ... ]This creature, which, to the 
terrestrial eye, was simply a monster, passed on the Other Earth as a young and 
beautiful woman. And I myself, observing her through Bvalltu's benevolent eyes, 
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recognized her as indeed beautiful. To a mind habituated to the Other Earth her 
features and her every gesture spoke of intelligence and wit. Clearly, if I could 
admire such a woman, I myself must have changed. (Star Maker 66; my 
emphasis) 
Despite the anthropomorphic analogy to the Terran animal kingdom, the narrator reveals 
how his newly acquired habits have altered his conception ofbeauty, of womanhood 
(surely he is now estranged in some way from his wife at home), and of the home. As 
Prendick discovers in Moreau, habituation leads to sympathy, and sympathy to a new 
social relation, which, in tum, deterritorializes our established conception of the "home" 
and leaves us open to the contaminating effects of symbiosis. 
While the star-seeker frequently uses the analogy of contagion to describe the 
numerous "swarms" of insane organisms that destroy their own worlds and those of other 
sentient beings (see, for example, Star Maker 43, 93, 129), he also applies this analogy to 
himself, suggesting that the symbiotic experience-the savoring of the "richness and 
subtlety" of alien sense organs ( 64 ), the "contrapuntal harmony" of living and moving 
with each other and through each other (70)-implies the mutual contamination of 
identity. Certainly, if we recall what Derrida has said about true or "radical" hospitality, 
the hosting of another involves a parasitical relationship, a "receiving without invitation, 
beyond or before the invitation" ("Hostipitality" [2002] 360; original emphasis). Two 
particular instances in Star Maker indicate that the narrator has gradually assumed the 
role of a parasite or symbiont, further suggesting his own status as a changeling of a sort. 
In the first case, he describes the reaction of the "hosts" he visits on the Other Earth: "The 
more sophisticated [inhabitants] assumed that I was a mere disease, a symptom of 
insanity in themselves. They therefore promptly applied to the local 'Mental Sanitation 
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Officer'" (Star Maker 35). In the second case, he describes his part as another kind of 
"host," perhaps akin to Derrida's conceptualization ("Hostipitality" [2000] 4): "Like a 
swarm oflocusts we would descend upon a new-found world, each of us singling out a 
suitable host" (Star Maker 133). This return to the concept of hospitality reminds us how 
significant SF has itself deterrritorialized-and contaminated-its own domain as well as 
that of folklore: the symbiont, for example, has become a well-established "alien actant" 
in the realm of alien-encounter SF (Malmgren 16), modifying the persona of the parasite, 
as featured in other SF works like Robert A. Heinlein's The Puppet Masters (1951) or 
Jack Finney's The Body Snatchers (1956) and in folktales about changelings. In 
Stapledon's hands, the SF changeling sheds its regressive characteristics and 
ressentiment, even while it reaffirms its animal and alien divergences. We can also 
perceive that Stapledon (like Capek) forces us to rethink the concept ofhospitality, which 
is modified when we graft onto it the additional component of"alliance." But, after all, 
the home and the family of the changeling has always been a "mobile territory" (Deleuze 
and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 67). And if Star Maker does not conceptualize a 
changeling we have seen before, it soars through the outer reaches of our own galaxy and 
beyond in order to make humanity itself unrecognizable, hybridized, and therefore a 
candidate for a changeling that is new under the sun. The strength of a comparison lies in 
the ability to find not only points of correspondence but also points of convergence: two 
very distinct personae may be said to converge when they bear a conceptual resemblance. 
Therefore, while Stapledon employs changeling personae, such as the Great Brain or Odd 
John, who resemble previous ones, he also employs prototypes whose operations, rather 
than appearances or characteristics, mark them as relevant for the current discussion. 
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One such prototype in Star Maker is the race consisting of Ichthyoids and 
Arachnoids who play a crucial part in Stapledon's search for "personality-in-community" 
because they constitute the most striking biological model for symbiosis in his entire 
cosmological series. This sequence is fascinating for its dazzling anthropological style, 
mixed as it is with an impressive knowledge of amphibian biology as well as a 
characteristic science-fictional flight of fancy. And while we find no recognizable 
changelings here (not that Stapledon ever explicitly acknowledges them as such in his 
work), we do discover the metamorphoses at work in the crossing over of kingdoms 
within the alien biospheres-operations that characterize all changeling tales, whether 
they be found in European folklore or SF. The two species, one resembling a "fish-like 
stock" and the other a "crustacean," initially engage in a fierce cultural war. As the 
narrator explains, both "were sufficiently human to be aware of one another as rival 
aristocrats in a subhuman world, but neither was human enough to realize that for each 
race the way oflife lay in cooperation with the other" (Star Maker 104-05; my emphasis). 
This may strike us as humanist in the worst way.75 However, the narrator's subsequent 
description of what "cooperation" between species entails completely estranges us from 
any human conception of that word: 
As the epochs passed, the two species moulded one another to form a well-
integrated union. The little arachnoid, no bigger than a chimpanzee, rode in a snug 
hollow behind the great 'fish's' skull, his back being stream-lined with the 
contours of the larger creature. The tentacles of the ichthyoid were specialized for 
large-scale manipulation, those of the arachnoid for minute work. A biochemical 
interdependence also evolved. Through a membrane in the ichthyoid's pouch an 
75 We may recall, from the mov1e Star Trek VI The Undzscovered Country (1990), the Klmgon woman's 
mockmg reply when Chekov makes a toast to "mahenable human nghts": "In-a/zen-able? If you could hear 
yourselves-human nghts The very name 1s rac1st The Federat10n 1s nothmg more than a Homo sapzens-
only club" 
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exchange of endocrine products took place. This mechanism enabled the 
arachnoid to become fully aquatic. So long as it had frequent contact with its host, 
it could stay under water for any length of time and descend to any depth. A 
striking mental adaptation also occurred in the two species. The ichthyoids 
became on the whole more introvert, the arachnoids more extravert. (1 05; 
emphasis added) 
It is notable that the narrator continues to anthropomorphize alien species in this 
passage: 76 we have comparisons to a chimpanzee and a fish, and each species is explicitly 
identified through a classification from the animal kingdom (ichthyoid and arachnoid). 
We might also speculate that the internal secretions of these creatures are likely not 
endocrinic, or even akin to what we usually identify as hormonal. Lastly, the narrator is 
intent on using human psychology to determine the temperaments of each species: one is 
extravert, the other introvert. The difference between this scenario and the earlier one 
involving the woman of the Other World is that the narrator does not specify the ways in 
which he experiences the new environment through the alien perspective. More so than in 
earlier episodes, the narrator maintains the perspective of a highly trained-if highly 
sympathetic-anthropologist. Following Gregory Benford's lead, Carl Malmgren 
characterizes this type of alien encounter as "extrapolative" since it involves an 
anthropomorphic categorization and therefore allows for a "readerly recuperation" (17). 
Despite these obvious faults, however, we might argue that Stapledon's concern in this 
passage (and in the book as a whole) is to place the human organism within the biosphere 
as a whole, including all of the wondrous creatures that crowd around Darwin's "tangled 
76 As Stamslaw Lem argues m Mzcroworlds, most Amencan SF stmphfies the human/ahen dtchotomy, 
leadmg authors to proJect "thetr fears and self-generated deluswns on the umverse" (247). For related 
dtscusswns of allen-encounter SF the anthropomorphized ahens, see Patnck Parnnder's "The Ahen 
Encounter. Or, Ms Brown and Mrs LeGum"; Gregory Benford's "Ahens and Knowabthty: A Sctentlst's 
Perspective" and "Effing the Ineffable", and Carl D. Malmgren's "Self and Other m SF: Ahen Encounters " 
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bank," and to show, by analogy, the human capacity to think beyond its own species; but 
before we can contemplate the alien, we must contemplate the animal. For this reason, the 
changeling may actually be easier for us to contemplate since it has always been 
associated with either our own species (lesser-evolved "savages," throw-backs, missing-
links, or hybrid unions) or with the animal (the "monster" that exhibits uncouth behaviour 
associated with a feral organism). The alien, on the other hand, presents for us an 
"impasse" in which both the human and the animal registers fail us; we may very well be 
forced to "leave behind the notion of characterization" altogether (Parrinder, "The Alien 
Encounter: Or, Ms Brown and Mrs Le Guin" 55). But we should not forget the powerful 
effects of cognitive estrangement, as Suvin suggests, nor should we discount in particular 
the subversive and satirical (not to mention defamiliarizing) technique of the animal 
bestiary, as exemplified by Swift, Orwell, and Capek. It does the human race no credit to 
discover that simple Arachnoids and Ichthyoids ("alien" or not) can achieve a truly 
symbiotic community and a "partnership" that is "at once more intimate than human 
marriage and far more enlarging to the individual than any friendship between members 
of distinct human races" (Star Maker 106). Further, while we (as humans) may find the 
grotesque description of the first Great Brain to be an almost familiar sight, we may find 
the image of aristocratic insectoid amphibians engaging in "contrapuntal sexuality" (1 05) 
estranging and a threat to our own human sensibilities. 
We have already seen how Wells conjures up folktale entities in his island of 
Beast-Men, and how Capek returns to Wells in his dystopian world of talking Newts. 
Stapledon plumbs the depths of these scientific parables in order to move off in an 
entirely new direction by conceptualizing the first of a series of symbiotic communities 
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based on both the traditional, folkloric notion of communal hospitality as well as the 
tactical alliance. The fairy realm is the height of human potential because human 
participation in the fairy economy constitutes a hybridization of two societies, cultures, 
and perhaps even kingdoms. For, if "evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in 
the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and 
kingdoms, with no possible filiation" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 238; 
original emphasis). If we do not reach the level of alienation produced in the best "alien-
encounter SF," we can also recognize that the alien converges at various points with the 
changeling persona, as seen in this and previous chapters. The hybrid theoretical approach 
of philosophical Darwinism ("creative evolution" in Bergson, "nomadic philosophy" in 
Deleuze and Guattari) helps us to gauge these intersections: the alien persona perhaps 
corresponds to what Stapledon calls the Cosmos, while the changeling corresponds to the 
terrestrial realm, to the solid earth. These points of convergence lead us to new insights in 
the next section. 
II. Odd John and Sirius: A Changeling for All Seasons 
It was suggested in the Introduction that Odd John and Sirius constitute 
Stapledon's proper "novels" because they abandon the essay format but also because they 
correspond to the more recognizable prose narrative containing a tightly-woven plot and 
individual protagonists distinguishable from the mass of their society. These works also 
extend the warning of Star Maker that the "lofty communal mind" can lead to a 
gregarious lifestyle and an oppressive herd mentality (Star Maker 171). While it is true 
that Stapledon was generally interested in the "enhanced lucidity of the cosmical spirit 
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itself' (254-55), Odd John and Sirius focalize for us, perhaps better than the Last Men, 
symbiosis in the modem milieu-an environment that is directly analogous to an external 
"truth": Stapledon's empirical world (Angenot 18). The eponymous protagonists situate 
us in the empirical world ofbio-genetics in 1930s and 1940s Britain and enunciate the 
problem of how "variations, beneficial or deleterious, come about in the first place" 
(Isaacs 37). It may be said that each of the five chapters of this project also correspond in 
varying ways to the motif of animal-hominid deterritorializations and 
reterritorializations-wresting the paw from the earth, reterritorializing it onto all manner 
of tools, turning away from territories and returning to them, as the situation demands 
(Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 67-68). It would be premature, then, to 
suggest that the Last Men or the Symbiotics constitute a finished product: if we can say 
that the changeling (folkloric or science-fictional) is the model for a higher evolved 
human, Stapledon's Eighteenth Man and his Ichthyoid-Arachnoids are theoretical models 
for Odd John and Sirius. As I have suggested, the symbiotic relation occurs on both the 
cosmological and anthropological planes, and the focus on a folkloric entity has allowed 
us to keep both in perspective. For 6 Gioll<lin, Jenkins, Briggs and other folklorists have 
continually stressed that any account of the changeling must take into consideration the 
"syncretism" of "popular" and "official" beliefs, and of religious and economic concerns. 
If the changeling functions for both the Church and its largely pagan congregation as a 
demonic force, it also operates as a parasitical threat to the material stability of the 
household. Appropriately, Odd John returns us to the realm of the "domestic" fiction, but 
with a twist: it parodies both traditional folklore and contemporary SF, and in doing so, 
displays more of Stapledon' s skills of insinuation. 
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i. Odd John 
Odd John depicts the life of a superman, and, through appropriately titled chapters 
("The First Phase," "Thought and Action," "Many Inventions," "Methods of a Young 
Anthropologist," and so forth), details the stages of John Wainwright's maturity from 
deformed revolutionary to god-like philosopher. Bakhtin has shown us that the "basic plot 
of a novel [ ... ] is presented as the course of a life sheathed in a metamorphosis" (Ill) and 
is "drawn from pre-class world folklore" (112). Odd John imitates the old form in its 
early catalogue of the hero's growth and maturity, including his remarkable ability to 
learn mathematics and theorize physics from his pram (Odd John 14): this is also an odd 
twist on the modernist "portrait" of an artist. The first eleven chapters (roughly the first 
half of the novel) describe John's rapid acquisition of human knowledge (mathematics, 
chemistry, biology, psychology, philosophy, and religion) and the tactics and operations 
that will allow him to survive in a world of"normals." Like other Bildungsromans, the 
plot turns on the protagonist's search for a vocation, which, for John, means the search for 
the fully "awakened" state of the human spirit. Chapter 12, entitled "John in the 
Wilderness," finds the protagonist at an impasse in his life, after which, in the next ten 
chapters (roughly the second half of the novel), John begins to tum his back on the human 
world and make an earnest search for other "supemormals" like him. It should be noted 
here that Sirius repeats this structure but with a crucial difference. The discussion that 
follows is largely concerned with how Stapledon's superhuman persona carries on the 
project to achieve "personality-in-community"; but it also concludes by considering why 
Sirius is more successful in this same objective. The distinction between each persona has 
much to do with their individual responses to the deformed changelings that surround 
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them. And so, as a fulfillment of my promise in Chapter 1, I first consider how 
Stapledon's SF reinvents the old world changeling in a modem milieu. 
But if we say that Stapledon returns the changeling to its old world scenario, by 
reminding us that these folkloric entities resembled "failure-to-thrive" children, his novel 
goes one step further than the folktale: it parodies the attempts to diagnose deformity, 
revealing its knowledge of congenital disorders and its powers of imperceptible 
insinuation. Fittingly, the newborn infant, little John, is described as an "inert pulpy bit of 
flesh," "more vegetable than animal, save for an occasional incongruous spasm of 
activity" (Odd John 11 ); and, when he matures, the infant prodigy appears "spiderish," 
long and lithe, with grey-green skin, a "Mongolian" head with close white, almost 
"Negroid" wool hair, and large, green cat-like eyes, which are the "most obviously 
'queer' part of him" (9). These descriptors are certainly indicative of an anomalous child, 
even while none of these features distinguish him from the changeling children we 
encounter in European folktales. According to Eberly, who cites the authority of fairly 
current medical texts (1990s), the child here may suffer from Marfan's syndrome, which 
was "characterized by very long, slender, 'arachnoid' digits and limbs" (236), or perhaps 
homocystinuria, which often had the symptom of "arachnodactyly," manifesting itself in 
"spider-like" limbs (242). More so than the first Great Brain, Odd John seems to come 
right out of a medical text on physical anomalies, and he may recall for us the "living 
skeletons" discussed in a work like Leslie Fiedler's Freaks (133-36). Even John's later 
pram riot, which the narrator compares to "a rich and subtle shindy, full of quaint 
modulations and variations" (Odd John 12), recalls the legendary changeling's cradle 
antics. But John is no passive spider-boy, nor is he mentally crippled by his deformity; if 
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he "fails to thrive" it is not because his parents fear or reject him (Munro 277); far from it, 
they protect him fiercely. Further, his pram riot is directed towards a complex and 
intelligent purpose, whereas, for the most part, the folkloric changeling's anarchy is short-
lived, even while we may feel that it has certain potential. But, at this point, we would be 
wrong to say that John transcends the folk changeling: rather, he explores the potential of 
this entity and, by embracing these characteristics, defies the set parameters of changeling 
behaviour, which would limit his "quaint modulations and variations." Moreover, 
Stapledon neatly displaces the authority of both medical science and the unnamed 
narrator: if John fits the traditional description of a changeling, he also effectively 
undermines the narrator's journalistic attempt to "complete the description" (Odd John 9), 
since each descriptor ("spiderish," "Mongolian," "Negroid") carries the register in several 
directions and reveals the divergent nature of our conceptual persona. These descriptors, 
in other words, present us with a series of personae-animal, man, man-becoming-
animal, and so forth-as well as alternate regions and territories (Mongolia), biological 
deterritorializations, and finally a hybrid identity (Negroid and therefore what used to be 
called Mulatto). We could go further with this and say that John is an entity swarming 
with previous conceptual personae-all the crippled and deformed children and the 
prodigies of twentieth-century pediatrics and pathology, the imps and interlopers of 
folklore, even Martin Luther's devil-in-the-cradle. The first indication of this occurs when 
John first opens his eyes, some eighteen months into his career: "it was as though a 
sleeping city had suddenly leapt into life" (11). Perhaps, like his literary descendent Paul-
Muad'Dib, the superhuman protagonist of Frank Herbert's Dune (1965), John is a 
"theater of processes," even while he does not fall ''prey to the imperfect vision, to the 
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race consciousness and its terrible purpose" (Herbert 390; original emphases). Like the 
Last Man of Last and First Men, John is able to harness particular processes and 
coordinate them into tactical patterns, and to keep others at bay. 
In particular, John orchestrates the processes he harnesses (the "theory of 
relativity" [Odd John 14], "passionate manual constructiveness" and drawing [16], 
"locomotion" [17], physical agility [23], and inventiveness [47-49]) towards the 
cultivation of his own particular "style" ( 44), which is related to his search for a vocation. 
Throughout these first several chapters he performs a series of experiments as a way to 
discover what fields of knowledge and what kinds of social relations are worth pursuing. 
True to his changeling nature, he deftly infiltrates the world of finance and politics; 
discovers that most modem philosophers are mere "howlers" (35), that psychiatry is pure 
quackery (71) and religion "Ninety-nine per cent. slush" (73). His particular style is a sort 
of bricolage of human philosophy, religion, and science, shaped and redirected for a new 
purpose. Even as a child, John does not merely "play" with numbers (an already 
precocious activity) but discovers, in essence, that it makes more sense for humans to 
count in twelves (13); and shortly after this, his conversation with a mathematician proves 
that he has the "imaginative power" to perceive principles without knowing the "jargon" 
(15). As he accumulates his catch-all ofhuman pastimes, John discovers that science, 
philosophy, and all the rest of it have the potential to serve the human race well but that 
the human race makes a muddle of it all-which means that they are unable to see beyond 
their doctrines, ideologies, and quackery. The coordination of his experiment, then, 
requires him to develop his powers as imperceptibly as possible to avoid the damaging 
effects of human irrationality and to extricate himself from any prolonged contact with 
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those who are his inferiors. He first accomplishes this task by constructing for himself a 
subterranean workshop in which he creates a series of ingenious "household and personal 
labour-saving devices" ( 4 7). The description of this burrow of sorts, located deep in the 
woods under a sheet of corrugated metal, is a variation on the folktale landscape featured 
in Chapter 1 : 
The sheet was now easily lifted, and opened like a trap door in the hillside. It 
revealed a black hole between three big stones. John crawled inside, and bade me 
follow; but before I could wedge my way through he had to move one of the 
stones. I found myself in a low cave, illuminated by John's flashlight. So this was 
the workshop! It had evidently been cut out of the clay slope and lined with 
cement. ( 45-46) 
We may recall the scene in "The Fairy Wife" where the little boy comes through the door 
in the hillside in order to buy the foal from the man (Chapter 1, section I). Following his 
fairy ancestors, John invites the human into his cavernous dwelling and proceeds to 
initiate an economic transaction: introducing his series of inventions, John discloses his 
financial venture, which can only function if the narrator assumes the role ofbusiness 
agent ( 48-49). The inventions themselves-a trouser pocket for boys ( 46), a parsley 
cutter, a potato peeler ( 4 7)-are variations on domestic devices and therefore further 
insinuations into the human world directed for the purpose of '"putting one over' on the 
established order on its home ground" (de Certeau 26). Like the Good People, John 
resides in the earth only to tear himself away from it, to break through it and ascend 
above it; accordingly, he will reside in the company ofhumans (the narrator and his own 
mother, Pax) in order to reaffirm his need to escape humanity. Moreover, this method of 
detachment creates a dilemma for the superhuman protagonist: as he begins to distance 
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himself from Homo sapiens, he also loses touch with his changeling heritage which, as 
we know, derives in part from that very same species. 
There is, then, a certain amount of cynicism involved in John's search for a style 
or mode of expression. But always this cynicism appears to have a purpose, for we must 
remember that John also enunciates some of the criticisms of his creator, the author, 
Stapledon. As the superman, the Ubermensch, John also enunciates Nietzsche's 
frustration with the "man" who sees himself as a finished product, or who, on the 
contrary, delights in his "crippled" misery (Zarathustra 159-60). Accordingly, he enters 
the realm of human social relations in order to initiate a radical convalescence among the 
"hunchbacks" of his society (159). However, once John discovers his great powers of 
seduction early on (Odd John 58), it appears as though he is simply engaging in lab 
experiments with Homo sapiens. His first affair or attempt at conquest is with his closest 
friend, Stephen (59); this is a sure sign of John's "queer" behaviour and yet another 
gesture of his defiance of accepted human morals. He engages in other love-affairs with 
older boys and young men ( 61) but focuses most of his attention on the pursuit of an 
attractive girl named Europa. Later on he tells the faithful narrator, whom he benevolently 
calls "Fido," that he needed the conquest of Europa in order to gain independence from 
Homo Sapiens but that, by engaging in the affair, he was fraternizing with an inferior 
specimen (64-65). There is, of course, an allegorical reading available to us, since Europa 
is seen by John as a representative of at least one segment of the race-Europe-but there 
is more to unpack here. His whole career of seduction and his otherwise misogynist 
remarks on one of the female sex, whom he compares to a "dog [ ... ] smelling around me" 
(64), indicates that he is loath to be tied in any way to another, and that he sees the 
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dangers in becoming affiliated. Additionally, his homosexual relationship with Stephen 
does not require him to consummate a relationship through marriage, or at least to 
become subject to the heterosexual marriage convention. This is not the first "queer" 
changeling we have encountered, if we recall the homoerotic undertones of the Jekyll-
Hyde relationship. 77 Lastly, his final transgression of committing incest with his mother 
Pax underscores his larger intention to "assert his moral independence of Homo sapiens, 
to free himself of all deep unconscious acquiescence in the conventions of the species that 
had nurtured him" (65). The great irony, however, is that the rejection of human 
affiliations seems to truncate "new social relations" all the more. Most of these brief 
friendships, and even his life-long one with "Fido," are comparable to that between a man 
and his faithful dog. As both Barbara Bengels and Arthur Roy Swanson argue, 
Stapledon's "Story Between Jest and Earnest" (the subtitle of the novel) may be inviting 
us to see the flaws in the superhuman mentality, just as we are encouraged to see flaws in 
the engineered society of the Great Brains in Last and First Men. Part of John's tragedy is 
that he is unable to find fully awakened humans and must search instead for 
superhumans. For failing to see that humanity is the source ofthe symphony he seeks 
(Last and First Men), and for failing to acknowledge his own human heritage, John truly 
is "a dullard in his own way" (Bengels, "Olaf Stapledon's 'Odd John' and 'Sirius': 
Ascent into Bestiality" 59). But another part of the tragedy-which is also the comedy, 
the Jest, and the satire-is that a large portion of human society cannot see the potential to 
77 Andrew M. Butler and Chris West have recently sketched out what should be a pwneenng exploratwn of 
the "queer" or "perverse" elements of SF, which can be traced back to Jekyll and Hyde and which recur 
most prommently m the texts of the magazme heyday and of the Cold War era, aliliough frequently through 
the perspective of a hyper-homophobic protagomst. 
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embrace the spiritual transcendence that John at least emulates, even if he is too divine to 
appreciate the experience (Swanson 284). Moreover, "Stapledon is philosophically sad 
that humans cannot be what they must remain, once they have developed full spirituality" 
(285), and John enunciates this flaw when he ultimately transcends humanity. 
Transcendence has never been the objective of the changeling and even in the 
crudest versions of the legend, there is a tragic sense of the loss of community: as Johnnie 
laments, "I wish I had been longer with my mother. I'd a kent her better" (Briggs, 
"Johnnie in the Cradle" 290). At the same time, right from the start the changeling has 
been a "theater of processes" intended to carry out the objectives of his own-sometimes 
terrible-race, the Good People. Nevertheless, while John has crawled out of the cradle, 
propelled by his inventive operations, he has refused to fall back on the home when he is 
vulnerable. He chooses instead to exile himself permanently from the human world. This 
break happens when he strikes off to the wild hills of Scotland in order to relive primitive 
man's struggle for existence (Odd John 94-104): this we may see as his "down-going" 
(Nietzsche, Zarathustra 39) and his very last reterritorialization. John discovers that he 
has become "spiritually contaminated by contact with the civilization of Homo sapiens," 
and while he is momentarily thrust back to the blood-riot of Homo sapiens' savage 
hunter-gatherer beginnings, he makes a clean break in order to "strip away every vestige 
of [the race] from his own person[ ... ] without depending in any way whatever on the 
primitive and debased creatures who dominated the planet" (Odd John 94). Thus, in the 
middle ofhis search for "personality-in-community," John has reached an impasse, for he 
has surpassed the previous mutants, Beast-Men, monsters, and changelings of all kinds 
and degrees. Like Zarathustra, he underscores man's animal ancestry but is much too 
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impatient with the slow process of evolution; while he had originally been amused by 
man's animal, earthy, and earth-bound thinking, his final down-going leads to a torrid 
denunciation of man's stultified position as man. Man is too much the animal, he asserts 
frequently; man is much too proud of his primitive instincts, and even the greatest man, as 
Zarathustra exclaims, is "all-too-human!" (Zarathustra 117). This impasse is worth 
considering in further detail since John's absolute deterritorialization nevertheless 
contributes to one coordinate of Stapledon' s radical reinvention of the changeling 
persona. For "man," or rather the human, is a crucial part of the equation: as Zarathustra 
says poignantly in the opening prologue ofNietzsche's philosophical fantasy, "What is 
great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a 
going-across and a down-going" (44). 
However we are meant to interpret John's superhuman arrogance, it is apparent 
that he operates effectively as a component of Stapledon's critique of contemporary 
human society. Unlike the Last Men, John has great difficulty adjusting to his 
environment, especially since he cannot transform society with society's willing 
assistance. Being a superhuman, he experiences the acute pain of living in the wrong era, 
instead of in one of the future eras described in Last and First Men, where he truly seems 
to belong. Accordingly, John searches for beings of this sort, and his acquired telepathic 
abilities allow him to succeed at least in this pursuit. As a testimony to his belief that the 
world of Homo sapiens has "contaminated" the supemormals who must live in the same 
space, the first "wide-awake" person he finds, James Jones, is a five-fingered flute player 
currently living in a lunatic asylum (Odd John 1 09). The ailing old man discovers a way 
to produce sweet music from his pipe in the midst of his isolation and despite the fact that 
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the orderlies regard his "oddly twisted variants" of classical pieces as the "caterwauling 
of a lunatic" (11 0). John tells his faithful Fido that the pipe music straightens out the 
"tangles" ofhis mind (111), suggesting once again the ways in which the behavior of 
these supernormal changelings defies the expectations and diagnoses of modem society 
and, ultimately, John's own doubts about the race. If we have gradually become more 
detached and less sympathetic towards John, who has subjected every one of our sacred 
beliefs to merciless ridicule, we may experience a kind of pathos for "J. J.," this 
deformed, pipe-playing child living in an old man's body-evidently, a descendent of 
Johnnie-in-the-cradle. When he finally leaves the old man, J. J. sinks back into his 
madness, reinforcing for John the need to strip away the vestiges of the human world, 
which seems to have done more to harm than to help the changeling. 
John's next encounter with a supernormal goes some way towards convincing us 
ofhis need to extricate himself from human society, but the meeting also reinforces 
Stapledon's search for a human community that might learn something from the 
changeling's variant music. The second "wide-awake" individual is discovered to be 
living in South Uist, Outer Hebrides, and John gives his faithful biographer a detailed 
description: 
He's a ghastly cripple; no legs, and arms like a newt's arms. And there's 
something wrong with his mouth, so that he can't talk. And he's always sick, 
because his digestion doesn't work properly. In fact he's the sort any decent 
society would drown at birth. But the mother loves him like a tigress; though she's 
scared stiff of him too, and loathes him. Neither parent has any idea he's-what 
he is. They think he's just an ordinary little cripple. And because he's a cripple, 
and because they treat him all wrong, he's brewing the most murderous hate 
imaginable. (Odd John 112) 
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In this scenario we discover the, by now, recognizable changeling persona, with his 
deformed limbs and internal organs: he is like the "fractious" baby of "The Caerlaverock 
Changeling," contrary because he is constantly ill, and a good candidate for infanticide. 
The difference here, which John is sure to point out, is that this changeling possesses a 
glittering malice. Unlike the beautiful lunatic, J. J., this creature has become completely 
warped by his deformity: he does not say, "friend" when he sees another supernormal 
(110) but instead shuts his mind like an oyster (113). For John, as for Stapledon the 
author, the old world changelings will not do; for too long (not just since the Victorian 
period but as far back as the Renaissance, and perhaps as far back the Middle Ages), 
changelings have functioned as scapegoats in society, like Luther's "devils in the cradles, 
which thrive not, only they feed and suck" (qtd. in Hartland 109), like Stevenson's Hyde 
who represents the atavistic behaviour of the lower (criminal) classes, or like Capek's 
Newts who, as "little people," thrive on the honour of deformity and the reactionary 
politics of mass military bravado. 
Odd John is a radically deterritorialized changeling; "radical" because he is born 
as a changeling but quickly sheds most of the characteristics associated with changelings 
and changeling behaviour. Most significantly, this changeling grows up. When the 
crippled child finally "opens" himself to him, John is nearly swallowed by the mirror-
image of himself: "I felt myself dropping plumb into the most appalling darkness [ ... ] a 
sort of dank atmosphere of poison" (Odd John 113). This "baby Satan" (114) is the 
changeling that John used to be, but also the changeling that was fetishized in the folklore 
of the Victorian period: the changeling that we have been trying to shake off since 
Chapter 1. We may then shiver in relief as John escapes with his life-and especially his 
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mind-intact, but also feel a certain haunting sadness for both the afflicted child, with his 
poor digestion (his inability to savor life while in this crippled state), and his elderly 
parents who protect him fiercely, fear him all the more, and ultimately help to deform his 
sociability. The very domestic scene haunts us as well since it seems to fit the setting of 
the old changeling tale: the "minute room with a flagged floor, the peat fire" (113), 
which, we might add, is never used to drive the wretched creature out of the home. I have 
lingered on this passage and on this figure because he, more than any persona 
encountered since Chapter 1, allows us to see the changeling in its old world setting; 
allows us to see the old world changeling with new eyes, and to remind ourselves that this 
persona has always oscillated between ideological recuperation and radical reinvention 
(Chapter 4, Introduction): the Hebridean child comprises one ofthese, and Odd John 
comprises the other. In the midst of this black hell-hole ofhate, we discover within the 
extremes of these two changelings, the possibility of "personality-in-community." More 
than any other SF writer ofthe period, Stapledon employs a changeling persona in order 
to discover the "appropriate attitude of the adult human spirit" (111 ). 
While John later founds a colony of supemormals, after having recruited 
throughout the British Isles and then the rest ofthe globe, we eventually discover that he 
cannot succeed in his enterprise without opening his familial circle. Indeed, his own 
insinuation into the domestic realm early on-his changeling birth-precipitates his 
lifelong search for contingent allies who will not demand membership. His is a "family" 
without the usual blood ties, for they are bastard and nomadic, hybridized and, to a certain 
degree, deformed. Moreover, there is a certain amount of irony in the Hebridean episode, 
for this "baby Satan" fits the bill for loose membership in John's band of freaks, and is 
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likely a more powerful supernormal than even John (Odd John 114). The child is, 
moreover, John's folkloric doppelganger, not only because he resembles John in infancy 
(the "inert pulpy bit of flesh") but also because he foreshadows the stunted growth of the 
supernormal colony, which John establishes in the final stage of his life. It may not 
surprise us in the end that the old world changeling ultimately contributes to the 
destruction of John and his colony of supernormals. When an international fleet of ships 
finally discovers the secret colony, and proceed to inquire about the curious project, John 
and his clan manage to use the power of telepathic suggestion to manipulate their guests 
into benevolence. This tactic works initially, but one representative from Japan begins to 
resist the telepathic control and ultimately convinces his cohorts to dismiss the 
supernormals as "devils" that will someday destroy the human world (186). John believes 
that the Hebridean child had "contrived to be telepathically present at this scene" in the 
mind of the Japanese representative. Shortly after this, John and his colony members 
commit mass suicide to avoid their inevitable destruction but also to avoid the possibility 
of being experimented on. This summary "complete[ s] the description," as it were, 
supplying us with the first of two tragic endings to a beautiful life. But we should be far 
from convinced that Stapledon saw only tragedy in this "failed superman."78 The whole 
project of the colony, with its intention to explore the fully awakened state, deserves 
further consideration. 
Some critics have taken Stapledon's tale of a superman to be an "earnest" account 
of the extraordinary possibilities of genetic mutations, believing, as Stapledon may have 
78 Leshe Fiedler's chapter on Odd John m OlafStapledon A Man Dzvzded IS titled "A Failed Superman and 
His Fmthful Hound" 
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in his early years (see, for example, "The Splendid Race"), that "the great hope for 
mankind is the coming into being, either artificially or through mutation, of an advanced 
species which will possess more of godliness and less of the animal" (Moskowitz 273). 
These assertions seem to be confirmed when, after he has founded his colony, John 
initiates a series of experiments in an attempt to genetically alter human embryos (Odd 
John 168-69): not content with living amongst Homo sapiens, he seeks to alter them in 
his own way after all. Characteristically, Fido passes over this episode rather quickly, 
perhaps aware of the delicate nature ofhis biography and of the fact that his narrative can 
only describe John's actions rather than fully explain them. Once again, Stapledon seems 
to be inviting us to add our own interpretation, but we cannot assume that the author 
supports his protagonist's actions, whether they involve biological engineering or the 
casual murder of a crew that intercepts John and his collective on their way to the island 
(146). While John may be right that Homo sapiens would likely destroy a colony of apes 
if it threatened to inhibit the founding of a human society (148), we may not forget his 
earlier claim that the inability to sympathize with a lesser or misfortunate species 
(crippled, deformed) indicates a spiritual corruption. More than this, John refuses to see in 
his own maturity from changeling to superman, the sped-up version ofhumanity's very 
slow and painful evolution. So it is with irony that we return to John's own words: "My 
looks are a rough test for people," he tells Fido. "If they don't begin to see me beautiful 
when they have had a chance to learn, I know they're dead inside, and dangerous" (9). 
But John still believes that the colony of wide-awakes can find no success in the world of 
the normals. Langatse, the supernormal Tibetan monk who becomes advisor for the 
project but not full participant, invites John to delay what he views as a hasty enterprise in 
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order to share with him "more exalted spiritual adventures" (149). John ultimately rejects 
the offer. Perhaps we might view Langatse, this supernormal changeling, as one of two 
possible routes for John in the aftermath ofhis wilderness exile: for the monk possesses 
the spiritual sensitivity that John is lacking and which would tum John's enterprise into a 
less isolated venture by delaying the complete departure from human affairs. John's 
rejection of the spiritual "adventure" "may be seen as [his] rejection of his humanity and 
indeed of humanity itself in favor of a demigodhood that cannot retain its human 
experience of spirituality" (Swanson 291 ). 
Despite the sense of community that is present in the colony, as described by the 
ever faithful Fido (who, we may say, is rather too quick to adopt John's views), we could 
say that the supemormals have either 1) reterritorialized on their obsession with forming a 
community of like minds and have therefore fallen back on the affiliation after all, or 2) 
they have brought about an absolute deterritorialization in which "community" is 
completely drained of its "social" significance. We have already seen in Last and First 
Men how the Great Brains choose the former option, and how the Martians choose the 
latter one. Perhaps we might venture to say that the supemormals oscillate between the 
two options and, at certain moments, achieve an optimal level of sociality-indeed, a 
''personality-in-community"-despite their isolation from Homo sap. This intersection of 
the individual and the community occurs when, upon finally rejecting the old world 
changeling, the nasty Hebridean child, John invites other changelings into his circle. 
There is Ng-Gunko who, by all appearances, is a "Negroid" variation of the changeling, 
or a "grotesque and filthy little blackamoor," as the narrator uncharitably describes, 
appearing "about eight years old," but being in fact "over twelve." He is a "freak" with 
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impossibly red wool hair, two different sized eyes, a face that had "a sinister comicality 
which was borne out by his expression" (Odd John 136), and a personality which 
suggested that he was "at heart a little savage" (137). Ng-Gunko himselfbecomes a 
recruiter and abducts an African baby that, even before birth, demonstrates "supernormal" 
ability (145). Throughout the lengthy journey back to the other supernormals, the child 
does not "thrive," even though he ultimately survives the ordeal and remains mentally in 
peak form: we can assume that he, too, bears the likeness to the deformed changelings of 
British folk legend, but with the difference that he (like his abductor, N g-Gunko) is free 
of the crippling hate that affects the Hebridean child. Moreover, despite his best efforts, 
John fulfills the promise and the threat of all folklore changelings: that the more 
interpretations and diagnoses we introduce, the more conceptual personae appear. And 
despite his attempt to deterritorialize the old world changeling, it keeps returning, always 
with a new variation on the old theme. 
To be sure, in Stapledon's hands, the changeling motif undergoes a significant 
alteration. However, the old changeling narratives frequently display ambiguous attitudes 
towards the interlopers, indicating both the parental fear of the outside world as well as 
the desire to experience some of its pleasures and utopian possibilities: the gifts of the 
Good People could be invaluable and life-altering. Recalling Chapter 1, the "fairy 
economy" involves an ongoing transaction between the domestic and public/market 
spheres, resulting in a crossover scenario in which the home becomes the very site for 
material exchange and therefore serious domestic disturbances (thefts and abductions). 
The changelings in these tales and legends are hybrid figures because they not only 
occupy but effectively instigate the in-between state of the transaction itself-the 
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exchange of human child for fairy child. In other words, it is a measure of Stapledon' s 
skill that he incorporates these same ambiguities in his depiction of the super-changeling, 
Odd John, and of the "baby Satan," the Hebridean child who is his arch-nemesis. Further, 
the older generation, represented by his mother Pax, may be unusually accepting of the 
mutant child, but the rest of John's world is still tainted by the old world fear of both the 
changeling and the supernormal intelligence, which is why, John claims, religious folk so 
desperately want "their God to be human" (Odd John 73). Post-WWII SF authors have 
picked up on this almost mystical fear of human evolution or, to be more precise, the fear 
of the real possibility of a post-human evolution. In his study of Stapledon, Olaf 
Stapledon: A Man Divided, Fiedler suggests that only in Arthur C. Clarke's Childhood's 
End (1953), which incorporates the changeling motif in its depiction of extra-terrestrials 
as midwives who nurture a new species to replace Homo sapiens, did a whole generation 
take "the myth of the Changeling Child as their very own" (103). While most academic 
SF critics and a few enthusiasts would likely agree that Stapledon was a "major molder" 
oflater SF (Moskowitz 14 ), the philosopher-poet was virtually unknown to most fans 
throughout his writing career and remains something of an obscurity today. But I am not 
ultimately concerned here with Stapledon's popularity, how he succeeded or failed to 
spawn his own "freak" following (as Clarke did and as Heinlein certainly did). Rather, I 
am interested in how he molded his conceptual persona, and in this respect 
(philosophically, conceptually), Stapledon bridges an important gap between the 
Victorian folkloric changeling and the post-WWII changeling that would inhabit the 
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worlds of Clarke, Heinlein, Bradbury, Sturgeon, Wyndham, Blish, Brunner, Dick, 
Anderson, and Butler. 79 
ii. Sirius 
If Odd John is one of the most fascinating supermen of the first half of the 
twentieth century, Sirius is likely the most fascinating supercanine. After his engineered 
insinuation into the life of humankind, Sirius proceeds along a path that in some ways 
runs parallel to that of John Wainwnght, for the chapter titles detail the stages of Sirius's 
maturity from deformed sheep-dog to enlightened man-dog. The canine initially appears 
to be an unpromising anomaly, more prodigal than prodigy, even slow to acquire the 
usual canine locomotion, but he also shows remarkable intelligence that is latent in the 
early years of growth ("The Making of Sirius," "Infancy"). He then spends a certain 
length of time getting used to his supernormal abilities and the painful realization that he 
is not like the other members of his species, assuming the role of a "super sheep-dog" in 
the country, then a lab researcher at the university, and then a religious confidante of a 
minister in the city ("Sheep-dog Apprentice," "Sirius at Cambridge," "Sirius and 
Religion"). The search for a "vocation" that follows is difficult since he is forced to 
79 Fiedler is perhaps one of the few cntics to note Stapledon's use of folklore matenalm ills SF and the 
possible ways of gaugmg the author's vanation on a theme. Both "Humpty and Paul" (a story sequence and 
fictional pamng from Last Men zn London) and Odd John, he argues, "reembody, mmverted form" the 
ancient myth "preserved m the folktale of the Changehng Child" (OlafStapledon 103). By "mverted" 
Fiedler means that, whereas the "ongmal verswn iS sympathetic to the older generatwn," that iS, the parents 
of the changehng, "m Stapledon, the balance iS tilted m favor of the later born, the 'freaks,' whose 
monstrosity he emphasizes so strongly that it seems as if he beheved that to be truly admirable a new 
species must challenge not JUSt ethical but esthetic norms." Prevwusly, m his widely acclaimed book 
Freaks Myths and Images of the Secret Self, Fiedler had explored the science-fictwnal penchant for 
mutants and the 1960s youth movement's co-optwn of works hke van Vogt's Sian, Clarke's Chzldhood's 
End, Tolklen's Lord of the Rzngs (1954-55), and Robert A Hemlem's Stranger zn a Strange Land (1961) as 
"gmdes to freaking out" (Freaks 322). Fiedler remarks that while m retrospect, Odd John must seem an 
equally mfluential "mutant" text, Stapledon did not-and could not-reach his youngest contemporanes m 
the same way that Clarke and others could m their era (323-34). 
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choose between a life of the mind and a life of the body ("Experiences in London," "Man 
as Tyrant," "Farmer Sirius"). Despite the pressures on all sides to conform to one pursuit 
or another, he chooses to design his own career by seeking out other awakened minds like 
his own ("Tan-y-Voel," "Strange Triangle"). He finally dies after his perverse 
"community" with his foster sister Plaxy becomes intolerable to the other normals of his 
society ("Plaxy Conscripted," "Outlaw"). Like Odd John, Sirius incorporates both folk 
narrative and the Bildungsroman mode, combining the motif of the animal-human 
transformation and the general theme of a protagonist's social metamorphosis. However, 
there is a greater tension here between the two generic modes; on the one hand, our 
animal "protagonist" struggles to break free of the folktale structure that would reduce his 
role to spiritual guide or magical agent; on the other hand, if we consider the general 
description of the Bildungsroman, the hero also refuses to allow the "social order" of the 
human world to become "manifest" in him (Hader). This refusal means that Sirius is 
ultimately not "accommodated into society" (Hader) but that, when his spirit fades from 
the world ofhuman affairs, he has in a certain sense reinforced the residual significance 
of folk narrative in contemporary culture. We can see here, and especially in the specific 
details of each stage (which are addressed below), that Sirius's career differs from John's 
in significant ways-but always in the form of a repetition with a difference. Together, 
among the conceptual personae discussed in this chapter, John and Sirius are the most 
significant components of "a composite fiction of staggering scope" (Rabkin 23 8), and 
they constitute the two coordinates in "Stapledon's attempt to isolate the true human, a 
being that is spiritually somewhere between an intelligent handless animal and an 
emotionless, wingless demi-god" (Swanson 288). Moreover, Sirius completes the 
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composite changeling persona by reintroducing the animal-human component, which 
would return to the earth where the superman would wish to transcend. Quite literally, 
Sirius tears humanity away from itself in order to reaffirm its significant role in the 
community, as a sort of gestalt persona. 
Certainly, Sirius does not possess the wings of his mutant counterpart, but he also 
seems to find a certain flawed beauty in the "pack," as the voice inside his head tells him 
over and over: "For you, humanity is the pack. You are not one of them, but they made 
you and you are for them. And because you are different you can give them a vision 
which they can never win for themselves" (Sirius 1 07). This is the voice of the folk 
changeling who possesses a keen understanding of the domestic realm and who, 
folklorists continually remind us, offer a new and sometimes estranging "vision," which 
intrudes upon the household like a divine intervention. Indeed, as a "monster," Sirius 
signifies something "marvelous" (Eberly 228), even while his origin is also scientifically 
explained. The point here is that Sirius is "for" humans, even while this preposition 
remains ambiguous for nearly everyone except the creator himself. Unlike the other 
creator-changeling relationships we have seen in previous chapters (Frankenstein and his 
monster, Jekyll and Hyde, Moreau and his Beast-Men, Rossum and his Robots), Thomas 
Trelone and Sirius share both an emotional and intellectual bond, for, when the great 
scientist "builds" the supercanine, he also adopts him as one of his foster-children: the 
little "man-dog" is indeed, from the start, part of the pack. The animal-human 
relationship, as it develops between Sirius and Thomas, Sirius and Plaxy the foster sister, 
Sirius and Robert the narrator, and Sirius and the "sheep," is a highly complex one, 
involving different sets of coordinates, including what has generally been identified as the 
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anthropological-cosmological planes. Within this axis Sirius struggles between his "wolf 
nature" and his "compassionate civilized mentality" (27), which is the spiritual or divine 
component already articulated by the superhuman John. But as we discover, Sirius does 
not embrace one at the expense of the other, and he invests much more in the project of 
studying the human species and the possibility of comprehending the "awakened spirit," 
even to the point of risking contamination. In this way, Sirius employs the folktale "law 
of sympathy" between humans and animals as a further means to explore the 
"personality-in-community," which, if allowed to blossom, can be extended to the wider 
socio-political realm. 
To be sure, Sirius does not work "out according to plan," for the success of the 
experiment changes all pre-conceived plans, as dictated by the so-called "laws" of nature, 
and as a result, transforms the mundane world into something marvelous. Indeed, as I 
have suggested since Chapter 1, the residual presence of folk narrative in modem 
literature highlights the often "submerged" voices of marginalized or disenfranchised 
groups: such a dynamic engagement with primitive tradition reproduces versions of 
utopia-Fairylands, Earthly paradises, and, as in the denouement of R. U R., new 
"Edens." Sirius's complaint that his creator made him "without making a world for [him] 
to live in" also acknowledges that he can nevertheless act upon that environment and 
reshape it. As he continues, "It's as though God had made Adam and not bothered to 
make Eden, nor Eve. I think it's going to be frightfully difficult being me" (Sirius 78). If 
War with the Newts promises the creation of a "new Atlantis" in which the upperworld is 
reduced to the submerged nation, Sirius promises the creation of a new Eden in which the 
divine "creator" is neither the scientist Thomas Trelone nor the titular character but rather 
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a powerful alliance between the two. In this "fairy" economy, the social milieu has indeed 
become hybridized by the crossing of multiple genres and biological types. 
Sirius, who possesses very few of the usual changeling characteristics, converges 
conceptually with the changeling in his particular operations-in his willingness to seek a 
"down-going," to fall back as the circumstances demand, and to teach the music that is 
animal-man as well as animal-woman. Like all changelings, Sirius's birth comes about as 
an insinuation, for Thomas Trelone creates Sirius by "introducing a certain hormone into 
the bloodstream of the mother," which thereby affects "the growth of the brain in the 
unborn young" (Sirius 13). Trelone's theories lead us to believe that this sane scientist 
among the mad understands in a rudimentary way the implications of this mutant birth: as 
a "missing-link mind" ( 15), Sirius can possibly adapt more easily than a superhuman 
individual who would already outstrip the dominant species, Homo sapiens, and thereby 
suffer the fate of an Odd John. As numerous critics have observed, Sirius is itself part of 
the evolutionary stage of Stapledon's writing, a repetition of, but also a variation on, Odd 
John. It is a mark of the novel's evocative power, then, that it comes across to us as 
Stapledon's most "human" piece of SF (Aldiss, Billion Year Spree 236; Fiedler, Olaf 
Stapledon 184): it is more human because it celebrates the animal nature ofhumanity. 
Despite these distinct differences, the description of Sirius as a puppy very much 
resembles that of John Wainwright as an infant, suggesting the convergence of a 
changeling birth. As the narrator tells us, the supercanine "remained a helpless infant long 
after the other litter were active adolescents. For months it could not even stand. It merely 
lay on its stomach with its bulgy head on the ground, squeaking for sheer joy oflife; for 
its tail was constantly wagging" (Sirius 17). Like John, Sirius shores up intellectual 
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powers while he languishes in his clumsy, inert body, "squeaking" all the more for the 
possibilities awaiting his active brain. Perhaps we might say that Sirius's tail is originally 
a crude compensation for his lack of "wings," even while the former appendage is far 
superior because it remains in "flight" without transcending the earth: this movement in 
the midst of apparent immobility, and its indication of remarkable patience in the face of 
physical deformity, confirms the canine's nomadic operations, for "the nomad moves, but 
while seated" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 3 81 )-or in this case, while 
prone. More significantly, Sirius lacks both the cold indifference of the super-changeling 
John and the glittering malice of the deformed changeling the Hebridean child, for his 
own shortcomings present the opportunity for interesting challenges, such as the task of 
forming words without the benefit of vocal cords (Sirius 24), or the creation of music 
without the benefit of hands (36). Sirius's proximity to the ground allows him to cultivate 
throughout the course of his life the art of excavation, which John pursues only in his 
early years and which succeeds in operation only as exile, as absolute deterritorialization. 
Sirius's insinuation takes him far down into the earth, literally, and his mud-stained coat 
(58) marks him as a terrestrial soul who is nevertheless alien to his own canine species, in 
the way that animals in folktales are usually associated with the supernatural because they 
talk and move like their human counterparts. Indeed, part of the conflict in Sirius's life 
lies in the fact that he is without hands and therefore lacks manual dexterity; despite these 
limitations, Sirius wrests himself from the earth all the same, using the biological 
advantage of his hybrid human-animal heritage. 
As we discover, Sirius's best defense is simply to act like a dog, or at least a 
"supersheepdog," which Thomas has already succeeded in introducing to some of the 
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farmers and sheepherders of the Welsh countryside (Sirius 18). This act is not difficult to 
follow since, unlike John, Sirius is inclined to be congenial towards his "master," man, 
and since, unlike other creators, Thomas ultimately sheds the role of master when his 
prized experiment begins to mature. As the narrator discloses to us, "Unfortunate 
experiences in [Thomas's] own childhood had led him to regard the family as a 
hopelessly bad institution, and one which ought to be abolished" ( 19). The human-canine 
relation is certainly complex and painful, not to mention tragic; but the ability for each 
partner to give ground on occasion leads to some surpnsingly joyful moments of 
communal sharing. Sirius initiates this first gesture towards symbiosis when he accepts 
the role of sheepdog and when he, as part of the business transaction, assumes a more 
prosaic and practical identity. In this capacity, Sirius performs all sorts of manual tasks, 
herding sheep, corralling them for the purpose of shearing, protecting them from 
intruding beasts, and even rescuing them on occasion. "Bran,"80 as Sirius is temporarily 
renamed by the benevolent farmer Pugh, possesses a docility that is not, however, "due to 
a servile disposition. When he had learnt his lesson he often introduced novelties which 
greatly improved the method" (59). Here we see again how passivity, as Bergson remarks, 
80 The name "Bran" IS associated With a number of Celtic myths denvmg from both Welsh and Insh 
traditiOns. There IS Bran the Blessed, the Insh kmg whose decapitated head speaks, his story IS recounted m 
the tale "Branwen Daughter ofLl r," which IS mcluded m the thirteenth-century Welsh mythological cycle 
The Mabznogwn (Gantz 66-82). There IS also the Bran from the old Insh saga "The Voyage of Bran," 
which dates from around the eighth century. Both of these Brans are human, even while they possess 
supernatural or god-hke powers. There Is, however, another "Bran" that may have been one of the 
msprratwns for Stapledon's camne protagomst, and who IS certamly evoked m the particular sectiOn of 
Stapledon's novel where Smus assumes the name Bran. The particular source IS the Insh mythological 
cycle relatmg to Fwnn Mac Cuniliail and his followers, the Fmnna. One particular sequence recounts "The 
Birth of Bran" (Gregory 173-75). A fmry woman named Uchtdealb discovers that her lover, Iollan, IS 
engaged to a female mortal named Tmren; m retaliatiOn, Uchtdealb turns Tmren mto a hound, "the most 
beautiful that was ever seen" (174). As a hound, Tmren gives birth to two "whelps," Bran and Sceolan. 
When Iollan finally agrees to keep Uchtdealb as his lover, Tmren IS returned to her human shape and the 
two hounds become Fwnn Mac Cumhml's compamons Bran IS featured m several subsequent tales about 
the Fmnna, and hke Smus, he IS notable as a dog that possesses "human Wits" (176). 
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is the first requirement for insinuation: this conceptual performance is the first of a series 
of gradual-painfully gradual-reterritorializations and deterritorializations of both the 
human and canine spheres; but it also signals the ways in which each sphere intersects 
with the other and anticipates the complex sympathy/intimacy between Sirius and his 
human beloved, Plaxy. For while Sirius competes with other canines for supremacy in the 
animal world, and even demonstrates his evolutionary advantage over normally superior 
mammals, such as the bull (62-63), his ultimate goal is to compete on a level with 
humans. This conflict leads to the most devastating defeats-the failure to see colour or 
to make music in the conventional way, the inability to grasp objects or to articulate 
freely-but also reinforces the dangers of living in a society in which animals are 
domesticated to the point of becoming "'pathetically human' dolls" (53), and in which the 
animal passion for physical intimacy is perversely repressed and even sadistically 
punished (104). To remain fully in the world of Homo sapiens is to suffer the oppressive 
stench of the "super-simian tyrant" (88) who can, nevertheless, provide the crucial 
ingredient for a new social relation. 
If John suffers from his contact with Homo sapiens and the influence of the 
species' primal urges, he does not feel such urges himself; in the face of obvious 
opponents, he is able to transcend the blood-riot of the brain which would command him 
to defend his slighted honour. Can an exception be made for his pre-teen battles with 
neighborhood boys (Odd John 17-23)? Or perhaps his almost religious slaying of the deer 
(98-99)? Perhaps not, for consider the narrator's remarks after John has defeated the big 
neighborhood boy, Stephen: "John's own rage, I suspect, was artificial. He could fight 
better in a sort of cold fury, so he produced one" (23). While we risk giving deference to a 
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"gormless" narrator (Fiedler, Olaf Stapledon 1 06), we are without another option, and 
most of John's subsequent enterprises are accomplished with an almost sadly stoic 
attitude towards the normals of his society. Sirius, on the other hand, fails to keep himself 
in check at the first insult he receives: when the neighborhood dog, Diawl Du (the Welsh 
for "Black Dog"), harasses Sirius and even chases him away, Sirius feels cowardly and 
therefore humiliated; after Plaxy suggests to her mother that he just does not have any 
"spunk," he rushes off in a rage, tricks the dog through an inventive strategy of circling 
and weaving, tackles it, and nearly crushes its windpipe before the village people can tear 
apart his jaws (Sirius 39-41). Indeed Sirius does not ascend in the manner that John does; 
he takes "flight," as it were, on contingent events, such as his ability to produce music, his 
cultivation of his olfactory faculties, and his discovery of a kindred spirit in Plaxy; but he 
also returns to the earth-bound activities of sexual play, hunting and killing, and the basic 
enjoyment ofbeing canine. But as a "man-dog," an animal-becoming-man, Sirius 
complicates the easy dichotomy of the two modes, demonstrating that the earth-bound 
activities are not mere regressions but creative and therefore tactical operations. His 
olfactory art, for example, is both doggish and spiritual, penetrating as it does the physical 
armory of deceptive facial expressions and body language: the typical array of human 
defenses are useless since they can be sniffed out by the dog. Of course, Sirius follows 
each trail as a human might follow a line of thought, even while, as he laments to Thomas 
later in life, he sometimes loses the scent in order seek out a more frivolous activity (76). 
Nevertheless, he discovers in these unforeseen "scatter-brained" moments the opportunity 
for invention. Certainly it does him no good to strive for a philosophical stoicism when 
his life is threatened by another, usually lesser-evolved, beast: his early unacknowledged 
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motto might be, when danger strikes, always be creative; but to be creative is also to be 
"human." 
But the point here is that nature produces the most remarkable violations of 
seemingly strict laws, and then remakes them again only to find new ways to violate 
them. The case of Sirius is especially instructive here, for, as a "man-dog," he violates 
natural law at every tum, and ultimately brings his relationship with his creator to a crisis 
point when he discovers that his role is continually determined by Thomas who insists 
that he be a full-time employee at Cambridge University. Sirius asserts that he must be 
allowed some freedom, and that he must not be constrained to the role of a lab experiment 
or "tenth-rate research worker" (Sirius 91). As Bengels argues, Stapledon's decision of 
choosing a dog for a protagonist in Sirius comically reverses roles in which "man's best 
friend" is no longer the faithful lap dog but the best possible source for exposing his 
foibles and shortcomings ("OlafStapledon's 'Odd John' and 'Sirius"' 57). 
But if Sirius operates as a foil for his human masters, he cannot alter human 
society without first becoming a part of it; and so his project to "study" Homo sapiens 
(Sirius 119) requires experiments in which he himself is a key element. A large part of the 
drama of Odd John involves the protagonist's discovery of other supemormals; for while 
they help to form a community of like minds, they also introduce a series of divergences 
that reinforce both their superhuman differences (longevity [123], telepathic 
communication across centuries [129-34], telepathic manipulation of the mind [172-86]) 
as well as their animal resemblances (J. J., the Hebridean child, Ng-Gunko, and Sambo all 
appear to be evolutionary throwbacks in certain respects). As we have suggested above, 
despite his attempts to exorcize the human-animal element, John's recruitment program 
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offers an open invitation to the changeling whose primary characteristics marks him/her 
as primordially human and therefore "at heart a little savage" (137). In Sirius, Stapledon 
returns to the scenario of the symbiotic community but with a greater emphasis on the 
human-animal alliance. The difference in this case is that Sirius fully embraces his 
kinship with animal-man, cringing all the while at the cruel grasp of the "super-ape" 
(Sirius 87). Further, while John demonstrates his supernormal (telepathic) skill oflocating 
others ofhis kind, Sirius demonstrates his supercanine ability of inducing a change in 
others. The Rev. Geoffrey Adams (116f.), for example, experiences a truly religious 
epiphany as a result of Sirius's crooning canine anthems during his church services (123-
24, 126): the first song in particular contains the truth that the Rev. had striven for all his 
life despite the fact that it contains no words (123). Early in his study ofhuman religion, 
Sirius refuses to be bound by his canine half, asserting in his memoirs that he is 
determined to be a "hound of the spirit" (111). We may not be surprised, then, that he is 
intrigued and touched in his spirit by the hymn "Washed in the blood of the lamb" (113). 
For this is a communal blood-riot of spiritual ecstasy, in which Sirius can unify both his 
tenderness and his feral nature, and witness the same spiritual symbiosis within the 
human members of the congregation. For the congregation, the dog-song reaffirms the 
primordial nature of a religion since its chief symbols are blood and the savage struggle 
for existence. Far from reinstituting a dominant Christian interpretation of "the spirit," 
this divine animal ditty suggests something ofthe pagan belief in "contagious magic" 
(Frazer, Rohrich) in which a particular element-like hair or, in this case, blood-
reinforces a primordial connection between species. Later, when he has joined the Rev., 
Sirius continues to adapt human religious rituals, at one point urinating on a gatepost 
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before entering the church grounds. When the Rev. complains, Sirius explains the rite to 
him: "It was a religious act. I have poured my libation in honour of your God. And I have 
relieved my spirit of impurity. I am lightened for the chase, the pursuit of the divine 
quarry by song" (123). Moreover, Sirius embraces all of the savage rites that John hopes 
to escape, proving that the most powerful composition descends into the subterranean 
realm of the animal-hominid alliance and may very well resemble "the howling of an 
alien species in the jungle" (113). 
If John operates as the leader of his changeling colony, Sirius effectively becomes 
a key component of a hybrid entity, Sirius-Plaxy, which constitutes the penultimate 
sequence of the human-animal symphony. This is the most vivid attempt by an SF author 
before the 1950s to imagine a human-alien sexual relationship, although, as in Star 
Maker, the "alien" is first conceived within the terrestrial biosphere as a hybridized cross-
section ofkingdoms (ichthyoid and arachnoid, in the one case, and human and canine, in 
the other). If we recall the description of the pairing in Star Maker, the cross-over or 
interpenetration amounts to a "contrapuntal sexuality" (1 05) in which both fluids and 
thoughts are exchanged, leading to a gradual physiological and philosophical alteration in 
both species. In the case of Sirius, there are early signs in the novel before the narrator 
has really begun his dog-tale that a similar contrapuntal experiment has been at work with 
Plaxy and her canine companion. Plaxy teases Robert when he first arrives, telling him 
that he has "nosed" her out (Sirius 9); her remark may suggest to us, if not to the narrator, 
the first sign ofPlaxy's woman-becoming-dog. At the same time, Robert discovers that 
his own "brilliant race" had contributed to the development of Sirius's "huge cranium," 
suggesting the latter's dog-becoming-man. In the continuing sequence, Plaxy reveals 
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more of her animal transformation: "'Nice human Robert' [she says] putting her head on 
[his] shoulder." Immediately she pulls away from him and says with emphasis, "No, I 
didn't say that. It was just the female human animal that said it" (1 0). In many ways 
Plaxy is in the position of John, at times seeing herself superior to the brute animal, not 
fully comprehending the attraction she feels for her canine foster brother. But even 
against the strictest British cultural mores, Plaxy cannot deny her own animal desires, 
which, in her early years, are expressed in her imitation of Sirius's "etiquette for leaving 
tokens" (37) and, in her mature years, are manifested in marked physiological alterations 
and the "intensification of animal sex feeling" (134). This development, from mimicry to 
embodiment, indicates the maturity of the changeling persona as she oscillates between 
operations-mimicry and insinuation, social deviance, anarchical behaviour-and as she 
grasps for more intimate alliances. If Sirius is Stapledon's frankest and most perverse 
novel, this is because he has come to understand that symbiosis requires biological 
hybridity and therefore the sexual union between two rather different species. For this 
reason, Sirius returns us to the concerns of previous chapters, for we have (re)discovered 
that the changeling is a multiplicity: it is not only decidedly male (Stevenson and Wells), 
not only a "collective male horde" (Capek), but also a female persona. We cannot 
therefore speak only of Sirius-the-man-dog but of Sirius-Plaxy the man-woman-
supercanine, a composite changeling persona that recalls for us the hybrid wonders of the 
remarkable folktale "The Speckled Bull." 
Indeed, Sirius may be the closest thing in Stapledon's oeuvre to a folktale, 
especially given its inclusion of extraordinary animal-human metamorphoses, the heroic 
deeds of a nonhuman protagonist, and the unusual romance between an animal and a 
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human, which constitutes the "contagious" or "sympathetic" connection between the two 
kingdoms. According to James Frazer, sympathetic magic contains two components, as 
part of the so-called "law of sympathy": first, that "like produces like, or that an effect 
resembles its cause; and second, that things which have once been in contact with each 
other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been 
severed" (12). We might find in these two components-respectively, the law of 
similarity and the law of contagion-a complex ritual analogous to the conflicts and 
alliances formed between species over time. In a certain sense, sympathy-like magic-
produces startling results when two like-minded entities come into contact. The physical 
connection between Plaxy and Sirius is based not on any specific biological relation but 
rather on the primal blood-riot that links animal and human, including especially the need 
to form powerful bonds; the dog-woman bond is not based on a strict affiliation but rather 
a willed symbiosis. As Sirius describes it, "the more different, the more lovely the loving" 
(Sirius 53). We might then call Sirius's conceptualization the "law of symbiosis." We 
may sympathize with Plaxy who, like the first wife in "The Speckled Bull," is ostracized 
by her community for her association with puppies; the difference here is that Plaxy 
fancies one pup in particular over the human males in her village. One way of 
understanding this preference for the animal is to consider the second sequence of the 
folktale: the princess of the Eastern World discovers that the bull is also the "finest man 
that a young girl, or an old woman either, ever laid eyes on" ("The Speckled Bull" 124). 
Like the princess, Plaxy struggles to maintain the relationship despite the physical 
difficulties; in a sense, she too can live with Sirius only part of the time, when she is able 
to adapt to his turbulent lifestyle, and when he is able to sniff out her own shifting moods. 
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Once Plaxy's neighbors have discovered this human-canine community, they begin to 
engage in sadistic games, perhaps comparable to the prince's second wife in the folktale: 
when Plaxy is conscripted during the war, her hired replacement, Mary Griffith, invents 
all kinds of salacious tales, involving Sirius's perverse attempts on her virtue (Sirius 176-
77); Plaxy is, of course, charged with similarly perverse acts, even while she is, like the 
princess of the Eastern World, the sexual confidante of an animal. While it is never made 
entirely clear, and while this constitutes much of the beauty and richness of the folktale, 
we may surmise that both the prince's first wife (who is accused of giving birth to kittens 
and puppies) and the princess of the Eastern World are themselves not entirely human, 
and that this may be attributed in some way to both the animal and fairy realms. If she has 
not indeed given birth to animals, the prince's first wife has certainly begotten a 
changeling child (as the wicked second wife strategically claims ["The Speckled Bull" 
120]). Similarly, the princess in the eastern realm possesses the ability to see the human 
in the animal, the animal in the human. Early on in Sirius, it is remarked that Plaxy is "not 
quite human," and Robert himself claims that she does, indeed, have a certain "feline" 
quality about her. But he also believes that her "elegant 'handedness"'-an 
acknowledgement of Sirius's own doggish obsession with manual dexterity-"was 
something far stronger than felinity [ ... ] It was at once human and 'parahuman,' so that 
she seemed to [him] not so much cat as fay. She was indeed at once cat, fawn, dryad, elf, 
witch" (Sirius 49). Here we find that, as in Odd John, the narrator tries to impose his 
formal perspective on the proceedings, but that he also succeeds in demonstrating to us 
the ways in which Plaxy's relationship with Sirius leads to a proliferation of multiple 
personae-mythical or mundane animals, condemned female personages: each 
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corresponds to the divergent operations we have encountered in previous SF narratives 
and in folk narrative. 
As her relationship with Sirius begins to change, Plaxy feels that she is losing 
something of her humanity. This discovery occurs in the wake of her first sexual 
encounter with Sirius, which is, perhaps not surprisingly, never described in detail. As the 
narrator says, the pressure of the general outrage in the village leads Sirius and Plaxy to 
become more intimate than ever: 
Isolation, combined with contempt for the critics, drew girl and dog into closer 
intimacy, in fact into a manner oflife which some readers may more easily 
condemn than understand. Plaxy herself, in spite of her fundamental joy in her 
love for Sirius, was increasingly troubled by a fear that she might irrevocably be 
losing touch with her own species, even that in this strange symbiosis with an 
alien creature she might be losing her very humanity itself. (Sirius 167) 
In his dark dreams, Robert envisions the "beast" mauling "the sweet human form" that he 
himself"so fittingly embrace[s]" (172); but he does not indulge in the sadistic pleasures 
of the Welsh village and ultimately feels a certain "warmth" for Sirius (173) as the 
worthy rival of another animal-hominid-himself. On the other hand, Robert's brief 
vision does invite us to glimpse the awkward pairing of this brute beast and the well-
made female form, reminding us that two taboos have been broken here: incest as well as 
bestiality. Unlike "The Speckled Bull," Sirius does not include the expected 
"disenchantment" in which the animal protagonist is transformed into acceptable human 
form before the relationship between beast and woman is consummated (Rohrich 91). 
The beautiful, if perverse, philosophy of symbiosis is finally summed up in Plaxy's own 
configuration: Sirius is "the part ofSirius-Plaxy" that she loves (Sirius 91); she herself is 
the "human part of Sirius-Plaxy" (136, 146); and, in her own words, "I am not just a girl. 
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I am different from all other girls. I am Plaxy. And Plaxy is half of Sirius-Plaxy, needing 
the other half. And the other half needs me" (171 ). The very use of the hyphen here 
shows us that symbiosis has been initiated at the level of the sentence, and the joyful 
conjugation of two disparate parts: again, as Sirius says, "the more different, the more 
lovely the loving" (53). 
If Sirius tears the human away from itself by enunciating philosophical problems 
through a doggish invention of speech, he also tears the canine away from itself by usmg 
its doggish tricks and operations for the purpose of philosophical speculation. The 
intersection of the human and animal, the philosophical and the biological, result in an 
interpenetration of each zone, so that philosophy may end up being the likely occupation 
of the dog, and the urinary marking of territory the common office of the woman. As 
Deleuze and Guattari say, if "thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who 
possesses a method than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps" 
(What Is Philosophy? 55). In order to investigate the dog, Kafka, in his "Investigations of 
a Dog" (1922), necessarily had to initiate a becoming-dog in the form of the canine 
narrator, a conceptual persona who would not merely study dog behaviour but who would 
be, in effect, an intersection between philosopher and canine, man and anima1. 81 In a 
similar way, Stapledon initiates a becoming-animal, but this process is far more radical 
than his previous forays-his completely silent human narrator in Last and First Men, his 
subservient and "gormless" reporter in Odd John, and even the apparently transformed 
81 Smus also, m a certam sense, learns to "leap" hke the canmes m Kafka's story While the dog narrator of 
thts eccentnc text acknowledges the leapmg camnes "by force of habtt stmply as dogs" he happens to meet 
on the road (Kafka 207), thetr dancmg and leapmg "evolutwns" leads them to walk about on thetr hmd legs 
and therefore to vtolate the sacred camne law (210). 
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star-seeker in Star Maker. In particular, Stapledon dispenses with the catalogic pedantry 
of Odd John in which an overawed mere mortal naively celebrates the demise of his own 
species. While Robert, the narrator of Sirius, may remain a human narrator, his 
willingness to narrate the life of a dog leads to a sort of understanding in the midst of the 
human-animal difference, which, while it at first appears to be a simple animal rivalry, 
develops gradually into a human social relation. As Robert puts it, 
[L ]ittle by little the identical spirit in each of us, as Sirius himself said, triumphed 
over the diversity of our natures and our private interests. Had I not actually 
experienced this close-knit triple relationship I should not have believed it 
possible. Nor should I, perhaps, have been able to sustain my part in it, had not my 
love for Plaxy been from the onset unpossessive; owing to the fact that I myself, 
like Sirius in his canine style, had sometimes loved elsewhere. (Sirius 173-74; 
emphasis added) 
Perhaps we could modify this by asserting that the developed interrelation also sustains 
the "diversity" between Robert, Plaxy, and Sirius, and succeeds in crossing over the 
boundaries between human and animal, and perhaps also male and female (since Plaxy' s 
own becoming-dog crosses over both species and genders). Whatever Robert may intend, 
to love elsewhere is not simply to have many "bitches" (1 01-04 ), or even to have frequent 
promiscuous sexual relations; it is, rather, to love outside of one's own conventional 
sphere. Certainly, the comparison of human and canine styles indicates the ways in which 
each organism embraces or dispenses with the operations of the other as the situation 
demands: both Robert and Plaxy provide the hands that Sirius lacks, even as Sirius offers 
them a symphony that no mere appendage could create. Following this program, we 
discover here the first truly intimate relationship between the narrator and his intended 
"subjects": an event in which the narrator is thrust into the action-the chaos he had 
merely studied from a scientific point of view-and becomes an agent (unlike the 
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voiceless or passive narrators in the other works). Sirius may be seen as the 
author/narrator in its "true"-and therefore hybridized-form: he is an animal that 
requires a human to narrate, and a human narrator that requires an animal to enunciate the 
action or the philosophical problem. "In making me," Sirius tells Thomas, "you made 
something that sees man from clean outside man, and can tell him what he looks like" 
(91). After Sirius is killed by one of the Home Guards and Plaxy repeats back to us one of 
Sirius's joyful songs (187), we discover that Sirius has, in a certain sense, made 
something that sees animal from clean outside animal-Plaxy, who is one of the first 
significant female changelings of modem SF. 
Conclusion 
This exploration of a particular conceptual persona (the changeling) seems to have 
led us down a strange and unpredictable road, even while a glance backward would 
reassure us that if we are not on the trail of the SF changeling, s/he is already on ours. 
The changeling persona, since it is still with us (because it has always been with us, not 
only in folktales like "The Speckled Bull" but in the medical literature of a very recent 
era), allows Homo sapiens to understand its own evolution as a species. Unlike the 
accepted view ofhuman evolution, Stapledon's version shows that the race as a whole 
does not proceed by straight lines, in a progressive and linear fashion, but by erratic and 
unpredictable pathways, sometimes in furious leaps, other times in shameful plummets or 
reversals. The nearly immeasurable chronotope of Last and First Men nevertheless 
discovers time and time again the multiple reterritorializations and deterritorializations 
that comprise the evolution of the species. In the second work, Star Maker, Stapledon the 
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writer/artist/philosopher/scientist evolves in his own way, seeking ever more divergent 
pathways of sentient life, looking beyond the progress of a single species (from the "First 
Men" to "Eighteenth Men") in order to gaze wonderstruck at the societies of "other men" 
ofhis own galaxy as well as the "Echinoderms," "Nautiloids," "Plant Men," and 
"Symbiotics." In this first series, then, his philosophical vision is not a rigid system but 
rather an incubation of previous thought, which, like the portrait of Stapledon' s ideal, 
"awakened" spirit, sheds those characteristics detrimental to its development, and ingests 
and modifies those characteristics vital to its increased complexity. The link between 
philosophy and biology is found in the dual concern w1th the physical coming together of 
bodies and the intellectual joining together of thought. Perhaps in the spirit of George 
Bernard Shaw, Stapledon attempts in these first two "far-out" and far-flung "possible 
worlds" a "Metabiological Pentateuch,"82 grafting entirely invented but entirely plausible 
cosmologies onto the received story of the creation myth. 83 
82 Th1s 1s the subtitle of Shaw's sc1ence-fictwnal play, Back to Methuselah, performed first m 1921 In th1s 
work Shaw employs the concept of"creative evolutwn" to speculate on human evolutionary metamorphosis 
and transformatwn, and, m particular, to develop a theory to extend human hfe to three hundred years as a 
solutwn to the moral1mmatunty of those whose hfe extends only to a mere "three score and ten." Wh1le 
Shaw himself reJected mechamcal Darwm1sm for "creative evolutwn," Stapledon speculates on the 
poss1bd1ties of an evolutwn that 1s fraught by both acc1dent and the excesses of 1magmatwn; m other words, 
however pess1m1stic and depressmg 1t m1ght sound, a whole c1v1hzatwn could conceivably be anmhllated 
by the mad mventwns of a commumty of scientists (as 1t occurs m Ch. IX/2) JUst as easily as an entire 
planet could be destroyed by the unforeseen colhswn w1th the moon (as 1t happens m Ch. XII). 
83 By the tlme we reach the dem1se of the F1rst Men, 1t becomes clear that Stapledon's book 1s more 
mterested m studymg the ways m wh1ch myth operates m human soCieties than m actually constructmg a 
myth proper; that 1s to say, Stapledon's two-b1lhon-year cosmology of Homo sapzens 1s both analogous to 
and estranged from the then current comprehenswn of our evolutwnary character, tracmg as 1t does early 
twentieth-century h1story up to and beyond Stapledon's own spatw-temporal co-ordmates. If certam "men" 
(be they the "first," the "second," or some other spec1es) become myth1c mlater epochs, Stapledon (or at 
least h1s fa1thful future Chromcler) descnbes the ways m wh1ch th1s myth-creatwn comes about as the result 
of a prevwus human soc1ety' s fmlures. for the m1suse of knowledge leads to mystlficatwn and helps to 
foster a dangerous myth1ficatwn of human authonty figures. The most v1v1d cntlque ofth1s human flaw 
(wh1ch, Stapledon 1s qmck to pomt out, 1s yet an Important 1mpetus for the documentmg ofh1story) comes 
m the Patagoman section where the prophet, known as the "Boy Who Refused to Grow Up" (80), smashes 
the sacred 1dol of the D1vme Boy wh1ch has led the people to make a cult of youth, to stnve only for 
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But as I have argued especially throughout this chapter, the most significant SF is 
situated somewhere between cosmology and anthropology: Stapledon illuminates this 
tension between the unknown forces of the universe and the biological drives of the 
human organism through his invention of a whole series of mutant or changeling 
personae. As Aldiss has remarked, the "strength of [SF] is that it is not a pure stream" ("A 
Monster For All Seasons" 16). Moreover, SF constantly reveals its operation as a 
feedback loop wherein the folk novum and its associated conceptual personae are 
appropriated and redeployed in an altered form: through SF, the changeling has been 
Darwinized. 84 But still we can say that folk narrative continues to inform SF through its 
estranging themes ofbiological deformity and species hybridization. More than any 
writer in his day, Stapledon carries forward this project of redeployment by grafting onto 
the mythological and folkloric landscapes ofhis literary antecedents (the Victorians and 
Wells in particular) plausibly constructed worlds filled with personae who enunciate the 
philosophical problems ofthe current day (1930s and 1940s Britain). Like Wells and 
Capek, Stapledon wished to explore through metamorphosed men of the future, star-
seekers of distant galaxies, and two changeling contemporaries, Odd John and Sirius, the 
friction between the old and the new, the animal and the human, the human and the 
superhuman. He is, then, concerned with the ways in which the Victorian world of 
Wells's scientific romances had to change and how these alterations demanded new men 
and new women who would learn how to combine animal passion with intellectual 
insight. 
victones, to forget the struggle and beauty of the "game ofhfe" Itself, and to squander Its vitality m "violent 
hvmg" (83). If Stapledon IS a "myth-maker" he IS also a myth-breaker. 
84 I owe this pomt to Dr. Nicholas Ruddick. 
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The Victorians feared the insurgent, monstrous, and hybrid changelings of their 
society: the children who defied their parents' authority, the women who refused to 
adhere to patriarchal authority, the dark-skinned immigrants or the Irish who refused to be 
enslaved or oppressed by Her Majesty's Empire. Similarly, the Modems feared their own 
changelings: the immigrant labourers who formed a molecular population, 
undifferentiated like so many Robots, industrious and cunning like so many Newts. The 
Great Brains of Last and First Men suffer the tragedy of fulfilling a State-sanctioned plan 
for a new engineered humanity: a massive and bloated changeling whose very organs are 
manipulated for the purpose of autocracy and absolute tyranny (Last and First Men 160). 
For the "men" of this society, there is no escape from the organism (Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 163): they have become the organ(s) of the State. The 
Eighteenth Men of Last and First Men are all too aware of their perverse, changeling 
appearance, but they are "more human and more animal" than all of the other prototypes 
who, we can say, are analogous to the various political and social systems of Stapledon's 
own empirical world (democracy, cosmopolitanism, totalitarianism, Communism, and so 
forth). In Star Maker Stapledon returns to contemporary Homo sapiens in order to 
reinvestigate the engineered changelings of his society, who, now several years later 
(1937), have begun to menace the world in the form of fascism and Nazism. Stapledon 
narrows his cosmological scope in his other SF works in order to rethink the "relation," 
the "family," the "nation," and the Cosmos itself, which can operate as a "milieu of 
experimentation," a "milieu of pure intensity" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus 164), and a site for the creation of symbiotic communities. 
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Because symbiosis is both a biological and philosophical phenomenon, Stapledon 
is careful to sketch out in his denser works the possible pitfalls of placing too much 
emphasis on one plane or the other. The key mechanism for such a dialectic is 
divergence, and Odd John and Sirius deal explicitly with the mutant's internal struggle 
between a sort of primitive ressentiment of "normal" society and an almost divine 
rejection of "primitive" society. The cosmological-anthropological model leads us to 
consider the possibility that both Odd John and Sirius comprise the dual coordinates for a 
highly successful symbiotic relationship as well as the perfect components for a 
changeling that can adapt to the most diverse environmental changes: this is to say that, in 
going to the root of things, in embracing its divergent characteristics, it both rejects the 
"little man's" ideology of ressentiment and the superman's wish to expel or exorcize the 
"little man," the deformed changeling. However, since I have not been strictly bound to 
any model in this investigation, I would argue that Sirius does not simply complete the 
construction of the true human but allows us to imagine its conceptual shape (Sirius-
Plaxy) through his willingness to fall back, where John would want to transcend. As I 
have suggested, Plaxy may very well assume John's superhuman role because, unlike 
John, she helps "to elevate the lower orders of species" rather than "refine [herself] out of 
spirituality and human existence" (Swanson 291). After Sirius's death, Plaxy sings a song 
that Sirius had taught her: "The wordless phrases symbolized for her the canine and the 
human that vied in him all his life long. The hounds' baying blended with human voices" 
(Sirius 187). Here the woman-becoming-animal captures what is, for the man-becoming-
god, too uncouth for civilized ears but is, as Nietzsche would argue, the "rebirth of the art 
of hearing" (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 295). If Stapledon's critique is more subtle in Odd 
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John, his tum towards a supercanine and his search for the awakened individual within 
the animal itselfis a more direct critique of the human who would sacrifice his brothers 
and sisters for an abstract godhead. In Sirius Stapledon critiques the position of the 
Ubermensch as presented in Odd John and specifically the Nietzschean impatience with 
the herd-like "virtues" of humanity. Certainly, Stapledon is as tricksy as Nietzsche at 
times, inviting us to celebrate the superman at the expense of man, thereby exposing our 
lack of joy and our spiritual decay (John's central concerns). But we must remember that 
throughout the first part of Zarathustra, Nietzsche praises man as the "rope" or the 
"bridge" between "animal" and "superman" (43-44, 104) and celebrates the fact that he is 
a "going-across and a down-going" (44), a nomad and a burrower, as Deleuze and 
Guattari might say, rather than an angel that transcends the body and its crude processes. 
Our discussion of four works by Stapledon indicates four different approaches to the 
metamorphosis of the human organism and the evolution of what I have identified as the 
changeling persona. Therefore, we cannot, without violence, absolutely isolate each work, 
each movement, and even if we achieve such a separation, we discover the cross-section 
of themes that exist within each work, like the veins in a severed limb. In especially the 
last two works considered, we come to realize that the conceptual persona cannot function 
without the two components of superhuman flight and animal excavation-but that 
Stapledon's most fascinating female character (Plaxy) may very well be the new 
substitute in this SF changeling narrative. For this reason, Stapledon's divine mutant-his 
composite superhuman-canine-is a changeling for all seasons. 
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Conclusion-A Typology for New "Alien" Encounters, Components for a New Ethos 
The history of revolutions [ ... ] which politically spells out the innermost story of 
the modem age, could be told in parable form as the tale of an age-old treasure 
which, under the most varied circumstances, appears abruptly, unexpectedly, and 
disappears again, under different mysterious conditions, as though it were a fata 
morgana. There exist, indeed, many good reasons to believe that the treasure was 
never a reality but a mirage, that we deal here not with anything substantial but 
with an apparition, and the best of these reasons is that the treasure thus far has 
remained unnamed. Does something exist, not in outer space but in the world and 
the affairs of men on earth, which has not even a name? Unicorns and fairy queens 
seem to possess more reality than the lost treasure of the revolutions. 
-Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future 5 
The devil can also steal children away (as sometimes children within the space of 
six weeks after their birth are lost,) and other children, called Supposititii, or 
Changelings, laid in their places. [For] the devil hath this power, that he changeth 
children, and instead thereof layeth devils in the cradles, which thrive not, only 
they feed and suck. 
-Martin Luther, "Luther's Colloquia Mensalia" 314-16 
In what way is the changeling-and especially Stapledon's changeling-"for all 
seasons"? I've borrowed the notion fi·om Aldiss's essay "A Monster For All Seasons," 
which likely gets its title from Robert Bolt's play about Thomas More, A Man for All 
Seasons (1960), which takes its title from grammarian Robert Whittinton, who, in 1520, 
had described More as a "man for all seasons." Aldiss's essay makes the basic argument 
that SF characters continually reappear down through the history of the genre. In this 
instance, the changeling is "for all seasons" because it continues to return, sometimes as a 
changeling we've seen before (from a "fairytale" found in the Grimms or from British, or 
Irish, or Norweigan folk legend), sometimes as a changeling in an entirely new form (an 
artificial human with no relations, a brute animal with no manual dexterity). While my 
use of the phrase owes nothing to Bolt's play (as fine a play as it is), it could be seen as a 
general acknowledgement ofMore's "utopian" influence on the genre of SF and on the 
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various personae who seek to effect a change in society. If the communities featured in 
folk legends or folktales seem a far cry from utopian societies, the changeling motif 
continues to inspire SF authors attempting to articulate both biological and political 
metamorphoses; it is not the "utopia" or perfect society that one finds in these tales and 
texts so much as the utopian spirit, which More exhibited in his writings. Whittinton's 
description of More, on the other hand, has less to do with his utopian vision than with his 
general character: "More is a man of an angel's wit and singular learning. I know not his 
fellow. For where is the man of that gentleness, lowliness and affability? And, as time 
requireth, a man of marvelous mirth and pastimes, and sometime of as sad gravity. A man 
for all seasons" (xxviii). Perhaps this does not exactly match our general impression of 
the changeling, although we might say that Odd John possesses something like "an 
angel's wit"; that there is something "gentle" in the monster's dealings with the De 
Laceys, and in the Morlocks' tentative approach to the Time Traveller; and that there is 
something of"sad gravity" in Sirius's final days in claustrophobic human society. These 
changelings, of course, are also men and women for all seasons, or at least changelings-
becoming-men and women-becoming-changelings; the sad gravity of their situation is 
that they all seem to be living in the wrong era, even if they continually tum up again and 
again, season after season. It is as though these personae were all fairy creatures, living 
outside or underneath the human world, dreaming of a way to make contact. 
I. New Fairyworlds for Old 
"In the Underground Realm, where there are no lies and no pain, there lived a 
princess who dreamt of the human world." So begins Guillermo del Toro's 2006 film El 
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laberinto del fauna (Pan's Labyrinth), which uses a legend to frame a narrative about 
Spanish guerrillas attempting to resist Franco's fascist regime in the 1940s. Before the 
main thread of the story begins, the voiceover narrator describes how the princess escapes 
the magical realm only to lose her memory when she emerges into the upper world; 
shortly after, she weakens and dies. Just as the fantasy sequence ends, the camera pans up 
from the underworld and when it emerges we are suddenly amongst the ruins of a bell 
tower in modem Spain; as Paul Julian Smith notes, this is probably Belchite, the setting 
for an important battle during the Spanish Civil War ofthe late 1930s (4). As del Toro 
seems to suggest here, by leaving the place where there are "no lies and no pain," the 
princess is now vulnerable to the cruelty and misery of the upper, human world. What 
follows the initial voiceover is a double narrative strand in which the protagonist, Ofelia, 
imagines her life through the same tale about the princess from the Underground Realm 
and also tries to deal with living in a fascist military outpost; as it happens, her pregnant 
mother, Carmen, has married Captain Vidal, who is leading the campaign against the 
contingent of guerrilla rebels. As a way of coping with her marginal position in the 
outpost, Ofelia escapes to the fairy world where she is given a number of difficult tasks; 
these tasks resemble the sort encountered in European folk narrative and, at least through 
Ofelia's perspective, seem to affect the outcome of events happening around her. When 
she places a magical mandrake root under her mother's bed, her mother seems to recover 
from her pregnancy-related illness; other tasks like retrieving the golden key from the 
venomous frog that inhabits the fig tree are subtle parallels to the guerrillas' tactics of 
stealing food and medical supplies from Capt. Vidal's outpost. Moreover, del Toro's 
Underground is not simply a realm of escapism but, as the film gradually reveals, offers a 
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utopian vision of a better world. More than this, del Toro is drawing a subtle parallel 
between the guerrilla resistance, which must always remain submerged, and the entities 
like Pan (Ofelia's underworld guide) that fictively live beneath the earth. DelToro 
reinforces the link between worlds during a split scene in which Ofelia walks through the 
woods reading her fairytale book while Capt. Vidal leads his men through another part of 
the woods to search for a possible guerrilla hideout. The voiceover meanwhile describes a 
forest that was "home to creatures who were full of magic and wonder" and who 
protected and looked after one another. Clearly, we are meant to see that the oppressed 
guerrillas have something in common with the underworld creatures. It is crucial that 
Ofelia enables us to see the fairy world, for it helps to enhance the subaltern position of 
the Spanish guerrillas and their search for the "age-old treasure" that continually eludes a 
people struggling against a totalitarian regime. Given the futility of the guerrillas' 
struggle against Franco's regime, we might well agree with Hannah Arendt that 
"Unicorns and fairy queens seem to possess more reality than the lost treasure of 
revolutions" (5). But the important point here is that, as Jack Zipes notes in his review of 
the film, Ofelia has the ability to "see two worlds at the same time" ("Pan's Labyrinth (El 
laberinto del fa uno)" 23 7)-not the "real" and the "unreal" but rather the visible and the 
submerged worlds. 
It cannot be stressed enough here that Fairyland is not simply a reflection of the 
real world; the fairy creatures in del Toro's film are not the guerrillas, even if we are 
meant to see some commonality between the submerged positions of each group. The 
Spanish rebels are clearly a subaltern group, struggling to fight against a powerful fascist 
regime that has, as Capt. Vidal smirkingly quips in the opening of the film, already 
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"won." However, the elder race that lives beneath war-tom Spain is of a different order 
altogether; as I argued in both Chapters 1 and 3, despite their lowly position and homely 
appearance, the fairy folk of British legend tend to operate as a harmonious collective; del 
Toro's underworld creatures seem to be organized in a similar fashion. Despite Ofelia's 
battles with the darker elements of the underworld-the venomous frog and the eyeless 
ghoul who eats children-there is a strong sense that the rulers of the Underground Realm 
are peace-loving and not oppressive. Not so in the upper world, where the rulers feign 
kindness by hoarding all the food in one place (the outpost is located at a mill) and then 
distributing food in bread lines, announcing smugly, "This is our daily bread in Franco's 
Spain, kept safe in this mill!" This scenario smacks of totalitarianism, and the garrison-
style organization, along with Capt. Vidal's ruthless treatment of suspected "Red" 
sympathizers, indicates that this world is dominated by something worse than venomous 
frogs and ghoulish child-eaters; this point is reinforced in the final act of the film when 
Ofelia is shot and killed by Capt. Vidal as she tries to escape into the magical labyrinth. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the film, in which the rebels manage to storm the outpost, 
rout the army, and kill Capt. Vidal, indicates that this "submerged nation" has achieved a 
victory against great odds; this victory is reinforced in the closing scene where we see 
Ofelia resurrected in the Underground Realm as the long lost princess. This denouement 
demonstrates the ways in which folk narrative can be used (by directors and writers, by 
people involved in a political struggle) to alter the perception of a world. If Mercedes, the 
benevolent scullery maid who secretly delivers food and medical supplies to the 
guerrillas, tells Ofelia that she no longer believes in "fairies," Ofelia's ardent belief in the 
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Underground Realm is powerful enough to give the otherwise bleak world a tinge of hope 
and beauty. 
While it would be difficult to argue that del Toro 's film is a species of SF, its 
interest in the "feedback oscillation between two realities" and the way in which it 
"actualizes a different-though historical and not transcendental-world corresponding to 
different human relationships and cultural norms" (Suvin, Positions 37) means that it 
shares an important goal with SF. It was my initial, tentative suggestion in my 
Introduction that 1) there are certain thematic links between folk narrative and SF and that 
2) the most fundamental commonality between the two genres lies in their mutual use of 
"cognitive estrangement," which is not possible without the tension or collision between 
real and imagined worlds. I specifically argued that folk narrative's engagement with both 
"poetry" and history-as part of its composite make-up of folktale and legend-enabled it 
to straddle the imaginary and real worlds and therefore to correspond to the concerns of 
an empirical environment. My subsequent analysis in Chapter 1 established the 
precedence in the Victorian period for folk narratives to function as articulations of social 
anxieties; the central persona of my discussion, the linchpin for my main argument, was 
the changeling who became in this era an embodiment of the ways in which the outside 
world could so inexplicably intrude upon a comfortable and orderly bourgeois society. 
The examples I used to reinforce my argument were a series of legends for the most part, 
although two folktales, "The Fairy Wife" and "The Speckled Bull," supplied at least two 
instances where the folk genres overlapped. It would be pointless to prove that either 
genre is pure since the oral and written traditions continually intertwine through historical 
transmission; but it is apparent that the particular legends that comprised my main 
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discussion-"The Caerlaverock Changeling," "Johnnie in the Cradle," and so forth-
were intended to be parables about the human relationship with the earth's unknown 
elements. These offerings seemed to exemplify Rohrich's observation that the legend 
presented a "real otherworld" or a tension between "two worlds" (23-24). But where was 
this "otherworld"-indeed, where is it? Fairyland has a tendency to disappear just as 
someone is about to glimpse it; as a submerged locale, it is always just out of sight. And 
yet people claim to have seen it-people like Mr. Noy, in the Cornish legend, "The Fairy 
Dwelling on Selena Moor." Making a shortcut through a moor one evening, Mr. William 
Noy loses his way and travels for what seems like numerous miles until he sees "lights in 
the distance" and hears "music" (Briggs, "The Fairy Dwelling on Selena Moor" 225). 
When he finally reaches what he believes is a familiar farmhouse, William enters the 
orchard and sees "hundreds of people either dancing or sitting drinking at tables," all of 
them "richly dressed" and looking, "to him," "very small." Eventually, he is warned away 
by another mortal named Grace Hutchens, who was also lured to the farmhouse and who 
claims that life here is "unnatural and a sham" (226). When he attempts to rescue Grace, 
everything disappears before his eyes, and the narrator concludes by stating: "Like many 
other visitors to Fairyland, Mr Noy pined and lost all interest in life after this adventure" 
(227). 
If the message here is largely negative-that the fairies live a "sham" lifestyle and 
get a charge out of stealing women or children-the final line strikes a different note: if 
Fairyland is so bad, why would someone "pine" and lose "interest" in the affairs of the 
human world upon his return to it? Del Toro asks this question in a different manner: why 
would someone want to leave "Fairyland" if such a place existed, if such a place were 
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possible? When the princess of the Underground Realm leaves her home and emerges 
into the upper world, she quickly loses all thought and subsequently dies. Again, legends 
like the one del Toro adapts and the one I have briefly discussed here are not simply 
escapist. Ofelia does not escape from reality and, in fact, dies because of it. Similarly, we 
are left with the feeling that Mr. Noy languishes because he cannot return to the place that 
he so hastily left. The failure in both cases is quite significant: escapism is not permitted 
because the protagonist fails to escape. But these are only two examples, and, as I 
suggested in that first chapter, it is in the changeling legends that we really see this 
tension between worlds-embodied frighteningly in the body of (what looks like) a 
human infant. Despite the equally negative outcome of these tales (especially where the 
changeling is frequently abused or driven out of the house), they also enable the 
oscillation between realities. "The Fairy Changeling: II," for example, re-poses the 
question, Why would you leave Fairyland? when the long-lost brother tells his family that 
the "fairies had kept him in a beautiful palace under the rocks, and fed him on the best of 
everything!" and that he only returned because of his family obligation (Briggs, "The 
Fairy Changeling: II" 221-22). We only hear about Fairyland in this instance, but once 
again, the failure-in the young man's reluctant return, in our inability to actually see the 
"other" place-is important. 
Further, I would argue that the failure here is important for the same reason that it 
is crucial to modem SF: if this pining for a magical realm that can neither be fully 
glimpsed nor properly articulated was the impetus behind folk legends, it is also the 
impetus for a large number of utopian and/or SF narratives. Consider, for example, 
William Morris's News from Nowhere (1891 ). The protagonist, William Guest, awakes 
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one morning to discover that he has been somehow transported in time to a communistic 
utopian version ofhis merry England; this is a place in which all the drudgery of the 
industrial revolution has been replaced by a rural arcadia. However, despite the beauty 
and peacefulness of the society he witnesses, Guest begins to feel that he does not belong 
here somehow, that he does not fit in; finally, during a banquet, lie sees the faces ofhis 
beautiful hosts blur before his eyes, and then the whole scene fades to black. Guest then 
awakens to discover that the utopia has been a dream. Despite this failure, the first person 
narrator-this "guest" to the otherworld-concludes on an optimistic note: "if others can 
see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a vision rather than a dream" (Morris, News 
from Nowhere 228). Given that he wrote this proto-SF work as a response to Edward 
Bellamy's Looking Backward: 2001-1887 (1888), in which the protagonist Simon West 
also awakes in a futuristic, utopian world but never returns to his own tumultuous, 
nineteenth-century world, Morris seems to be suggesting that the failure is not only 
important but necessary. Indeed, as the legends themselves continually suggest, the jolt of 
leaving the strange, new world is as important as the initial shock of first encountering it; 
the charge that we might level at Bellamy's work and others like it is that it uses the 
folkloric dream sequence for the purpose of escape (finding security in Edenic pastures) 
rather than critique (knowing full well that one deserves Eden, but looking in from the 
outside all the same). 
Following up my study of folk narrative in Chapter 1 with individual author 
studies in Chapters 2 through 5, I attempted to place my originally "tentative" argument 
for a thematic link between folk narrative and SF on a more solid footing. These chapters 
served to reinforce 1) the two genres' mutual interests in a wished-for "otherplace" 2); the 
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function of cognitive estrangement in both folk narrative and SF, as exemplified in the 
human-nonhuman encounter and the resulting shock; and, as my central claim, 3) the 
numerous ways in which the changeling persona conceptualizes symbiosis and the 
creation of "new social relations" in modem SF. According to Suvin' s theory, which I 
have adapted throughout this study, "cognitive estrangement" occurs when the science-
fictional world causes the reader to both identify and shudder; the shock itself, that is, the 
subsequent reformulation of the SF conceptual worlds offered, constitutes the third 
option, the reader's own world, which is now transformed in a significant way (Chapter 3, 
section II). For example, in The Time Machine, the reader's own world is inverted, so that 
they (and "we," over 100 years after the book was published) are able to see London as an 
immeasurable mass of swarming Morlocks, inhabiting an underworld and operating the 
machinery that makes it function. As the sort oflinchpin of the dissertation, Chapter 3 
(beginning with the preamble in section I) established the major groundwork for a 
theoretical discussion of folk narrative as the "absent paradigm" in SF. On the one hand, I 
argued, the legend is simply an abbreviated expression of cognitive dissonance that the 
SF tale then expands and develops; on the other hand, I suggested, the legend is the seed 
of a larger idea, the monad or core problem that provides an SF narrative with its 
mechanism or thrust, even if the actual apparatus (plot structure, technical/technological 
details) derives from other sources (the detective novel, popular scientific journals). This 
is to say that the legend provides something like an explanatory inscription or code (like 
the legend on a map) that the SF story then attempts to decipher. In the case of the 
legends I have discussed, the particular inscription tells the brief story about an encounter 
between a human mortal and a nonhuman entity and the failure to achieve optimal 
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relations. Wells "reads" this legend through the Traveller's futuristic encounter with the 
Morlocks and the Eloi and Prendick's encounter with the Beast Folk; Capek brilliantly 
sees another "future" for these automated "little people," recasting them as Robots and 
Newts; and Stapledon goes right back to the source and offers a changeling and hybrid 
human-animal protagonist that would be at home in either "The Caerlaverock 
Changeling" or "The Speckled Bull." But reading and reimagining the legend does not 
mean that the essential problem is solved (or decoded); indeed, the changeling maintains 
the strict tension between the real and imagined worlds, embodying as it does the 
consequences of crossing boundaries. The fractious, deformed, hairy, ugly and anarchical 
creatures usually identified as changelings embody the situation of straddling two 
worlds-the fairy world that they are forced to leave behind and the cruel human world 
into which they are thrust. Indeed, we could argue that these specific changelings, 
identified through their recognizable traits, conceptualize the fundamental experience of 
exposure, shock, and transformation that occurs in most legends that treat human-fairy 
encounters. It has been my argument from the beginning that the changeling enunciates 
the rupturing experience of a self-other encounter and the metamorphosis that occurs as a 
result, and that this experience is characteristic ofboth folk narrative and SF. 
II. Anatomy of a Changeling 
While Deleuze and Guattari have been the general inspiration for a project that 
studies particular "conceptual personae," such a study would not be possible without the 
folkloric and science-fictional agents of enunciation. For this reason, folk narrative-and 
not a specific philosophical text-constitutes the main source for my theoretical 
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framework; it is specifically in changeling legends that we find a consistent exploration of 
hybridity and symbiosis, and that we find an almost archaic articulation of "new social 
relations." Indeed, while other chapters include explicitly identified theoretical sections 
(Chapter 2, section I and Chapter 3, section I), Chapter 1 is the primary theoretical 
chapter, from which all my subsequent arguments derive. In a certain sense, the anatomy 
of the changeling proceeds from those detailed sections describing "The Changeling as 
Naughty or Precocious Child" (II), "The Changeling as Monster" (III), and "The 
Changeling as Hybrid" (IV). 
i. The Child. 
The changeling, of course, typically shows up in legends as a child, albeit a nasty-
looking and bad-tempered one. Such a creature poses a threat to the domestic order and 
the authority of the family. As we recall from Chapter I, section II, the changeling motif 
elicited two basic and conflicting interpretations: on the one hand, stories about 
changelings offered warnings to individuals who had overstepped boundaries; and on the 
other hand, these tales seemed to comment on the human capacity for violence and 
intolerance, and, especially in a tale like "The Fairy Changeling: II," the possibility of 
reconciling the conflict through a new and perhaps "radical" understanding of hospitality. 
This fundamental conflict-and even the failure to find a resolution to it-finds new 
expression in the gothic and urban gothic environments of Shelley and Stevenson; we 
could say that the monster and Hyde are changelings "born" in the cradle of science-the 
laboratory. The changeling-as-child motif recurs in both works, for the monster is an 
infant in an old man's body who is abandoned by his father, while Hyde is repeatedly 
described as a "young man" who parasitizes his upper-class father. As most critics have 
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noted, the pseudo-human figures in each work seem to caution us about the consequences 
of "mad science," of altering humanity and unleashing monstrous changelings on a 
society. But both stories also elicit sympathy for the changeling: in the first instance, the 
monster is a vulnerable solitary fairy, with no "relations" (Frankenstein 81) and subject to 
all manner of abuse; Hyde, meanwhile, actually engenders in his creator a "more 
generous tide of blood" (Jekyll and Hyde 62). Both "fathers" ultimately reject their 
offspring when they can no longer tolerate the insurgent behaviour. 
Wells was clearly inspired by this gothic link between deformity and insurgency, 
andre-imagined the scenario as a future class war in The Time Machine. As texts that 
deal in a general way with the conflict between insurgents and autocratic authority 
figures, both The Time Machine and Moreau take their cue from the legends where 
upstart changelings attempt to supplant the ruler of the home and defy house rules. Of 
course, the Eloi are described as both elfin and child-like, while the Beast Folk are treated 
like subhuman infants and are, at least initially, forced to bow to their progenitor, Dr. 
("daddy") Moreau. We may at first sympathize with the Traveller's revulsion at the 
Morlocks and enjoy the pummeling strokes of his crowbar, but a closer reading of the 
story reveals a changeling society that deserves more sympathy, and perhaps empathy, 
given the real-worlders (East-Enders) to whom the Morlocks may very well be analogous. 
Certainly, in the case of the Beast Folk, the language itself (for example, the creature who 
looks like a "flayed child'' and who guides Prendick into the submerged world) invites us 
to sympathize with the subaltern plight and to contemplate "truly other relationships" 
(Suvin, Positions 55). 
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The basic plot of the changeling legend, then, could be summarized as a family 
dispute between parents and child, although in the hands of Shelley, Stevenson, and 
Wells, the legend begins to present a warning about not simply rejecting the changeling 
but possibly exploiting it for profit. This theme of exploitation is especially evident in 
Moreau, which seems to have had a conceptual influence on War with the Newts, just as 
Frankenstein is clearly a source for R. U R. Capek's Robots are "born" in vats, thrust into 
an adult world; they ultimately reach maturity but not before annihilating most of the 
parents who begot them. But if ever there were a "daddy" it would be van Tach; he is, of 
course, the first and most influential exploiter of the Newts, long before Bondy co-opts 
them as a global work force. Again, the changeling legend is instructive here as a 
commentary on and critique of hospitality, and it also offers a model for forming fruitful 
alliances. 
It could be argued that Stapledon warns his society to not forget the lessons of 
these previous folk and SF changeling tales. Throughout both his cosmological fantasies 
and his more mundane SF novels he emphasizes the beauty in cultivating a "personality-
in-community," and the devastating affects of exorcizing or at least misunderstanding the 
new changelings that appear from time to time, as nature sometimes dictates. Odd John 
and Sirius truly return us to the environment of the folk narrative and, in particular, the 
drama that begins where all human dramas begin: the cradle. We could say that Odd John 
reenacts the changeling legend where the parents peek into the crib and find a deformed 
infant-mute, ugly, sallow, and frighteningly inhuman. The difference here, however, is 
that is that his parents accept him and protect him fiercely. Sirius repeats the same 
formula but with significant changes; nevertheless, the changeling-child motif is in effect 
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just the same, with the additional folktale exploration of a "sympathetic" connection 
between "children" of different species. John and Sirius have no strict affiliations but they 
do, however, develop alliances and new social relations, even if the latter is more 
successful in achieving a symbiotic relation. 
ii. Monster 
The child is just one of the constituent parts of the changeling persona, for, as the 
legends reveal, the changeling-child it is not bound to its parents or relations, even if it 
laments the loss of such family ties; moreover, it generally tries to find new relations, but 
this only reinforces how much of a "monster" it is. While the folk legends discussed in 
Chapter 1 present the theoretical framework for our conceptualization of changeling 
monstrosity, it is especially in the realm of SF that the monster finds its fullest 
articulation. Frankenstein is the originating monster-text of the nineteenth century, a 
veritable organism of seething passions, sensations, and speculations, gathered from the 
most conservative socio-political philosophies (Malthus, Hobbes) and the most 
adventurous philosophical and scientific treatises (Burke, E. Darwin, Saint-Hilaire). 
Shelley's "monster" has contributed-and continues to contribute-to the 
conceptualization of all the aliens, robots, and changelings oflater SF (Chapter 3, 
Introduction), but is itself clearly indebted to eighteenth-century theories of the sublime 
and the monstrous sublime. Both Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde reiterate the manner 
in which the newly revised gothic mode, which was interested in the science of terror, 
could contribute to a cognitive estrangement, or the shocking collision between a known, 
empirical reality and an unknown but possible reality; if the supernatural turned out to be 
a terrifying mutation of the natural, it was deemed possible and therefore all the more 
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shocking. Clearly finding inspiration from the folk notion of a bodily substitution, Shelley 
and Stevenson each introduce a gothic monster as the "novum" (agent) of their work in 
order to posit the doppelganger as a biological possibility (Chapter 2, Conclusion). 
If Wells's monsters are generally identified as science-fictional entities, 
dominated by a consistently developed "novum" (Metamorphoses 63) that is, for the most 
part, validated by late nineteenth-century physics and biology, they are also heirs to the 
gothic fear of the "black things" (The Time Machine 50) that go bump in the night. His 
Beast Folk constitute (at least initially) a more successful attempt at creating automated or 
artificial humans. Wells knew as well as any ofhis contemporaries that, despite the 
apparent yawning abyss between the two genres, a little "jiggery pokery" was all that was 
required to make the gothic into SF. But ifWells's scientific romances validate the 
cognitive importance of the gothic monster, they also validate the parabolic importance of 
folk narrative. 
Subsequent SF works by Capek and Stapledon follow Wells's lead by including 
"monsters," or "mythical creature[ s] which [are] part animal and part human, or 
[combine] elements of two or more animal forms. "85 As works that explore the fascist 
obsession with the "biological sublime" (Gomel), R. U R. and War with the Newts posit 
the monster as the counterpoint to the racially pure "New Man." If it is true in each case 
that the "masses" really did desire "fascism" (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 29) and 
effectively perpetrate world destruction, Capek is all the more successful in proving how 
much the changeling has oscillated between ideological recuperation and radical 
85 See defimhon of "monster" m the onhne OED 
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reinvention, and how the fear of the changeling still reflects class and racial anxieties 
(Chapter 4, Introduction). 
Moreover, if we lose sight of the folkloric changeling through the course of our 
investigation, it continually emerges-sometimes through its constituent parts, sometimes 
as a bifurcation ofthe folkloric figure (child, monster, demon, animal-human, and so 
forth). Both Odd John and his Hebridean nemesis recall the legend's function as a lexicon 
of congenital malformation; these two figures also remind us of the supernatural or 
perhaps religious dimension of changeling legends, hitherto developed in Shelley's 
engagement with the monstrous sublime and in Capek's parodic evocation of the garden 
of Eden myth in R. U R. We discover in Stapledon's oeuvre the development of a 
changeling that has been centuries, if not millennia, in the making: the divine mutant. 
iii. Hybrid 
So, then, even before we reach the third component of our "anatomy," the 
changeling begins to alter before our eyes, converging as it does with a gothic or religious 
understanding of the "monstrous" and a biological understanding of the anomalous. But 
the gothic notion of monstrosity still reinforces how much the anomalous creature 
exceeds the limited scope of scientific investigation; for this reason, the folkloric 
perspective continues to contribute to our understanding of both "old world" and "new 
world" changelings. As presented in Chapter 1, the hybrid might be understood as a way 
of conceptualizing the combined supernatural and biological notions of monstrosity. As I 
argued in the final section of the chapter, the changeling legend conceptualized the divine 
mystery of conception as well as the unforeseen proliferation of deviations in the human 
organism. If Darwinian theory amplifies such a description, the changeling nevertheless 
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enunciates such a profound process; in other words, if we can distinguish between 
folkloric and biological and cultural "hybridity," the legends invite us to see the 
changeling as an agent of hybridity in its widest possible sense-that is, as not just the 
product of a supernatural intervention but also as the product of both physical and social 
inter-species alliances. Bhabha further develops the theory of hybrid or partial identity, 
while Williams provides an additional way of understanding the changeling's "residual" 
importance in nineteenth-century fiction and science fiction. This final component of the 
changeling's anatomy suggests that this folkloric persona may very well constitute a 
hitherto unacknowledged typological feature of SF, especially if we now consider the 
possible source for the cross-sections and intermixtures in Frankenstein and the "polar 
twins" in Jekyll and Hyde; the parasitical symbiosis in The Time Machine and the 
physical metamorphoses in Moreau; the engineered automata in R. U R.; and the 
deformed superman in Odd John. If the changeling only rarely appears in SF as a 
folkloric entity, he is nevertheless there, incognito, miming the ways of humanity until 
humanity acknowledges his request for whiskey and music as a basic and primordial 
request for hospitality. 
Ill. The Changeling Factor: New Actants for New Alien Encounters 
SF, and, I would argue, twentieth-century SF in particular, provides a new 
"conceptual plane" (Deleuze and Guattari) for folktales, and particularly those concerned 
with fairies and fairy changelings. It is in the realm of SF criticism, and in Suvin' s 
location of SF within optimal horizons (Positions 61-73 ), that folk narrative assumes a 
new cognitive significance; it is especially within the conceptual worlds of SF that the 
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changeling persona discovers new opportunities for optimal social relations. This should 
really be no surprise: folk narrative can be viewed as a speculative discourse, intertwined 
as it is with notions of otherworldly visitations and a program of genetic mutation 
instigated through the abduction ofhuman children (Rojcewicz 493). Where exactly does 
"science" come into folk narrative? one might rightfully ask. As I argued in Chapter 1, 
folktales involve a kind of speculation that may very well be pre-SF and even pre-
scientific, at least in the post-Enlightenment sense of the term. However, speculation, at 
least in the tales I discussed, rests on the disturbance or rupture of cognition, where 
otherwise natural phenomena (child birth, for example) exceed the limits ofhuman 
comprehension. What if, a folk legend might ask, a child is born with greenish skin, aged 
features, and spider-like limbs? As it turns out, these characteristics (green skin, wizened 
appearance, spidery legs) are mentioned in documented cases ofbirth deformities, the 
changeling rearing its ugly head in the modem hospital (Chapter 1, section III). This set 
of changeling traits also accurately describes the protagonist of Stapledon's Odd John. As 
this text seems to suggest, "Fairyland" turns out more than just fractious, deformed 
infants; it sometimes produces "supemormals." Somewhere in between the so-called 
"medical changeling" and Stapledon's SF changeling are those failed experiments of 
Shelley, Stevenson, Wells, and Capek; failures or not, these creations are inspired by that 
folk paradigm of the human-nonhuman encounter and by the possibility of fashioning a 
symbiotic community. Moreover, both folktales about changelings and SF texts that 
reconfigure the changeling persona in a new environment are linked to-or can be 
impelled to relate to (Geertz 23)-cognitive horizons corresponding to relevant epochs or 
empirical worlds (Victorian England, the interwar years in England and in Eastern 
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Europe). So if a "plane" functions as the habitation for otherwise homeless and scattered 
concepts, the concepts themselves (hospitality, monstrosity, hybridity, metamorphosis, 
symbiosis, and so forth) also populate and nourish the landscape of the plane, and the 
folkloric personae (the fairy, the changeling) function as the necessary agents of this 
concept creation (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 36-37). This is to say that, if 
SF enables a new interpretation of folk narrative, specific folk legends, in tum, can offer a 
new perspective on SF by filling in the absent paradigm and thereby providing a 
mechanism for social metamorphosis; science itself can provide answers, but something 
beyond the realm of the scientific asks the question, What if?: this is precisely the 
changeling factor. 
The scientific method of interpreting changeling narratives as representations of 
children with congenital disease has been echoed in twentieth-century SF tales where 
supernormal abilities (telepathy, telekinesis, and so forth) are initially attributed to birth 
defects. In John D. MacDonald's "A Child Is Crying" (1948), for example, scientists 
speculate on the possibility that the "child" was a mutation either a) "brought about by 
atomic radiation," orb) produced as a defensive mechanism in the case of nuclear war (he 
is an anomaly with the ability to predict the near future). As the boy reveals when he is 
stuck with a needle containing a truth serum, neither of these theories are accurate; he is, 
rather, a "direct evolutionary product," he is "necessary to humanity because otherwise 
humanity would not have survived," and he is, therefore, the "factor missing from man's 
intellect" (204). Like Odd John, this child is no mere deformity, nor is he spiteful like the 
Hebridean child; MacDonald's child prodigy exemplifies the notion that the fairy realm-
that missing factor-is possibly the height of human potential (Chapter 1, section IV). In 
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the film Stalker (1979), Andrei Tarkovsky's loose adaptation of Arkadi and Boris 
Strugatsky's SF novel Roadside Picnic (1972), the area called the "Zone" is considered 
by the surrounding population to be the site of a mysterious "visitation"; it is also thought 
to contain gifts and to produce miracles. Functioning as a sort of expert and freelance 
guide, the Stalker sneaks individuals into the Zone past the barbed wire and the troops 
assembled to keep all intruders out. The Stalker's wife is upset that he continues to enter 
the Zone, despite the dangers involved. She believes that the Zone is responsible for their 
child who exhibits something like mental retardation; apparently, the child, affectionately 
called "Monkey," was conceived after the Stalker first entered the Zone. As the mother 
puts it, "God himself has cursed you by giving you this child!" As we discover in the final 
scene of the film, Monkey has telekinetic abilities: sitting placidly at the kitchen table, she 
moves three glasses along the smooth surface without the aid ofher hands. We could 
argue that the Zone functions here as the SF equivalent of a Fairyland-clearly dangerous 
in some way but also capable of producing marvelous anomalies. The mother's reaction 
to the child is symptomatic of the typical human response to the miraculous: some divinity 
must be responsible for this. As Susan Eberly remarks, birth defects and congenital 
afflictions "have produced feelings of fear and awe since earliest times" (228). Perhaps it 
is this alternative religious component that has made the changeling figure so fascinating 
for SF writers interested in exploring the fearful symmetry of the human organism-or, 
for that matter, the nonhuman organism. The tales and texts I have discussed in Chapters 
1 through 5 lead us to contemplate the cultural predominance of a figure whose 
characteristics suggest something of a divine mutation, which is the result of a radical 
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hospitality that has enabled these blasphemous unions between disparate kingdoms to 
occur in the first place. 
The speculative search for a new faith and for new social relations in the 
irreligious and hyper-technological era of the twentieth century has its roots in the 
seventeenth century when both Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes attempted to separate 
philosophy from theology by proposing a "new method" that would rely upon the 
principles of scientific inquiry and dispense with the old metaphysics (Lewes 1-2). As 
true Renaissance men and harbingers of the "scientific revolution," Bacon and Descartes 
rejected any philosophical system which did not search for "visible or tangible results" 
(117). In particular, Bacon's New Organon (1620) was "driven by a strong commitment 
to new technical scientific instruments and the increasing variety of experiments on 
nature they made possible" (Jardine xii). As I suggested in Chapter 4, however, this 
supplanting of theology had the long-term goal of restoring humanity's dominion over the 
earth, a notion that had already been prescribed by Christian doctrine centuries before. 
Despite his ultimate failure, Victor Frankenstein is the first modem fictional scientist to 
achieve the utopian dream of engineering a superior human species, as described in 
Bacon's New Atlantis (291-92). Both Dr. Jekyll and Dr. Moreau attempt to perfect the 
Baconian project by extracting the animal instinct; in each case, the radical experiment is 
guided by a conservative devotion to Man's Edenic dominance over the lower orders. As 
Moreau reveals, the separation of the Church and unfettered philosophical inquiry (that is, 
science) did not liberate society in the way that the Renaissance philosophers imagined 
but actually passed all "Authority" into the hands of an elite minority of intellectuals: 
such a venture effectively eliminated the religious side of speculation or the continual 
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faith in nature's unknown principles. As Gary K. Wolfe argues in his seminal SF study 
The Known and the Unknown, "If technology is the systematic appropriation and ordering 
of natural forces, the monster is the spontaneous bursting forth of those forces in strange 
and terrible guises" (Wolfe 187). While they begin their career as simply an ingenious 
and industrious species, prone to exponential growth, the Newts evolve into something 
horrifying: the "Newt Menace." Capek's Newts are no mere fantastical creations but 
salamanders bred for labour, intellectual speculation, and ultimately war; the horror 
derives from their mutation, which humanity has not been able to predict. Capek's anti-
utopian work depicts the frightening results of Moreau's "monsters manufactured'' 
(Moreau 53; emphasis added) and the proto-fascist obsession with transcendent, pseudo-
religious violence and a directed evolution. There is, as Wolfe suggests, something 
menacing about nature's "spontaneous" changes. On the one hand, the scientists and 
engineers in Capek's works seem to usher the change into society almost in a calculated 
or extrapolated fashion. On the other hand, these authorities are unable to estimate the 
degree of exponential change and the variety of changes that occur in the Newt 
population: some salamanders are able to talk and perform in sideshows, while others 
possess the frightening ability to mobilize in military fashion and break apart the 
continents of the world. In other words, whereas extrapolation isolates determinable 
variables in the world, speculation requires us to entertain the possibility of an irreducible 
otherness that exists beyond the purview of our human-made science. If Bacon is 
considered to be the father of modem experimental science, Darwin is not, as it has been 
assumed, the strict disciple of the Baconian method (Rees 386) since his Origin at least 
celebrates the speculative or conceptual possibilities of the scientific paradigm. 
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Evolutionary theory, moreover, emphasizes the special uniqueness of individual creatures 
both great and small, and in particular, those "deviations of structure so strongly 
pronounced as to deserve to be called monstrosities" (Origin 26). 
The changeling has evolved, moreover, as both a stigmatized representative of 
fallen humanity (the progeny of demon incubi, fallen angels, fairies without souls) and a 
scientific anomaly (a congenitally afflicted infant, a mutant, a hybrid human-animal), and 
this makes the changeling a possible prototype for the "alien actants" of SF. This 
discovery was first hinted at in my argument in Chapter 1 that the changeling tale could 
be interpreted as an evolutionary narrative (Chapter 1, section IV). Given that folk 
narrative continually reveals the relationship between human and nonhuman species, it 
seems reasonable to argue that genres like folktales and legends present rituals that are 
analogous to the interrelations between species described in biology. Throughout my five 
chapters I have identified the unforeseen effects of species evolution as changelingism, 
which has to do with the changeability of elements in nature. Shelley's monster may be 
pre-Darwinian, but his monstrous form foreshadows the later discovery that the world 
evolved through "indefinite variability" and not a definitive act of creation (Origin 26); at 
most, the "species" is "the unknown element of a distant act of creation" (65), and this 
applies to the changeling who seems to arrive from out of nowhere. Wells was one of the 
first SF artists (although his novels of the 1890s were usually identified as "scientific 
romances") to combine the discoveries of Darwin with speculations on the future 
evolution of humankind; and it is significant that his far future species resemble the 
denizens of Fairyland encountered in British folk narrative. Under Wells's influence, folk 
personae, including the changeling, become agents of evolutionary change. Capek was 
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clearly influenced by Wells's Darwinian speculations, although there is much to 
suggest-given the conclusion of R. U R. and the scientific bits on "elan vital" in War 
with the Newts-that he did not discount the possibilities of a "creative evolution," in 
which species could grow, survive, and thrive despite the destructive forces of humanity. 
For, as we know, Darwin continually stressed that natural selection would determine the 
"preservation of favorable" traits (Origin 1 08) and the "extinction" of unfavourable ones 
(213); while Darwin was often vague in this early work on exactly what sort of traits 
would be favoured, he gradually came to believe that certain "types" of humanity 
possessed a higher moral rule (Descent of Man 13 7) and were therefore more likely to 
survive. So perhaps we can say that the "Darwinian lesson" of War with the Newts 
(Chapter 4, section II) either reflects Darwin's early thought or is more accurately a 
Bergsonian lesson, which is that "there is no universal biological law, which applies 
precisely and automatically to every living thing" and that "[t]here are only directions in 
which life throws out species in general" (Bergson 16). This is to say that, if the 
changeling is an agent of evolutionary change, it has less to do with so-called "favorable" 
traits than with "divergent" ones, being a product of a force of nature and not the tool of a 
Social Darwinist "survival ofthe fittest." 
Stapledon's SF constitutes the pinnacle of this evolutionary-cum-folkloric 
exploration, particularly in Odd John where the legendary changeling makes an 
appearance again; only this time, the creature turns out to be an evolutionary advance on 
humanity-more divergent and also more adaptable, The subsequent fusion of folk 
themes and biology especially in the work of Stapledon enables the "changeling" and 
perhaps even the "fairy" (not to mention "Fairyland") to become part of the typology of 
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SF, and in particular, "alien encounter SF." As Carl Malmgren defines it in his article 
"Self and Other in SF: Alien Encounters," 
Alien-encounter SF involves the introduction of sentient alien beings into the 
actantial system of the fictional universe; one or more of the actants are nonhuman 
or subhuman or superhuman. [ ... ] The encounter with the alien necessarily 
broaches the question of the Self and the Other. In general, the reader recuperates 
this type of fiction by comparing human and alien entities, trying to understand 
what it means to be human. (15; emphasis added) 
While Chapter 1 demonstrates folk narrative's engagement with a self-other relationship, 
it further specifies the "encounter" as a convergence of multiple personae or "alien racial 
groups" (Silver 57). Indeed, these philosophical categories of Self and Other are often too 
strictly defined, whereas the changeling legend undermines such attempts at definition 
right from the outset, confusing the boundaries of human and nonhuman or human and 
animal, suggesting that alternate forms of "sentient" life come from the "world" that we 
live in rather than the one that has yet to be discovered. The folkloric changeling's 
appearance and behaviour may be echoed by Malmgren's typological categories of 
"nonhuman," "subhuman," and "superhuman," but they are also already specified enough 
in the legends to suggest an additional sort of entity that critics either have neglected to 
mention or have quickly subsumed under the general category of"alien." In his article, 
Malmgren suggests a plethora of more specific alien actants to which the changeling 
roughly corresponds; for example, there is the "technologically transformed self," the 
"mutant," the "monstrous alter ego," as well as a variety of "aliens" that take the form of 
parasites and syrnbionts ( 15-16). Again, the folkloric changeling is one of the prototypes 
for such entities, and Briggs's enormous collection A Dictionary of British Folk-Tales in 
the English Language offers a wide-ranging portrait of such "syrnbionts" and "parasites" 
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and, therefore, a hitherto unacknowledged contribution to the typology of SF. 
Specifically, the changeling emerges as the primary prototype for the alien "mutant" so 
prominent in American SF of the 1930s onward. 
SF writers in the post-WWII era seem well aware of this folkloric influence. 
Consider the following passage from James Blish's The Seedling Stars (1957): 
The notion of modifying the human stock genetically to live on the planets as they 
were found, rather than changing the planets to accommodate the people, had been 
old with Olaf Stapledon[;] it went back, in essence, as far as Proteus, and as deep 
into the human mind as the werewolf, the vampire, the fairy changeling, the 
transmigrated soul. (Blish 43) 
As this passage indicates, the changeling is among several notable fictional or 
mythological personae associated with the notion of physical metamorphosis, an 
imaginative scenario familiar especially to readers of folk narrative, SF, and horror and 
fantasy stories. But, coming as it does within the pages of a classic SF novel of the 1950s, 
the passage situates the genre of "science fiction" as a trans formative plane in which both 
fiction and science are seen to be interactive agents: the changeling is not simply part of a 
primitive belief system but is rather an anticipation of, and a conceptual model for, the 
biological possibility of genetic mutation. Indeed, as the protagonist Donald Sweeney 
discovers while listening to a seminar on "pantropy," or the process by which humans can 
be biologically adapted to inhabit new planets, the "notion" of the "fairy changeling" fits 
well into the conceptual history of biological engineering since it speculates on the pros 
and cons of altering the human organism. Significantly, pantropy is offered as an 
alternative to terraforming (Blish 42-46), or altering the new planet to suit the Terran 
colonists, a practice closely associated with imperialist encroachment in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Wells's The War of the Worlds (1898) is, at least in part, a 
377 
satirical jab at British imperial expansion, and the Martians could be seen as either the 
invading Empire itself or the foreign "others" who succumb to "contact" in the end. Other 
texts like Capek's War with the Newts and Stapledon's Star Maker explore similar themes 
but, in particular, contemplate the consequences of engineering or adapting pseudo-
humans to different environments. In every case, the message seems to be that humans 
should learn to adapt to the new landscape or environment rather than attempt to convert 
it and its inhabitants to suit their needs. If the Newts adapt to various changes in their own 
environment (the rocky shelves or coral beds under the sea), they are also forced to adapt 
to other environments (shallow pools in laboratories and zoos) and to serve the State's 
program of militant capitalism. In this instance, the Newt environment is exploited and 
reformed to suit humanity's needs. In the "Symbiotics" episode of Star Maker, the 
Ichthyoids and Arachnoids initially exist in an exploitative relationship in which the 
hostile environments-the sea for the one, the land for the other-constitute the very 
basis for a genocidal war. However, certain "flexible" individuals from each group see 
the advantage of "fraternization with the enemy" (Star Maker 1 05) and agree to the 
biochemical exchange that allows each to adapt to the new environment. In SF, then, 
terraforming is analogical to more specific strategies of colonizing planets, exploiting 
resources, and planting new and more suitable citizens. Pantropy, on the other hand, is 
analogous to the specific tactics of adapting to new environments through survival skills, 
sharing resources, and engaging in symbiotic relationships with otherwise "alien" 
communities. The changeling is, accordingly, an agent of pantropy since it initiates a 
symbiotic community, however often this project fails. 
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Poul Anderson's novelette "The Queen of Air and Darkness" (1971) contains 
perhaps one of the most direct admissions of SF's debt to the folkloric tradition. The tale 
focuses on a widowed ecologist, Barbro Cullen, whose three-year-old child Jimmy is 
kidnapped during a field expedition in the interior of a planet called Roland and the 
Holmesian detective, Eric Sherrinford, who is hired to investigate the case. According to 
traditional belief in Roland, the mysterious kidnappers are none other than the "Old 
Folk," an enigmatic and fey-like species who are believed to inhabit the margins of 
Roland's wilderness world, a wild region known as Arctica. According to 
anthropologists, these creatures of legend may actually be the "Outlings," an indigenous 
species driven to the margins of their wilderness world by a century of colonization. The 
puzzling nature oflittle Jimmy's abduction-that the child was taken from the scientists' 
campsite without tripping the alarms and carried away with so little effort-leads to 
further questions: Who are these creatures? What is the purpose of these child-thefts? 
And can a peace, if not an alliance, be established between the colonists and the natives? 
Sherrinford insists that the key to this case is coming to terms with an additional, 
academic question: 
[W]hy-across that gap of centuries, across a barrier of machine civilization and 
its utterly antagonistic world view-no continuity of tradition whatsoever-why 
have hard-headed, technologically organized, reasonably well-educated colonists 
here brought back from its grave a belief in the Old Folk? (49-50) 
While the specific details of the story do not concern me here, Sherrinford's initial 
question does; and it seems both whimsical and significant that Sherrinford's boss, Chief 
Constable Dawson, suggests that "eventually somebody will get a thesis out of [his] 
question" (50). Why, we might ask, do seemingly out-of-date genres survive in 
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technologically-driven societies where folk beliefs appear to have been superseded by 
rational truths or disproved by scientific discovery? As Sherrinford discovers, the belief 
in "nonhuman beings with supernatural powers" ( 48-49) is linked in some way with 
actual "tactics employed in a chillingly subtle strategy" (54). In a scenario reminiscent of 
seventeenth-century captivity narratives, or, as I would suggest, nineteenth-century 
changeling legends, these Outlings have begun stealing children as a tactical method in a 
nearly invisible war against the exploitation and settlement of a final frontier. The link to 
folk narrative is firmly established when Barbro sees one of the captives in the woods and 
specifically identifies it as a "changeling, stolen in babyhood and raised by the Old Folk" 
(66). But, again, why the recourse to legendry? Given this science-fictional example, we 
might surmise that an increasingly industrialized-and now technologically advanced-
environment naturally provokes its inhabitants to search for a new "structure of feeling," 
which comes in "the form of modification or disturbance in older forms" (Williams 134), 
such as the folk legend or the folktale. This is to say that, as dominant forms of 
knowledge and communication narrow the possibilities of speculation, the mass 
population holds onto and/or re-articulates beliefs and practices that, by default, have 
been marginalized but which, for this same reason, have also retained a certain 
significance. 
If the folk belief associated with fairies indicates "the struggle between the 
subordinated cultures oflocal communities and the hegemonic culture of the state" (6 
Gioll<iin, "The Fairy Belief and Official Religion" 199), the science-fictional text that 
adapts folkloric themes may be said to redeploy such a struggle, but in a new context. 
Anderson's novelette is instructive in this regard: what remains beyond the purview of the 
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dominant or "technologically organized" culture has the ability to survive and influence 
new generations whose voices still remain submerged. We may identify the adaptation of 
folk motifs in Anderson's tale-written in the late twentieth, but likely set in at least the 
twenty-first, century-as an indication of the residual effects of certain colonial anxieties, 
of the guilt over colonization and the subsequent displacement of cultures, and, more 
significantly, of the fear that further "contact" will ultimately threaten the stability of a 
hyper-industrialized society. Indeed, invasion or abduction narratives can be seen as 
expressions of the fear that a formerly subordinate group might tum the tables and invade 
a territory, terrorize an unsuspecting and even undeserving country or nation: this seems 
to be one ofthe socio-political thrusts ofWells's The War of the Worlds, which draws 
comparisons between the Martians' invasion of earth and the British Empire's 
"extermination" of the Tasmanians (266). The point here is that, as Geertz has suggested, 
folk belief can be directed towards other purposes. Far from indulging in superstitions, a 
particular segment of society in Anderson's tale impels traditional folk belief to tackle the 
practical problems of a modem society. Similarly, British (and, generally, European) folk 
narrative often supplies practical solutions to crises that the authorities of law and 
medicine are unable to comprehend. The legend about a fairy woman who curses a man's 
cattle may seem a quaint fireside story, but it may also offer an analogy to an 
insubordinate woman who is fed up with patriarchal authority. Similarly, the legend about 
a deformed fairy child exchanged for a human one may be analogous to more than 
superstitious belief about the "Good People" (or the "Old Folk," for that matter); it may 
actually express a fear regarding birth defects, infant paralysis or death, class or racial 
position; it may also reflect a personal-perhaps wished for-association with the 
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subversive undercurrents of the fairy world. In any event, legend has the capacity to cross 
the "barrier" of civilizations and societies but always through the vehicle of agents-
fairies, "little people," and, of course, the changeling. 
IV. A New Changeling Ethos 
The resilience of the changeling persona in modern SF is the result of a number of 
factors. To begin with, the legend from which the changeling figure derives encodes a 
spiritual yearning for a utopian society and is especially attractive to those discontented 
with modern political systems and the Christian notion of a "Heaven" that can only be 
realized in the "afterlife." Specifically, the changeling has helped to conceptualize new 
social relations and, in particular, the development of a community of unlike peoples, 
animals, and organisms in which symbiosis between disparate groups rather than 
dominance of one over the other becomes the organizing principle. These relations are 
specifically imagined with varying degrees of success in the novels I have discussed in 
Chapters 2 through 5. The failed or achieved social relations presented in each text 
correspond to actual socio-political contexts, and throughout each of the chapters I have 
followed Suvin's basic argument that an SF work should bear some analogical 
resemblance to an "empirical environment." As he argues, "When we read a text we 
should understand not only its internal narrative articulation but also its relation to wider 
paradigms. The result is that the text inescapably amounts to a given interpretation or 
model ofthe extra-textual universe" (Metamorphoses 46; original emphases). So, for 
example, the new social relations in several ofthe works are analogical to the residual 
effects of cultural encounters in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries; colonization 
382 
sometimes produces "hybrid" subjects, a phenomenon embodied by the changeling who 
straddles two "kingdoms" and explored in The Time Machine, Moreau, and Star Maker. 
These relations are also meant to be analogous to experimental societies and "submerged 
nations" in contemporary society; such societies are explored in Wells and also especially 
in Capek's War with the Newts and Stapledon's Odd John and Sirius. In some 
circumstances, of course, the second case might be understood as simply the aftermath of 
the original cultural encounter, where the colonized society remains unassimilated or 
produces its own community as a variant on the dominant political system; either way, we 
should now recognize in these scenarios the typological "alien encounter" motif and the 
crucial part that the changeling has had to play in the conceptualization of"first contact." 
Finally, the preceding sections have indicated that the changeling persona conceptualizes 
a new ethos that emphasizes the interplay of a whole species rather than only specific 
individuals or groups. 
The components for this new ethos are to be found especially in Stapledon's 
works, which, on the other hand, appear to be a variation on almost all the previous SF 
works discussed in Chapters 2 through 4. Moreover, throughout Stapledon's four major 
books, there is a re-evaluation ofthe monster-creator relationships in Frankenstein and 
Jekyll and Hyde; the parasitical symbiosis in The Time Machine and the animal-human 
hybrids in Moreau; the engineered humans in R. U R. and the adapted, co-opted sea-
creatures in War with the Newts. As I have claimed, Odd John and Sirius constitute 
Stapledon's most important achievements. His reinvestigation ofthe SF canon leads him 
to present his first mutant-the congenitally deformed child-as the model for a higher 
evolved human, or "an advancement in human evolution rather than a 'throwback' or 
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reversion" (Chapter 1, section IV). The deformed body itself, as John describes, presents 
a "test" for people: "If they don't begin to see me beautiful when they have had a chance 
to learn, I know they're dead inside, and dangerous" (Odd John 9). Accordingly, the 
experimental community in Odd John operates collectively as part of a larger Nietzschean 
critique of the spiritual "hunchbacks" of modem society (Zarathustra 159), or those who 
fail to see the beauty of a symbiotic community like the one John has organized. John's 
test, of course, is a variation on the monster's trial in the De Lacey household; only the 
old blind man passes the test, but his keen-eyed nephew is very quick to pass judgement 
and banish the one-time "good spirit" from human fellowship forever. Despite this 
failure, the monster is nevertheless freed from the filial confinement of the family 
structure. There is no space in this novel for a full articulation of an alternate social 
relation, but the break itself provides the gap for subsequent authors to fill. Enter the SF 
changeling. As one of these hybrid personae, John wishes to change his society by tearing 
humanity away from itself, by altering it beyond recognition; moreover, his experimental 
community is to be a model for a completely new society in which "every vestige" of 
humanity has been stripped from the planet (94). This first component, then, specifies the 
changeling as an evolutionary leap. 
The second component of this new ethos reinforces the original sentiment: that the 
symbiotic community does not exclude but rather encourages intermixture and the 
celebration of all species that inhabit the particular biosphere. As I suggested in Chapter 
5, John's alternate community is composed of an endless variety of "freaks" who possess 
paranormal abilities, each of which seems to supplement the "factor missing from man's 
intellect" (MacDonald 204). Ultimately, however, the need to make the leap from human 
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to superhuman blinds the community to the original, symbiotic spirit of the campaign. 
Indeed, John's community fails because it is missing a crucial element: the human or at 
least respect for the human ancestor. It is in Sirius that we find the flowering of this 
second component, which occurs because Stapledon's canine protagonist values the 
human part of his identity and also because he understands that an evolutionary leap goes 
backward as well as forward, and that divergence means wresting the paw from the earth, 
reterritorializing it onto all manner of tools, turning away from territories and returning to 
them, as the situation demands (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 67-68). 
Stapledon's novels present the animal-human relation as a fluctuating scale that alters our 
perception of the human: for John, the human is what needs to be transcended since it is 
the lower species; for Sirius, the human is what he needs to ascend towards, but he does 
not believe that it is the higher species. Again, Sirius wishes to compromise where John 
refuses to make himself vulnerable to the contaminating effects of human society. Sirius 
values humanity because it partakes of both the animal world and the divine realm-the 
descent into the earth and the ascent into spiritual ecstasy and communion. This ethos is 
reinforced through the symbiotic relationship in which a canine benefits from the "elegant 
'handedness"' (Sirius 49) ofhis female human lover and she, in tum, benefits from the 
animal energy of his "canine style" (174); it is almost as if Plaxy-Sirius were a musical 
composition in which case the beautiful song could not be heard unless both entities were 
in sync. This entity enables that interplay between species that has been hinted at in all 
previous SF (or proto-SF) works-Frankenstein-monster, Jekyll-Hyde, and Morlocks-
Eloi-and which originates in the deformed changeling's plea to be loved and tolerated. 
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I have suggested that the fairy economy, as presented in the various legends, 
suggests the workings of a "fairy ethics," which can be distinguished from human 
morality (Chapter 1, section I). In a certain sense, the new ethos I have described is the 
sort that might be prescribed to a superhuman since it both praises the "new" organism 
and honours its progenitor. Indeed, the procedure of my analysis has been to identify and 
present a loose genealogy for the changeling, and to explore the numerous ways in which 
SF authors incorporate and deterritorialize the changeling persona: the changeling is, like 
the human, an important "bridge" to something else. One work that elaborates on this 
notion and, in fact, demonstrates the further development of this ethos is Theodore 
Sturgeon's classic SF work More Than Human (1953). The novel has its share of 
changelings, including the "idiot" and telepath Lone who lives almost by instinct until he 
meets other unusual humans such as Janie, who has telekinetic powers, Beanie and 
Bonnie, who can teleport, and "Baby," the "Mongoloid" infant who never grows but has 
the brain capacity of an "adding machine." Together, this group functions as a "Gestalt" 
organism, with Lone as the "head," Janie as the "body," the two twins as the "arms" and 
"legs," and Baby as the "brain" (More Than Human 60). When Lone is accidentally 
killed, the Gestalt requires another "head"; this role is eventually filled by Gerry, another 
very powerful telepath, but we discover that he intends to use the other members to 
achieve power and to usher out the inferior elements of society. As he explains to a 
psychologist, "self-preservation for the gestalt" takes precedence over morality (113-16). 
This brief plot description suggests that Sturgeon is developing a theme in Stapledon's 
Odd John, but whereas John cannot reconcile humanity, Gerry learns to; in fact, he is 
taught how to accept humanity by another human, Hip Barrows, who is recruited for this 
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purpose by Janie when it is apparent that Gerry has become tyrannical. Unlike so many 
other SF works of the period, the final showdown between human and superhuman does 
not end in the typical way: Hip does threaten Gerry but he also offers the superhuman 
what we might consider to be an elaborated version of the ethos I have described above: 
The ethos will give you a code for survival too. But it is a greater survival than 
your own, or my species, or yours. What it is really is a reverence for your sources 
and your posterity. It is a study of the main current which created you, and in 
which you will create still a greater thing when the time comes. (181 ). 
In a certain sense, Hip's ethos is an antidote for the fascist ideology, which, from the 
perspective of 1950s SF and culture, had recently tried to exterminate mere humanity in 
the name of the Ubermensch. Gerry is made to realize that, while he does constitute an 
evolutionary leap and therefore something "more than human," he is also part of 
humanity or the "main current" that first breathed life into his limbs. In this sense, then, 
Sturgeon has also adapted from Sirius, which presents a sort of gestalt entity comprising 
animal and human parts. The power of Sirius is that the changeling is neither a 
completely isolated individual, as in Frankenstein, nor a completely absorbed unit of a 
collective, as in War with the Newts; Sirius is also the only text throughout the five 
chapters where we find a successful pairing, and in that a pairing, a physical and spiritual 
symbiosis. As an elaboration of Stapledon' s concept of "personality in community" as 
well as an adaptation of key folkloric themes, Sturgeon's novel teaches us to reverence 
"those who bore [us] and the ones who bore them, back and back to the first wild creature 
who was different because his heart leapt when he saw a star." This is the ethos of the 
fairy folk who were frequently identified as "star-worshippers" (Briggs, "The Fairy 
Dwelling on Selena Moor" 226) and of Sirius whose name translates as "Dog-Star." And 
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yet who is this "wild creature" if not humanity in its changeling infancy? For this ethos 
describes the evolution of Homo sapiens, which, having now experienced a sort of 
cognitive estrangement, is maybe the strangest progeny of all. 
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